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Chapter 1 
Tne purpose; we five in view in the ensuing discussion 
of I urge are of a very limited kind. In the first place we 
are not to meddle with his ethics but only with his meta- 
physics, i.e. with Treatise Book I, and in the second place, 
we are to concern ourselves not with the whole of this 
Treatise I but only with those parts of it where there is 
some sort of evident continuity between Hume's themes, and 
the themes favoured by philosophers in Hume's native land 
curing the century following the publication of the Treatise. 
In snort, we are to be concerned with Hume's metaphysics 
only so far as they inaugurate the sort of discussion of 
the problems of perception that was to flourish in the 
Common Sense School and that went by the name of "Scotch 
Metaphysics" or "La Philosophie ecossaise" or "School of 
Edinburgh" in England, France and the U.S.A. respectively. 
Hume, however was not the first philosopher of his 
time and country to occupy himself with the problem of 
perception. Tne fact is that when, in about 1728, the six- 
teen year old pro ley was beginning, all unknown to his 
family, to turn his attention to philosophy, Edinburgh and 
also Glasgow, and even perhaps.!Aberdeen were already swarming 
with earnest young metaphysicians, not much older then 
Hume. "It is well known" the Ochtertyre papers relate, 
"that between the years 1723 and 1740 nothing was in more 
request with the Edinburgh literati, both laical and clerical 
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than meyapiiysica.l disquisitions ", and Locke, Clarke, 
Butler and Berkeley are mentioned as the chief subjects of 
debate. Moreover a plain enough hint as to the serious 
critical temper of these discussions is given by Woodrow 
and diarist where he mentions certain student societies in 
Edinburgh and Glasgow in 1725 and 1726 : "the clubs are like 
to have a very ill influence; they declare against reading 
and cry up thinking." 
Of all the clubs the most notable, apparently, was the 
Rankenian Society of Edinburgh, so called because of its 
m eting regularly in Ranken's tavern. It was founded in 
1716 or 1717 for the purpose of literary and philosophical 
discussion and its members, to judge by the list appended to 
Volume I. of Woodhouselee's life of Karnes, were at its 
inception Edinburgh students in their late teens. Yet, 
young as they were, they seem to have soon become competent 
in philosophy, and according to the account given in the 
Scots Magazine for July 1771, the accuracy of which is con- 
firmed carefully by Dugald Stewart in his Life of Robertson 
and elsewhere, they entered into correspondence with Bishop 
Berkeley himself and were complimented by him on their 
understanding of his system. Indeed, if the Magazine is to 
be trusted, the correspondence was not finally terminated 
till the eve of Berkeley's departure to America (i.e. about 
1727), and in the course of it the Rankenians apparently 
-3- 
put some very awkward questions to Berkeley about the 
implications of nis views, "pushing his amazing tenets," 
as the Magazine says, "all the lengths they have been car- 
ried in subsequent publications." 
But Berkeley, was not, it seems, the only intellectual 
influence directly in touch with the country at this time. 
The Glasgow student society mentioned by Woodrow was ap- 
parently in contact with Francis Hutchinson and the other 
Dublin disciples of Shaftesburÿ; and the go- between, a 
i_, c,, >3ous young Itishman of Ulster stock, until 1724 prominent 
in student circles, and already in 1725 contributing articles 
of a Hutchesonian tendency to the magazine in Dublin, for 
which Hutcheson himself was writing, must evidently have 
made a considerable impression, not only on Glasgow, but on 
the Edinburgh literati, being, in fact, no other than the 
addressee of the verse -epistle of Allan Ramsey "To James 
Arbukie of Belfast." In this way, the conditions would be 
prepared for a favourable reception for Hutcheson's first 
book - the Inquiry into Virtue and Beauty of 1725 - not 
merely in Glasgow, nis old alma mater, but also doubtless 
in Edinburgh, among the Rankenians. 
Now in a way iuúch of what has been said so far is mere 
conjecture, and in order to prove our case we must go to 
two books, "The Principles of Moral Philosophy" by George 
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Turnbull, born in 1698, student at Edinburgh from 1717 to 
1721 and member of the Rankenian Club, and "The Discoveries 
of Sir Isaac Newton," by Colin Maclaurin, born also in 1698, 
educated at Glasgow University, and appointed Professor 
at Edinburgh in 1725. Turnbull's book, indeed, was not 
published till 1`740, nor Maclaurin's till 1748, two years 
after his death, out each book, as it happens, can fairly 
be claimed as giving some sort of indication of the ideas 
canvassed in -vhe Rankenian club and University circles 
before 1728, Turnuull's book being, according to its author's 
own preface, ultiuiately based on lectures he gave to college 
students some twelve years earlier (i.e. about 1727 when 
the i College, was regent at x. r.larlscr:a.l ol eg Aber.:Jeen, and 
Maclaurin's book, or at any rate the part that interests 
us, namely the first hundred pages, being said by his 
editor, Patrick MMUrdoch, to have already been in existence 
in its present form since 1728, except for such additions 
as were necessary to keep it abreast of new works in the 
field. 
Both Turnbull and Maclaurin advocate the use of i ewton t s 
experimehtal method in all physical science, a_-id, in the 
cause of empiricism, , Maclaurin attacks the co nce.oti_ons of- 
Descartes, Leinbi t z and S ei no za. In particular, he opposes 
the pretentions of these ph..losoptlers to establish laws 
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of nature a priori, arguing patiently and In detail against 
the various proofs oferea by Descartes and Leibnitz of 
the inconceivability °I a vacuum, following up his ar- 
gument on -crisis point with briefer objections to their 
alleged demonstrations by pure rep con of laws of continuity 
and of conservation or force, and ridiculing, in uetween 
times, Spinoza's way of "assuming a definition of sub- 
stance ana attributes at his pleasure, ana passing from 
these definitions as true da.eas (as he calls them) to 
the necessary existence of the thing defined by a pretended 
immediate consequence which he will not allow to be disputed!' 
(P.78). Moreover he does not leave us in doubt as to his 
opinion of the major heresy of the rationalist school; 
"it is not the business of philosophy to take in at once, 
in one view, she whole shceme of nature; but to extend, 
with great care and circumspection, our knowledge, by 
just steps, from sensible things as far as Jur o áservations 
or reasonings from them will carry us, in our enquiries 
conuern.i.ng either the greater motions ana operations of 
nature, or her more suuìe ana .(leaden works." (P.1'). 
Occupied as he is ws.th poleics against the rival sect, 
he does not stop to enquire into the philosophical im- 
plications of tills obligation On us "to allow the necessity 
of taxing it (nature) in parts and of proceeding wit.0 all 
-6- 
the care and caution we are capable or in enquiring into 
each part." Perhaps, if he had given more tl.xne to questions 
of first principle, he would have developed a doctrine, 
much lire Hume's, of the exteulality of relations, but 
the nearest he coules to doing th.s is nis pic.King out from 
Spinoza and quoting the following passage : - "if matter 
coula oe so divided that its parts could be really distinct, 
why might not one part be annihilates wnile the remaining 
parts remain .connected with earn other as before? For, 
3t things t.uat are really distinct from one another, the one 
can exist and remain in its state without tue other." 
Spinoza's Ethics, part I. Proposition lb - reference given 
by Maclaurin.) 
By comparison with IKacawri , Turnbull gaves a some- 
what super icial szetch of the principles of empiricism in 
science. In particular, he noes not join -issue _at All 
with the anti -empiricists of the continent, and oves not, 
appareutiy, see tnat onere is any problem about founuatyons. 
To come now to their attitude 60 the problem of psychology 
both Turuouli and Maclaurin are evidently just as much 
taxen as Hume was with tue notion or introducing the method 
or experimental reasoning into moral suojects, ana of thereby 
doing 1dr the problem of mind wuat Newton had done for the 
problem of matter. "It was" says Turnbull," by this fmp:.rtaimt 
hint of Newton's) that 1 was ied long ago to apply my- 
self to i.ne study ol cne human mina in the same way as to 
that of the human body." (P.iii) Moral philosophy, he goes 
on to expiaiu more precisely, is distingulened from phy- 
siology, oecause "it inquires cnieiiy about objects not 
preceivabie by means of out outwaru organs of sense, opt 
by reelJ.Ltg auu experience." Even those internal, 
introspectabie oojects, he goes on, "may properly be called 
parts of dature, " anú in any case "it is o Ovious that an 
enquiry about any of i,nem is a question of natural histoxy 
or fact." (P. s) . JYk cn cne same thesis about mating the 
study of psychology a study of interual.Ly experienceu facts 
is maintained by Maclaurin too. "It is eviaent, " he say s, 
trying to confute some a priori speculations of Leibnitz, 
"that as it is from internal conscio s1 ess I know anything 
of liberty, so no assertion contrary to what I am conscious 
of can be admitted and it were better perhaps to treat 
thisai4truse subject after the manner of experimental phil- 
osophy than to fill a thousand pages with metaphysical dis- 
cussions of it" (P. ; italics mine.) 
Now let us see what Turnbull and Maclaurin make of 
the central problem of co ition as the result of this 
psychological, introspective approach. Actually neither of 
them devote much space to this sort of issue, the one being 
c"hielly occupied with Newton's physics, the other with an 
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empiricist approach to theology. However, the in-ï,eresting 
thing is that such discussions of "the human mind" as we 
do find in them Lend to bear out the traditions that have 
come down respecting the interests of the Rankenian Club. 
Of the existence in Turnbull of a certain Berkeleian 
tendency there can oe no reasonable doubt. In his preface, 
he praises Berkeley by name, and in his text he follows a 
procedure very like Berkeley's, dismissing the independent 
material world as an unnecessary entity, or, in other words, 
analysing away the belief we seem to find in ourselves as to 
the existence of. subh a world. "A material world" he says, 
"is to all intents and purposes nothing when considered as 
absolutely unperceivd, " because, "a material world. without 
being perceives woula be of no Use." For does he leave his 
thesis in this summary form; a material world, if considered 
as 1-6-6: ll ot ̂ c*)k C -reach of perception, must also, he seems 
to hold, be considered as beyond the reach of cognition, and 
thus can be conceived only as an inaefinite sort of being 
devoid of empirical, practical effects on us, and for that 
reason strictly negligible. But let nim put his point in 
his own way : "A material world considered apart from per- 
ceptive beings hath no existence or at least cannot be said 
to merit existence; it is neither good nor bad, beautiful nor 
deformed, useful nor hurtful, it cannot be said to have any 
property but bare existence which, by consequence, would in 
that case be thrown away on it." Finally, in the same 
passage in his book, and as a consequence of this very 
reasoning, he makes explicit the very Berkeleian conclusion 
that "inquires Into the material world can only mean inquiries 
into the effects material laws and connections have on per- 
ceptive beings, " and, in addition, in another part of his 
book, when trying to rebut the view that the annihilation of 
body involves the annihilation of mind, he applies this same 
principle it e peculiarly Berkeleian way; "when matter is 
said to be destroyed" he states "all that can be said to be 
done is that perceiving beings have lost a certain class or 
order of perceptions, conveyed into them from without." In 
short, Turnbull, like Berkeley, tries to analyse away the 
ordinary commonsense notion of matter as existing independ- 
ntly of mind, or in other words is willing to up et tue 
colloquial distinction between esse and percipi. 
Turnoull's book however shows, in addition, that other 
influences besides Berkeley were abroad in the land at tue 
tiue. If he iollows Berkeley on cognition, he follows 
Hutcheson in and, In developing the Hutchesonian 
doctrine a moral sense, he propounds a principle according 
to which, is seems, his Berkeieian annulment of the col- 
loquial distinction between esse and percipi becomes a 
nignly questionaole doctrine. "Language" he says "not beJ.ng 
invented by philosophers but contrives to express sentiments 
or wuat ever,. one ,,erce.i.ves, we way be morally sure that 
where universally all languages wake a ai rerence, there 
really is in nature a u.ii Terence. Now all languages speak 
of a beaui.iiul anu a aefoimeu in action as well as of pro- 
fitableness anu hui tfulness, " ana it is wrong, , here amore, 
he concivaes, to declare as some philosophers do that beauty 
in action (i.e. morai wor6h oi rectitude) is synonymous 
with, is nothing butt profitableness or expediency. Or again, 
speaking this time of those defenders of determinism who 
hold everyday talk about Imight have acted otherwise," as 
nonsensical, he gives an even more emphatic version of this 
same principle. "Common language" he says "is built on fact 
or universal feeling; and to say that such phrases received 
in all languages and universally understood have no meaning 
at all is to assert an absurdity." 
Now Turnbull, one might think, should at this point 
have remembered that Berkeley offers his principle of esse - 
percipi as an amendment of the ambiguities of ordinary 
speech, and shoula have gone on to note that the advice of 
Berkeley to pis aisciples - "to speak with the vulgar but 
think with the learned" is considerably at variance with 
the Hutchesonian injunction to accept the distinctions of 
vulgar speech as valid. where these distinctions are found 
in all languages. In fact, however, Turnbull noes nothing 
of the kind and in general he seems not to have the slightest 
inkling of any incompatibility between the doctrines of 
his* e:1 masters. It is, he seems to think, only anti- 
empiricist philosophers who depart from common language 
in this way, ana tamper with its usages, ana of course, 
he considers both Berkeley and Hutcheson as represent - 
atives of the empiricist school. In the event, therefore, 
he sees no difficulty in accepting the esse- percipi, and in 
professing adherence to common sense. 
Colin Maclaurin, in sharp contrast to George Turnbull, 
makes a very great weal indeed of the incompatibility of 
Berkeleianism and common sense in his orieï notice of the 
problem of perception. "It were easy" he concludes "to 
make many more remarks about the philosophy o f those whose 
principles would lead tnemn to maintain that external ob- 
jects vary with our perceptions, and that the object is 
different when perceive,i by different minds, or by the same 
mind in different circumstances." However Maclaurin iimmi is 
hilnbeif to making some three points against this position. 
In the first place, this tneeis, ne says, is an unnatural 
one k 2..e. in conflict with common sense); "when a figure 
described on a board" he says "produces a similar impression 
on ali wno see it, it is as natural to ascribe this to one 
cause as wuen we speak to a numerous auuience the effect of 
the discourse is to ue ascribed touts." That is tó say, 
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it would be difficui6 60 deny that the various sounds heard 
by each of my listeners, though no doubt different in 
each case, have all, one common source, namely, guy aIs- 
course, arru, tnis granted, why refuse to allow that people's 
perceptions of a figure, although differing In accordance 
wi ft the stand point of each, have, in litre manner, a com- 
mon Independently existing source. :fit, Ixr tire second 
place, wnat of &Ire berxelesan point tnat _tris allegedly 
common sense notion of material substance is the no Lion 
f swaetniug wnieh transcenus perception i. e. oI a know - 
not -wúat, anu, as such, is quite superfluous' As to that, 
Maclaurin apparently would reply, that Berkeley goes not 
regard as superï iuous our common sense notion of other 
People's ru . ncás although these transcend perception too and 
are not directly Knowable, anu ought Ma he not therefore, 
in all consistecy, to allow us to retain our natural 
notion of ooay in its transcendence. "As It Is nut an 
o of ection, " Maclaurin says, "against the existence or. the 
$ouis of other risen t,nat they may oe very aii 1 erent from 
the notion or conceptio., we have formed of them, so it is 
no just reason, against the existence of body treat 'its 
inner essence or suustratum may oe very different fromn any - 
tuning we know of it." However, in tìie third place, túere 
remains the c uc..al point of .berkeleian.A.sm tnat it is 
impoaslule, 4strl.ctly speaking, to form any concep iun 
wriatever of this inner ese.,ue oi ouuy, ana It le apparently 
with an eye to tnis sort UI alifiouity tnat haciaurin 
iormuiaGes very oriet.Ly hJ.s one other point. Material 
auustance i.e. matter s._. its unobserved state, he seems to 
concede to Berkeley, is certainly unimaginable, and the 
crucial question therefore is whether, as the result of this 
unimaginability, it becomes wholly inconceivable. But this 
question is surely settled, he seems to think, by reference 
to a fact or alleged fact still sometimes invoked by phil- 
osophers (e.g. Moritz Schlick in his Ethics), namely that 
while one is quite capable of thinking about past or pos- 
sible attacks of toothache, one cannot, strictly speaking, 
iLL;};Lf what the pain was like or might be like. "The idea 
we form in our imagination of a place or person or figure," 
he says, "has a much more perfect resemblance to the im- 
pression we receive from sense than the idea we form in our 
imagination of a pain has to the sensation we have felt of 
it." It is quite inaccurate then, he apparently wants us 
to conclude, to say as Berkeley does that an absentt thing 
cannot be thought about unless it can be clearly and dis- 
tinctly imagined, and accordingly material substance or 
matter absent from perception, in spite of its unimagin- 
ability, may still be regarded as conceivable. 
Now although the Rankenian Club was by all accounts 
a forum rather than a clique, this utter divergence of 
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view between two of its members is certainly noteworthy. 
In this connection, the relevant fact probably is that 
Turnbull left Edinburgh and presumably gave up regular 
membership of the Club in 1722, while Maclaurin settled in 
Edinburgh only in 1725 and presumably did not take up 
with the Club before that date, and accordingly it seems 
a fair surmise that Turnbull's opinions of Berkeley derive 
from the days of the Club's initial enthusiasm, and Mac - 
laurin's from the time of the Club's final disillusionment, 
as hinted at in the Scots Magazine cited above. Interest- 
ingly however, it is also a fact, apparently, that, during 
the years (1723, 1724, 1725) between the departure of the 
one from Edinburgh and the arrival of the other there, both 
these men were for a period colleagues on the teaching staff 
of the Marischal College, Aberdeen, and it is accordingly 
quite likely that they may have argued about Berkeley there. 
Now, in these circmrnstancess, there is apparently no- 
thing very anachronistic about our speculating as to the 
sort of argument that might have arisen between Turnbull 
and Maclaurin, supposing them to have explained to one an- 
other the rival views of Berkeley just set forth. On the one 
hand, Turnbull, we think, might have been able to make 
a very effective retort to Maclaurin's suggestion that while 
Berkeley is right in holding material things in their in- 
dppendence of sense to be unimaginable, he is wrong in 
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holding them to be, while in that state, also in all 
respects, inconceivable. After all - Turnbull might have 
said - the point really at issue is whether or not one can 
form any conception whatever of something never in any 
circumstances Present to sense, and so it is beside the 
point to cite the fact, if fact it be, that éntities like 
pains which have already been present to sense are con- 
ceivable but not imaginable during their absence from sense. 
Ín any case - Turnbull might have gone on to reinforce 
his point - if, as is universally allowed, the blind can 
form no conception whatsoever of colour because colour is 
not an object of sense to them, it must on analogous 
principle follow that men in general can form no conception 
whatever of the inner nature of body, because the inner 
nature of body, is not an object of sense to them. But, on 
the other hand, Maclaurin, however troubled by this argument, 
would still have been able to put a strong case against 
Turnbull. If, he might have argued, Berkeley is on the 
right track in upholding the impossibility of our forming 
any conception whatsoever of what is not given us in some 
sort of experience, then we have, properly speaking, not 
only no conception whatever of an independent material world, 
but also no conception whatever of other minds. Berkeley, 
then, he might have said, leads, in a word, to solipsism. 
But now solipsism, he might have gone on, is unnatural or 
cepntrary to common sense, and according to Turnbull's own 
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principles, commun sense is incontrovertible. Accordingly, 
there must be, un Turnbull's own showing, something wrong 
with Berkeley's views, in spite of all that can be argued 
in their favour. 
Now there is no need to speculate as to whether the 
imaginary conversation ever could have taken place. The 
important thing to note is rather that the issue shown 
by means of this literary device to be implicit in the 
divergence between Turnbull and Maclaurin is precisely the 
issue explicitly brought to light and candidly faced by 
David Hume, when he is dealing with this range of topics. 
In the first place, Hume insists on the very position that 
Maclaurin with his talk about pains tries to upset, by 
maintaining unequivocally that where there is no sense 
perception, there can be no corresponding idea and that 
therefore as we lack all sense impression of matter in 
its unobserved state, we can have no idea whatever of an 
external world. In the second place, Hume applies the 
principle he shares with Turnbull and Maclaurin - the 
principle of common sense - much more consistently than 
Turnbull does, agreeing that ordinary usage is a clue to 
belief, pointing out that, in the case in question, "when 
the thing is absent, we say it still exists, but we do not 
see it, do not fíel it" and going on to conclude that we 
are indubitably in possession of an idea of an external 
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world. Finally, in the third place, Hume going far 
beyond the one sidedness of Maclaurin or Turnbull, draws the 
conclusion that there is here a crux of the most serious 
Mind, namely a discrepancy between sense and common sense, 
and raises the question as to what is to be done to resolve 
it. 
Obviously then there are remarkable coincidences be- 
tween trie approach of Hume to this problem, and that of 
the Rankenian members. In the first place, Hume seemingly 
made his philosophy out of exactly the same material as 
Turnbull. That it to say, a penetrating appreciation of 
the standpoints of both Berktiey and of Hutcheson formed the 
starting -point of not merely of Turnbull in Aberdeen between, 
say, 1725 and 1727, but also, as Professor Kemp Smith has 
suggested, of Hume in Edinburgh, about 1728 or 1729, ana the 
chief difference between the two men is that Hume, unlike 
Turnbull, was aware of the impossibility of both adopting a 
Hutchesonian standpoint in morals and of following Berkeley 
all the way on cognition. But, in the second place, this 
perception of Hume in Edinburgh probably before 1730 that 
Berkeley is incompatible with Hutcheson was perhaps to a 
great extent the same as the opinions propounded in the 
Rankenian Club in Edinburgh about 1727 or earlier in the - 
criticisms made there of Berkeley. Indeed the statement 
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of the Scots Magazine cited above that "they carried his 
(Beriçe1my's) amazing tenets all the lengths they have 
been carried in suosequent publications" is nothing short 
of a declaration that the RanKenians in Edinburgh before 
l'í27 were anticipating Hume, since the reference "sub- 
sequent publications" can hardly refer to any other books 
but Hume's; ana although, no doubt, this magazine assertion 
taken by itself, would have to be regarded with caution; 
nevertheless, it becomes probable enough once the Mac- 
laurin evidence is taken into account, that in the Rankenian 
Club 13erceley was being criticised by 1727 as solipsistic 
and as contrary to common sense. 
However, it is after all by no means easy to argue from 
the uiidouoted fact of these coincidences between the Rank - 
enians and Hume to the conclusion that the Rankenians were 
in fact the determining influence in Hume's format.lon, 
for the reason that a certain apparently quite un- Rankenian 
factor, - foreign at any rate to the spirit of Turnbull and 
Maclaurin, and explicitely mentioned by the former as being 
of only secondary moment - namely, associationism, figures 
prominently in Hume's original discussion of the problem, 
and in consequence the only part of Hume's writings on the 
topic where the issue at stake is the same as that dividing 
our two Rankenians o ccurs no t in the Treatise of ].739 but in 
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the inquiry of 1v48. That is to say, Hume, in the 
Treatise, as Processor Kemp Smith has shown, seemingly 
oscillates between two points of view; his chapter on the 
subject (I 4. 2.) begins by elaborating the dilemma that 
common sense and. sense, though each of equal authority, 
nevertheless contradict one another on Fhe topic of the 
external worla, and ends, or seems to end by formulating 
the thesis that common sense, in so fax as it contradicts 
sense, is a mere transcendental illusion, a secondary 
formation derivable in the last resort from sense, by a 
complicated ana subtle sort of association of ideas; and he 
is here, so to speak, at one moment the sceptic, playing off 
Berkeley and Hutcheson against one another without favouring 
either, and, at the next moment, the positivist, bent on 
carrying on Bereley's position in an improved form, con- 
ceding nothing to Hutcheson, but rather explaining common 
sense away. In uhe Inquiry, on the other hand, all this 
ambiguity or osc.uliation disappears; the attempt to analyse 
away common sense as a fiction of the mind is quietly but 
unmidtakably aLopped, and, instead, the contradiction 
between sense ana common sense is emphatically declared 
to be of a serious, unsurmountable nature. As if to 
e 
dissociate himself completely from the Berkelian point of 
view, he has recourse to his famous aphorism that Berkeley's 
arguments admit of no refutation but produce no conviction - 
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an aphorism wnie. we will Misundereand unless we be in 
mind that, as Proiessor Kemp Smith has argued, conviction, 
i.e. natural belief, is here regarded by Hume as authorit- 
ative and uncontrovertible. Indeed th1 idea behind the 
aphorism of Hume's would seem to be this, that the Berkeleian 
principle of appeal to sense, and the Hutchesonian principle 
of appeal to common sense or language cannot be reconciled 
with one another, and yet cannot either of them be refused, 
ana the passages in Hume where the aphorism occurs read like 
a comment on the issues raised in the Rankenian discussions. 
Why, the., i s Hume's Inquiry of 1748 somewhat nearer in 
spirit to the writing of the Rankenians than his Treatise of 
1739? Of course, it is perhaps idle to ask questions of 
this kind, and one must in any case be very cautious in 
one's answers.. However, the most likely answer, we shall 
argue, would seem to be that Hume was moved to recast the 
relevant section of the Treatise and to produce the 
revised version of 1748, precisely on account of the 
criticisms and misunderstanding on the part of the philos- 
ophical set in his own native city, i.e. on the part of the 
men prominent in the Rankenian Club in their youth. If so, 
then it would seem that while Hume in some vague, indirect 
way may very well have been "influenced ", by the Rankenians 
before he left for France i.e. before 1733 - in the sense 
-21 
that he was occupied with the same books and problems as 
they were - nevertheless he was under Rankenian influence in 
a much more direct, definable way in the decade between 
the Treatise and the publication of the Inquiry. 
Now as evidence of the unfavourable reception of the 
Treatise in the Edinburgh of the forties, there is a re- 
markable passage in Maclaurin which certainly does not date 
back to 1728, and was presumably added, in accordance with 
his aforementioned habit of keeping his MSS up to date, at 
some time between 173 and the year of his death, 1746 as 
his considered judgment on Hume's Treatise. Maclaurin, 
after concentrating his attention throu ;bout the whole of 
his Book I on the three great a priori systems of Descartes, 
Spinoza and Leibnitz, suddenly introduces on the very last 
page of this first book a reference to two more recent sy- 
stems of a very different tendency. "Some" he remarks 
"from contrary disposition k i. e. dislike of materialism) 
admit nothing but perceptions and things which perceive, 
and sume have mum pursued this way of reasoning till they 
have admitted nothing but their own per_ce-Dtions." "In 
forming these systems" he proceeds, meaning both systems 
of the Continental sort and systems of the kind just no- 
ticed, The who nas prosecuted each of them furthest has done 
the valuable service that, while he vainly imagined he had 
completed or improved it, he really opened up the fallacy 
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and reduced it to absurdity. Many wno sutfered themselves 
to be pleased with Descartes' fables were out to a stand 
by Spinoza's impieties, and some, willing to give up the 
realtiy of matter, would not think of giving up their own 
and other minds." (P. yb 1748 edition). 
In reading Maclaurin's very cool appraisal of the 
Treatise, written at least two years before the publication 
of the Inquiries and itself published (with a Royal Society 
im3rimatur) in the same year as the Inquiries we can under- 
stand better both what Hume meant in saying that the Treatise 
"fell dead -born from the press" and also perhaps w1}y he set 
about preparing a radically different version of úis argu- 
ment. The fact is that the Treatise was regarded by the 
best mind in Edinburgh bar Hume's merely as an attempt to 
continue and improve on Berkeley, and that in all probab- 
ility the only tendency detected by Maclaurin in the book 
was the tendency to explain away common sense as a fiction. 
Indeed, in nis cppacity as Newton's chief official dis- 
ciple, Maclaurin would be very likely to take a poor view 
of Hume's claim that the principle of association - i.e. 
the principle behind the fictions - was to do for psychology 
what Newton's principle of attraction had done for physics, 
and accordingly in lumping Hume with Berkeley and the 
Continental system - builders, he perhaps wanted to indicate 
that, in his own, authoritative opinion, the would -be 
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Newtonian aim of the Treatise, as Professor Kemp Smith 
calls it, is conceived much more in the a priori specul- 
ative spirit of Descartes or in the analytic reductive 
spirit of Berkeley than in the genuinely experimental 
fact - loving spirit of Newton. 
What then of Hume's reaction, when he heard judgments 
of this sort passed on his Treatise? In the first place, 
Hume, we may be pretty sure, would not be very happy to be 
told that his contribution to philosophy lay in having un- 
wittingly carried through a reductio ad absurdum of the 
Berkeleian or reductive principle; for example, Hume was ev- 
idently not very enthusiastic about the aptness of this 
sort of description of his achievement, when, in 1764, Reid 
compliments him in terms that recall the passage by Mac- 
laurin. In the second place, to correct the superficial 
impression, Hume in his Inquiry of 1748 goes out of his way 
to suggest that nis achievement in this quarter lies not 
in the reductio ad absurdum of Berkeley or associationism 
i.e. of a passing fashionable hypothesis, but in the re- 
ductio ad absui uum - of- so to speak- the human mind, i.e. 
in the demonstration of the mutual irreconcilability of a 
set of basic principles which no competent philosopher' could 
ever refuse to admit. In other words, Hume fn his remarks 
in the Inquiry about perception presumably meant to deny 
that the crux brought to light in the Treatise is a super- 
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fi cial ávoidaaie uifficulty due to some mistake in the 
preliminary statement of the facts, and on the contrary meant 
to assert that the Treatise crux is a quite fundamental dif- 
ficulty confronting philosophers of all tendencies, no 
matter what their system or hypothesis may be. 
But here let us go back to the text of the Treatise 
in order to show to what extent the issue faced there by 
Hume is at bui,toln the same as the issue arising between 
Turnbull and Mac.iaurin. According to Hume there is a 
thorough -going discrepancy between facts as they are for 
sense and the same facts as they are for common sense, or, 
if you like, between the colloquial description of one's 
situation in the world and the phenomenological description 
of one's situation in the world, and he sets about making 
this point in the following manner. A plain man, Hume 
points out, will say that the table is beyond his hadd, and 
that the hand is part of his own body, but the table is a 
foreign body; accordingly the habits of everyday speech 
may be said to testify to the existence of a belief in the 
plain man's mind that bodies like the table are distinct from 
and external to him kx and his sense organs. Now Hume's 
intention is of course to raise a question as to the evidence 
the plain man has for this belief or set of beliefs, and, 
in order not to have too complicated an issue on his hands, 
he proposes to disregard entirely that part of the plain 
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man's belief that involves a reference to his own self 
in the sense of thinking subject, and to confine himself 
entirely to that part of the plain man's belief that in- 
volves a reference to his own self as incarnate being, 
that is, as a body external to other bodies. In that case, 
therefore, the question at .issue simply concerns the found- 
ation of the belief that a certain &nfamiliar body, viz. 
the table, is situated beyond a certain familiar body, viz. 
the hand, the eye, or other sense organ, endowed with certain 
familiar feelings such as muscular sensations. But now, 
even if the belief in externality is reduced to this art - 
ifically simplified form, the question as to its foundation, 
Hume argues, still remains as obstinate a crux as ever it 
was, ana he proceeds to argue that not one of the five 
senses, if regard is paid to the original deliverances of 
each, ever corroborates any such belief. Tastes, smells, 
sounds, Hume argues, turn out to be as vague and elusive 
things as muscular sensations are if you try to discover 
by introspection their spatial relations and places, and for 
that reason cannot properly be regarded as being anywhere 
at all i. t. as e::isting in space. Accordingly the belief 
in externality cannot be based on hearing, taste or smell. 
What then of sight which at any rate does present its ob- 
jects, viz. colours, as spread out in space? In the light 
of Berkeley's theory of vision, Hume pdints out that these 
coloured objects are not seen as external to the eye, i.e. 
to the appropriate part of myself, and in any case present 
themselves to be not as common sense bodies but as flat 
patches. Accordingly there is no foundation for the belief 
that the objects of vision are seen as being beyond one's 
eye. Nor, finally, is common sense confirmed ëven by tac- 
tual experience. We say, or believe, no doubt, that the 
hand when acting as organ of touch, presses on the table, 
and we claim, in effect to feel, in immediate experience, 
the solid table as being beyond the hand that serves us as 
feeler, but we do not, Hume maintains, immediately experience 
in the actual act of touching, anything remotely resembling 
this contact of two bodies, this externality of table to 
hand which our common sense thus alleges to be occuring. On 
such occasions, we see, no doubt, our hand resting on the 
table, or more precisely perhaps, one coloured shape called 
a hand hiding part of another coloured sha -tie called a table, 
out - ana this is Hume's main point - the corresponding 
tactual experience makes us aware only of one solitary 
solid shape, and not of two solid shapes in contact, or, to 
put the matter wore pointedly, whereas we see both the hand 
and the table, we feel only the table and do not feel the 
hand. But even if it is thus the case that we are not 
aware of our organ touch as a solid shape, are we not, during 
tactual experience, aware nevertheless of the co- existence 
of two distinct objects, each of a different sort, viz. "a 
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sensation conjoined with solidity" to use Hume's expression? 
Or, in other words, are we not aware simultaneously of both 
the above- mentioned solitary, solid shape-: or outer object, 
and our muscular sensation or inner object? But, Hume 
replies, if we are to be aware of the alleged objects as 
distinct from one another, we must have experience of the 
objects in separation from one another, nor example, the 
solid minus the sensation. But surely we cannot ever en- 
counter this solid minus the sensation, since to do this, 
we wouid have to know by experience what an unfelt solid, 
a solid beyond experience is like. Accordingly, we cannot 
analyse the object given in tactual experience into two 
distinct parts, a sensation on the one hand and a solid on 
the other, i.e. into an inner component and an outer com- 
ponent, because the experience in question turns out to be 
one and indivisible, or, Hume pu cs its, to be a simple 
sensation. In short it seems impossible to hold that our 
common sense belief in externality is even in its most 
elementary form derived from experience. 
But now, in the secona place, the refutation or the 
view that our common sense belief in externality arises 
through our experience or the relation of our body to other 
bodies has not yet been carried through, and Hume has now 
to cope with the argument treat we ordinarily believe the 
table to be beyond ,he hand, simply because, as was noted 
above, we see u..in the .liana anu the table ana their ex- 
ternally to one another. But this argument, Hume nuteb, 
w .i1 not ao. It is, for example, notorious that the shape 
believed to exist independently of us rarely or never 
tallies with the coloured shape actually present to vision, 
and accordingly he sort of claim we make in saying in a 
common sense way that my hand rests on the table is by no 
means borne out by actual introspections of the visible 
counterparts of the objects in question. "Properly speaking* 
it is not our body we perceive when we regard our limbs 
and members, but certain impressions." Moreover, Hume does 
not confine his illustrations of this principle to sight 
and the senses most obviously effecteo by illusion, but, 
by a characteristically bold move, - not easy perhaps to 
parallel in the philosophical disuc$sions of the time - goes 
on to throw out a hint that an analogous discrepancy is to 
be found perhaps in tactual experience. "Though the 
solidity" he says "continues to be always invariably the 
same, the impressions of touch change every moment in us, 
which is a clear proof that the latter are not represent- 
ations of the former." The point of this is apparently that 
in the case of the experience of handling a ball - for 
example - common sense believes the object to be of an 
unchanging degree of solidity throughout, whereas intro- 
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spection or phenomenological dêsoription can find nothing 
but an interrupted succession of shifting "feels," not all 
of them of the same strength. If so, then the argument 
here is analogous to another argument of Humes. "The 
table which we see seems to diminish as we remove further 
from it; but the real table, exists independently of us 
suffers no alteration. It was therefore nothing but its 
image which was present to the mind." But the last ar- 
gument is Hume's main reason for holding the sort of 
thesis descriue.. earlier in the paragraph, - for example - 
that I do not really see my hand but only a certain impres- 
sion. The principle than is the same in relation to both 
touch and vision. 
Now there are two points to bear in mind about all this. 
First, the problem of the external world as expounded here, 
is only the second of Hume's co- ordinate questions : 'Why 
we attribute a continued existence to objects, Sven when 
they are not present to the senses; and why we suppose them 
to have an existence distinct from the mind and perception." 
Second, it is not by any arbitrary interpretation or guess 
that we have identified tiiis Humeian problem of belief in 
distinct existence withnthe rather restricted problem de- 
veloped above, of my belief that the material objects per- 
ceived by me present themselves as both locateu beyond my 
organ of perception and standing out in sharp contrast to 
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my feelings during the act of perception. Hume himself 
indicates pretty plainly that he himself understands the 
problem in just tihis sense. "Under this last head" he 
says, referring uo -che problem of distinct existence, "I 
comprehend them situation as well as relations, their 
external position as well as the independence1`) operation." 
(italics in IIuine; "their" means the situation as well as 
relation of the bodies at present perceived.) 
But there is another matter to be settled before the 
interpretation of Hume offered here can become acceptable. 
It will be asked, perhaps, what justification we can give 
for treating Hume's discussion of touch at the end of 
Treatise I,4,4, as if it were an immediate sequel to his 
discussion of uhe other four senses early in Treatise 
1,4,2? Now in uefence of this procedure all that we can 
urge is that the passage on touch, difficult and obscure if 
taken by itself, soon begins to make good sense if taken 
as a sequel to he earlier passage on the other senses. Com- 
pare, for example the two following extracts, the first 
from I,4,2, anu Lhe second from I,4,4. "That our senses 
offer not their impressions as images of something distinct 
and independent or external, is evident because they con- 
vey to us no-tiling dut a single perception and never give us 
the least intii,iation of anything beyond, and a single per- 
ception can never produce the idea of a double existence." 
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"The impressions of touch are simple impressions, ex- 
cept when considered with regard to their extension which 
makes nothing to the present purposes; and ' m ptheir sim- 
plicity, I infer that they neither represent solidity, nor 
any real object." Now, in our view, this second passage is 
best interpreted as an illustration of the general principle 
announced in the first passage. In the first place, consider 
the curious phrase "simple impressions except when considered 
in regard to their extension, which makes nothing to the 
present purpose." Now the impression of touch Hume has in 
mind here, as appears in the course of his discussion, is 
the impression got by a man who "presses a stone with his 
hand "; that is to say, the impression in question, being 
the impression of a solid shape or extension, is, according 
to Hume's ordinary usage, a compouTld impression. According- 
ly Hume's meaning would seem to be that the impression got 
by feeling a stone is a simple impression, not in the or- 
dinary sense in which he uses this term, but in some other 
sense. But, in the second place, Hume, continuing his an- 
alysis, tells us that in the case in question it is im- 
possible "to remove some part of the impression which the 
man feels with his hand" when he presses the stone, without 
at the same time removing the whole impression. Presumably 
then, Hume, in calling the impression simple, means that it 
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is indecomposable, i.e. that it does not involve two dis- 
tinguishable, separable parts, one of them the organ of 
touch, or something belonging thereto, and Drithm the other 
the object of touch; or in other words that we can't 
distinguish between feeler and object felt. In short, 
then, Hume's point here would seem to be a development 
of the point made in the earlier chapter, namely that the 
tactual impression of the stone is a single, indivisible 
perce_ ?tion and can never convey the idea of a double ex- 
istence or distinct existence. 
As this question of touch is somewhat important, it 
will be best to State, in our own words, what we take to be 
the substance of Hume's remarks in the paragraph preceding 
the one just summarized. His problem, apparently is some- 
what as follows : do we have in our experience of a solid 
body an experience of that body as being independently real 
i.e. as being distinct from ourselves and from our bodies? 
Now in answer to this question he makes apparently one main 
point. He asks us to consider the action of touching a 
stone or a table from two points of view - one of them 
being that of common sense, or perhaps visual observation 
(it doesn't matter which) and the other being that of at- 
tentive introspection to what is actually felt, and on the 
strength of this comparison he expects us to agree with 
him that there is very little resemblance between the 
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process as it is experienced from without, and the same 
process as it is experienced from within. Apparently alS 
point Is that the distinction between the feeling hand 
and the stone does not emerge nearly so clearly from the 
internal stand-point as it does from the externals stand 
point, and following up this point, he goes on to make the 
further contentions we have discussed in the previous para- 
graph. 
This saiL, we reach the end of our present theme - 
namely - the rise to prominence in Scotland of the prob- 
lem of the external world. It might, indeed be expected that, 
in the interests of completeness, we would append to the 
survey of Hume .n the belief in distinct existence a paral- 
lel survey of Hume on the belief in continued existence. 
However in view of the limited purposes of our study, this 
will not be necessary. The fact apparently is that whereas 
Hume's discussion of belief in distinct existence starts, 
so to speak, from where the Rankenian Cluj; left oft`, and 
prepared the way for the century -long inquiries and ar- 
guments of Reiu anu the Common Sense School, his dis- 
cussion of belief in continued existence made h0 im- 
pression whatever on philosophy in his native lana, and 
raised issues outsiae the scope or his forerunners ana his 
successor, 
Here let us turn abruptly to quite another sine of 
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Hume's discussion or the perception of an external world - 
namely .ells discussion or cae rounclation oz our ordinary 
Belie' in the spatial extenuedness or o uj ects or sight 
ana touch. The pro oiem at stake in this new case, just 
as in previous case, seems to have been "in the air" at 
the time in Hume's city, and some points in Hume's doctrine 
become more intelligible in the light of contemporary 
texts. 
In the introductory part of Maclaurin's book, the most 
elaborate piece of argumentation is an attempt to combat 
a Leibnitzian thesis that Newton's system rests on a con- 
tradictory notion, that of a vacuum, and to prove, against 
Leibnitz that, on the contrary, it is quite good sense to 
postulate a vacuum. But now the last .of Hume's chapter 
on space (Treatise I Part 2 Section 5.) is occupied ex- 
plicitly with much the same point at issue as arises be- 
tween Maclaurin and Leibnitz, and Hume's contribution con- 
sists in the contention that Newton's system works quite 
well without the sort of vacuum Maclaurin and Leibnitz 
have in mind - namely a sort of absolute or metaphysical 
vacuum. 
Now there is nothing so very unreasonable in the idea 
that Hume is here intervening in this very controversy. 
Professor Hendel has already pointed out that Hume's ideas 
about space "imply a criticism of Newton and Locke not 
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unlike that which Leibnitz propounded in his yet un- 
published Nouveaux Essais, and goes on to suggest that 
Hume could very well have picked up hints as to the Leib - 
nitzian view about space from two works by John Toland, 
an Irish philosopher resident in Germany and in touch with 
the Leibnitzian circles. But now there is no difficulty, 
surely, in supposing yet one more Irish philosopher and a 
Glasgow student at that, to have been studied attentively 
in Scotland in the seventeen twenties. Acdordingly - to 
state the most probable implication of these facts, - 
Hume's contrioul:ion to this Maclaurin controversy, was to 
point out that, although Leibnitz is in the right about the 
notion of a vacuum, the essentials of Newton's system can 
be defended just the same, and that in order to defend it, 
the proper question to ask is what can be meant in em- 
pirical terms, phenomenologically speaking (Hume is most 
emphatic on thiti point) by the notion of space, or, in 
other words, whether a notion of empty space, quite adequate 
ter Newtonian purposes, can be "logically constructed out 
of sense - data" - to use a modern phrase. 
Furthermore when it comes to the actual business of 
phenomenology, Hume's discussion of space- perception, we 
believe, bears somewhat the same sort of relationship to 
previous discussions in his neighbourhood of the paradoxes 
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of Berkeley's Theory of Vision, as his discussion of the 
belief in externality seemed to bear to previous dis- 
cussions in his neighbourhood of the paradoxes of Ber- 
keley's Principles of Human Knowledge. That it to say, 
somewhat as in tae other case, Hume would seem to be some- 
times siding wiuh those who prefer "convictions" or common 
sense to Berkeley, sometimes with those who prefer Berkeley 
to common sense. 
Let us begin uy proving, by quotations from Turnbull, 
the existence of a whole -hearted admiration in the circle an 
question for berKe±ey's theory of vision. "How few, not 
very much accustunied to philosophy, are not startled to 
hear that distance is not an idea of sight, but an idea of 
touch sggesteu by sight .'" Or gg again, consider this 
other passage. "How soon do we learn to judge of mag= 
nitudes, distances and forms, and of the connection be- 
tween the ideas ui sight and touch, as far at least, as the 
common purpose and conveniences of life require; so much, 
that, when we are grown up and begin to reflect, we have 
quite forgot how we learned these connections and became 
able to judge them so readily. Nay, when we come to play 
the philosopher about them, it is very difficult for us not 
to confound those :eas which are,however, totally dis- 
tinct from one another and only connected together by the 
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institution of the Author of our nature." (Turnbull 
P.87,88 and (ii) P.39.). 
Maclaurin, by comparison, adopts a much more judicious 
attitude to Berkeley's theory of vision. "A learned author, 
of a distinguished character, begins an ingenious treatise 
upon this subject, by observing. OIt is, I think, agreed 
by all that distance, of itself and immediately, cannot be 
seen. For distance, being a line directed endwise to the 
eye, it projects only one point on the fund of the eye, 
which point remains invariably the same, whether the dis- 
tance be longer to shorter. * ' "The distance here spoken of" 
Maclaurin continues, speaking now for himself, "is distance 
from the eye; and what is said of it is not to be applied to 
distance in general. The apparent distance between two 
stars is capable of the same varieties as any other quantity 
or magnitude. Visible. magnitudes consist of parts into 
which they may be resolved as well as tangible magnitudes, 
and the proportions of the former may be assigned as well 
as of the latter; so that this author goes too fax when he 
tells us that visible magnitudes are no more to be accounted 
the object of geometry than words; and when he concludes of 
distance in general what has only been shown of distance 
directed do ise to the eye, and p retenas "to demonstrate 
that the ideas of space, outness anct things placed at 
a distance are lion;, strictly speaking, the object of sight, 
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and are not ot.ierwise perceived by the eye than by the 
ear." Maclaurin's Newton, opening of Bk. III. ) 
The precise point Maclaurin makes here against Ber- 
keley can best ue wrought out by a quotation from Reid 
to much the same purpose. 'We may observe, by the way, 
that the ingenious author (Berkeley) seems not to have 
attended to a distinction by which his general assertion - 
that distance of itself and immediately is not seen - ought 
to have been licuited. It is true that the distance of an 
object from tut eye is not immediately seen; but there is 
another kind of uistance of one object from another which 
we see immediately. Astronomers call it angular distance; 
and although they measure it by the angle which is made by 
two right lines drawn from the eye to the distant objects, 
it is immediately perceived by sight by those who never 
thought of the angle." (Hamilton's Reid I P.282.). 
Maclaurin, then, is impatient with Berkeley's denial of 
the common sense notion that space relations are the objects 
of sight as well as of touch. Accordingly while admitting 
Berkeley's narrower thesis that the visual perception of 
depth is not original but acquired by tactual association, 
he goes on to deny the wider thesis of Berkeley that the 
visual perception of space relations is in no degree innate 
but id due to the inrluence of touch. In defence of his 
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position, he asserts that we see the distance of the stars 
from one another immediately and independently of touch, 
and the point of taking a case like this presumably is 
that, as the stars are out of reach, tactual association 
cannot be regarded as influencing vision here. 
It is now time to turn to Hume. "It is commonly allowed 
oy philosophers that all bodies that discover themselves to 
the eye, appear as if painted on a plain surface, and their 
different degrees of remoteness from ourselves are dis- 
covered more by reason than thm by the senses. When I 
hold up my hand before me, and spread my fingers they are 
separated as perfectly by the blue colour of the firmament 
as they could be by any visible object which I could place 
uetween them. In order, therefore to know whether sight 
can convey the impression and idea of a vacuum (i.e. space 
emoty of object in the sense that the space separating the 
fingers is empty of objects) we must suppose that amidst 
an entire darknesc. there are luminous bodies presented to 
us, whose light discovers only the bodies themselves without 
giving us any impression of the surrounding objects." 
(Treatise I 2.5) . 
Now Hume here is evidently concerned with much the 
same topic as Maclaurin. Taking for granted the primary and 
widespread thesis that the distance of objects from the 
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observer's eye - i.e. their depth or three dimentionality - 
is an acquired and not an original perception of vision, 
Hume means to consider carefully the secondary, and, so 
to speak, peculiarly Berkeleian thesis that the distance of 
objects from one another as exemplified in the space - 
separatedness of the fingers is likewise an acquired and 
not an original perception of vision. Moreover for Hume 
just as much as for Maclaurin, the devisive question in 
this connection is whether sight originally or immediately 
reveals the intervening spaces between one star and another 
in the night sky. (cf. luminous bodies presented to us 
amiust an entire darkness). 
Hume formulates the problem somewhat in the following 
manner. 1 see three stars suddenly appear in the midst of 
a previously piton black night - that is - I remember what 
the sky was like before tnese numerically different objects 
appeared, and 1 see what it is like now that they have 
appeared. That is all the experience 1 am allowed to have, 
and the question is whether, on the basis of that experience 
alone, l could even understand, let alone verify, a pro- 
position (which I now, as a matter of common sense, know 
to be true) to the effect that the distance between this 
star and that star, is twice as great as the distance be- 
tween the latter star and a third star. 
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Now Hume disposes of the matter pretty quickly. If 
I am to speak of the relation between star one aid 
two as being twice as extensive as the relation between 
star two and star three, I must understand what would be 
meant by easing that there are two parts to the first relation, 
each of them equal to the whole cyl the second. I "Visible 
magnitudes c insist of parts into which they may be resolved," 
said Maclaurin, in the above quotation, thereby conceding 
to Hume his premises.) Accordingly the question now is 
whether, on the basis of the experience allowed to us, we 
can give a relevant sense to the expression "whole and part" 
in reference to the objects that now interest us. But once 
the question is put in that form, there is no longer any 
reason, Hume thinks, to remain in any doubt about the answer. 
The darkness, surely, he points out, is, if taken by itself, 
"without parts, without composition, invariable and indivis- 
ible," and, in elucidation of this thesis, he argues that, 
when everything is pitch black we are as good as blind or 
see absolutely nothing, his object in this assertion ap- 
parently being to rule out as contradictory the counter - 
thesis that in the dark we see something indefinite or, in 
other words, a spread -out whole containing parts, but not 
definite, clear -cut parts. (fit is evident that the idea of 
darkness is no positive idea, but merely the negative of 
light, or, more properly speaking, of coloured and $isible 
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objects" - Treatise I.2.5. P.61, Everyman) This granted, 
then, we couldn't in the circumstances, get the idea of 
exten. ion from our memory of what the night was like with- 
out stars. But further, does the appearing of the stars, 
he goes on, make any real difference to the situation in 
this respect? At any rate if the view followed is sound, 
it is evident that, if we were in parallel circumstances to 
look at the pitcri -olack corner of a partly lighted street, 
we would see nothing - and therefore no extendedness - in 
the direction in which we look. Accordin:;ly, "it is im- 
possible that the dark and indistinguishable distance be- 
tween the two (luminous bodies) can ever produce this idea." 
(i. e. of extendedness.) 
In order ,o understand Hume's view on the topic by 
comparison with Maclaurin or Reid's, it is necessary to go 
not merely to the text of Treatise Book I, part 2, chapter 
5, but also to the appendix added after Book III. In the 
*` o to ti , 
text,,, owing to some C®t1fusión, had come pretty near to 
conceding the orthodox theory about angular distance 
mentioneu by Mac.aurin and Reid, but in the appendix he 
owns to having made a mistake on this point, .and accordingly 
introduces a correction. "An error," he says, "may be 
found in Vo1.1 page so- and -so, where I say that distance 
between two bodies "(i.e. the luminous bodies in the dark)" 
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may be known among other things, by the angle which 
the rays of light flöwing from the bodies make with 
one another" 0..e. in the eye) "Tis certain that these 
angles are no u known to the mind and consequently can 
never discover the ui. stance. " 
In this decbve "Tis certain the angles are not 
known to the menu," Hume presumably is putting to a 
special use a principle enunciated in the same appendix 
in connection with topics of this kind: viz. "So long 
as we confine our speculations to the appearance of objects 
to our senses, we are safe from difficulties, and can rever 
be embarassed by any /q_uestion. " If so, Hume's point is 
simply that the question at issue is a question as to the 
purely visible facts, and the angles made by light rays are 
accordingly irrelevant as they are not visual facts at all, 
or that, since the initially postulated situation is that 
of stars seen in a pitch -black night by uncontaminated 
virgin vision, the sort of talk the angular distance theory 
would seemingly involve - namely talk about imaginary 
coloured lines from the stars conceived as meeting in some 
visible organ of my body - is ruled out by our preliminary 
supposition. 
But, at this point, it is quite in order to recall 
Reid's assertion that "although they measure it by the 
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angle which is made by the two right lines drawn from 
the eye to the distant objects, it is immediately perceived 
by sight by those who never thought of that angle." That 
is to say, Reic obviously holds that even where "these 
angles are not known to the mind," the mind, nevertheless, 
immediately and without measuring, sees the so- called 
apparent or angular distances oetween the stars, and, 
therebye, makes a claim, directly at variance with líumetia, 
about the purely visual facts. Accordingly, in order to 
clarify Hume's position, we had better ask what sort of 
reply he would. have made to Reid. 
Now there can be little doubt as to the line Hume 
would have taken in the face of this crux. He would 
probably have pointed out that where people have already 
learned by experience to perform the appropriate operation 
Of measurement, they are in a position to pass rouge and 
ready opinions, preliminary to actual measurement as to 
the visible distances of stars from one another, but 
would have then gone on to raise a query as to whether 
people, before they have the least notion of the mode of 
measurement in question, are in a position to form any 
opinion whatever about the matter in hand. Now Reid, he 
would have perhaps continued, apparently is relying on 
the idea that people have notions of size before they 
have notions of measurement, but such an idea, surely, is 
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tañamount to the claim that people have notions of visible 
size before they have precise notions of visible size, and, 
as such, seems to contain a contradiction, since it seems 
nonsense to speak of having a conception or notion which 
is not clear and precise. 
Let us see, finally, now Hume works out his peculiar 
view of the purely visual datum in the case in question. 
It is "our natural and familiar way of thinking," he tells 
us, to believe Ghat "when only two luminous bodies appear 
to the eye, we can perceive whether they be separate or 
conjoined or wreuher they be separated by a great or a 
small distance." That is to say, we believe ourselves, in 
cases like this, c,o be immediately aware, by vision, of 
space -relations. But, Hume goes on,tm this is an opinion 
which "we will learn to correct by a little reflection." 
Reflection, Hume claims, leads us to the conclusion 
that we don't actually see the spatial relations between 
the stars in:_ali these different cases. To start with 
the point alreauy made, we can't claim to see differences 
in the disposition of the pair of stars in their relation- 
ship to their uac ground or environment, since the alleged 
background or environment - the gloom said to encompass 
and to relate Ghe stars in different ways - has revealed 
itself in analysis to be nothing positive, and so not to 
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be an object of vision at all. But, even granting this, 
do we not, it quay oe asked, actually see a spatial difference 
between the yriurrm relationship of the two stars to one 
another in all ;hose ûifferent cases? Hume apparently had 
envisaged very urstinctly the sort of objection and some 
of his mot ce.Leurated principles were perhaps devised for 
the purpose of ,,«ecing it. His approach to the matter pro- 
bably consisted in asking what is meant by saying that 
we see two numerieally distinct stars, and in invoking 
as relevant to lie case the principle that what is disting- 
uishable is separable, or, in other words, that the proof 
of empirical dis,.nctness is to be found., in cases like 
this, in empirical The point this principle 
is presumaoly .rat - to take a particular case - if my 
only visual expeience had been that of two conjoint stars 
always appearing together and always disappearing together, 
I would not have the least ground for distinguishing the 
red component from the blue component (supposing them of 
different colours) so long as I had no experience of each 
in independence of the other, and would naturally believe 
myself to be looking at one single, indeed, for aught I 
knew to the contrary, simple object, or that - to put 
the matter in a more general way - before I can claim to 
be looking at two stars, I must have managed to see each 
of them in separation from the other and by itself i.e. 
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succesively. Bait if this is so, then the visual experience 
basic to the claim of seeing a pair of stars is that of 
seeing one solitary light by itself in the dark followed 
by another solitary light be itself in the dark, and it 
will readily be granted that, in a case of a purely visual 
experience of a succession of wilpi.oue lights, each alone in 
the dark, one can't have the least notion of the where- 
abouts of one in relation to another, or in other words 
it doesn't make sense to talk of space- relation here. 
But, in that case, - to mention a final objection - what 
about our undoubted impression of the pair of visible stars 
as being in one case conjoined, in another case separate 
but near, and in a third case far apart? As regards this 
point, reflection, Hume probably thinks, will tell us that 
our impressions or notions of this kind., in so far as they 
must be allowed some sort of a foundation in the experience 
in question, can perfectly well be traced to a sense ouite 
different to that of sight, and one, moreover, not in- 
volving any information about space- relations - namely the 
organic sense. In speaking of two stars as far from, or 
as near to, or as just beside, one another, all we mean, 
practically speaking, is, according to Hume, that, in 
looking from the one star to the other, or rather in the 
quickest successive experience of the one after the other, 
we feel a larger, or a shorter, or a minimal train of mus- 
cular sensations in the eye -balls, as the case may be, and 
the impression of differences of this sort (Hume leaves 
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their nature very vague) gives us the germ of the notion 
we want to explain, without involving any experience of 
space, as yet. 
Now, in all this, Hume has been, it is plain, de- 
fending one of Berkeley's opinions (albeit with arguments 
sometimes Leibnitzian rather than Berkleian to inspiration) 
against the attack of Maclaurin, or rather ,perhaps against 
an attack quit;. similar to Maclaurin's, and so far accordingly 
has been aligning himself with devoteds of the Berkeleian 
theory of vision like Turnbull, i.e. with Maclaurin's op- 
ponents. However, Hume's agreement with the Berkeleians 
noes not apparently in this field extend much beyond the 
one point in question, and, at the next stage of his dis- 
cussion of the problem of seeing space, we find him brushing 
aside as brusquely as Maclaurin himself would have done, 
the main suggestion offered by Berkeley himself towards 
the solution of this problem, and so enthusiastically 
commended by Turnbull, the suggestion, namely, that our 
visual perception, ooth a case like the present and in 
all other cases, though not originally and in themselves 
space -revealing, come in the long run to be regarded as 
space -revealing through the operation of tactual association, 
that is, because the corresponding tactual experiences 
are, originally and in themselves, space- revealing, and 
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hence come ay custom to infect the visual perceptions 
with spatiality. 
To make this point clear, let us confine ourselves first 
to the sort or case we have been discussing. Hume's pos- 
ition, here, we rind, is that the same sort of arguments 
enabling us to deny theoriginal or immediate visibleness 
of the space-reiauions between the luminous bodies set 
apart in the darx can also be used to deny the original 
or immediate palpableness or tangibleness of the space - 
relations between he solid aspects of these bodies sus- 
pended in the air. The immediate suc.essor to the original 
paragraph quoteu about the luminous bodies runs as follows: 
"t +Te must form a parallel sup2osition concerning the objects of 
our feeling. It is not proper to suppose a perfect re- 
moval of all tangible objects : we must allow something 
to be perceived by the feeling; and after an interval and 
motion of the .uana or other organ of sensation, another 
object of touch to be met with; and upon leaving that an- 
other; and so un, as often as we please. 
The question is, whether these intervals do not 
afford us the idea of extension without body?" (i.e. of 
empty space.) Now Hume's treatment of this new case is 
pretty well a auplication of his treatment of the other 
case. In the first place, he points out that, during the 
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time elapsing uetween the man's feeling one solid object 
and his feeling the next solid object, nothing occurs 
but "the perceiving of that sensation we call motion in 
ouf hand or origin of sensation" and, these feelings being 
muscular feelings, The feels in that case, a certain sen- 
sation or impression, the parts of which are successive 
to one another, and may give him the idea of time, but are 
certainly not uisposed in such a manner as is necessary to 
convey the idea 01. space or extension." In the second place, 
Hume goes on, just as before, to deal with tie objection 
that the analysis given wholly fails to account for our 
natural propensi,y to describe an experience of this sort 
as the experience of two solids as not in contact with or 
not touching one another. "If it be asked whether two ob- 
jects having sucu a distance between them (i.e. having 
an intangible uistance between them, or having nothing pal- 
pable between 'hey) touch or not;it may be answered that 
this depends un i,he definition of the word touch. If the 
objects be sa.iu. 6o touch when the hand feels both objects 
sucessively, without any interposed motion (i.e. without 
feeling one of these trains of muscular sensation ac- 
companied by something solid), then the objects do not touch. ° 
That is to say, our language in these cases can quite 
adequately be accounted for up to a point, without invoking 
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space -perception. 
To touch here for a moment on Hume's discussion of 
space- perception as a whole,'we will venture the remark that 
much the same line very likely is followed in those parts 
of Treatise I. Part II ße will leave aside as in the parts 
of it we have just explained. That is to say, Hume at one 
and the same time rejects the whole -sale Berkeleian "re- 
duction" of the perception of visual extension to perception 
of tactual extension, and yet accepts a "reduction ", de- 
vised by himself no doubt but clearly owing something to 
Berkeley, of the perception of the extended to the per- 
ception of the unextended proceeding on parallel lines in 
the case of vision and of touch. For example, in dis- 
cussing the question of the condition of our awareness of 6 
colours, or lights as extended in space, he evidently wants 
us to regard coloured extension as definable, at least in 
principle, in terms of the number of contiguous minima 
visibilia, expecting us, on the one hand, to arrive at the 
notion of a minimum visible or "atom of colour" by the 
same sort of employment of the principle that whatever is 
distinguishable is separable as was made above in dealing 
with the stars, and, on the other hang, to analyse the 
spatial notion of contiguity or side -by- sideness on the now 
familiar lines of its reducibility to the non - spatial or- 
ganic sensations involved in seeing. So too, in the case 
of touch, the procedure followed is in all respects parallel; 
the minimum tangible or "atom of solidity" 
that enters into 
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the business is apparently the exact analogue of the 
vi °H1- 
minimum t.., and side -by- sideness and apartness are 
disposed of by reference to the purely temporal feelings of 
movement in the hand. 
Now, in latew of the facts like these, we are very 
much attracted by she hypothesis that in this Treatise 
discussion of space -perception Hume is trying to reconcile 
pretty much the same opposite tendencies as he also tries 
to combine in his Treatise (note, Treatise) discussion of 
belief in an external world - namely the tendendes which 
we have called respectively Berkeleian (Processor Kemp 
Smith calls it Newtonian) and Hutchesonian, that is to say, 
the tendencies kx represented among Hume's own countrymen by 
Turnbull on the one hand, and Maclaurin on tree other. How- 
ever, so far as we have gone, we have only dealt auequately 
with the tendency in Hume we call (for the sake of a word) 
Berkeleian, and if we are to render our hypothesis ac- 
ceptible, it remains for us to show just what Hume does, 
on this one subject, in the way of-moving in an anti -Ber- 
keleian direction. 
Let us begin by repeating, in clearer language, the 
one point we have already made about Hume's anti- Berkeleian- 
ism. Our starting -point will be a quotation from Hutcheson, 
brought to general notice by Pro.essor Kemp Smith. "Exten- 
sion, figure, motion and rest" says Hutcheson, "seem to be 
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more properly called iaeas accompanying the sensations of 
sight or touch than sensation: of either of these senses ", 
and he means by that assertion, as the context plainly 
shows, that extension and the rest are objects accompanying 
both our experience of colour, and our experience of hard- 
ness or soliui&,y, and so common to ooth touch ana sight. 
Now this doctrine is, of course, by no means peculiar to 
Hutcheson. It is found also in Locke, not to mention 
anybody earlier, and - to come now to the point that con- 
cerns us here - it is one of the things in Locke that Ber- 
Keley most strenuously opposes. Hutchesonls aoctiine, then, 
may famiy be regarded as anti- Ber,eleian. Moreover Reid, 
considerable later in the century, - though that doesn't 
matter here, - repeats this doctrine approvingly pretty 
much following Hu teneson' s very words, in connection with 
his criticism of .tierieley on ale point, in question. But 
now, as Proiessur Kemp Smith has argued, thib Hutchesonian 
doci.i.Lne seems to nave formed the starting point oi Hume's 
treat.ueut of space -perception, and, accordingly, Hume, 
for all that ne is a "reduculonist" and Eel. is not, id at 
one with his classic opponent on this subject. 
But let us try to make Hume's position a little more 
definite by a further reference to his contemporaries. 
Maclaurin, it will be recalled, when defending the view that 
space is an object common to sight and to touch but not to 
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hearing or smell, repudiates Berkeley's di ctylna that 
"space is no otherwise the object of sight than of 
hearing." But now Hume, even when his peculiar point of 
view on the subject is taken into account, is here in 
agreement with Maclaurin on fundamentals. That is to say, 
Hume, while holding space- percei'ption to be "a logical 
construction" out of the perception of the non- spatial 
i.e. (one might gay) of the temporal, nevertheless lays it 
down that "the logical construction" in question can be 
managed both in the case of the non -extended impressions 
of sight (i.e. atoms of colour) and (in e, gñite separate but 
parallel way) in -f,he case of the non -extended atoms of solid- 
ity, but does not in the least apply in the case of the 
equally non -extended impressions of sound, of smell or 
of feelings like muscular strain or aversion. Hume, in- 
deed, would hesi irate to go all the length of saying that 
space or extension is an object common to (in the sense 
of "identical for ")both sight and touch, but would certainly 
admit - and, as we shall show, does indeed do so - that al- 
though colour and solidity bear no sort of resemblance to 
one another yet Their respective modifications, visible ex- 
tension and tang101e extension do bear some sort of re- 
semblance to one another. But, in saying even this much, 
he is already opposing himself to Berkeley on the question 
under review since, as Adam Smith says, the Berkeleian 
doctrine is that "as colour and solidity bear no sort of 
resemblance to one another, so neither can their respective 
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modifications." (Essay on the External Senses.) 
But here Jet, us look more closely into one of the 
arguments as to whether or not in fact so- called visible 
extension bears no sort of resemblance to its tangible 
namesake, or, more precisely, as to whether space is no 
otherwise the obtect of sight than of hearing. Now the 
Berkeleian position here is generally stigmatised as 
paradoxical i.e. gut of line with common sense, and, ac- 
cordingly, in As defence of it, Berkeley tries to shake 
the prestige of common sense, arguing that "while common 
speech would incline me to think I heard, saw and touched 
the same thing" (iLVi) yet it is, to all appearances mis- 
leading in the way it speaks of herring here, and accordingly 
need not be regaraed as trustworthy either in what it says 
about seeing. Hume,however, in his discussion of the same 
topic, gives a very different version of the facts, arguing 
that the commoli sense treats sight and touch as analogous 
to one another anu as sharply differentiated from x the 
other senses in the respect in question. "What is extended 
must have a parIicular figure, as square or triangular; none 
of which will agree to a desire, or to any other impression 
or idea, excep.c those of the two senses above mentioned," 
(i.e. sight anu vouch) "nor can a smell or sound" he adds 
further to the same topic, "be either of circular or square 
figure." In short, it is impossible, according to Hume, 
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to convict common sense of indefiniteness or error even 
in what it says auout hearinek. and so the Berkeleian case 
for upsetting colloquial usage collapses. (Qoutations 
from Treatise nook I Part 4 Chapter 5). 
Now let us tarn to another of Berkeley's arguments in 
support of the tnesis that it is, strictly speaking, a 
misnomer to apply the word "extension" to objects of 
sight as well as touch. "I am apt to think, that when men 
speak of extension, as being an idea common to two senses, 
it is with a se:;iet supposition, that we can single out 
extension from all other tangible and visible qualities, 
and form- thereui an abstract idea which idea they will have 
common to sign.t ana touch." (CXXii) Berkeley then proceeds 
in his usual strain. "Now I do not find that I can perceive, 
imagine or in any wise form in my raina, such an abstract 
idea, such as is Llere spoken of. A line or surface, which 
is neither bla.e , nor white, nor blue, nor yellow, etc., 
nor long, nor short, nor rough nor square, nor round etc. 
is perfectly incomprehensible. This I am sure of as to 
myself; how far the faculties of other men may reach, they 
best can tell. "( CXXiii) Accordingly, "there are no 
abstract ideas of figure" and "it is impossible for us, by 
any precision of thought, to form an idea of extension 
separate from all other visible and tangible qualities, which 
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shall be cornmbn both to sight and touch." (CXXVii ). 
But now, to turn to the first point in Hume relevant 
to the Berkeleian thesis - it is quite possible, Hume says, 
to concede that "a line or surface which is neither black 
nor white etc. is perfectly incomprehensible" and at the 
same time to lay claim to the power of forminn an idea of 
visible figure in the abstract. He approaches the matter by 
way of a query as to whether one could differentiate between 
the shape ana the colour of a white globe, supposing that 
one had no experience of any other object but this. His 
point is that, in such a case, one would as yet have no ev- 
idence at one's disposal enabling one to make the distinction 
in question. "Thus when a globe of white marble is presented, 
we receive only the impression of a white colour disposed in 
a certain form, nor are we able to separate and distinguish 
the colour from the form. But observing afterwards," he 
goes on, "a globe of black marbld and a cube of white, and 
comparing them with our former object, we find two separate 
resemblances in what formerly seemed, and really is, 
perfectly inseparable. After a little practice of this kind, 
we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour by a 
uistinction of reason; that is, we consider the figure and 
colour together, since they are, in effect, the same and 
undi stingui shable, but still view them in different aspects, 
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according to the resemblances of whicn they are suspectibie. 
When we would consider only the figure of the globe of 
white marble we form in reality an idea both of the figure 
and colour, but tacitly carry our eye to its resemblance with 
the globe of black marble." But if we do this, we have, Hume 
claimed, already formed an abstract idea of the figure of 
the thing and, in short, forming an abstract idea of the 
visible figure of anycning doesn't in uhe least involve, 
as people like Berkeley seem to think, the impossible feat of 
"seeing in one's mind's eye" an uncoloured figure. "A person 
who desires is to consider the figure of a globe of white 
mErble without thinking on its colour, desires an impossibility; 
but his meaning is that we should consider the colour add 
figure together, Dut still keep in our eye the resemblance 
to the globe of black marble, or to any other globe of what- 
ever colour or substance." (Treatise I Part I Section VII 
PP. 32, 33. Everyman.) . 
Now it is by a further development of this very theme 
that Hume attempts (a few pages further on) to demolish com- 
pletely Berkeley's thesis about the impossibility of forming 
"an idea of extension separate front all other visible and 
tangible qualities which shall be common both to sight and. 
touch." These are his words. "Suppose that, in the ex- 
tended object, or composition of coloured points, from. which 
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we first received the iaea of extension, the points were 
of a purple colour; it follows, that in every repetition 
of the idea we should not only place the points in the same 
order with respect to each otner, out also bestow on them 
that precise colour with which alone we are acquainted. But 
afterwaras, having experience of the other colours of violet, 
green, rea, white, black, and of all the different com- 
positions of these, and finning a resemblance in' the dis- 
position of coloured ~points of which they are composed, we 
ouliti the peculiarities of colour, as ffar as possible, and 
found an abstract iaea mr _ely on fact disposition of points 
or ,canner of appearance in which they agree. Nay, even 
when the resemblance is carried beyond the objects of one 
sense, and the impressions of touch are found to be similar 
to those of sight in the disposition of their parts, this 
dies not hinder the abstract idea from representing both, 
upon'àccount of their resemblance." (Treatise I Part II 
Section III P.41 Everyman.). 
Now Hume is here working on the same theme as before, 
starting with a purple patch instead of a globe of white 
marble as the first extended object ever seen. However this 
time he combines his anti - Berkeleian or common sense tendency 
to defend an abstract idea of extension with his anti - common 
sense counter- tendency of "reducing" extension to a set of 
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unextended minima sensibilia.. That is to say, his 
manner of speaking implies that the experience revealing 
to us this entirely new sort of object - to wit -, a space - 
occupying one - m.st involve an experience of the difference 
between a set of contiguous atoms of purple and a set of 
non - contiguous atoms of purple, or - to express more exactly 
what we take to be Hume's meaning - that we first see the 
object as being, so to speak, an undifferentiated whole and 
in that sense simple, (much as in the former case, we first 
saw the white globe as simple), then we see it as a suc- 
cession of bits, each one being seen by itself while 
the others are hidden from view, and, at the same time, feel, 
by means of the sensations in the eye before alluded to, the 
succesFion- relation in question to be a species of relation 
never encountered A.th sets of sounds or smells, namely 
a relation of eonti guity or non -contiguity, or, rather, a 
r 7.ation allowing he "logical construction" of these spatial 
notions, of contiguity and non -contiguity and finally as 
the result of all these experiences, we come to regard the 
originally given simple object as being extended or spatial, 
i. e. containing in it the relation we call spatial. Now, 
by this time, we are, according to Hume, aware of the object 
as being complex in the sense of being composed of a set of 
contiguous simple parts, but so far we are not aware of the 
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complex so composed, i.e of the given extension as being 
itself complex ur of doublé aspect in the sense of having 
both a shape koy 'order of parts" Hume seems to mean shape) 
and a colour. nut now we cannot, Hume is clear, become 
aware of this latter sort of complexity in the same manner 
as we become aware of the first sort of complexity; in the 
case treated, uuir analysis or apprehension of the complexity 
depended in seeing each of the minimal atoms of purple by 
itself without seeing the others, whereas in this new case, 
we cannot, it will be admitted, see the aspect principally 
concerning us ueie - namely the shape - without seeing the 
other aspect, uam_.;ly the purple colour. That it to say, 
we must proceed nere exactly as we did in the case of the 
white globe, the Uiack globe and the white cube, when we 
become aware of each of them as a complex only in the act of 
noting that tue ilist in one way resembles the second more 
than it does tne juhird and in another way resembles the third 
more than it dues the second. Accordingly the crucial step 
is for us now 60 have a whole new set of experiences, not 
merely of these uontiguous atoms of purple arranged in dif- 
ferent orders (i.e in different shapes) from the one originally 
encountered, but also of equally numerous sets of atoms of 
red, of blue, and so forth, similarily disposed in all these 
various orders, or shapes and even of - to drop now the 
jargon parti- coloured shapes with various combinations 
of hues. Therebye we would, though comparing the visible 
objects with one another, come to the conclusion that shape 
and colour, though inseparable, varied independently, and 
then, in th(_ next place, through going on to compare visible 
objects -:ith tangible objects would. begin to discover that 
shape was, in a certain sense, independent both of solidity 
and of colour; not of course that we could ever hope to 
encounter a shape that wasn't either solid or coloured but 
we would know how to talk about shapes and their relations 
without having to mention their colour or solidity. 
By this time, there is not much room for doubt as to 
the existence of divergent (though not perhaps contradictory) 
tendencies in Hume's doctrine of space, but, to round off 
our discussion, we' had better say something more about these 
different tendencies so as to note, more precisely than 
hitherto, just what they have in common, th and when they 
begin to diverge. To confine ourselves to the case of 
vision, it is obvious tn.at the starting -point of both lines 
of treatment is common sense in the one case, the fact of 
our believing objects of sight to be spatially extended ij 
a way o raj ects of hearing are not, and, in thé other case, the 
fact of our believing objects of sight to have both colour 
and shape, and that the question at issue in the case of 
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either belief is whether common sense is here ultimate 
and analysable, and, granted its analysability, what are 
the separate experiences that form its constitution. But 
now in either case, common sense is regarded by Hume as 
being analysable, and, so far, his treatment of the one point 
is on a level with his treatment of the other. However,the 
parting of the ways is reached as soon as Hume begins the 
business of analysis; and whereas on the one hand, our 
awareness of an object of sight as extended is analysed into 
the experience of objects or two kinds - minima visibilia and 
ocular strains - each of which objects is literally unextended 
in the sense of being nan- spatial, on the other hand,our 
awareness of an object of sight as having both shape anu 
colour is treated according to a very different principle 
and is regarded as analysable into the experience of a series 
of objects, each of which, taken by itself, is devoid of 
shape and colour, but only in the sense of having the dis- 
tinction in question as yet latent in itself, or implicit, 
and not therefore in the sense of being literally devoid 
or this shape - colour distinction. That is to say, the 
former type of analysis is, in its way, like the Berkeleian 
reduction of talk about the existence of material objects 
to talk about the existence of sense- data, whereas the 
latter sort of analysis is, as Hume explicitly tells us, 
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taken over from "the schools," and might perhaps be viewed 
as a case where "the wn.oie is more than the sum of its parts. ti 
In short the one line of approach proposes to deal with 
common sense by explaining it away - "Space is nothing but -" 
whiles the otner line of approach proposes to deal with 
common sense, oy regarding it as - su to speak - potenoiall$ 
out not actually present in its alleged constituents, ano. 
thus tries to explain it, without explaining it away. 
While nothing further need be said about the side of 
Hume's analysis ui common sense taken over from scholasticism, 
because it is introduced into the Treatise only in a some- 
what incidental way, the other tendency in his analysis of 
common sense t the one we have called Berkeleian, and which 
Professor Kemp Smith, perhaps with more accuracy, cells 
Newtonian in the sense of associa.tionistic) aemands a good 
deal of further consideration, because Hume himself, at 
various points in L,he Treatise, not to speak of the Inquiry, 
raises some penetrating questions about the general validity 
of this sort of approach. For example, it is a fact that in 
his mature reflections, in the Inquiry on the problem of 
belief in an external world, he rejects outright the Ber- 
keleian tactics, and, after comparing the two relevant set 
of facts, on the une hand our common sense beliefs about 
our situation, anu on the other hand, the actual experiences 
relative to these beliefs, goes on to point out the impos- 
sibility of attempting to "reduce" the first set of facts to 
the second. Bùt how a fact of this sort is obviously very 
pertinent to our present thesis, and in view of it the 
question naturally arises as to whether Hume was as much aware 
of the difficulty of reductively explaining away the belief 
in the spatial extendedness of objects as he was of the dif- 
ficulty of reductively explaining sway the belief in the in- 
dependent existence of these spatially extended objects. 
Now Hume, of course, excludes from his Inquiry all dis- 
cussion of the belief in space, but, if we go carefully through 
his Treatise, e wind him, on one occasion, drawing attention 
to certain paradoxical consequences following from his positiv -. 
istic analysis ol our awareness of tangible or solid exten- 
tion. The passage containing the admission occurs in the ear- 
lier part of tine long discussion of toucri in Treatise I, 
Part IV, Section lv, the remainder of which has already been 
considered during our discussion of Hume on the belief in 
independence. "I, Hume begins, "have shown that it is 
imposbible to cuuceive extension but as composed of parts, 
endowed with colour or solidity. The idea of extension is 
a compound idea; but as it is not compounded of an infinite 
number of parts or inferior ideas, it must at least resolve 
itself into such s are perfectly simple and indivisible. 
These simple auu, Indivisible parts not being ideas of extention, 
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must be nonentities, unless conceived as coloured or solid. 
Colour is excluded from any real existence. The reality, 
therefore, of our idea of extension depends upon the reality 
of that of solidity; nor can the former be just, while the 
latter is chimerical. Let us then lend our attention to the 
idea of solidity. 
"The idea of solidity is that of two objects, which 
being impelled by the ttmost force, cannot penetrate each 
other, but still maintain a separate distinct existence. 
Solidity therefore is perfectly incomprehensible a'one, and 
without the conception of some bodies which are solid, and 
maintain this separate and distinct existence. Now what 
idea have we of these bodies? The ideas of colours, sounds, 
and other secondary Qualities are excluded. The idea of motion 
depends on that of extension, and the idea of extension on 
that of solidity. It is impossible, therefore, that the idea 
of solidity can depend on either of them. For that would 
be to run in a circle, and make one idea depend on another 
while, at the same time, the latter depends on the former. 
Our modern philosophy, therefore, leaves us no just nor sat- 
isfying idea of solidity, nor consequently of matter." 
In order to bring out Hume's meaning more clearly, let 
us set side by side a sentence from I.IV.4. and a sentence 
from I.ìi.iii.. Here, then, is Hume's reductive anälysis 
of our ordinary notion of solid extension : "That compound 
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impression, which represents extension, consists of several 
lesser impressions which are indivisible to the eye or 
feeling, and may be called impressions of atoms or corpus- 
cles endowed with colour and solidity." But now let us 
compare Hume's comment on our common sense notion of solidity: 
"In order to form an idea of solidity, we must conceive of 
two bodies.pressing on each other without any penetrating; 
and it is impossible for us to arrive at this idea when we 
confine ourselves to one object." Now, obviously, there is 
some sort of contradiction between the facts of common sense 
as given in the former quotation, and the root of the dif- 
ficulty would seem to be that, as far as tangible extension 
is concerned, the would -be elucidatory analysis or reduction 
of common sense can be carried through only at the price of 
introducing a certain notion - namely an isolated, simple 
solid - that makes nonsense of solidity in its common sense 
meaning, and, so far, doesn't elucidate at all. 
Trlis granted, we can perhaps begin to see better what 
Hume is driving at here. Apparently, he expects us to recall 
that the total problem at issue is that of accounting for 
our common sense belief in, or talk about, space- occupying 
bodies, and he is pointing out that his previous analysis of 
the item in this common sense formula concerned with space 
and space -occupation, although illuminating in its way and 
satisfactory enough for certain limited purooses, for example 
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in regard to the crux: about the Newtonian vacuum, never- 
theless carrots wi.tri it the disadvdnta7e of rendering unin- 
telligible and altogether mysi erious, the other items in 
the common sense fornriila, namely that concerned with soliaity. 
Indeed, when he declares, above, that "our iuouern philosophy 
leaves as with no just or satisfactory idea of matter" he 
means nothing else apparently, by "our moaern philosophy" in 
the present connection than his own analysis of space and 
extension as given in T'reatlee I. Part II, ana his point is, 
therefore, roughly speaking, that the analysis of the belief 
in extenaeuess in terms of feelings or unextenaed objects 
makes nonsense of our common sense notions of body in much 
the same fashion as does the ata.ly sis of the belief in 
independence in terms of the idea that "the imagination, when 
set into my train of thinking, is apt to continue even when 
its oujeet fails." (Treatise I. Part V Sec6Ion II - 
Everyman.) . 
In short, it would seem as it Hume's dominant policy 
in regara to trie problem both of spatiality, and or in- 
dependent existence is, in general, to -try to ao full justice 
to the factd of common sense. In the Treatise, this tendency 
mainly shows itself in his decidedly suspicious and critical 
attitude towards: his own highly ingenious attempts at 
"positivistic" or "associasionistic" analysis of common 
sense in terms of sense; in the Inquiry, he goes on to reject 
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this sort of explanation altogether, and to propound the 
paradox that common sense cannot be set aside, and yet, on 
a strict view, doesn't make sense. Of course in this Inquiry 
doctrine, he is concerned explicitly only with the question 
of belief in independent existence, but apparently he would 
not have dealt very differently with the question of belief 
in spatiality, if he cared to introduce that topic too, along- 
side the otiher. 
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Chapter 2 
Older than Hume by about two years, Thomas Reid had 
been introduced to philosophy at the Maxischal College, 
Aberdeen, by none other than the George Turnbull of the 
Rankenian CluD, and was probably led, thereby to ddopt a 
position, which he himself, looking back,. called Berkeleian, 
but which may well have been the sort of amalgam. of Ber- 
keleianism and Hutchesonian common sense characteristic of 
his teacher. However, as the result of reading the Treatise 
of Human Nature, Reid renounced Berkeleianism, and the only 
partlof Turnbull's Leaching which has any echo in the works 
of hie pupil's maturity is the commonsense ;part - the 
principle of respect for the distinctions of ordinary lang- 
uage, so far as thy are universal. What Reid had in fact 
done was to take over from Hume the idea of common sense 
or natural be..iet' as authoritative and unshakable, and then 
to go somewhat further than Hume did in the airection of 
defending the uonsistency and trustworthiness of this 
unshakable common sense. 
With the Humeian doctrines discussed in the last chap- 
ter, Reid, as une might expect, is partly in agreement, 
partly in disagreement. On the one hand, Reid agrees with 
Hume that the (;().)n sense beliefs in the objects of sight 
and of touch as existing independently oi perception, and 
as being, both the one and the other, equally space - 
occupying, have iV be accepted in a spirit of natural 
piety, in spite of their not being fully justifiable at the 
bar of reason. That is to say, he is quite prepared to 
accept the "hypothesis" of Hume, so fundamental to the 
Treatise, that belief is more properly an act of the 
sensitive than of the cogitative "part of the mind - pro- 
vided the point about "cogitative" is taken as meaning that 
"the belief and fidelity of our faculties cannot be proved 
by reasoning," and therefore the belief of first principles 
(i.e. spatiality, independence etc.) cannot be founded on 
reason : "If this last be what the author calls his hypo- 
thesis, I subscribe to it, and think it not an hypothesis but 
a manifest truth, though I conceive it to be very improperly 
expressed "by putting it paradoxically in the way Hume does. 
quotations from Hamilton's Reid, Vol.1 P.489. On the other 
hand, Reid goes on to repudiate Hume's suggestion that, from 
a merely theoretical point of view, there is something to 
the sceptical or the positivistic criticism of these natural, 
and, practically speaking, indispensable beliefs. That is 
to say, Reid tries to meet the point in the Treatise ex- 
plained above that the universal and natural belief in the 
independence of the visible and tangible objects are found 
to be in conflict with other less natural, less wide - spread 
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but equally well- founded beliefs - namely those acquired 
by devotion to phenomenological introspection. As regards 
the other belief in question in the last chapter, namely 
the belief in the irreducible spatiality and complexity 
of things, "here again" says Reid, "the ideal system comes 
in our way; it teaches us that the first operation of the 
mind about its ideas is simple apprehension," and "that 
the belief or knowledge is got by putting together and com- 
paring the simple apprehensions." (P.106,107, Hamilton's 
Reid, Vol.1). But now this part of the Humeian doctrine, 
- the part, that is, declaring material objects seen and 
felt to be at bottom nothing but a bundle of simple un- 
extended impressions of sight and of touch - is, according 
to Reia, no better than the part just touched upon - i.e. 
the part declaring the independence of these material ob- 
jects of sight and touch to have no foundation whatsoever in 
the facts of experience, and Reid's argument here consists 
I roug1J r , speaking in the contention that the one Humeian 
doctrine admitting an idea of extension in the abstract 
is in conflict with the other Humeian doctrine viewing ex- 
tension as being, in the last analysis, a series of non - 
extended simple impressions of-touch or of sight. 
In his approach to this last topic, Reid is to some 
extent following up a line already opened by Karnes in 1751, 
ana a glance at the latter will form the best introduction 
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to the former. Now Kames here is concerned to make two 
points. In the first place, "by sight and touch, we have 
the impression of substance or body as well as qualities; 
it is not figure, extension, motion, we perceive but a thing 
figured, extended, moving" ( Principles of Religion and 
Morality, 1'151, P.262) or again "another thing that is ob- 
served with regard to these things which are perceived as 
qualities by sight and touch is that we cannot form a con- 
ception of them ndependerlt of the beings to which they 
belong" (P.248). Moreover he takes care to explain pretty 
carefully what ne means by "impression of body or substance" 
or by "conception of the qualities as dependent on the beings 
to which they belong" - "it is not in our power to separate, 
even in imagination, colour, figure, extension and motion 
from body or substance," (P.248) or again "smoothness, hard- 
ness, extension and figure are felt not as separate and un- 
connected existences, but as belonging to something I call 
body." (P.246). In short, Kames' first point is that not 
only is extension or shape, as Hume admits, unimaginable 
except as solid or coloured, but also, neither colour or 
solidity are, contrary to what Hume thought, imaginable ex- 
cept as extended and possessing shape. In the second place, 
Kames has to give some reason for his denial, of the llumeian 
view that unextended colour (atom of colour) and unextended 
solids or atofds of solidity are readily imaginable. "The 
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above analysis of the impressions of sight and of touch 
will be best iilu,trated by means of a comparison with 
the impressions ..jade by the other senses. I hear a souna, 
I feel a smell. Attending to these impressions, I perceive 
nothing but the wound or smell. They are not perceived by 
the qualities ur properties of any body, thing, or substance. 
They make their appearances in the mind as simple existences." 
(P.248). That is ,o say, Karnes' second point is simply 
that it doesn't seem to make sense to speak of simple ilia - 
pressions of colour and solidity, in the way it does seem to 
make sense to speak of simple impressions of smell or sound; 
and this grantee, it follows that Hume is wrong in holding 
our perceptions u.i material substances or body to be, in the 
last resort, reuuoible to groups of perceptions of the non - 
bodily or non - space -occupying atoms of colour or hardness. 
The most noteworthy thing about Karnes is, however, not 
so. much the actual argument as the context presupposed by 
the argument. As .Lames sees it Hume'sPeculiar view about 
the nature of :, -tended things rests in some ways upon, or, 
perhaps, is only a more definite expression of, the view of 
the nature of belief peculiar to Hume. Indeed the chapter 
on the authority of the senses, where the above argument 
is propounded, is apparently intended by Kames as a sequel 
to his chapter on belief, and as an answer to the problem 
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raised by Hume about belief, and in general, it looks as if, 
so far as Karnes is concerned,- Hume's reduction of sensible 
extensions to a series of minima sensibilia depends on 
Hume's view of belief in the sensible presence of a body 
or materials substance as consisting in nothing but a series 
of simple impressions (or vivid simple ideas) of sight or 
touch. 
Now Reid's critique of this -Dart of Hume's question 
here is, to all appearance, a follow up of Kame4 critique. 
For one think, Reid occupies himself, like Kames, with the 
facts concerning the relationship of colour to visible 
extension or shaptb, and of solidity to tangib&t extention 
or shape. For another thing, and this is a very significant 
one, Reid propounds his criticism of the Humeian doctrine 
of our apprehension of extension and of material substance 
only as a sort of sequel, indeed as a brief corollary to 
a long discussion of the Humeian theory of belief, and accord- 
ingly his line of approach coincides entirely with Karnes', 
or rather is a further development of it. 
To introduce Reid's main theme, let us start with a 
quotation (somehwat abbreviated) from the een®1uaion (P.209 
Hamilton's Reid, Vol.1) to the Inquiry of 1764. "The 
account which this system (the ideal system) gives of our 
judgement and belief concerning things is very far from the 
truth. It represents the senses as having no other office 
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than that of furnishing the mind with xxxxxmxxx notions 
or simple apprehensions of tn.ings. We have shown, on the con- 
trary, that every operation of the senses, in its very nature, 
implies judgment or belief as well as simple apprehension° 
When I perceive a tree before me, my faculty of Seeing gives 
me not only a simile apprehension of the tree, but a belief 
of its existence, and of i Ls figure, distance and magnitude." 
Now, in order to bring out Reid's meaning. let us take 
a somewhat similar quotation, also from the Inquiry, but 
this time from the beginning (P.106) and not the end. "In- 
stead of saying that belief or knowledge is got by putting 
together and comparing the simple apprehensions, we ought rather 
to say that the simple apprehension is performed by resolving 
and analysing a natural and original judgment." Now by 
"natural and original judgment" Reid is, in this context tuo, 
balking about a judgment of perception - for example (to take 
the case of the tree) "I observe this object to be green 
and pyramid. - shaped. Accordingly, Reid's point would seem 
to consist in raising a question about the relationship be- 
Lween, on the one hang, the state of mind Hume calls "having 
a simple impression" e.g. in this case, seeing an extension - 
less atom of green, and, on the ogler hand, the state of 
mind Hume would perhaps call "having a natural belief in the 
existence of a substance," e.g. in this case seeing a thing 
both green and pyramid - shaped - namely a question as to 
whether Hume is right in ma_ ing the awareness of these 
extensionless atoms of green, each separately ana by itself, 
precede tae awareness of these atoms of green constituting, 
when taken togetier a green pyramid, or whether he would not 
have done better -6o make the awareness of the whole object as 
both green ana pyramid-shaped precede the awareness of each 
particular atoffl of green, by itself and out of relation to 
its fellow atoms, and so without relation to the extended 
shape of which if forms part. In short, Reid is taking up 
somewhat the same attitude to the Humeian doctrine as did 
Dares. 
Here let us state Reid's thesis. Perception, he tells 
us, naturally involves judging that the thing is and what 
the thing is. "Tine man who perceives an object believes 
that it exists, and is what he distinctly perceives it to be, 
nor is it in nis power to avoid such judgment." (Hamilton's 
Reid, Vol.1 P.414). However, in his serious discussion 
of the matter, uhe aspect of the judgment of perception 
that concerns .nim is not the aspect that regards existence 
so much as the aspect concerned with the what of the object 
perceived. Judgments about aspects of this latter sort, 
he tells us, "awe more allied to our rational nature" (P.416) 
- capable of being cultivated and improved in a way in which. 
judgments of exisence are not. Accordingly, Reid is more 
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concerned with tue judgment as to what than the judgment as 
to that, and, for example, when'in setting the stage for u s 
discusion, he tells us that perception involves judging 
a contigent rroposition to be true, ne does not bother to 
mention the existential reference in the example he gives. 
"That I now write upon a table covered with green ciöth is a 
contingent event which I judge to be most undoubtedly true. 
By judgment is grounded upon my ï ercePtion, and is a necessary 
concomitant or ingredient of my perception." (P.414) 
Reid approaches the crux of the problem in the following 
way. Judgments of perception, he has told us in the beginning, 
are judgments about contingent propositions. But now, "there 
cannot" he tells us "be any proposition in the language which 
does not involve a, general conception." (Hamilton's Reid, Vol.1 
P.417). Even an existential proposition does this, existence 
being "one of tine ,.lost abstract general notions," and "in every 
other proposition ('other than the existential one) "the 
predicate at leasU must be a general notion, a universal and 
a pre di ci bie being one and the same," i.e. the predicate must 
be a word like "green" or "round". Tow of course Reid, as we 
have said, is not seriously concerned with the reference to 
existence, and accordingly his main point is the simple one 
that when we make judgments of perception, we must understand 
anu !snow how to ure elementary general terms like those involved 
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in the judgment above, about the green cloth on the writing 
ta oie. 
But, this being the case, the thesis now being un- 
folded will at once, Reid notes, strike men like Locke and 
Hume as "pa.radoxi cal" and the objection they are sure to 
raise is that the view of experience or perceptions, as in- 
volving judgments of contingent propositions in the sense 
just explained,wlll render impossible any reasonable account 
of how the tabula rasa of the mind first gets written on. 
If perception naturally involves judging a contingent pro - 
position to be true on the eviLence of sense, then it is, 
they will argue, surely the case that one must first be able 
to understand the meaning of that proposition and its denial 
before one can go on to confirm it empirically, and that, 
until one achieves this empirical confirma.: ion, one does 
not, on Reìd!s own admission, begin to have a perception. 
But this being so ,the absurd situation, they will point out, 
must follow that, in respect of the dawn of cognition, the 
infant, before it can begin tu t1- ve p rceptions must be able 
to understand propositions about observable objects, i.e. 
propositions contaning gnneral terms of the sort already 
mentioned, - sweet, bitter, round, square, and so on. 
But here we had better let Reid formulate the objections 
in his own way. "I am sensib'e that a strung objection may 
be made to this reasoning (of mine) and that it may seem to 
-80- 
lead to an absurdity ur contradiction. It may be said, 
every judgment may be expressed by a proposition, and a 
proposition must be conceived before we can judge it. If 
therefore we cannot conceive the meaning of a proposition 
without a previous exercise of judgment, it :hollows that 
Judgment must be previous to the conception of any proposition, 
an, at the same time that the conception of a proposition 
must be previous to all judgment, which is a contradiction." 
In short, Reid continues, "it is likt Iht question concerning 
the bird and the egg. In the present state of things every 
bird comes .Prom an egg, and every egg from a bird, and each 
may ce said to be previous to the other," and a paradox similar 
to the one above may ce formulated. (All the quotations in 
this and subsequent paragraphs come from PP.417,418: Hamilton's 
Reid). "In order to avoid the labyrinth of absurdity and of 
contradiction," Reid procee,.s to avail himself of another 
"similitude ". "An artist, suppose a carpenter, cannot work 
in his art without tools and these tools must be made by 
art. The exercise of the art, therefore, is necessary to 
make the tools, and the tools are necessary to the exercise 
of the art. There is the same appearance of contradiction 
as in what I have advanced coneerning the necessity of some 
degree of judgment, in order to form clear and distinct con - 
ceptions of things. These are the tools we must use in 
judging and in reasoning, and without them, must make very 
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oung,Ling work; yet these tools cannot be male without some 
exercise of judgment." 
Now Reid apparently expects his readers to have some 
acquaintance with a well - known solution of the paradox about 
the tools and the art. Take the case of the first carpenter 
at his first job. Let us suppose he wants to cut up or slit 
up, a fallen tree trunk into regularly shaped cylindrical 
blocks. He begins by trying to use as tools the bits of 
wood and stone he finds lying about, and, taught by trial 
and error in one effort after another to split the tree 
trunk, he discarus the useless bits of wood and stone, and 
remodels the osiers, and at the moment he is sucessful in 
cutting up the wood into regular blocks, he rinds himself 
also the possessor of a set of primitive wedges, hammers, 
and axes, and the master of a technique. The point is that, 
through the man's instigation and efforts, the intact tree 
trunk and the original sticks and scones begin to act on and 
modify one another. 
Now Reid's speculations about the origins of judgment 
and conception follow exactly the analogy of these well known 
speculations aoout the origins of tools and of manufactures. 
"The faculties oz conception and judgment" he says, "have an 
infancy. and a mauurity as man has. What I have said is 
limitei to their mature state." (i.e. it is only in the 
mature state of these faculties that judnt supposes the 
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distinct conception of oroposition4 "I believe in the 
infant state tile are weak and indistinct, but that by im- 
perceptible degrees they grow to maturity, each giving aid 
to the other, ana receiving aid from it." (i.e. very much 
as the natural objects serving as tools 
ject and the natural objects serving as 
raw materials loi elaboration modify one another, and, by 
ar& ea 
modifying one anot.her,i,turnAthe former into tools proper, 
ana the latter into the finished product.). 
This second similitude does indeed give a fait idea of 
the sort of solution of the paradox Reid is working towards. 
The chief point .,f the analogy is apparently something like 
this : just as the everyday rule "you can't do the job with- 
out having the proper tools" doesn't hold good of the first 
beginnings of .wa nufacture, so, probably, the parallel rule 
"judgment supposes the distinct conception of a proposition" 
does not hold good of the first beginnings of cognition. Or, 
to put the mati,e in a precise way, there is apparently this 
point to be brought out; namely that just as primitive manu- 
facture does a rough job without having the proper tools, so 
too primitive cognition or perception produces only a rough 
judgment without having proper i.e. clear and distinct ideas. 
To pass now from these prefatory similitudes to the 
theory they introduce, its 'main point is certainly something 
like this. An ordinary common sense judgment of perception 
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like the one about the green cloth on the writing- table is 
not evidently, primitive and unanalysable for Reid any more 
than it is for Hume, and the chief difference between the one 
and the other ha s to do solely with the nature of the various 
elementary experiences underlying the common sense judgment. 
"It is acknowledjed on ail hands, " Reid says, conceding a 
point of to Hume, "that the first notions of sensible objects 
are got by the external senses only, and probatly before the 
judgment is brought forth; but these first notions," Reid 
goes on, defining his position against Hume's, "are neither 
simple, nor are they accurate and distinct; they are gross 
and indistinct, and, like the chaos, a rudis indigestaque 
moles." Indeed, according to what Reid tells us later on the 
same page, "the notion we have from the senses alone, even of 
the simplest objects of sense, is indistinct and incapable of 
being described," and, in fine, his main -point is that the 
ordinary judgment about the present existence of a material 
substance does not presuppose, as Hume would have it, an initial 
experience of a set of clear -cut nameable atoms, but rather 
presupposes an initial exDerJ ence. of a vague, nameless "some- 
thing ". 
Now in defence of this thesis, Reid at once introduces 
the topic of abstraction. "A man who is able to say with 
understanding ur to determine in his own mind that this object 
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ìs v;h,ite must have distinguished whiteness from the other 
attributes. If he has not made this distinction he does 
not unddrstand what he says" - since, the context implies, 
in that case, all he can _properly say is that the object 
is of an indescribable character, is a mere something. 
That is to say, the confirmation. of the above thesis about 
the vagueness of the initial experience, is, according to 
Reid, only to be had if we explore the foundations df a. 1.04g- 
ment like "this object is white." 
Now at the very end of the chapter immediately preceding 
the one under review, Reid has touched upon this very topic, 
and we may quote what he says about it. In the passage in 
qu,stion, his suoject is the empirical foundations of general 
notions like whiteness, or - in other torus - with the pre- 
suppositions of ordinary judgments of perception containing 
words like white and round, and his point is that, in order 
to form such judgments, a two fold process must be gone 
through, of, first, noting vague,i-esemoiances between dif- 
ferent things, and, second, distinguishing the parts of each 
thing from one another. "I believe, indeed, we may have 
an indistinct perception of resemblances without knowing 
where it lies. Thus I may see a resemblance between one face 
and another, when I cannot distinctly say in what feature 
they resemble; but by analysing the two faces, and comparing 
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feature with feature, I may form a distinct notion of that 
which is common to both. A painter, ueing accustomed to 
an analysis of this kind, would have formed a distinct 
notion of this resemblance at first sight; to another man 
it may require some attention. 
"There iti, therefore an indistinct notion of resem- 
blance when we compare objects only in gross; and this, I 
believe, brute animals may have. There is also a distinct 
notion of resemblance when we analyse the objects into their 
various attributes and perceive them to agree in some while 
they differ in others. It is In this case only that we 
give a name to the attributes wherein they agree which must 
be a common name because the thing signified by it is common. 
Thus when Icompare cubes of different matter, I perceive them 
to have this atrioute in common, that they are comprehended 
under six equal squares, and this attribute only is sig- 
nified by applying the name cube to them all. When I compare 
clean linen with snow, I perceive them to agree in colour, 
and when I apply the name of white to both, this name sig- 
nifies neither sn.w or cleak linen but the attribute which 
is common to oath." (Hamilton's Reid, Vol.1, P.411). 
Now we may dote in paHsing that the doctrine of this 
passage, when read in its context, is pretty complicated 
an will require further attention from us at a later stage 
in or exposition. For the present, however, we try to 
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explain Reid's position only so far as it throws light on 
the presuppositions of a judgment of perception like "this 
is snow- white ". Now Reid gives us to understand that in a 
case df this kind there is a sort of movement from a. prelimin- 
ary judgment as to indistinct resemblance, by way of an 
analysis of the objects concerned, to a final judgment as to 
distinct resemblance. Presumably, in view of his key -analogy 
of the features of the face, his point is that at first I 
would not be abL,.. 10 do more than merely judge the linen and 
the snow - or rattier (to confine the question entirely to 
vision) the linen -like colour -patch and the snow -like colour- 
patch - to be alike somewhat or in some way, I couldn't say 
how or where, bit that later, - perhaps after studying the 
objects in relation to their visual common background - I 
would be able to make the-rough preliminary verdict 'Distinct, 
and to judge the objects (regarded, it should be remembered 
as colour -patches) to be unlice in outline, but otherwise 
alike. Moreover it seems obvious, (though Reid. doesn't 
mention .the fact) that, having thus in a. manner distinguished 
and put to one side the outline or shape aspect of the object 
as irrelevant, I would now begin to repeat the whole process 
of passing from an indistinct to a distinct judgment about 
the resembling aspects of the bbjects at a new and, so to 
speak, higher level. That is to say, the judgment I have 
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already formed is a distinct perception of resemblance in 
the sense of nay now being able to assert that the resemb- 
lance between the two objects does not lie in their outlines 
(i.e. in parts of each, indicatable by pointing, which in 
the course of further experience we should come to call their 
outlines), but at the same time is also an indistinct per - 
ce_)tion of resemblance in the sense of my not yet knowing 
whether the regions or aspect singled out from the object 
I call linen everywhere uniformly resembles the corresponding 
region or aspect singled out from the object I call snow. 
That is to say, before I am in a position to pronounce the 
linen to be white as snow (taking the sno- to be standard 
case), I must make sure that e. g. the linen has no stains and 
that its resemblance is not in this way only approximate, and 
to ascertain facts like this, I must go through more than 
once the movement from indistinct perception of resemblance 
to distinct perception of resemblance. 
In order to duo ju ui ce to Reid's thesis that a judgment 
lie "this object is white" presupposes in the beginning an 
experience of the vague, we have gone ba,k to a passane in 
the previous chapter - Essay 5, Chapter 6 - as being pecul- 
iarly illuminating in regard to the point under review, and 
have disregarded the equivalent passage ( a P passage in 
the preceding paragraph) in the chapter containing the 
thesis - Essay 6, Chapter 1 - as being insufficiently precise 
as regards details. Continuing now on the same lines, we 
want to show that this passage from Essay b Chapter 6 is 
presupposed throughout the whole argument from Essay 6 
Chapter I, already suimarised by us in the preceding pages. 
Reid, we may note, introduces the crucial passage in Essay 6 
Chapter I with a reference to the same point as is made In 
the Essay 5 Chapter 6 paragraphs - the point, namely, that 
generalisation or the formulation of general notions involves 
abstracion. "It has been shown that our simplest general 
notions are formed by the two operations of distinguishing 
and generalising." But "it is impossible to distinguish 
the different attributes belonging to the same suájebt , with- 
out judging that they are really different and distinguish- 
able," and so too "we cannot generalise without judging that 
trie same attribute does ar may belong to many individuals." 
Accordingly it follows that "judgment is exercised in forming 
the simplest general notions." But now, in the unfolding 
of Reid's argument, the next important passage following this 
S'"" 
one is a passage we have met before, -summa i- ssorne common sense 
facts of logic. "There cannot be any proposition in the 
language which does not involve a general notion" and "every 
judgment may be expres;-;ed by a proposition." (The meaning 
of "ma;;- be" here is probably that ordinary language is el- 
liptical, and that a sentence liKe "I see a cow" is short 4ór 
"I see a cow to exist" (Reid Essay 6 Chapter I P.414). 
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But now, immmediately thereafter, Reid goes on to remove 
the apparent contradiction between the assertion in the 
earlier passage that judgments precede the having of general 
notions, and the assertion in the latter passage that there 
can't be judgment unless one has general notions, by pointing 
out that in the former case the judgments spoken about, i.e. 
those previous to the formation -of general concepts, are 
"immature ",judgments, whereas in the latter case the judg- 
ments in question are "mature" and, so to speak, common sense 
judgments, and in justification of this biological analogy, 
he goes on to explain that the so- called mature judgments, 
i.e. judgments presupposing clear and distinct general no- 
tions, rest on anu arise out of judgments presupposing in- 
distinct conceptions. In short, Reid overcomes the paradox 
by arguing that C.he judgments required previous to the for- 
mation of general conceptions of a clear and distinct kind 
are not ordinary judgments at all but rough judgments con- 
taining vague notions. But in saying this, Reid, if his 
words have any meaning, is, to all intents and purposes, id- 
entifying the mature and finished judgments with his per - 
cpe Lions of distince -e beriblance, and the immature and 
rough judgments .,ith his perception of indistinct resemblance, 
and, indeed, the whole passage in Essay 6 Chapter I concerned 
with the propounding and the resolving of the paradox of 
cognition is, in the last analysis, nothing but a restatement 
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of a more striidig and full kind, of the point made in the 
Essay b Chapter b passage. 
By this we have expîti,lned tartly adequately Reid's 
view of ordinary judgments of perception as arising out of 
vague experiences, or more precisely, perhaps, rough judgments, 
and it now rema.is to note the limits which Reid seems to 
set to the scope úf his doctrine. In general he is very 
emphatic about rezusing to carry his analysis back to first 
prmgins. "The first exercise of these faculties of judgment 
and conception is hld, lime the sources of the Nile in an 
unkno,,n region." Apparently Reid, to judge more from his prac- 
tice than front his express words - means by this kind of 
assertion to coilvey tous that while we can trace the original 
ordinary judgeli'.t of perception back to the perceptual judg- 
ment of vague resemblance, we must stop here and cannot get 
behind this latter judgment. But now, in this refusal to ex- 
plain everything, Reid, we are inclined to think, knows very 
well what he is doing. This perceptual. judgment of indistinct 
resemblance, to which we have got back, itself involves, Reid 
apparently is aware, some sort of rudimentary general terms - 
"like and unlike" or rather perhaps, for Reid himself, identity 
and difference in the sense of "is" and. "is not ", and it is 
out of the question to derive a vague judgment of this sort 
from some still vaguer judgment, by an extension of the method 
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used the previous case, since xxx every judgment, how- 
ever vague, must, by definition, already involve just these 
general terms. But let us hear Reid's version of this 
point. "Every proposition either affirms or denies. And 
no man can have a distinct conception of a proposition, who 
does not understand distinctly the meaning of affirming and 
denying. But there are very general conceptions, and, as 
was before observed, are derived from the judgment as their 
source and origin." (along with notions like "subject, pre- 
dicate, copula etc. P.414) - Reid's point being that we 
must know the meanings of basic words like "is and is not" 
and know the construction of sentences like "this is not 
that" in order to think at all. But this being so, Reid 
goes on "if therefore some previous exercise of judgment 
be necessary to understand what is meant by affirmation and 
negation" (i.e. if general concepts like them are formed 
on the analogy of the formation of general conceptions 
like "white" or "round "), then the exercise of judgment must 
go before any judgment, which is absurd." 
We had better close the topic with a word in defence of 
this last exegesis f Reid, we grant, is very unsystematic 
but there is little doubt that he holds some such doctrine 
as the one just attributed to him. The relevant fact is 
that he begins by formulating two distinct but analogous 
paradoxes - one about universals or predicables i.e. general 
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terms lixe "white" or "round" and t Je otrier about "the 
very general conceptions derivr d fro judgment as their 
source and origin" i. e. general terms like "is" and "is 
not" and that he ends by offering a resolution of the for- 
mer of the para.dô ces - the one about "white" Dr "round" 
and by failing to offer any solution of the latter -paradox - 
except' for emphatically telling us that he does not profess 
to determine anything about the origin of judgment as such. 
We now come to the third part of Reid's doctrine on 
this subject. His central theme here is summarised in a 
passage from the Inquiry already quoted "instead of saying 
that belief or knowledge is got by Putting together and com- 
paring apprehensions, we ought rather to say that 
simple apprehension is performed by resolving and analysing 
a natural and original judgment." Reid's point here is 
reí;tated somewhat more clearly in the heading to the section 
in question "Judgment and belief, in some cases precede 
simple apprehension," (Inquiry Chapter 3 Section 4), ana our 
task is not to explain just what this point of his is. 
We will let Reid make hits own comment on this doctrine, 
as given In the Intellectual Powers. "Simple apprehension, 
though it be the simplest, is not the first operation of 
the understanding; and instead of saying that the more comPlex 
operations of mlila are formed by compounding simple apprehen 
sions, we oL{ ght to say that simple apprehensions are got by 
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analysing more com;4ex operations. 
"A similar mistake" (similar to Hume's pruoably) "which 
is carried through the whole of Hr. Locke's essay, may here 
be mentioned. It is, that our simplest ideas or concep- 
tions are got immediately by the senses, and the complex af- 
terwards formed oy colupounuing them. I apprenena it is far 
otherwise. 
"So that it is not by the senses immediately, but 
rather by the powers of analysing and abstraction, that we 
get the most simple and the most aistinct notions even or 
the oojects of sense. This will oe more fully expiained in 
another place." (P. 3`i6. Essay 4, chapter 3). 
It must already be obvious-_in a vague sort of way, where 
Reid is going, out before we give a precise account of his 
doctrine, it will be necessary to explain the point of his 
peculiar terminology. To this end, let us quote (with 
omissions) a passage from Hume's Treatise. (Book I, Part 3 
Séction 7). There is an error, Hume says, "in the vulgar 
division -of the acts of understanding into conception and 
judgment, and in the definitions we give of them. Conception 
is defined to be a simple survey of one or more ideas, 
and judgment to ce the separating or uniting of different 
ideas. But these distinctions and definitions are faulty 
in very considerable articles. For it is fax from being 
true that in every judgment we form we unite two different 
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ideas, since in that proposition, God is, or indeed any 
other which regards existence, the idea of existence is 
no distkinct idea, which we unite with that of the object; 
and, in this case, we can form a proposition which con- 
tains only one idea." In short, the ,istinction between 
judgment and conception here begins to disappear, and, indeed, 
Hume tells us that in another place (2.89, Everywan Book I 
Part 3 Section b) that in the case of having a present im- 
pressionof sense, and believing in the existence of that im- 
pression, iihere is no foundation for any aisuinction what - 
eveit between the so- called simple survey, and the existential 
judgment. .Belief or assent, he admits, always attends the 
senses, but "To believe is in the case to reel an immediate 
impression of tn.e senses. It is merely the force and livli- 
ness of perception that constitutes the first act of judg- 
mens. " 
Now Réd} was evidently much struc by the doctrine of 
Hume, and the first seven xlit pag.s of his third philosophical 
oration (Aberueen, 17óy -) are devoi,ed to a discussion of 
it. He begins by explaining the traditional distinction 
(or what, following Hume, he regarus as auch) between simple 
survey, or as he calls it, simple apprehension, and judgment 
in m-eh the same way as Hume does but more fully and clearly. 
"ser Apprehensionem intellegunt philosophi nudum rei cujusvis 
conceptw,., aunque ulla atiiïmat..one vel negatione. Ea 
vero intellectus operatio, quae aliqua affirmatione vel 
NztxaK negatione enunciatur Judicium dicitur. Ita vir sapiens, 
est qui pauca loquitur, est Propositio, Judicii signum." 
(P.28 Oration, Aberdeen University Press 1937) - whereas 
'vir sapiens' alone is an apprehension. In the sequel he 
proceeds to raise the question which Hume had raised as to 
whether this sort of distinction makes sense when applied 
to sense perception, and produces the answer that while the 
older philosophers misuse the distinction in the case in 
question and so are open to the Humeian ciriticism, the dis- 
tinction, nevertheless, when properly understood, does have 
an application there. "A host of philosophers teach that 
sensation is simple apprehension. But now, although it is 
clear enough what they mean by sensation - namely those 
operations carried on by the medium of the external senses; 
nevertheless it seems to me that these operations are judg- 
ments rL.ther than simple apprehensions. I cannot look upon 
this learned assembly without believing in its present ex- 
istence, and feeling bashful before it. In one ana the 
same act, we apprehend a sensible thing, and believe that 
to exist which our senses testify, relying on no other evidence 
than sensation itself. In all sensation therefore there is 
apprehension, not simple (bare and by itself) but con- 
joined with judgment and belief." Accordingly this operation 
-96- 
(simple apprea.eiision) although it be the simplest, is not the 
first operation of mind. Judgment, Reid concludes, precedes 
simple apprehension, and we form simple apprehension from 
natural judgments oy resolution and analysis. That is to 
say, to take Heia's above example, it is only after I 
believe in the existence of my present object of vision, the 
learned assembly, that I can, so to speak, suspend my belief, 
and consider the object of vision purely phenomenogically, i.e. 
as a sense- datum. In this way and in this way only, according 
tcb Reid, we can establish the distinction Hume denies between 
an existential judgment of sense, and a mere impression of 
sense. 
Now this theme is fundamental in Reid, and the purpose 
of the chapter we have been studying (Essay 6 Chapter I) 
is, Reid tells us himself, to develop fully his criticisms 
of the thesis of hume we have been citing. "Sometimes he 
(Mr. Hume) maiitains that judgment and reasoning resolve 
themselves in,o ;,oiuceptions, and are nothing but particular 
ways of conceiving objects; and he says, that an opinion or 
belief may be mast accurately defined, . lively idea related 
to, associatea ::ith, a present - Treatise of 
Human Nature, v oi. I P.172 (i.e. page- reference miven by 
Reid to.the mein passage cited by us above) I have endeavoured, 
in the first chapter of the essay (i.e. in our chapter, Essay 6 
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Chapter I) to show that judgment is an oDerationbf the mind 
specifically aisuirict from the bare conception of an object. 
I have also cunsicaered his notion of belief, in treating 
the theory concerning memory." (Essay 6, Chapter III P.433). 
Reid's disc ssion of this topic in Essay 6 Chapter I 
is clearer than anything he says elsewhere; and for one 
thing, he enaules __s to understand the relation between a 
simple apprehension on trae one hand, and a simple idea or 
impression, in Hume's sense, on the other. A simple im- 
pression, he seems L o say, is a simple apprehension of a 
simple or elementary aspect of a thing, and he goes on to 
indicate in wLlat sense a state of mind like that may be said 
to occur. "That I may not be mistaken, it may be observed 
that I do not say that abstract notions or other accurate 
notions of things, after they have been formed, cannot be 
barely conceived without any exercise of judgment about 
them. I doubt not that they may; but what I say is, that, 
in their first formation in the mind at least, there must 
be some exercise of juugment. " 
Now still keeping to the question of the meaning of 
Reid's peculiar terminology Mere, let us supply by way of 
comment on the language in that passage one or two extracte 
from Essay o Chapter 3. First, then, take this declaration: 
"that hinaers me from attetiaing to the whiteness of the 
paper before me, without applying that colour to any other 
object. The whiteness of this individual object is an 
abstract conception but not a general one, when applied 
to one individual only," and, second, take Reid's elucidation 
later, in the same passage, of the notions implicit here: 
"the whiteness of this sheet is one thing, whiteness is 
another; the conceptions signified by these two forms of 
speech are as different as the expfiessions; the first sig- 
nifies an individual quality really existing, and is not a 
general conception, though it be an abstract one; the second 
signifies a general conception" (which is also an abstract 
one). Now the point Reid tries to bring out by this contrast 
is that it is one thing to say "I see that A is white i.e. 
A resembles B in whiteness, though not in other respects" and 
quite another thing to say "I see the whiteness of A, anu 
nothing but that disregarding its other qualities." Dolt now, 
apparently this latter case might well be regarded as "the 
barely conceiving of - i.e. the apprehending without judgment 
- the abstract aspect of the things" (conceive = apprehend, 
be aware of.) and the former case might well be regarded as 
the judgment of perception, corresponding thereto, and if 
this is so, tíien Reid's point is that the second sort of 
mental operation Faust always be previous to the first sort.. 
Finally, to make the doctrine clearer still, let us note 
that the paragraph under review - i.e. the one beginning : 
"Tn.at I may not be mistaken" and allowing simple apprehen- 
sions of the simple, provided they be posterior -co judg- 
ments of perception - is put as a sort of introductory 
paragraph to the discussion of the presuppositions of judg- 
ment which we studie4, at length. That is to say, for Reid, 
apprehension without judgment of an aspect of a thing pre- 
supposes a p,: evious judgment as to the distinct resem- 
blance of the thing in respect of th, aspect in question to 
another thing, just as this distinct judgment presupposes, 
in its turn, a previous judgment as vague resemblance of the 
one thing to the other. 
So far, we have not done more than educidate Reid's tar - 
minology, and it is time now to consider the point of his 
insistence on this topic of simple apprehension - to use 
Vie short name. Now the important thing here is that, when 
he is speaking (as in the quotatiJn under review) of 
"abstract and other accurate notions of things" ana of the 
possibility Qf their being "barely conceived" (i.e. simply 
apprehended) " without any exercise of judgment about them ", 
the sort of awareness he has in minci is, roughly speaking, 
the awareness of geometrical points, that is to say, the 
awareness identified by Hume with "having simple impressions 
of the coloured and of the solid atoms" Accordingly the 
central thesis tnat Reid is here advancing might be, 
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provisionally, aescribed as a thesis to the effect that the 
simple apprehension of points comes not at the start of the 
perception of extended objects, as Hume would have it, 
but at the eno. of the process. 
In order co get a more precise view of what Reid is 
about, we must look more closely at Hume's doctrine about 
mathematics. Geuifietry, Hume asserts, "is ;perfectly in- 
telligible only upon the supposition of the composition of 
extension by inaivisible points or atoms" i.e. of colour 
or solidity, ou., at the same time, he accepts thik doctrine 
only in a very qualified form, and his considered opinion 
is that geometrica.i notions, while intelligible in prin- 
ciple only on sonie such atomistic hypothesis, are, in prac- 
tice and as a matter of emoirical fact, int elligible on no 
hypothesis whatsoever. Take for example what he says of 
equality. The uefenders of the hypothesis of indivisible 
points, he asserts, "have the readiest and justest answer 
to the question. They need only reply that lines are equal, 
when the number of points in each are equal. But, though 
this answer be just as well as obvious, yet I affirm, that 
this standaru of equality is entirely useless since the 
points which enter into the composition of my line are so 
minute and so confounded with each other that it is utterly 
impossible for the mind to compute their number. (P.51, 
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Treatise I Everym :.n: abridged). Moreover Hume says much 
the same thing about the notion of a straig .t line. "You 
must surely have home idea. of a right line, to which this a 
line (the ben;, iihe) does not agree. Do you therefore mean 
that it takes hot 'the _.points in the same order, and by the 
same rule, as is peculiar and essential to a right line? 
If so, I must . uio4.-m you, that bedides that, in judging in 
this manner you allow that extension is composed of indivisible 
points (which is perhaps more than you intend - i.e which 
commits you to the Humeian hypothesis), besides this, I say, 
that there is no such firmness in our senses or imagination, 
as to determine when such an order is violated or. preserved." 
(P.57 Everyman, Treatise I. abridged). That is to say, we 
get some sort of a clear notion of a straight line by re- 
garding it as a series of points in complete continuity with 
one another, but at the same.time no use can be made of 
this definition, owing to "the natural infirmity and un- 
steadiness of our senses when employed on such minute ob- 
jects" as minima visibilia, i.e. as empirical points. 
Now the object Reid has before him in all this discussion 
is to reply to this Humeian view of geometry. His point, 
in brief, is that all Hume's paradoxes about the practical 
impossibility of making sense of the geometrical notions dis- 
appear if one adopts the hypothesis that we begin with vague 
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impressions. That is to say, he is trying to argue that 
Hume's difficulties are due to his regarding the hypothesis 
of our beginning with simple clear -cut impressions as being 
in principle the only intelligible hypothesis. 
"There are," he begins, "notions of the objects of sense 
which are gross and indistinct, and there areothers which 
are dittinct and scientific, The former can be got from 
the senses alone, but the latter cannot be obtained with- 
out some degree of judgment. The clear and accurate notions 
(cf. above "abstract and other accurate notions of things 
barely conceived ") which geometry presents to us of a point, 
a right line, an angle, a square and others of that kind, 
can find no admittance in a mind which has no degree of 
judgment. They are not properly ideas of the senses, nor 
are they got by compounding ideas of the senses, +fut by 
analysing the ideas or notions we get by the senses into 
their simplest elements and again combining these elements 
into various accurate and elegant forms which the senses 
never did, nor can exhibit. 
"Had Ur. Hume attended only to this, it ought to Lave 
prevented a very gold attempt, which he has prosecuted through 
fourteen pages of his "Treatise of Human Nature" to prove 
that geometry is founded on ideas that are not exact and 
axioms that are not precisely true. The principle he reasons 
from is, that every simple idea is a copy of a. preceding 
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impress- ion, and therefore in its precision and accuracy, 
can never go beyond the original. From which he reasons 
in this manner : No man ever saw or felt a line so straight 
that it might not out another equally straight, in two 
or more points. Therefore there can be no idea of such 
a line. I agree with this acute author, that, if we could 
i ulm no notion of points, lines and surfaces more accurate 
t as i those we see and handle, there cutkld be no mathematical 
demonstration. But every lean that has understanding can 
fabricate in his own mind those elegant ana accurate forms 
of mathematical lines, surfaces and solids. The Medicean 
Venus is not a copy of the block of marble from which it 
was made. It is true, that this elegant statue was formed 
out of the ruae block, and, that too, by a manual operation 
which, in a literal sense, we may cail abstraction. Math- 
ematical no funs are formed in the understanding by an 
abstraction ui another kind, out of the rude perceptions of 
the senses." (The quotation consists of an amalgamation 
of the passage in Essay 6 Chapter I wii,h a restatement of 
the very same point in Essay 6i Chapter 6.). 
Reid says little more on the present subject, and his 
intention probably was that or supplying sosie hints towards 
answering Hume's difficulties about gemmetry. . But Are these 
hints fruitful hints? By way of deciding this question, it 
will be- sufficient to look into Hume's opinions of the straight 
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line from Reid's point of view, and, to this end, to Quote 
a relevant passage from Treatise I. "It is true, math- 
ematics pretend whey give an exact definition of a right 
line when they say, it is the shortest way betwixt two 
2oints. BJt Lhe first place I observe, that this is more 
roerly the discovery of one of the properties of a right 
line, than a just a.efinition of it. For I ask r ny one, if, 
upon the mention of a right line, he thinks not immediately on 
such a particular appearance, and if it is not by accident 
only that he considers this property? A right line can be 
comprehended alone, but this definition is unintelligible 
without a comparison with other lines, which we conceive 
more extelided. common life, it is as 
a maxim, that the straightest way is always the shortest; 
which would be as absurd as to say, the shortest way is 
always the shortest, if our ic.èa of a, right line was not 
different frail' that of the shortest war betwixt two points. 
Secondly, I repea.0 that I have already established, that we 
have precise iuea of equality and inequality, shorter or longer 
than of a right line or of a curve; and conseeuenuly the 
one can never afford us a perfect standard for the other." 
Here let us put Reid to the test by inquiring to what 
extent the line of approach he suggests suceeds in meeting 
Hume's point. TO egin then with Huine's statement : "A 
right line can ue comprehended alone, but this definition 
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is unintelligible without a comparison with other lines," 
its point ,. let as hote, is that when we see nothing but 
isolated, disconnected lines, straightish and not so straight, 
we feel some kihd of difference between them, and are in a 
position to give them different names, but can't say where 
the difference lies, or make any statement about it what- 
soever, but that when we see a number of lines of a similar 
sort all intersecting in the same two points, ve can now 
as the result of a comparison say something about the 
difference in virtue of which we named them before - namely 
we can say in regard to it that the straighter the line, the 
shorter it is. But now, the comparison spoken of here is 
obviously a sort of judgment, and according to Reid's view 
of the matter, what we have been doing here is to pass by 
way of juagpent from s notion of the object . of sense in 
question, the si, aight line, which is gross and indistinct 
to one which 1s, y comparison, distinct and scientific. 
Even so, however, what about the retort to this Reidian 
view already i...Nlìcit in Hume's paragraph - the .retort, 
namely, to the effect that it is quite inappropriate to 
describe the knowleuge we start from, and the knowledge we 
subsequently attain by the comparison in question as being 
respectively a vague knowledge and a distinct knowledge of 
one and the same fact, since, on Hume's showing, we are 
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concerned here not with one and the same fact, throughout, 
but rather first with one fact discoverable by itself and 
without reference to what comes after, and second, with dif- 
ferent additional facts, which it recuires a quite separate, 
and special experience to learn? But now, according to 
Reid, it does not follow in cases lie the present one that 
because the facts are known-by separate ex>>eriences, they 
are therefore sheerly distinct and not intrinsically connected. 
"It is certain that attributes which in their nature are 
absolutely inseparable from their subject and from one another, 
may be disjoined in our conception; one cannot exist without 
the other, but one can be conceived without the other. Thus 
all the properties of a circle are inseparable from the nature 
of a circle, and may be demonstrated from its definition; 
yet a man may have a perfectly distinct notion of a circle 
who knows very few of those properties of it which mathem- 
atics have demonstrated." (Intellectual Powers, Essay 5, 
Chapter 3). That is to say, considered in the light of 
Reid's remark's, Hume's conclusions about the analogous case 
of the straight line would seem to be bound up with a very 
dubious application of the favourite Humeian principle that 
"whatever objects are separable are also ix distinguishable, 
ana whatever objects are distinguishable are also different." 
(Treatise I. Everyman, P.26). 
But, in the same place, how, it may be asked, would Reid 
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set about defending his claim that the mathematical "idea 
of a. stráìght line is not copied from any impression of sight 
or touch, but must have a different origin and a more per- 
fect standard "? (Essay 6 Chapter I). On the subject Reid 
is silent, pub presumably he might have argued that in 
addition to a group of lines actually drawn between two 
points, there is no limit to the number or lines that might 
be conceived also connecting the two points, and that among 
these conceivable lines there must be one which would not 
deviate with an upward or downward bend. Not that Reid 
ever does commit himself to any such proposition, but the 
significant thing is that he affirms the principle of some 
such operation, and repudiates the antithetic principle, when 
he is giving his opinion about Hume's fundamental views 
about space, his views of extension as composed of extention- 
less points and of these points as being identical with 
minima sensibilia. "There is a limit beyond wnicn we cannot 
perceive any division of a body. The parts become too small 
to oe perceived by our senses; but we cannot believe that it 
beco,ues then incapable of being divided, or that such div- 
ision would make it not to be a body. e carry on the div- 
ision and subdivision in our thoughts far beyond the reach of 
our senses, and we can find no end to it; nay, 1 think we 
plainly discern that there can be no limit beyond which the 
division cannot be carried. For, if there by any limit to 
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this division, one of two things must necessarily happen; 
eii er we have come by uivision to a body which is extenued 
out n s no parts and is aosoluteiy indivisible; or this body 
is divisible, out as soon as it is divided it becomes no 
body (i.e. we get an xx unextended point). But these positions 
seem to be absurd, and one or the other is the necessary con- 
sequence of supposing a limit to the divisibility of matter. " 
(Intellectual Powers, Essay 2, Chapter 19). 
Now of course Reid's points against Home, as we said, 
are nothing but a series of hints, and, it should be added., 
hints that are sometimes not very well worked out. A quite 
serious example of this is to be found in the passage when 
he objects to Une Humeian principle that whatever is disting- 
uishable is separable - the passage, that is to say, containing 
the remarks quoted above about the pròperties of a circle. 
What he does here is to speak both of the relationship between 
a body's solidity and its figure and of the relationship of 
the various geometrical properties of the body's figure to 
one another, without ever raising a question as to how far 
the one sort of relationship is different from the other, for 
example, as to whether the figure of a circle and its colour 
or solidity are not distingüishäble but inseparable in one 
sense whereas the properties of the circle's figure - for 
example, its having its circumference at every point equi- 
distant from Its centre, and its having its circumference and 
its Ammeter related in length to one another by the ratio 
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TT-r - are distinguishable but inseparable in Quite another 
sense. 
Obviously, however, there is a good deal of sense in 
Reid's main point that Hume's treatment of geometry is the 
result of his reïusal to allo vague ideas at the initial 
stage of apprehension, and he might very well have gone on to 
criticise the whole of Hume's treatment of space -awareness in 
general on similar lines. Take for example the Question which, 
in our opinion, had a great deal of importance indeed for 
Hume's position as a whole in regard to space - namely the 
question as to whether we are immediately aware of the so- called 
angular distances between the start; on this subject apparently, 
one of Hume's chief reasons fav denying us an immediate aware- 
ness of distance and spatiality is that Ise can't be aware, 
in this situation, of the precise distance between the lights, 
because the dark intervals, being "without parts and composition" 
i. e. being wlt.t definite visibly bounded parts, are im- 
measurable, and that, not being aware, accordingly, of the 
exact lengths between, we can't 11,:e aware of length and spatial - 
ity at all. As it is, however, Reid doesn't carry his theory 
into this kind of to )ic, but contents himself with the bare 
but repeated assertion that we do in fact apprehend this 
so- called angular distance is mediately, and without knowing 
anything of the angles in question, and, for the rest, passes 
by almost in silencer Hume's ingenious attempt at the "logical 
construction" of notions like, "being in, and out of, contact" 
from muscular and organic sensations. By this time we have 
said enough about the use to which Reid puts this distinction 
between the judgment of sense and the simple apprehension 
of sense, and it only remains for us to round off the dis- 
cussion in this chapter by calling attention to a fact so 
far passed over in silence by us - namely the fact that Reid 
has very decided views as to the metaphysical implications 
or presuppositions of the said distinction. Now the fact in 
qué.stion is that Reid regards the part of his doctrine dam# 
that we have been studying as implying a doctrine of abstract 
gener.r i ideas, and, in order to explain his insistence on this 
Doint we must take a step back from the chapter we have been 
studying (Essay 6 Chapter I) to the final pages of its im- 
mediate predecessor (Essay 5 Chapter 6). 
As some of the topics to be discussed are fairly familiar, 
we will plunge "in media+es ". "The third argument" (of 
Hume) "is this It is a principle generally received in 
pni to soppy, that everything in nature is individual; and that 
it is utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent which 
has no precise propo tj.on of sides and angles. If this, there- 
fore, be absurd in fact and reality, it must be absurd in idea, 
since nothing of which we can form a clear and didtinct idea 
is absurd or impossible." "I acknowledge" Reid continues, 
speaking in his own person, "it to be impossible that a 
triangle should really exist wAich has no, precise pro- - 
portion of sides and angles; and impossible that any being 
should exist ithich is not an individual being; for I think 
a being and an individual being mean the same thing; but 
that there can be no attributes common to any individuals 
I do not a.cknowleuge. Thus to many figures that really ex- 
ist it may be common that they are triangles; and to many 
bodies twat exist it may be cum Jon that they are fluid. 
Triangle and fluid are not beings, they are attributes of 
beings. 
"As' to the principle here, that nothing of which we can 
form a clear and rJ.istinct idea is absurd or impossible, I 
refer the reader to what is said upon it, Chapter 3 Essay 
44. It is evident that, in every mathematical demonstration 
ad absurdum, of which kind_ almost one half of mathematics 
consists, we are rqquired to suppose, and consequently to con- 
ceive, a thing that is impossible. From teat supposition 
we reason, until we come to a conclusion which is not only 
impossible but absurd. As this is the nature of all demon - 
station and absurdum, it is evident (I do not say we can nave 
a clear and distinct idea ) but that we can clearly and dis- 
tinctly conceive things impossible. 
"The rest of Mr. Hume's itimmammli discourse on this 
subject is employed in explaining how an individual idea, 
annexed to a general term, may serve all the -purposes in 
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reasoning which have been ascribed to abstract general 
ideas." (he means the rest of Hume's discourse is employed 
in showing that there is no need to postulate "the attributes 
common to many individuals" mentioned above) "Upon this ac- 
count" (of Humes) "I shall," Reid continues, make some re- 
marks." "He allows that we find a resemblance among several 
objects, and such a resemblance as leads,us to apply t:..e same 
name to all ofthem. This concession is sufficient to show 
that we have general conceptions. There can be no resemblance 
in objects which nave no common attribute, and if there be 
attributes belonging in common to several objects, and, in 
man, a faculty to observe and conceive these and give names 
to them, this is to have general conceptions. (He means of 
course, abstract general conceptions). 
"I believe, indeed, we may have," Reid continues, im- 
mediately after the above statement, taking un now on to 
familiar ground, "an indistinct perception of resemblance 
without knowing wherein it lies etc. etc." But we need not 
quote what we quoted cefure, and we can now proceed to comment 
on the whole of the above extract, insisting, in the meantime, 
that it forms one continuwus passage and that nothing has been 
left out in our citation bar redundancies. 
Now there are two gmite distinct points made in this 
set of paragraphs, of which the first is as follows. According 
-113- 
to Reid's frequently expressed view (see, especially the 
end or Essay o,Chapter 2) the fact that we can define a 
triangle and discuss its nature without referring to its. 
lengths of sides or sneasureüent of angles or time and place 
of existence, consti lutes prima facie evidence that we can 
form an abstract general idea of a triangle, answering 
in some sort to Locke's notorious description of such an 
entity. That said, however, he has at once to take into 
account the sort. of obj ectin Berkeley or Hume would raise 
to this sort of claim, namely that this abstract general 
idea of a triangle, in the Lockeian acceptation of the term, 
can be dismissed out of hand as something self- evidently 
inconceivable and absurd. Now the main point of Reid's reply 
to this standard objection only begins to emerge when we fol- 
low up his reference to Essay 4 Chapter 3, and turns out 
to be point to the effect that Hume is indulging in quite 
illtgiti.na.te tactics in pretending to settle in this off- 
hand intuitive way the question of the validity or invalidity 
of the hypothesis under discussion. "Mathematics have, in 
many cases, proved some things to be possible, and others to 
be impossible, which without demonsea.tion, would not have been 
believed. Yet I have never found that any mathematician 
has attempted to prove a thing to be possible because it 
c >n be conceived_; or impossible because it cannot be con- 
ceived. \Thy is uhis maxim not applied to determine whether 
it is possible to square a circle? - a point about which very 
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many eminent lii tuc-a.ticians have differed. It is easy to 
conceive that, In Che infinite series of numbdrs and inter- 
mediate fractions, some one number, integral or fractional, 
may bear the same ratio to another, as the side of a square 
beers to its diagonal; yet however conceivable this may be, 
it may be demonstrated to be impossible." That is to say, 
Reid is concerned to contend that Hume is taking in regard 
to the point at issue a. sort of arbitrary "short way" which 
no mathematician would dream of adopting in the case of 
analagous questions in that field, or, to put the matter more 
clearly, Reid's :oint is that the hypothesis of abstract 
general ideas can't lore discussed independently of arguments, 
an., so to speak, a certain intellectual content. Now the 
second part of the long citation from Reid - the part, that is, 
which we have analysed before - is, one might say, very much 
taken up with this question of contents and presuppositions. 
That is to say, not only is the contention Reid puts forward 
a contention to the effect that abstract general ideas pre- 
suppose distinct resemblances, but, in1ddition, this claim 
as to the existence of a connection between the doctrine of 
abstract general Fleas and the doctrine of the vagueness of 
initial experiences itself presupposes in its turn a good 
deal Reid has already said in the earlier parts of this 
present chapter, and other parts of his book relevant to 
the present'chapter,nota.bly the Essay 3,Chapter 4, to which he 
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has already referred us back. But now, .looked at from 
this standpoint; Reid's leading thought here may perhaps 
be expressed as follows. The anti- nominalist hypothesis of 
abstract general Edeas, he says, beginning with a point he 
doesn't expect to be questioned, is a hypothesis to the ef- 
fect that "there can be attributes common to many individual 
objects ", that - to take Reid's own example - linen and snow 
have the attribute of whiteness in common. Now this hypothesis 
that individual objects like these (i.e. ordinary objects) 
have something literally in common, he continues, here again 
making a point generally accepted, is a hypothesis to the ef- 
fect that the individuals in question distinctly resemble 
one another, or - to use a fashionable equivalent - resemble 
one another in a. certain respect but not in other respects. 
Now the question at issue with Hume, he proceeds, is a 
question as to whether this hypothesis of resemblance in a 
certain respect is an indispensable hypothesis for explaining 
the facts of the case in joint, that is, for explaining our 
co.cinon sense beliefs about, and our ordinary mode of alluding 
to the linen and the snow, and it is only in his answer to 
this question that Reid introduces any point that is a relative 
novelty. In the first place, Reid contends that the hypo- 
thesis of resemblance in a certain respect is a necessary 
hypothesis if the two individual objects in question - the 
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snow and the linen - are each indissolubly complex, and 
is an unnecessary hypothesis it the individuals in question 
are not uìti riabely complex, but are each composed of simple 
objects like Huitie's atoms of colour, end, in the second 
place, in explanation of the former part of this contention, 
Reid would apparently say that the hypothesis of abstract gen- 
eral ideas is indispensable in the case of the ultimate com- 
plexity of the individuals in question, because to call an 
individual object like the snow complex is to say that its 
qualities are not clearly and sharply distinguishable, if 
it is regarded b;;, itself and without reference to other obk4 
jects, and because, in that case our ordinary awareness of 
the individual object as having distinct qualities - our 
awareness of the snow as white - can arise only by comparing 
this individual object with another object like the linen, 
and by finding a resemblance in a certain respect. 
Now in case it should be thought we are reading into 
our author thirigo which aren't there, the following quot- 
ations are peculiarly instructive - the first one from an 
early page of the present chapter where Reid is 010A.ning 
his Position generally in reference to Locke, Berkeley and 
Hume, and the second one from the aforesaid Essay 4, Chapter 
3, which we may remark, is taken up with what Reid regards 
as the most serious mistakes of his predecessors. "It seems. 
to me, that, on this question, Mr. Locke and his two an- 
tagonists have divided the truth between them. He-saw 
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very clearly that the power of forming abstract general 
conceptions is one of the most distinguishing powers of the 
human mind, and _Buts a specific difference between ,,pan a.nd 
the brute creation. But he did not see that this power is 
perfectly irreconsi_Lable to his doctrine concerning ideas. 
His opponents saw this inconsistency but, instead of re- 
jecting the bypotaesis of ideas, they explain away the power 
of abstraction, and leave no specific distinction between 
tn.e human understanding and that of the brutes." The first 
quotation, then, shows that Reid does believe in the logical 
connection of nomina.lisd and of the uuctrines o2 simples 
his doctrine concerning ideas}'). 
But now for the second quotation. "A similar mistake, 
wtlim is carried through the whole of Er. Loclie's essay, may 
riere be mentioned. It is that our simplest ideas or con - 
ceptions are got immediately by Ane senses, and the complex 
afterwards forwed oy compounding them. 1 apprehend it is 
far otherwise. Nature presents no object tö %ur senses that 
is not complex. Thus by our senses we perceive bodies of 
various kinds; but every body is a complex object; it has 
length, breadth and thickness; it has figure and colour and 
various other sensible qualities; and I apprehend that brute 
animals, who have the same senses as we have cannot separate 
the different qualities belonging to the same subject and 
have only a complex and confused notion of the whole. Such 
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also would be our notion of the objects of sense, if we 
had not superior powers of understanding by which we can 
analyse the complex object, abstract every particular from 
the rest and form a distinct conception of it." Now when 
Reid speaks here of "our superior powers of understanding 
by which we can abstract" as compared with the inferior merit 
of the brute, he can hardly be speaking of anything else than 
of "the power of forming abstract general ideas" mentioned 
in the former quotation (and frequently - cf. the $ey- tu.otation 
on distinct resebiance) as putting a "specific difference 
between man and the brute creation ". Accordingly, his point 
in this quotation is that there is a connection between the 
doctrine of abstract general ideas and the doctrine of indiv- 
idual objects as complex also the doctrine of vague experience. 
Now - by way of comment, - it is not difficult to see 
what Reid probabiy means by saying that Hume is right re- 
fusing to combine a doctrine of general abstract ideas with 
his theory of simples. The hypothesis of individual objects 
as composed of simple entities is the sort of hypothesis 
that allows awareness of colour a ;art from awareness of ex- 
tension, and allows that awareness of colour by itself in 
the form of awareness of Humets atoms of colouf. But now if 
- as on this hypothesis one certainly might, - one had an 
experience of notaing but a series of these coloured atom, 
then, in regard to this experience, the nominalist view would 
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have to prevail since on4would here be able to speak of one 
atom as like or as unlike another, without being in the least 
able to speak of the likeness or unlikeness in question, as 
likeness or unlikeness in a certain respect, i. e. to speak 
with the antinoinivalist formula. Moreover there can be 
little doubt that what Reid says here of Hume holds good of 
one, at any rate, of the discussions of abstraction in the 
Treatise - the une on page 41 of the Everyman i.e. in Treat- 
ise I, Part 2, bee-Lion 3. In that passage - the one about 
the purple color., Hume certainly combines the one contention 
that the abstract idea we form of ettensibn,is not an abstract 
general idea with the other contention that the idea of ex- 
perience is nothing but the idea of composition of coloured 
points, and it looks as if some Ednd of a connection is im- 
plied between the nominalism and atomism of the kind indicated 
above. 
But here, by way of further comment - this time on Reid's 
own counter- position, let us seek whether Reid is being al- 
together fart to Hume on the present subject. Granted Hume's 
statements in the passage about the purple points answers 
pretty well to Reid's description of the Humeian position, 
but what about Hume's other utterance on the same theme, the 
passage about the white globe, the black globe and the white 
cube? The pages in question, taken by themselves, do not 
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involve any reference to atoms of colour, or, for that 
matter, to nominalism, and the doctrine they teach, it might 
be suggested, bears a considerable resemblance to Reid's 
own, being a doctrine to the effect that if an ordinary com- 
plex object like a white globe is regarded alone and without 
reference to other objects, the common sense distinction be- 
tween its share and its colour cannot be drawn. 
Reid himself would apparently repudiate any attempt to 
liken his own position with the position Hume takes here. This 
point is brought out by ion ôbiter dictum, put in apparently 
as a final flourish at the very end of the chapter we have 
been reva7.ewing - Essay 5 Chapter 6. "He tells us gravely 'that 
in a globe of white marble the figure and the colour are in- 
distinguishable and are in effect the same'. How fodtlish 
have mankind been to give different names, in all ages and in 
all languages, to things indistinguishable, and in effect the 
same. Henceforth in all books of siience and of entertain - 
ment we may substitute figure for colour and colour for figure. 
By t11is we shall make numberless curious discoveries, without 
danger of error.' 
Now the thing that Reid takes exception to here is very 
likely Hume's claim that a uniformly white globe, if regarded 
alone and without reference to anything else presents it- 
self as - to use Hume's own term - simple; simple, that is 
to say, in the sense of not having visually distinct parts, 
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i.e. parts distinct in colour, in different regions. For 
that matter, Reid, when dealing with the subject-of 
vision, is evidently prepared to regard our experience of 
uniform colour as the experience not of something simple 
but of something complex. "In this case, the acr.tired 
perception in a sense obliterates the original one; the sphere 
is seen to be of uniform colour, though originally there 
would have' appeared a gradual variation of colour, i.e. the 
eye would have perceived only tw.) dimensions and a gradual 
variation of colour on the different sides of the object." 
In short, accordin ; to Reid, even in thit experience, the 
regions of the object woula be visually distinct from one an- 
other, in the sense at any rate of being vaguely demarcated 
by the gradual differences of shade. ( quotation from Essay. 2, 
Chapter 20). 
But now to put aside guess -work and to stick more 
closely to the facts - it is very likely not this latter 
phenomenological consideration of Vision that determined 
Reid to repudiate Hume's treatment of the white sphere, 
out ratner the other wider consiaeration first mentioned - 
namely Reid's suspicions of the doctrine of the initial 
xttxpx simple. Now in order to support our contention here, 
iet us go back to the quite central passage it Essay 6, 
Chapter I, qu Lea above, as containing Reid's resolution 
of the paradox of perception; "it is acknowledged on all 
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hangs t.nat the first notions we have of external objects are 
got uy the external senses alone, ana probably belore judg- 
ment is brought *orth, but these first notions are neither 
accurate nor are they distinct; they are gross and indistinct, 
and like the chaos, a rudis indigestoque moles." Now the 
relevant fact here is that in order to illustrate his con- 
tention, the first thing Reid does is to give his own version 
of what is virt_:ally Hume's question about the white sohere. 
"You perceive, for instance, an object white, round and a foot 
in diameter. I grant that you perceive all these attributes 
- 
of the object by sense; but if you had not been able to dis- 
tinguish the colour from the figure and both from the magn- 
itude, your senses would have only given you one complex 
and confused notion of all these mingled together." According 
to Reid, then, if one took >wpy the judgment i. e. abstract 
general i.aeas i.e. the experience of similarity in a certain 
respect, no thus reduces oneself to the experience of the 
wïlite ball by itself, one's max experience would be that of 
something " inaistinct and complex ", ana not of something 
simple. 
ghat saga, we come to the ena of the expose &ion of Reia's 
doctrine so iar as it is contained in the two successive 
cna.pters - Essay ö Chapter 6, and Essay 6, chapter I, ana 
are left with the impression -hhat these chapters contain a 
fairly systematic body of teaching. There remains, nowever, 
the question as to whetner one uoctrine Reia teaches in these 
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c;_apters is consistent wltin une aoctri.ne he teaches else- 
:.-here, and, fur the purpose of dealing with this question, 
it is necessary to draw attention to a passage containing 
a doctrine apparently inconsistent with the above doctrine, 
and, in the opinion of Dugald Stewart, really inconsistent 
with it. 
The passage in question occurs at the beginning of 
Chapter 3 in this same Essay{5, and contains Reid's intro- 
ductory remarl-s on the topic. He is discussing generalisation 
i.e. noting two separate things to have an attribute in com- 
mon, and abstraction i.e. distinguishing the attributes of 
a single thing from one another, and he speaks as follows. 
"It is difficult to say which of them goes first a 
comme-ote &that . -nei hes -off s 
f4011110* or whether they are not so closely connected that neither 
can claim the proceaure. For, on the one hand, to perceive 
an agreement between two or more objects in the same attri- 
bute seems to re-uire nothing; more than to compare them to- 
gether. A savage, upon seeing snow and chalk, would find 
no difficulty in perceiving that they have the same colour. 
Yet, on the other hand, it seems impossible that he should 
observe this agreement without abstraction - that is dis- 
tinguishing in his conception the colour, wherein these two 
objects agree, from the other r _alities wherein they disagree. 
"It seems therefore that we cannot generalise without some 
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degree of abstraction; but I apDrehend a may abstract 
without generalising. From what hinders me from attending 
to the whiteness of the paper before me, without applying 
that colour to any other object. The whiteness of this 
individual object is an abstract conception, but not a gen- 
eral one, when ap..died to one individual only. These 
two operations, however, are subservient to each other; 
for the more attributes we observe and distinguish in any 
one individual, the more agreements we shall discover be- 
tween it and other individuals. 
Let us set aside for the present the alleVged contra- 
diction between this doctrine of Essay 5, Chapter 3, and the 
doctrine of Essay 6, Chapter I, and look at the present 
passage, or rather ail of it except the opening sentence 
in the light of its context. Now on the very next page, 
and in the coarse of an attempt to elucidate the ambiguous 
paragraphs at the beginning, Reid speaks as follows. "It 
is certain," Reid says, "that there are innumerable attrib- 
utes that are really common to many individuals." But he 
goes on, "There are some attributes expressed by general 
wsrçs, of which this may seem more doubtful. Such are 
the qualities which are inherent in their several sub- 
jects. It may be said that every subject hath its own qual- 
ities, and that ti,hich is the quality of one subject cannot 
be the quality c another subject. Thus the whiteness of the 
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Sheet I write upon cannot be the whiteness' of another sheet, 
though a e called white. - To this I answer, that the 
whiteness O1 -n,_.0 sheet is one thing, whiteness is another; 
the conceptions signified by these twu forms of speech are 
as different as the ex.ressionz. The first signifies an in- 
dividual quality really existing, and is not a general con- 
ception, though it be an abstract one; the second signifies 
a generai conception which implies no existence, but may 
be predicated of everything that is white, and in the same 
sense. On this account, if one should say that the whiteness 
of this sheet is the whiteness of another sheet, every man 
perceives this to be absurd; but when he says both sheets 
are white, this is true and perfectly understood. It appears 
therefore, that the general names of qualities, as well as 
of other attributes are applicable to many individuals in the 
same sense." (i.e. that the attributes tao are common to 
many individuals). 
Now Reid here is obviously opposing those nominalists 
who say that talk of this and that object as being white, 
i.e. of having whiteness in common is, in the last analysis, 
reducible to nothing but talk of the whiteness of this ob- 
ject and the whiteness of that object. Or, if we want Me5d's 
point in a somewhat more up -to -date form, it appears to 
amount to this that it is a serious error to confuse the 
state of mind normally called something liKe "seeing the 
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object to be white" with the other state of mind normally 
called something like "seeing the whiteness of the -object" 
by claiming both in the last resort to be identical with an 
alleged state of mind., not normally mentioned or recognised, 
but apparently closer to the latter than to the former, - a 
state of mind in fact called by philosophers "seeing white 
here now." 
Let us now proceed to relate the doctrine here to the 
passage at the beginning of the same chapter Reid and there 
to ld.ok at both in the light of Essay 6, Chapter I. In the 
first place, it must be fairly obvious that the two sides 
of Reid's basic distinction here between "the whiteness of 
the sheet," on the one hand, and tie "whiteness" on the other, 
correspond _pretty closely, the former to "the whiteness of 
the paper" mentioned in the earlier paragraph, the latter 
to what is said there about snow and chalk, and that the -one 
is concerned with the experience of seeing that the chalk and 
the snow are similar in respect ± of colour, and the other 
with the experience of seeing the whiteness of the snow, 
without bothering about its other qualities or indeed any 
thing else in the world. But now, in the second .place, it 
must also be fairly obvious that this distinction between 
seeing the object to be white and seeing the whiteness of the 
object correspond pretty precisely to tn.e distinction an- 
nounced in Essay 6, Chapter I between the bare conception 
apprehension without judgment) of the aspect of a thing 
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in abstraction =rum everything eise and the judgment of per - 
cpption corresponding thereto. Accordingly what R ld is 
very liely doiii here - i. in Essay 5, Chapter is to 
draw his favouzi Le distinction between simple apprehension 
and judgment in order to correct what he regards as a mistake 
of some nominalists, but at the same time to leave -Unmentioned 
here the point about the distinction he mentions elsewhere 
- namely that judgment proceeds simple apprehension - be- 
cause, in the argument he Is making against Condillac or some 
other nominalist, that _point is here irrelevant. 
Having tnus tried to interpret the second paragraph of 
the passage in dispute more or less independently of the first 
paragraph, we will next try to interpret that first para- 
graph quite independently of its sucessor. In doing this, 
we will concentrate our attention above all on the sentence 
which we expressly left our of account in the part of the 
work just done - that is to say, on the first sentece in 
this first ppragra.ph, the one that runs, "it is difficult to 
say which of them goes first, or whether they are not so 
closely connected that neither of tLem can claim the precedence:') 
Now this paragraph, if considered by itself, would seem to 
state a problem concerning the relations of generalisation 
and abstraction, that is, (according to Reid's definitions) 
of being aware of two or more numerically distinct things as 
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having an attriuuLe or attributes in common on the one 
hanc;., nd of br:iiig aware of one of these things as having 
various distinguishable attribAes on the other. In the 
para ;repI,., Reia would seem to be first stating something he 
regards as basic and to be taken for granted, and then to 
be indicating tle sort of problem that arises if this 
fact is taken lul granted. Now the fact constituting the 
starting- poin' is the fact that abstraction and generalisation 
are intimately .,uinected, the fact expressed near the begin- 
ning ox Essay , vrlapter I by saying, "The same faculties 
by whicn we distinguish the different attributes belonging 
to the same subject enable us licewise to observe that many 
subjects agree in certain attributes while they differ in 
others. " The problem then arising out of this fact, is, Reid 
tells us, a two -fold one; in the first place, is the con- 
nection so intimate that the one process and the other really 
cmncide and are virtually indistinguishable, or is the 
form of intimate relation such that each is, so to speak, 
a disinct phase, in one complete process? And in the second 
place, if each thus forms a phase in a process, does the 
initial phase consist of noting reseblances between dif- 
ferent things, or does it consist rather, of distinguishing 
from one another the features in one single thing. 
chat -:e want to argue now is that just as the second 
paragraph, considered independently of the first, but taken 
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.long with the kindred passage on the next page, makes sense 
when looked at in the light of Essay b,Chapter 6 and Essay 
6, Chapter I, so too this first paragraph, considered by it- 
self and interpreted in the above number 2 10 makes sense 
when looked at in i,he light of the concluding chapter of this 
essay., and the first of the next. Indeed in the resent case, 
we believe, tú_3 comparison will prove more illuminating 
than it did in the other case, in the sense that whereas on 
the former occasion we did not thereby learn anything new 
about these crucial chapters on the subject, on this latter oc- 
gam casion we are likely to clear up certain of the most 
vexing difficulties and. obscurit a in Reid. 
To make a beginning on the various points of view. Reid 
distinguishes as to the relations of abstraction and general- 
isation, it is not perhaps very difficult to identify, or at 
any rate illustrate, out of what has gone before, the one of 
these first mentioned, the one that makes generalisation and 
abstraction coincide, since Hume's theory is pretty much a 
theory of this sJrt. According to Hume, we first succeed in 
distinguishing between the shape and the colour of the white 
globe mthly when we obsetve a white globe and a black to be 
alike in one respect and unlike in another respect; and so 
too, in the other case he deals with - that of the purple 
patch - it is only afterwards when we see, patches of various 
different colours in addition to this one that we found an 
-130- 
c $S 
idea extension in the abstract that the peculiar- 
ities of colour. In short, on Hume's view, generalisation 
and abstraction, one might say, really become identical. 
Here we turn to the other view of the matter that these 
two operations of mind are quite distinct as being successive 
- phases in one complete process. Now it is this vie.; that 
Reid himself regards as :r:ore adequate to trie facts, and for 
that matter, there seem to be evident traces in Essay 5,. 
Chapter 6,and Essay 6 Chapter I,of both of the alternative 
versins of the view indicates in Reid's -_prefatory sentence, 
t:.at is, of the version that gives abstraction the precedence 
as weil as of the version that gives generalisation the pre- 
cedence. Here, for example, is a passage already familiar. 
"There is an indistinct notion of resemblance when we compare 
objects only in gross, but there is also a distinct notion 
of resemblance when we analyse the objects into their dif- 
ferent -.ttributes, and perceive them to agree in some at- 
tributes while they differ in others. It is in this case only 
that we give a name to the attributes wherein they agree 
which must be a common name because the thing signified by 
it is common. Thus, when T compare cubes of different matter, 
I perceive them to have this attribute in common, that they 
are compreeiended under six equal squares, and this attribute 
only is signified by applying the name of cube to them 
(Essay b, Chapter 6). But now without waitin7 to comment, 
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.let us cite a passage from Essay 6 Chapter I tttiat works 
over much the sane ground as the latter, but makes the 
process of Eettin; a distinct notion of a cube and Its 
attributes take Di .ce in the absence of an second cube to 
compare it with. "Sup Dose a cube of brass to be presented 
at the same time to a child of a ,:y ar old and to a man. 
The regularity of the figure will attract the attention of 
both. Both have the senses ()I ieight and tough in equal 
perfection; and, therefore, if anything be discovered in 
this object by the man that cannot be discovered by the child, 
it must be owing, not to the senses, but to some other 
faculty which the child has not yet attained." Reid has 
previously described the process, judgment, which the man 
goes' through but not the child as follows. "Before we 
can have any distinct notion or this mass, it must be analysed) 
he heterogeneous parts must be separated in our conception, 
anu the simple elements, which before lay hid in the common 
mass, must first be distinguished anu put into one whole." 
But to take up the initial passage when it speaks to the same 
effect : "By this analysis anu composition two effects are 
produced. First, from the one complex object which his sen- 
ses presentee through one of the most simple his senses can 
present, he k i. e. the man "a man of oru nary judgment ") 
educes many simple anu distinct notions of right lines, angles, 
plain surface, solid equality, parallelism; notions which tue 
child has not yet faculties to attain. Secondly, when he 
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considers the cube as compounded of these elements put 
together in a certain order, he has than and not before a 
distinct and scientific notion of a cube." 
Now, to awl appearance, there are three somewhat dif- 
ferent lines of approach to much the same set of problems, 
and, in order to make each of them clear, it will be neces- 
sary to state them all in a common terminology. Fortunately, 
this translation will hot be difficult to effect, since 
both Hume and Reid are evidently thinking of the traditional 
scholastic question of the distinction between form and 
matter, the latter speaking of cubes of a different sub- 
stance, and of a. cube of brass, the former primarily con- 
cerned with the relation of "body and body figured" and, 
while giving the question a phenomenological version in 
terms of colour and figure, nevertheless ready:_ it would 
seem, to regard "colour or substance" as alternatives. Ac- 
cordingly for the sake of clarity, let us follow Hume's 
formula rather than Reid's, and, for the sake of simplicity, 
speak of circles and squares, where they both speak of cubes 
and globes. 
That done, we can now begin to distntangle the relation 
of these three cases, beginning with the first and the 
second. Now evidently, up to a point, there is a certain 
amount of common ground between Reid and Hume here, in the 
sense tnat, for both, the mere comparison of a red square 
and a blue: square k supposing them "colour- patches ") wouìd 
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enable us in the first instance only to judge them to 
ce vaguely resenoling i.e. in some unspecifiable sense 
alir >e. The diver ;once between i ae two - I mean, of course, 
the two as examined according to the spirit ratki r than the 
letter - has, one might say, to do witn the fact tnat whereas 
Hume turns this vague notion of resemblance into a precise 
notion by bringing into comparison a third object - in this 
case, a blue circular colour patch, Reid tries to ao away 
with the vagueness by means of a part -by -part comparison of 
trie two squares in respect of their vaguely resembling regions, 
and this difference in tactics no doubt has a good deal to 
do lwe do nut say, everything to ao) with tue fact tnat 
whereas for Hume each object considered by itself or inter- 
nally is virtually a simple object, for Reid, on the other 
hand, each object is already, in itself, a vague complex, 
in virtue probably, as we have already explained, of its 
containing, in the natural way of things, differences of 
shade in its colouring. 
Let us pass now to the third case which is a crucial 
one, in the sense that it exhibits a further difference be- 
tween Reid and Hume ' over and above the difference 
constituted by Reid's explicit insistence on vagueness. The 
/point here is apparently - to put the matter in our own way 
- that, in the first place, the single blue square colour- 
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patch would present itself not merely as vaguely complex 
in the sense of having slightly different shades of blue 
in different places, but also is being vaguely regular 
in outline, and that, in the second place, if one continued 
to regard attentively the square in its singleness and with- 
out regard to any other similar object, one would never 
certainly manage to differentiate properly its attributes 
of colour and shape, but one would be able to pass from a 
vague to a precise grasp of the regularity- relations holding 
between the parts of its outline. That is to say, the claim 
here - implicit in Reid rather than explicit - is that, in 
the case of this single object, we should be able to get by 
abstraction (i.e. a form of abstraction consisting of 
"analysis and composition ") precise information as to the 
regular arrangement of its outer parts, even at a stage when 
it would be ali one to speak of the "edges of the visible 
object" and "the place where the blue stops" and "the inside 
of the visible object" as "the ,lace where the blue continues 
to shade into ogler blues." 
Now at last we are in a. position where we may venture 
a word as to the probable meaning of Reid's problem : "can 
we abstract prior to generalising ?" In the first place, we 
may note that iteid introduces htix this passage about the 
single cube of brass preparatory to his criticisms of Hume's 
views about geometry, and that when he speaks of our being 
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able to distinguish various attributes of the cube without 
comparing it with other cubes, the attributes hd refers to 
are all attributes having to do with its extension- aspect 
i.e. shape -aspect. In the second place, if the latter half 
of our above exegesis is sensible or even plausible, it would 
seem that the sort of knowledge we could get of the regular- 
ity of thè -cube is a knowledge of what is virtually the 
extension -aspect of the cube and the properties Pertaining 
thereto - although no doubt we would not get an actual 
knowledge of tkiese extension- properties in their ordinary 
sig gifica.nce until we had distinguished extension from 
colour as a result of a comparison of the object with other 
object. But, in that case, when Reid speaks of abstraction 
prior to generalisation, the sort of thing he is very li'ely 
thinking of is -- so to speak - uhe possibility of distinguis- 
hing certain of a thing's shape- attributes from one another 
prior to distinguishing the shape as such from the colour, 
or in other words, Reid is, to ail intents and purposes, 
touching up ou the präblem of the relation between, on the 
one hand, the distinction of a.thingts shape from its colour, . 
and, on the other hand, the distinction from one another of 
the properties a thing has in virtue of its shape - dis- 
tinctions which Reid equally regards as abstraction as the 
following passage will show. "It ought likewise to be 
observed, that attributes may, with perfect ease, be dis- 
tinguished and disjoined in our conception, which ca.rnot be 
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actlIally separated fnto the subject. Thus in a body, I 
can distinguish its solidity from its extension, and its 
weight from both. In extension I can distinguish length, 
breadth and thickness; yet none of these can be separated 
from the body or from on another." (the relation of solidity 
and extension are parallel it should be remarked to those of 
colour and extension) - Essay 5, Chapter Z. Here we can now 
turn back to the passage in dispute. As a -!preliminary, it 
may be remarked tnat this passage last quoted is on the same 
page, and isgiven by Reid as an illustration of the notion of 
abstraction as used in the preliminary passage, in much the 
same way as the other point used earlier, in this argument 
about the difference in meaning and usage between "whiteness" 
and "the whiteness of" is also, as we said, intended as an 
illustration of the other notions introduced into the prelim- 
inary passage. Indeed the fact that Reid _ises the Instance, 
previously discussed, of the relation of a circle's properties 
to one another, to round dff these remarkd about abstraction 
does strongly suggest that, in these opening remarks, Reid 
has in mind this nïnd of geometrical abstraction, from the 
start. 
Accordingly, we suggest the following exegesis. When 
Reid in the first paragraph says it is difficult to elucidate 
the rèlations of generalisation and abstraction, he means 
that it is difficult to work out accurately the foundations 
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or presuppositions of the various kinds of common sense 
judgment - for instance those about shape and those about 
colour o: hardness - and trace them back to the more prim- 
itive vague jddgments. But when in the second para^raph 
he refers to the existence of the case when the two are 
separated and abstraction indubitably occurs without general - 
istaion, he is apparently saying that, whatever the dif- 
ficulties as to the origins and foundations of the judgment, 
a clear and sharp distinction be drawn between the judgment, 
and the simple apprehension, that is posterior to the judg- 
ment. 
As for Dugald Stewart, who takes a very different view 
of this passage from that which we take, it is unlikely that 
he ,, ;ould raise any very strong objections to our inter- 
pretation. Witness this declaration. "In comparing Dr. 
Reid's publications at different periods of his life, it is 
interesting to observe his growing partiality for the ap- 
horistic style. Some of his Essays on the Intellectual and 
Active Powers oi Man are :little more than a series of de- 
tached paragtaphs, consisting of leading thoughts, of which 
the reader is left to trace the connection by his own saga- 
city." 
That said, we will close the controversy, and endeavour 
to pass from the half- chapter dealing with the Reidian 
doctrine of perception as judgment to 
the half dealing with 
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the Reidian doctrine of perception of an external world. 
And yet, in he .,,onntime, as a sort of poste ript to the one, 
and preface to the other, we had better say a word or two 
about the ellipses and ambiguities to which Dugald Stewart 
called attention and which do indeed infect many of Reid's 
pages - equally those on the external world as those on judg- 
ment. On this subject, all we claim is that, on the whole, 
the disputed points can be explained in Reid's favour - that 
is, as not being really fallings away, but -.plausible things 
to say from his point of view, and pretty well in accord- 
ance with the rest of his philosophy - as for example, in 
the difficulty about the meaning of "abstraction," Reid can, 
for the most part, we think, be cleared up along the lines 
just indicated, or, again, in the equally troublesome dif- 
ficulty about the meaning of "conception" and equivalent 
words and phrases; Reid can likewise be cleared along the 
lines indicated long ago by Sir William Hamilton. 
rsy way of approach to the perception of externality, we 
had better briefly explain this latter controversy. The prob- 
lem is something like this. It was pointed out that per- 
ception i.e. awareness of a thing present to the senses,is 
always regarded by Reid as conception of the thing. Then 
it was further pointed out that imagination i.e. awareness 
of a thing not present to the senses ,is equally regarded 
by Reid as conception of thekthing. Finally, in consequence 
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of this fact, it was argued that Reid really treats per- 
ception as a department of imagination, virtually, if not 
actually regards the object of perception as a species of 
mental image quite distinct from the externally existing 
body, and, accordingly, in spite of his professions to a 
direct or presentative theory of perception, is at bottom 
as much xx a votary of the indirect or representative theory. 
as any of the philosophers he attacks. 
To meet this difficulty Hamilton calls us not to st..cty 
Reid's theory of the perception of externality in isolation 
from the rest of his philosophy. He goes on to point out 
that Reid's whole theory of conception in the sense of im- 
ina.tion) is a protest against the view that "images in the 
mind serve to account for the faculty of conceiving things 
most distant in time and place" - "I can likewise" Reid says 
"conceive an individual object which really exists such as St. 
Paul's church in London. The immediate object of this con- 
ception is four hundred miles distant, and I have no reason 
to suppose it acts on me or I on it, out I can think of it, 
notwithstanding." (quotation from Reid. Essay 4)Chapter 2) 
But now in virtue of holding a view like this, Reid must, Ham- 
ilton points out, "equalise perception and imagination" just 
as much as the philosophers he attacks, but this equalisation 
of perception and imagination in Reid means something very 
different, Hamilton goes on, from what it means in his 
opponents. "Other philosophers brought perception into unison 
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with imagination by making perception a. faculty of 
mediate knowledge; Reid, on the contrary, brought imag- 
ination into unison with perception by calling imagination 
a faculty of immediate knowledge." (Hamilton, Lectures 
on Metaphysics, Volume II, p.79, 80). 
Of course, ;,here are still many difficulties, as 
Hamilton points out over and over again about the meaning 
of Reid's terrr.tinu.iugy here, and, perhaps, in the nature 
of the case they are inevitable. Granted that Reid 
wanted to avoid all language implying a mental image theory, 
he might (one would think) just as easily have formulated 
the distinction Uetween imagination and perception in 
the form 'experience without judgment' and 'experience 
with judgment' as in the form 'conceptions without judg- 
ment' a .nd'conceptions with judgment', and it is obvious 
that difficulties and paradoxes arise either way. 
CHAPTER 3 
To begin - it should be pointed out that, while in 
Reid's opinion, vne part of his doctrine we have studied 
as well as the part we are going to study, both seem to 
rank, in their way, as defences of common sense, he neverthe- 
less regards the defence of common sense in the former 
case as no doubt preparatory to, but at the same time as in 
no way predetermining his defence of common sense in this 
latter case. That is to say, se Ear as Reid is concerned, 
it follows certainly from the doctrine already expounded, - 
that common sense is right in regarding the object of per- 
ception as a thing, or rather a complex impression rather 
than a sense - datum, i.e. a simple impression, but it just 
as certainly a.oes not follow from that doctrine, that com- 
mon sense is ais- equally right in regarding this complex 
object of perception or perceived thing as an independent 
existent i.e. identical with a real thing in the ordinary 
sense. It may, uy the way, be noted in passing that Reid 
seldom makes any attempt to discuss the relation of the one 
set of doctrines to the other, and that almost the only 
place where his intentions in this matter are at all dis- 
cernible is Essay ;',, Chapter 20, pp. 26,27 in Hamilton's 
Rid). 
From Reid's point of view, the issue in the new case 
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may be summed up as follows. In the first Mace, Reid and 
Hume are agreed - in opposition to Berkeley - on one vital 
point, namely that all men accept an uviive -ri. ioa e belief in 
an external world - vriv -e t:_ .t-a ltII, at least as regards ".con- 
tinued existence ", and that the fact of this unverifiability 
constitutes in itself no objection to the belief, In the 
second place, Reid and Hume differ as to whether or not cer- 
tain beliefs acquired through introspection - beliefs, that 
is, available only to phenomenologists - are found to be in 
contradiction to this unverifiable instinctive belief in 
externality. 
It might be as well, before we go further, to show by 
quotation that Reid does in fact distingidsh shabply betwnen 
Hume and Berkeley in pretty much the way suggested here. "In 
this acknowledgment (of the belief in the independent ex- 
(*^"Q- 
istence of body as'a natural instinct or^ possession') Mr. 
Hume indeed seems to me more generous, and even more in- 
genugus than Bishop Berkeley, who would persuade us that his 
opinion does not oppose the vulgar opinion, but only that 
of the philosopers; and that the external existence of a 
material world is a philosophical hypothesis, and not the 
natural dictate of our.perceptive powers. The Bishop shows 
a timidity of engaging such an adversar -, as a primary and 
universal opinion of all men. He is rather fond to court 
its patronage. But the philosopher intrepidly gives a de- 
fiance to this antagonist, and seems to glory in a. conflict 
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that was worthy of his arm. Optat a.prum a.ut iulvum des - 
cendre monte leonem." (Essay 2, Chapter 14 P.299 -Hamilton's 
Reid). 
On the question of the external world, then, Reid's 
argument would seem to be an ar gument against Hume rather 
than against Berkeley, and the main -point at iss le is - to 
make it more precise - whetter this natural belief in an 
external world can be reconciled with the findings of 
phenomenology on the two topics of sensible shape and size, 
on the one hand, and of independent (in Hume's sesne of 
"distinct ") existeTice on the other. 
Here we had -,_getter say a word or two about these topics, 
as to how each is related to Reid's o.n discussion of the 
belief in externality in connection with the sense of touch, 
and his further discussion of the belief of externality in 
its relation to the sense of sight. Now this topic of sen- 
sible shape and size is naturally regarded by both Reid and 
Hume as having an intimate connection with the question of 
the independent reality of objects of vision, but is not 
regarded by either of them, so far as I can see, as entering 
into the parallel question of the independent reality of the 
objects of touch. On the one hand, Hume frequently tries 
to prove the existence of a discrepancy between the in- 
stinctive belief about the object of vision's shape or size 
and the introspective. report about the object of vision's 
shape and size, and Reid, in his turn, takes account of this 
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sort of argument and exercises all his ingenuity in trying 
to answer it.' On the other hand, Hume never uses any kind 
of analogous argument in respect of the *tapes and sizes of 
the objects of touch, and, Reid, taking advantage of Hume's 
silence -here, feels at liberty to adopt Bishop Berkeley's 
view as to the identity of tangible shape and size with 
real shape and size, i.e. with the shape and size believed 
in by common sense. 
But while it is in Reid's interest, as a defender of 
common sense, to adopt Berkeley's view on this point, Reid, 
it may be pointed out does not take over this view of touch 
as being virtually illusion -free and never being out of ac- 
cord with common sense, without in the first place carefully 
considering the one alleged case of tactual illusion that was 
well known in the schools then. "Dr. Smith" (a contemporary 
writer on optics) "justly attributes to custom that well - 
known fallacy in feeling whereby a button, pressed with two 
opposite sides of two contiguous fingers laid across, is felt 
double. I agree with him, that the cause of this appearance 
is, that those opposite sides of the fingers have never been 
used to feel the same object, but two different objects, at 
the same time. And I beg leave to add, that as custom pro- 
duces this phenomenon, so a contrary custom destroys it; for, 
if a man frequently accustoms himself to feel the button with 
his fingers across, it will at last be felt single; as I have 
found by experience." (Inquiry, Chapter. 6, Section 17) - 
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That is, this reputed case of tactual illusion is not, ac- 
cording to Reid, a real illusion, i'n the sense that seeing 
the convergence of the railway lines is a real illusion; the 
latter can't be made to disappear by habit as the former 
can. 
The other topic of distinct existence, unlike the topic 
of sensible size and shape, does enter into the Reid -Hume 
. debate both in the case of belief in the externality of 
visible objects and in the case of the belief in the extern- 
ality of tangible objects. Indeed, ao far as Reid is con- 
cerned., the discussion of this matter on the visual side 
and the discussion on the tactual side are fairly closely 
linked, in the sense, at least, that the former aspect -is to 
some extent subordinate to, and not fully intelligible a- 
part from the latter aspect. Accordinly, it seems best to 
exahust this problem in its tangible aspect first, and, then, 
i.mediately afterwards, to take the visual half. 
As a preface to our exposition, it has to be said that 
there are difficulties of interpretation in this half of 
our chapter, of a sert not encountered in the previous part. 
There, we were drawing on the Essays, a book based on class - 
lectures and indicating the actual passages in Hume and Locke 
relevant to the argument; here, we have to do with the In- 
Lim, a. book of polite literature, referring only in very 
general terms to the authors criticised. Accordingly there 
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nothing for it here but to use guess -work if we are to 
understand with any precision the meaning of Reid's pos- 
itions. 
Let us, then, without more ado venture the hypothesis 
that Reid, in his Inquiry chapter on touch, is arguing a- 
gainst the position about touch maintained. by Hume in Treat- 
ise I,4.4.. and, then, try to interpret Reid in eccordamce 
with this hypothesis. Reid, we will say, agrees with Hume 
about the tactual situation to this extent - that when one 
believes oneself to be feeling a flat, hard surface with 
one's hand, and the surface to be external to or beyond the 
impressing hand, one does not actually feel any such thing 
as two shapes or surfaces in contact with one another. But 
Reid goes on to deny Hume's allegation that the only thing 
felt here is one single object of sense, one indivisible 
presentation, anal to assert on the contrary that two ob- 
jects are in this case -resented simultaneously, namely (to 
use Hume's own phrase) "a sensation conjoined with solidity. 
Wha.t ha:. ;yens in fact is that I feel both a strain or pain, 
and also a solid shape or surface of some kind, and, more- 
over, the feeling in question, Reid insists, quite plainly 
contains two distinghishable separable_ parts, because when 
I move my hand freely without encountering anything I feel 
the strain without feeling any solid shape at all. Tut,. 
farther, these so- coiled muscular strains, Reid continues, 
here following Hu m.e' s lead, are vague events, existing in 
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ti e only, but not in space, and therefore are not material 
things in the sense in which the solid shapes are. Accord - 
ingly the object of feeling, Reid concludes, is found to con- 
tain (if one observes oneself carefully) two distinguishable 
components, one of them an immaterial one and the other a 
material one, and Hume has simply made a mistake as to the 
introspectible facts, in maintaining there is only one in- 
divisible presentation. But now, if this alternative analy- 
sis of the fact in question is granted, then the common.dense 
belief in the distinct existence of the shape felt, i.e. the 
material component, is supported by experience. 
But here let us quote Reid. "Let a man press his hand 
against the table - he feels it hard. But what is the 
meaning of this? - The meaning undoubtedly is, that he hath 
a certain feeling of touch, from which he concludes, without 
any reasoning or comparing ideas, that there is something 
external really existing, whose parts stick so firmly to- 
gether, that they cannot be displaced without considerable 
force. 
"There is here a feeling, and a. conclusion drawn from 
it, o,y~â in some way suggesteJ by it. In order to colm?ere 
these, . we must view them separately and we will perceive 
them :to be as unlike as any two things in nature. The one 
is a sensation of the mind, which can have no existence but 
in a sentient being; nor can it exist one moment longer than 
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it is felt, the other is in the table, and we conclude, 
without any difficulty, that it was in the table before it 
was felt, and continues after the feeling is over. The one 
implies no kind of extension, nor parts, nor cohesion; the 
other implies all these. Both, indeed, edit of degrees, and 
the feeling beyo *d a certain degree is a species ofi1a.in, 
but adamantine hardness does not imply the least pain." 
(Inquiry, Chapter 5, Section 5, abbreviated). 
Now, in the first place, what does Reid mean here by 
"having a certain feeling of touch ?" His answer to this 
question is kg given in the very next section, where he tries 
to show what these feelings are like when they are isolated. 
Imagine, he says, the case of a man whose mind has become a 
"tabula rasa" and who is blind - the blindness being post- 
ulated so as to cut out visual experience. "Let us suppose 
he makes some instinctive effort to move his head or hand, 
but no motion follows on account of palsy. Can this effort" 
(x ±xx.g i.e. feeling of effort) "convey the notion of space 
or motion to one who has never had it before. Surely it 
cannot. " But further let us suppose he does manage to 
move the limb by instinct without its encountering anything. 
He has here a new sensation which accompanies the swelling 
of the muscles, but how this sensation can convey into his 
mind the ideo. of space and motion is altogether mysterious 
and unintelligible. The motion of the heart and lungs aré all 
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performed by the contraction of the muscles, but yet xgimix 
give no conception of space or motion." On the other hand 
- to take a different sort of case, i.e. so called passive 
touch - suppose the man to be immobilized, and "a body 
drawn across his face or hands while they are at rest. Can 
this give him any notion of space or motion. The motion of 
the blood imam along the arteries, when violent, is felt, but 
it would surely not give a conception of space or motion to 
one who didn't have them before." Secondly t9 the same 
topic, suppose into my two hands, thus immobolized, are put 
the extremities of a body - of a stick for instance. I will 
then cdrtainly have two feelings, but "if I have no previous 
notion of hands at all, or of the distance between them, I 
can never get the notion of the size of the body" (i.e. of 
the stick as having size) "from their being touched." (In- 
quiry, Chapter 5, Section 6) - Part of what Reid says here, 
indeed the main part - it will be remembered, had already 
been said by Hume, when in Treatise I Part 2, Section 5, he 
examines "the perceiving of that sensation we call motion in 
our hand or organ of sensation." 
Reid, then, means something fairly definite when he 
says "there is here a feeling," but what does he mean when 
he adds that there is in addition to the feeling "a conclusion 
drawn from it or in some way suggested by it? " No' it is 
the word "suggestion" that is Reid's nor:ral word in a case 
like this, and his talk about "conclusion" is apparently only 
a variation, and he explains on 
one 
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a variaton, and he explains on one occasion, "when I say the 
one suggests the other, I mean not to explain the nature 
to 
of the connection but to draw attention,a fact everyone 
may be conscious of, that the perception immediately and 
constantly follows the sensation. In other words, the re- 
lation of the first to the second is, Reid wants to say, a 
purely do facto sequence or concomitance, and "no man can 
give a reason why the sensation of smell or sound" (which 
Reid, like Hume, regards as non - spatial o)jects) "might not 
have indicated hardness" (i.e. solid shape, since for hmendmIelex 
Reid, 'hardness implies extension') "as well as that sen- 
sation whereby our constitution does indicate it" - ' indicate'_ 
being another synonym for suggest. 
Finally a word is to the general scope of Reid's doc- 
trine in this passage. As to the reference "we condl_de, 
without any difficulty it wasAthe table before it was felt 
Í h ¡ ( 
and continues,,,after the feeling is over," Reid is concerned 
to uphold here the belief in "continued existence ",as well as 
the belief "distinct existence" - to use Hume's convenient 
phrases. However, there is this very great difference be- 
tween his treatment of the former topic, and his treatment of- 
the latter topic both in this passage and elsewhere, - namely, 
that whereas he has a point, or rather series of points to 
make about distinct existence, he has nothing whatever to 
contribute on the subject of continued existence. Accordingly, 
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his discussion of our perception of an external world, if 
read according to the spirit rather than according to the 
letter, is a discussion only about the problem of the be- 
lief in distinct existence. 
The quetion nou arises as to what opponents Reid has 
in view here; as to wit kx what heresies his arguments are 
designed to crush. All Reid tells us in the somewhat be:llel- 
ettristic Inquiry is that "the sensation and. the perception 
of hardness have hitherto been confounded by the most acute 
inquires into the principles of human nature" (P.122) and, 
again, philosophers have entirely overlooked it (the sensa.t- 
ation in question) or confounded it with that cans lity of 
bodies we call hardness.'" (P.120 - Section 2 of Chapter 5, 
the previous citation being from Section 3). But now, the 
opinion of Reid, Locke and IIume rank pretty high as ineuir (i- s 
into Human nature, and, in the Essays, he gives more space 
to them than to other philosophers. Now Locke does ap- 
parently overlook altoget.er the sensation in question; at 
any rate, 34r. O'Connor, in his recent book on him, says he 
does not take into account organic sensation.. As for Hume, 
he does not over -look the sensation in question, since his 
description of the free movement of a. limb corres-?onds enE- 
irely to Reid's and may well be Reid's source, but he 
might well be regarded, from Reid's point of view, as cori- 
founding the sensation of touch with the perception of solid 
body, since, in the very chemter when he discusses the experience 
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bo4 a sort f logicel eonstrection oot of perceptions 
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present extension to the mind; but how they cc - to do so is 
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of free movement, he tries to regard the perception of solid 
body as a sort of logical construction 'out of perceptions 
of atoms of solidity, and does not clearly distinguish the 
perception of an atom of solidity from the sensation of 
touch, in Reid's sense. 
It would seem then that Reid's insistence on the 
sharp distinction and de facto relation of the tactual sen- 
sation and the tactual -perception is intended in large part, 
as a protest against attempts like Hume's to define solid 
or tangible extension in terms of something rather like 
sensations of touch. Here for example in a passage from 
Reid strictly relevant to this very topic. "It is kuma 
true that we have feelings of touch, which every moment 
present extension to the mind; but how they come to do so is 
the question; for those feelings do no more resemble ex- 
tension, than they resemble justice or courage - nor can 
the existence of extended things be inferred from those 
feelings by any rules of reasoning, so that the feelings 
we have by touch, can neither explain how we get the 
notion, nor how we come by the belief, of extended things." 
(Inouiry, Chaster V., Section 5). 
To make this :.point more clearly, let us view a pas- 
sage in Hume ítß. the light of Reid. Hume is here (Treatise 
I.4.4.) oroliounding.a sceptical crux of the following kind: 
"though solidity remain always invariably the same, the 
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impressions of touch change every minute on us, which is 
a clear proof, that the latter do not represent the former." 
Now the point Hume wants to make is apparently that in the 
present case of fingering a coin in one's pocket, whereas 
common sense unhesitatingly pronounces the object felt to 
be a solid shape whose parts maintain an unchanged relation- 
ship to one another throughout the duration of the experience, 
introspection on the other hand finds the object to be 
nothing but a shifting succession of "feels, " and that, ac- 
cordingly, the belief in the existence of a whole of stable 
parts cannot be based on the experience of successive, non- 
co-existent atoms of feeling. In short, Hume wants us to 
understand that in this case co mion sense and introspection 
contradict one another about the same fact, whereas Reid, 
envisaging the same sort of situation, would want to report 
that the alleged contradiction does not occur at all, be- 
cause, contrary to Hume's notions, introspection and common 
sense are not concerned with one and the same fact, but with 
two different facts contingently related to one another. That 
to say, from Reid's point of view, introspection records 
the sensation and common sense the perception and Hume's 
paradox is brought into being, only because Hume expects the 
former to (the sensation) be evidence for the latter (the 
perception), i.e. wants the connection between the extended 
solids and the feelings of touch to be a logical one. 
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Let us here abruptly pass from touch to vision,- keeping 
still the present problem of distinct existence. Here Reid's 
initial problem is probably that whereas common sense regards 
the coloured shape seen as external in much the same way as 
it regards the solid shape felt as external, introspection 
on the other hand does not confirm the externality Of the 
former in the same ready way as it confitms the externality 
of the tactual object. The Point is that, whereas the solid 
shape .resents itself to introspection as having an external, 
or distinct existence through its always presenting itself 
in contrast to the concomitantly felt muscular sensation of 
strain, the coloured shape does not present itself to intro- 
spection as being external, or having a distinct existence 
in any similar way, beda.use - according to Reid - there are 
no contrasting concomitant visual sensations to fulfil a role 
here analogous to that of the tactual sensations there. 
Now Reid draws attention to this kind of difficulty 
only by implication, when, in his chapter on thn present 
topic, he says "there seems to be no sensation that is ap- 
propriated to visual - figure, or whose office it is to suggest 
tkR 
it" (inlay in which there is a sensation appropriated to 
tangible figure and with an office to suggest it), but Adam 
Smith, a man of the same country and of much the same time, 
does, it is worth noting, make an analogous point in a quite 
explicit way at the beginning of his discussion orivision. 
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"That the objects of sight are not perceived as resisting 
or press:.ing upon the organ which perceives them is suf- 
ficiently obvious. They cannot therefore suggest, at 
least in the same manner as the objects of touch, the ex- 
ternality and independency of their existence." (P.294,295 
of Smith's Essays, 1795). Indeed, it almost looks as if 
both Reid and Smith approach this part of the prö.blem of the 
external world in the light of the Humeian principle that 
"our senses offer not their impressions as the images of 
something distinct or independent, because they convey to 
us nothing but a. single perception, and a single perception 
can never produce the idea of a. double existence ", and one 
might express the starting -point common to them both by 
saying that, for each of them, (though in somewhat different 
ways), touch does indubitably yield a double impression, 
despite Hume's claims to the contrary, and, in that way, 
gives a foundation for the idea of the distinct existence 
of its objects, whereas sight, on the other hand, yields 
merely a single impression, and, therefore, doesn't in that 
way at all, produce the idea of independent existence. 
The next question for Smith, as probably also for neid, 
is whether the common sense belief in the externality of 
the objects of vision or shapes seen can be justified in 
any other way, and to the question Adam Smith replies in the 
negative by developing a point already stated by Hume in 
the summary form : "sight does not inform us of distance or 
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outness immediately." Smith puts the matter it this 
way. 'ale are apt to imagine that we see objects at a dis- 
tance from us and that consequently the externality of 
their existence is immediately perceived by our sight. 
Berkeley, however, has corrected this common misapprehension, 
and shown us "that all visible objects must be naturally 
perceived as close upon the organ, or, more properly per- 
haps, like all other Sensation, as in the organ which per- 
a. 
ceives them. That the objects of sight are all ptkinted 
in the bottom of the eye, upon a membrane called the retina, 
pretty much as the like objects are painted in a Camera 
Obacura, is well known to whoever has the slightest tinc- 
ture of the science of Optics; and the principle of per- 
ception, it is probable, originally perceives them as ex- 
isting in that part of the organ, and nowhere but in that 
part of the organ." (loc.cit. continue'). 
Now Reid's tactics at a corresponding stage of the 
argument are seemingly very different from Smith's. Like 
Smith, he accepts the position that distance from the eye 
is not seen, but, unlike Smith, he refuses to argue from 
the invisibility of distance to the invisibility of outness. 
Not that Reid himself formulates this distinction or ex- 
pressly states his position in this form, blzt his arguments 
make better sense once it is imputed to him, and, in any 
case, one of the most competent judges of these matters among 
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his more immediate successors seems to have interpreted 
him, and Stewart, who on this topic follows Reid, as in- 
tending some such doctrine. "Reid ,and Stewart" says 
Ferrier, writing in Bladkwood's in 1842, kept quite distinct 
and separate "the question as to whether objects are seen 
by the unassociated vision to be at different distances from 
the percipient," from the question "whether objects are 
immediately seen to be at an indefinite distance from the 
eye, and thus to be external" and, according to Ferrier, 
they answer 'not to the former question and 'yes' to the 
latter (P.323 - Volume 2 of Lectures and Philosophical 
Remains) - Reid''_.. editor. IKIaxhilton, it should be noted, 
disagrees with Ferrier on this point, asserting that "we 
must be careful not, like Reid and philosophers in general, 
to confound the perceptions of Mere externality or outness, 
and the knowledge we have of distance through the eye; the 
former may be and probably is natural, while the latter, 
in a great but unapDreallable measure, is acquired", (Foot- 
note to P.177 of Volu_ae of his Reid), but Hamilton, as 
we shell see in due course, is not a reliable guide to Reid's 
meaning on the present problem. 
From this point of view, we can perhaps put Reid's argument 
as follo -.s. In the first place, the invisibility of out - 
ness does not, Reid probably thought, follow from the in- 
visibility of distance, because the invisibility of distance 
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is compatible with regarding the object of vision either 
as being at no distance from the eye and thus as being in 
the eye, or as being at some indefinite, i.e. so far as 
immediate experience goes, indeterminable, distance from 
the eye, and thus as being external. But, in the second 
place, if one takes the alternative of putting the object 
of vision in the eye, one is compelled, Reid certainly 
thought, to adopt the sort of position Adam Smith adopts - 
that all visible objects are naturally :-perceived as in the 
eye, printed upon a membrane called the retina, and this 
sort of position Reid dismisses at once as "unphilosophical" 
because "not founded on fact or observation" i.e. not em- 
pirically verifiable. The point of Reid's reply is, in fact, 
that this sort of hypothesis, though advanced cautiously 
by its votaries as probable, (cf. Adam Smith, above), is 
not, strictly speaking, scientific at all. "There is 
no probability" says Reid, "that the mind perceives the 
pictures upon the retina.. These lanikk pictures are no more 
objects of our oercepion than the brain is or the optic 
nerve. No man ever saw the pictures in his own eye, or in- 
deed, in the eye of another, until it was taken out of the 
head and duly prepazed. " (Inquiry, Chapter 6, Section 12, 
P.156 Hamilton's Reid) - But this is not Reid's last word on 
the matter, and there is another, stronger statement from 
his to be quoted below. 
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Here we had better state in our own way the point we 
conceive Reid to be driving at here, taking,our. cue, so 
to speak, from the declaration of Dugald Stewart that "Dr. 
Reid was the first person who had courage to lay aside all 
the common hypothetical language concerning perception." 
Now, looked at in this light, Reid's fundamental question 
would seem to be as to how far tht-reis a foundation in fact 
for two philosophic doctrines, each in its way contradicting 
common sense - the one a doctrine to the effect that the 
object of vision, though popularly believed to be seen at 
a distance or as having depth, is not actually seen as 
having depth or being at a distance, and the other . doctrine 
to the effect that the objects of vision, though popularly 
believed to be seen as being beyond the eye, are nevertheless 
seen - to use Adam Smith's expression - "as being in the 
eye." Now Reid allows the first of these two statements to 
be founded on fact :- if you resolutely put aside all tac- 
tual association, when you look at a white globe, all you 
see is a flat circle of white (i.e. you can't tell the 
difference; visually, between a disc and a sphere), or, in 
other words, depth, in suite of the opinion of common sense 
to the contrary, is not actually seen. But, Reid apparently 
continuesin the senselt which the one assertion about "vis- 
ibly lacking in depth" is a fact, the other assertion about 
"seen as in the eye" is not a fact at all. The relevant fact 
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to bear in mind here still. using U,c ,0023,. "fact in the 
sense of phenomenological datum, - is the fact that the 
eye is not rmormally seen by its possessor - a fact which 
Reid mentions in the philosophicr.l orations as being of 
some significance for philosophy, and which he cites in the 
form : " oculus, Quoquo- versus prospiciens, ae ipsum non 
cernit, " and once this fact is borne in mind, no ground 
whatever is left to an assertion like Adam Smith's, that the 
principle of perception, it is pmobable, originally perceives 
the objects of vision as existing in the organ of vision. 
In short, Reid's point here is very likely something like 
this : that if I don't see my eyes, I don't ever see the 
objects of vision as being in my eyes. 
So much then in regard to Reid's point 'no man ever 
saw the pictures in his own eye.' But he has another point 
to make on this subject in sequel to the first one. It is 
imatiocany certainly the case, he says, that when I see ob- 
jects, there occur imprints on the retina corresponding to 
these objects. But there is no ground, he goes on, for id- 
entifyipg the objects of vision with the pictures in the 
retkaa. The existence of the objects Of vision is known 
naturally by sight, whereas the existence of the retinal 
imprints corresponding thereto is known by a very different 
kind of process, experimental research, and, When this point 
is taken into account, the one fadt is obviously releted'in 
a purely contingent way to the other fact; - Reid himself 
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expresses his denial of the identification of objects of 
vision With occurrences in the eye in the paradoxical 
form : "the yye is a natural organ of sight, but it sees 
as little as a telescmpe. We know, " he goes on, "how the 
eye forams a picture of the visible object on the retina; 
bu Low this picture makes us see the object we know not. 
We can give no reason why the picture on the retina should 
be followed by vision, while a like picture on any other 
part of the body produces nothing like vision, and if ex- 
perience," (he means, experience like that noted above of 
taking out the eye) "had not informed us that such a ni cture 
is necessary to vision, we never should have known it." 
(Intellectual Powers, Essay 2, Chapter 4). 
The position Reid takes up --ere is fundamental to his 
whole theory of the perception of an external world, and, 
in order to make still clearer his meaning let us quote 
the paragraph immediately preceding the last quotation. He 
is speaking there o& the brain, but includes apparently with 
it, optic nerves, end- organs and so forth. "The third 
point in this hypothesisis, that the mind perceives the images 
in the brain, and external objects only by means of them." 
But, Reid retorts, "if our powers of perception be not al- 
together tha fallacious, the objects we perceive are not in 
our brain, but without us. We are so far from perceiving 
images in the brain, that we do not perceive our brain at all; 
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nor would any man ever have known that he had a brain, if 
anatomy had not discovered by dissection, that the brain is 
a constituent part of the human body." 
But here it might be reasonable at once to allow some 
force to Reid's reply to a theory of Smith's type denying 
externality to the obj.ects of vision, and yet at the same 
time to suggest that difficulties still remain in regard 
to the relation between visual experience and belief in 
externality. In particular, one could start by drawing at- 
tention to the first of the two citations from Smith, ktlxi 
the one to the effect that "the objects of sight cannot sug- 
est, at least in the same manner as the objects of touch, 
the externality and independency of their existence "; go on 
to point out that there is still in spite of everything a 
discrepancy of this kind in Reid's theory of the senses, a 
discrepancy finding expeEssion in the distinction, alrdady 
mentioned, between the existence of tactual sensations, as 
correlative to the experience of tangibld shapes, and the 
absence of any corresponding visual sensations accompanying 
the experience of visible shapes; and end by asking whether 
this kind of discrepancy might not give rise to seine serious 
problems respecting the externality of the objects of vision, 
which have no parallel in the tactual field. 
For clarity's sake, let us put a question of this kind. 
in our own way. On Reid's theory, there cannot be, we will 
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say, any doubt that the tangible shapes are beyond the 
hand w &th which they are felt, because, in the first in- 
stance, we feel nothing but the tangible shape in contrast 
to sensations of touch, and, in the second instance, when 
we have happened to observe the hand as a material shape, we 
are naturally led to connect the sensations with the hand, 
i.e. to place them in it, and, by contrast, to locate the 
tangible shapes beyond the hand. (See Inquiry, Chapter 6, 
Section 12, P.159 Hamilton's Reid, for Reid's view of 
this sort of point.). Now, it would, on F'eid's theory, 
be equally easy to be sure that the visible shapes were be- 
yond the eye, if we had visual sensations, analogous to the 
tactual ones, if - to concoct an instance Reid doesn't him- 
self discuss - the seeing of these coloured visible shapes 
were always accompanied with vague visual phenomenk- like 
"spots dancing before the eyes," or the sort of stars one 
sees when one's eye is hit - since in that case, one would 
naturally regard the visual sensations as connected with 
the eye and as in the eye, as soon as we observed the ex- 
istence of the eye, and would equally regard the visible 
shapes as unconnected with the eye, and outside it. How- 
ever, in fact, there are no such visual sensations on Reid's 
theory, and the question accordingly arises as to whether, 
in their absence, we can be as sure of the externality of 
the objects of vision, as we are of the externality of the 
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objects of touch. 
Now we do not claim that this question really did pass 
through Reidts mind, but we do claim that there is a passage 
in his Inquiry (Chapter 6, Section 8 - a section to be 
discussed later) which looks like a reply to a question of 
this sort. We will give the passage side by side with in- 
terpolated comments. "In answer to the question proposed, 
there seems to be no sensation that isappropriated to visible 
figure, or whose office it is to suggest it" - in the way 
in which, he expects us to mAinommot understand, tactual sen- 
cation suggests tangible or real figure. "It seems to,\sug- 
gested immediately," he continues, "by the material im- 
pression upon the organ of which we are not conscious; and 
why may not a material impression upon the retina" (under- 
stand of which we are not conscious) "suggest visible figure 
as well as the material impression on the hand when we grasp 
a ball" (of which impression, equally, we are not conscious) 
"suggests real figure?" - As for our interpolations here, the 
following passage from a m crucial paragraph in Inquiry 
Chapter 6 Section 21 is relevant : "The impression made by 
the object on the organ either by immediate contact" (as in 
touch) or by an intervening medium (a.s in vision) as well as 
the impression made upon the nerves and the brain is performed 
behind the scences and the mind sees nothing of it." - 
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But to return to the original extract, Reid's next sentence, 
we find, is, as so oftens happens with him, a. repetition 
of the one just quoted, adding only that whereas the one 
material impression suggests colour and visible figure, 
the other suggest hardness and real figure. Then, at once, 
he sets off into a new paragraph, and a new theme, begin- 
ning with the observation "since the visible figure of 
bodies is a real and external object to the eye as their 
tan7ible figure is to the touch," which latter clause, read 
in its context, would seem to mean "it having been proved 
in the preceding paragraphs that the visible figure of 
bodies etc. etc.", since these preceding paragraphs have 
been concerned, in an allusive way, with the themes that 
have so far occupied us on vision. 
Now let us see what the argument just quoted means, if 
considered, perhaps arbitrarily, as a reply to the question 
formulated above, and if read, as Reid no doubt intended 
it to be read, in the light of the other relevant passages 
in his writings. Apparently, then, the point would seem 
to be that even if there were no sensations of touch ac- 
companying the perceptions of touch, the objects thus tac- 
tually perceived would be regarded as external to the hand 
just the same, as before, and there would be not the least 
danger of their being identified with the material impression 
on the hand, or the events in the nerves and brain consequent 
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mn these material impressions. In the first place, to 
consider the sensations of touch as non -existent would be, 
on Reid's theory, to regard the tactual experience as now 
devoid of those elements that alone naturally point back to 
the hand as being the organ of touch - his doctrine on this 
subject being, apparently, that the sensations in question 
are instinctively associated with or located in the hand or 
relevant limb, as soon as that limb has been observed and 
taken notice of, in much the same fashion a.s, the pain is 
automatically or rather instinctively associated with the 
pert of the body affected. (In.-tinct, we -- ey mention, had 
to be brought in by Reid. here to answer the question arising 
both for Hume and for himself as to how we come to regard 
an intrinsically non -spatial event like a strain ora pain 
as being located in a space- occupying lint . - Inquiry, Chap- 
ter 6, Section 12, P.159: Hamilton, and Hume's Treatise, 
Book I Part 4 Section 5, P.224 -226 in Everyman). But now, 
in the second place, after the sensations of touch are in 
this way put out of account, tactual experience becomes more 
or less on a level with visual experience, in respect of 
the fact that the awareness of a connection between the 
tactual experience1on the one hand/and the bodily organ of 
touch and material impressions thereo-. i on the other hand 
would be as much a matter of contingency as the awareness of 
the connection between Visual experience and the eye or organ 
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of sight, and would take place in virtue of a set of ex- 
periences quite different from and additional to the 
tactual experience in question. Accordingly, in the third 
place, the same sort of facts as forbid the identification 
of the object of vision with the impressed parts of the eye 
would equally forbid the identification of the object of 
touch with the impressed parts of the hand. In this case, 
;eid's general principle that "we perceive no external ob- 
ject but by means of the organs given us for that purpose, 
but these organs do not themselves perceive" (Essay 2, 
Chapter 4, loc.cit.) would apply in the-form ; we feel 
the solid shape, the: object of touch with our hands, but we 
donnot in the sa e experience feel the hand as a hand, and 
consequently get no knowledge of the impressed portions 
thereof - this kind of formula being pretty well the exact 
analogue of Reid's formula : the eye does not see, according 
to his exposition of it, in the Essay 2 passage. That is to 
say, according to Reid, it is only later, by a different 
sort of experience, that we observe the object, whose tan- 
gible shape we feel, always to have fo hand, i.e. our hand, 
pressing on it and begin from then ó to regard the hand as 
our organ of touch, but this new experience, far from in- 
troducing any confusion into the issue, tells us plainly 
that as the organ of touch presses against the object of 
touch, so the object of touch is external to the organ and 
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to us. 
Now tithout cla; ming that Reid. had precisely this point 
in mind in the passage under review, we do claim that he 
was here considering whether the discrepancy between sight 
and touch in respect of the absence of any visual counter- 
parts to the tactual sensations raised any kind of serious 
prö.blem in the matter of externality, and our ground for 
making this latter claim is that a similar issue in regard 
to a discrepancy of this kind constitutes an important 
part; indeed the central part of a discussion of perception: 
which is very close to that of both Reid and, incidentally, 
Adam Smith)in the sense of being an immediate follow -up of 
Hume - the discussion which we find in Lord Karnes, a man 
who formed the closest link between Hume and Adam Smith 
on the one hand, and Reid on the other, being at different 
periods in his life the close friend of all three. 
Let us, see, then, how Karnes, in the chapter on the 
"Authority of the Senses" already referred to, proceeds 
in his attempt to justify the ordinary belief about the 
independent existence of the objects of touch and of sight. 
The case of touch, he thinks, is quite straightforward 
I believein the existence of the body felt as external to 
and pressing on the limb serving as organ of touch, but 
these two distinguishable things in juAM4form are precisely 
what I find in introspection. That is to say, Ka.mes regards 
-169- 
the contact between the two extended surfaces - the hand 
and the body tactually felt - as given immediately, and, 
unlike Reid, does not reckon the impressed surface of the 
organ of -touch to be beyond experience. On the other hand, 
in the case of vision, only one single object, the coloured 
shape, is given, according to Kale's view of the matter, 
and he proceeds to deal with the ensuing difficulties very 
much in the same way as Reid did after him (though much more 
briefly) - considering the theory that perception at a dis- 
tance is impossible and the object of vision is really the 
image on the retina, and rejecting this theory because, in 
visual experience itself, one is quite unconscious of the 
material impression on the eye. But here he becomes aware 
that, n this view of the matter there is a sort of anomaly 
in the visual situation as compared with the tactual sit- 
uation consisting in the absence from the visual field of 
- the material impression on the organ, and the -presence in 
the tactual field of the material impression on the organ; 
and he raises the question as to why vision, unlike touch, 
deceives to the extent of denying us awareness of its bod- 
ily organ)or the material impressions thereon. But let us 
state the matter in his own words. "The operation of vision 
is, in one respect, on a footing with that of touch, both 
being performed by means of an impression made at the organ. 
There is indeed this essential difference, that the impression 
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of touch" (equivalent, as is quite plain from the context, 
to what Reid calls the material impression on the hand) is 
felt, as such, whereas the impression of tight is not 
felt; we are not conscious of any such impression but merely 
of the object itself which makes the impression." But then 
why are we unconscious of the material impression in the 
visual field and wh.y does sight deceive us in a way touch 
doesn't? "Nature" Karnes replies "has carefully concealed 
this impression from us to avoid all ambiguity, and to give 
us a distinct feeling of the object itself and that only," 
and he explains his point thus. "In touching, the impression 
made at the organ is so closely conrp cted with the body that 
makes the impression that perception creates no confusion 
or ambiguity, the body being felt where it really is. But 
were we conscious of(i.e. visually) of an organic impression 
at the retina" (as well as of the body seen), "the mind 
Mould have a constant propensity to place the body therealso," 
(to see all objects as within the eye, or touching the eye) 
because "it is doubted by naturalists whether outness or 
distance is di scoverkble by sight." That is to say, dis- 
tance being invisible, 
: it would be impossible to see any 
gap between the eye and the object, supposing the eye or its 
impressed portions were to be seen as well as the object, 
and this "could be a circumstance extremely perplexing in 
the act of vision as setting feeling and experience in per- 
. 
petual opposition," i.e. if the eye were visible, feeling i.e. 
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the immediate information coming from vision ?would always 
present the external object as being in contact with the 
eye, whereas 'experience i.e. tactual association,would 
suggest the existence of a gap between the eye and the ex- 
ternal object. 
Now this chapter of Karnes on "Thd authority of the senses, 
is in all probability, one of the chief sources Reid used; 
at any rate Reid had evidently studied it closely in his 
formative 'veal-s, since in the philosophical oration 
giving to the world,the original "preview" of his system 
(the oration of 1759), Reid mentions Karnes as not having 
bro` en awe,- from the idea:. system - doubtless referring there- 
by to these difficulties of Karnes about material impressions 
here, or perhaps to the fact, noted much earlier in this 
chapter, that Kanes allows simple impressions in Hume's 
sense in smelling and hearing, ar perhaps to both these 
facts together, - it being ,a fixed idea with Reid that the 
one point is connected with the other, and that, if one be- 
gins by making the material impression on the organ the im- 
mediate Abject of consciousness, one is bound to end with a 
system like Hume's of simple impressions. In short, then, 
Kame's chapter was in all probability an important influence 
on Reid, and, in that case, it becomes at once illuminating 
and credible to say that the theme of Reid in the passage 
about the relation of the material impressions on the ere and 
the hand to the objects of experitnce, visual and tactual, 
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conneeted wic±b1 therewith, is much the same as the theme of 
Karnes in the extracts just given. In that case, what Reid 
is contending here is, roughly speaking that no such awk- 
ward questions arise out of his defence of the externality 
of the object of sight, and the objects of touch, as arose 
out of Kame's-defence of common sense on the sa :Qe subject, 
on account of the fact that he applies in both the fields 
of sense the ruling principle which Karnes applies only the 
field of Tight : "nature hath carefully concealed the im- 
pression from us in order to remove all ambiguity; and to 
dive a distinct feelin_ of the ob' ect, and that onl ." 
With that, we come to an end of Reid's dealing with 
what we have called the problem of "distinct existence" 
both in regard to vision and to touch, and the only thing 
that remains to be done by way of summing up is to comment 
on the relations of the two arguments we have found in Reid 
mn this subject. Of the two, the chief argument is the ar- 
gument against the identification of the object of sense 
with the material impression on the corresponding organ of 
sense, and this argument, we have tried to showy i s u eant by 
Reid to apply as much to the facts of touch as to the facts 
of vision, although, to be sure, he discusses this point 
chiefly in connection with vision, the argument for the 
alleged identification fixtdt , its chief support, in his 
time,in the visual sphere. The other argument, however, 
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has an application solely to the facts of touch and is a 
kind of corrollary to Reid's protests against the kind of 
reduction ti tactual perceptions to tactual sensations 
which he regards Hume as attempting. 
Now before we go further we had better try to relate 
our account of Reid to Reid's text. The complications here 
arxmsrily arise solely in connection with vision, and the reason 
for the occurrence of complications here is that the chief 
source of Reid's theory of vision - the extensive chapter 
in the Inquiry - has a great deal of matter in it which, 
even perhaps an the standards of Reid's day, pertained more 
to optics than to the "science of mind." Indeed, it would 
not perhaps be easy to distinguish what is of real philos- 
ophical interest there far Reid from what is not, were it 
not the brief and exclusively philosophical account he gives 
of his views about vision in the course of the Essays. For 
example, it is only in reading the Essays that we lecome 
quite sure about the central inmortance, to Reid's whole 
position of perception, of his protest against the ident- 
ification of the objects of vision with the pictures on the 
retina. In the Inquiry, indeed, he says plenty under that 
head, but what he says there, is, for the most part, hidden 
away in odd chapters devoted to inverted images, binobular 
vision and what not; whereas in the Essays, he makes this 
same point in a more general way, and makes it moreover as 
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a kind of climax to his introductory discussion of the 
question of perception, prior to expounding his own more 
special distinction between sensation and perception. 
It is necessary, therefore, to read the long, detailed, 
and perhaps over -literary Inquiry in the light of the much 
more professional Essays, and, when this is done, the chap- 
ters of the Inquiry that stand out as of especial importance 
are the two chapters, 7 and 8 on visible figure. It is in 
these chapters, if anywhere, that we find Reid's leading 
opinions about vision set down, although, of course, owing `$,) 
his mannered style of .writing, he sets forte.:- -dt opinions 
rather elliptically and seems to expect us to fill in the 
gaps from our knowledge of what he has said elsewhere. 
In these chapters, Reid gets to grips with most of the 
problems. In the first place, he tries to separate very 
sharply indeed our experance of the visible figure from our 
experience of its colour, distinguishing the former as a 
perception and the latter as a sensation (though a sensation 
of a somewhat different kind from the sort of sensation 
found in sensations of touch), and his motive for insisting 
on this separation is, so far as can be made out, a desire 
to protest against the Hur_Zeian view that visible extension is 
a logical construction out of extensionless atoms of colour 
i.e that - to say the same thing in Reid's terminology - 
colour -sensation of vision represent i.e. ire logically 
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connected with the perceptionSof vision. In the second 
place, he goes on to argue that visible extension and figure, 
although distinct from tangible or real extension and figure, 
are nevertheless necessarily connected with these latter in 
the sense of being as spatial as they, and this argument is 
evidently meant as an objection, very like Hume's, to Ber- 
keley's paradox that visible figure and extension are so to 
speak misnamed and have in fact no sort of resemblance to 
or identity with their tangible namesakes. In the third 
place, he takes up the question as to whether this visible 
figure or extension is indeed external to the eye in the 
way common sense wants its objects of vision to be external, 
- a question very much to the point here, because nothing 
follows from a denial of the paradostical Berkeleian sever- 
ance of visible extension for tangible extension as to whether 
the former is external to the eye or not, - and his page of 
discussion of this subject culminates in the passage we used 
above about the analogy between vision and touch in respect 
of the relation of each to the material impressions upon their 
appropriate sense- organs, and, on the way to the culmination, 
both introduces and presupposes ideas already dealt with at 
length by us a few pages back. Finally, he takes up the 
question as to whether his admission of "queer objects like 
visible figures and visible space, unknown to the plain man, 
in any way damages his general claim to be a defender of - 
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common sense and the plain man's standpoint. He had already) 
indeed earlier in this same chapter touched on this very 
matter by a frank confession as to the dubious ontological 
status of his visible figure, but it is only in these closing 
paragraphs of the chapter, in this discussion of the plain 
fan's disbelief in, or unawareness of visible figure, that 
he succeeds in formulating the point at issue here in a ver- 
sion suithble to his own general approach to philosophy. 
Let us start with the last- mentioned of these questions 
- the one concerning visible figure. The factis, Reid says, 
that "the visible appearances are innumerable when we confine 
ourselves to one object," and out of this fact, a problem 
arises. '?'If it should be asked," says Reid, "to what cate- 
gory of beings does visible figure belong, I can only in an- 
swer give some tokens whereby those who are better acquainted 
with the categories may chance to find its place." He then 
goes on to give the following summary answer. "A projection 
of a sphere, or a perspective view of a Nix palace, is a re- 
presentation (i.e. of the real tangible figure) in the very 
sense as ïaisible figure is; and wherever they may have their 
lodging in the categories, this will be found to dwell next 
door." (Inquiry, Chapter 6 Section 8. - Hamilton's Reid, 
P.144). However, Reid seems to be well enough aware that 
this sort of answer is not very satisfactory, or at least is 
not very complete, and he goes on to reformulate the question 
-177- 
in his own way - a way which might perhaps be restated as 
follows. 
This sort of theory of perception obviously has some 
very paradoxical implications and Reid himself is perfectly 
aware of this fact. The visible figure of bodies is, no 
doubt, as real and external to the eye as the tangible fig- 
ure to the touch, but, at the same time each body has appar- 
ently innumerable objectively existing visible figures 
corresponding to its one objectively existing tangible figure 
according to the position and distance of the latter from 
the tangible eye -ball. (See Inquiry, Chapter 6 Section 8 
and Essay 2 Chapter 14, P.304 : Hamilton's Reid). But now 
a sophisticated doctrine of this kind implying the existence 
of objective perspectives waiting to be seen, though no 
doubt appropriate to other sorts of philosophers, sounds 
somehow out of place in the pe. es of a. self- professed friend 
of common sense and the vulgar, like Reid, and we naturally 
wonder what kind of defence Reid would give, if criticized 
from this point of view. 
Now the Question at issue here is the question of common 
sense, and this question assumes in Reid's hands a definitely 
linguistic form, probably in virtue of his having been 
Turnbull's pupil. Indeed Reid's own statement of his guiding 
principles i, these matters at once obviously echoes and 
deepens Turnbull's teaching. "A philosopher," says Reid, 
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Otis, no doubt, entitled, to examine even those distinctions 
that are to be found in the structure of all languages. But 
if in his first setting out, he takes it for granted without 
proof that distinctions found in the structure of all lang- 
uages have no foundation in nature, this surely is too fast- 
idious a way of treating the common sense of mankind. `.here 
may be distinctions that have a real foundation, and which 
may be necessary in philosophy, which are not made in com- 
mon language, because not necessary in the common business 
of life. But I believe no instance will be found of a dis- 
tinction made in all languages, which has not a just found- 
ation in nature." (Intellectual Powers. Essay 1, Chapter 1). 
Now Reid constantly appeals to these principles in his 
philosophical work, and in order to see what he means by 
them, we had better see how he uses them. The first inst- 
ance we will give of Reid's practice in this respect has to 
do with the doctrine of perception as judgment, discussed 
in the first part of the present chapter. On the one hand, 
y, 4EE.Net 
consider how he deals with Hume,AReid is speaking of the 
doctrine "which teaches us that conception, perception by 
the senses and memory are only different ways of perceiving 
q1 
ideas in our own minds. If that theory be well founded "he 
I 
goes on"`, it will indeed be very difficult to find any spec- 
ific distinction between conception and o rcept'on. But 
there is reason to distrust any philosophical theory when 
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it leads men to corrupt language, and to confound, under 
one name, operations of the mid which common sense and 
common language teach them to distinguish." (Essay 4, Chea- 
ter 1 in Hamilton's Reid, P.362). On the other hand., note 
how he deals with his own counter- theory that the common 
distinction between conception and perception is indeed valid 
but that this distinction can be upheld only if perception 
involves judgment i.e. if perception is - to use Reid's own 
terms - conception alus belief. tJlften we speak of seeing 
or remembering anything, we, indeed, hardly ever add that we 
judge it to be true. But the reason of this appears to be, 
that such an addition would be mere superfluity of speech, 
because every one knows that what I see or remember, I 
must judge to be true and cannot do otherwise. A 
woman with child says, that, going such a journey, she car- 
ried her child along with her. We know that, while it is in 
her womb, she must carry it alo-rg with her. There are some 
operations of mind that may be said to carry judgment in their 
womb, and can no moms leave it behind them than the pregnant 
woman can leave her child. Therefore in speaking of such 
operations, it is not expressed." (Intellectual Powers, 
Essay 6, Chapter 1). 
An instance will make the point in question clear. Reid 
and Hume, one might say, are both tampering with ordinary 
language, the latter maintaining that the sentence "I feel 
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pain" really means "I am thinking about pain in a vivid 
manner ", the former maintaining that the sentence "I feel 
pain" really means "I judge and believe I am really pained." 
But whereat Hume is intent on annulling a distinction com- 
monly made, Reid is not interfering with any orthodox ver- 
bal distinction, but is making clearer the meaning of a 
phrase by introducing his technical distinction between 
simple apprehension and judgment. 
A new instance will perhaps explain better what Reid 
means by legitimate interference with ordinary language. "It 
is indeed strange that a sensation which we have every time 
we feel a body hard, should yet be so much unknown as never 
to have been honoured by a name in any language. I think 
it is probable, that the novelty of this sensation will pro- 
cure some attention to it in children at first; but, being 
in nowise interesting in itself, as soon as it hmsxxxfssiti 
becomes familiar it is overlooked. If this is the case, we 
must become as little children again, if we will be philoso- 
phers; we must overcome this habit of inattention which has 
been gathering strength, ever since we began' to think." 
(Inquiry. Chapter 5, Section 2 - with omissions). Reid is 
here, of course, justifying his introduction of the technical 
term 'sensation of touch' to describe an event that doesn't 
get mentioned in ordinary language, because it is unnecessary 
to refer to the event for the business of life. 
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But to return now to the question of the paradoxical 
relations of visible figure, on the one hand, and tangible 
or real figure on the other - ordinary language, Reid 
points out, knows nothing about visible figure, and when 
the plain man speaks about seeing the shape of anything, 
the shape he is referring to, as is evident from his des- 
cription ,is not the visible but the real (i.e. tangible) 
one. Ordinary language then has to be interferked with in 
order to make room for this distinction between visible 
and tangible shape, just as it had to be interferked with 
to make room for the distinction between feelings of touch 
and feeling of hardness, and for the same reason, namely 
that the distinction in question, though unnecessary in 
ordinary life, is necessary in philosophy. It is in fact 
failure to break away from the habits of ordinary language 
in this s respect i.e. failure to bear in mind the sharp 
distinction between visible objects and tangible objects) 
that has led to the sceptical doctrine about conflicts 
between the delivdrances of the senses. For example, in 
regard to Hume's sceptical inference from the fact that "the 
table which we see, seems to diminish as we remove further 
from it ", - "it is evident" says Reid," that this ingenious 
author has imposed upon himself by confounding real magnitude 
(tangible) with apparent magnitude (visible) and that his 
argument is a mere sophism." (Essay 2, Ch; I4. But if we 
are thus entitled to go outside common sense and ordinary 
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language by admitting visible figure, are we not, it may 
be asked, entitled to go outside common sense and ordinary 
language by admitting the identity of the visible figure 
with the piäture on the retina? But in reply to a point 
of this kind, Reid would very likely have suggested that 
just as 1222256f has to be given of the existence of visible 
figure, so proof will have to be given of this identity. 
But take, if you like, a new argument for the identification 
of the object of vision with the imprint on the retina or 
optic nerve - an argument this time based on the thesis that 
perception at a distance is impossible because action at a 
distance is impossible. Now action at a distance, Reid 
grants, is impossible so far as bodies are concerned, but 
as 
se farAthe claim that impossibility of action at a distance 
implies impossibility of perception at a distance, this 
sort of claim, Reid argues, can be valid only if "thought 
in the mind ßì.s conceived to have some analogy to motion 
in a body ", that is, if it is held that "as a body is put 
in motion, by being acted on by some other body, so the mind 
is made to perceive by so;:.e impulse it receives from the 
object. But reasonings, drawn fro-q such analogies, ought 
never to be trusted, and we might as well conclude that 
minds may be measured by feet and inches, or weighed by 
ounces and drachms, because bodies have these properties." 
(Essay 2, Chapter 14) 
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It is in the chapter from which we quote - Essay 2, 
Chapter 14 - that Reid's main defence of common sense is 
to bd found, and it will be as well to look at its general 
trend. The common sense belief in the externality of objects 
of perception is generally regarded, he points out, as 
being already subverted by the admission of visible figure 
in addition to real figure, and, in the second place, as being 
totally destroyed by the consequent identification of the 
said visible figure with the perceiving retinal image. As 
regards'.this second point, Reid maintains that the thesis is 
not proved and can never be proved to the perceiver's satis- 
faction, and that therefore we are quite entitled to regard 
ix* a visible figure as existing external to the eye. As 
regards the first point, Reid argues that it is not, strictly 
speaking, a subversion of common sense to introduce a dis- 
tinction between the visible and the tangible aspects of the 
external object, when the distinction in question is one 
irrelevant to the ordinary business of common life. 
In short, then, Reid sticks mom pretty faithfully to 
the principles he announced in Essay 1 Chapter 1 on this 
subject. The only sort of theory that is contrary to common. 
sense, he tells us there, is one that obliterates "those 
distinctions that are to be found in the structure of all 
languages," or, more precisely, modifications of ordinary 
language are not in themselves illegitimate unless they are 
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"reductive" modifications. That is to say, the sort of 
doctrine Reid thinks illegitimate is milustrated by him, 
thus : "If a man would persuade me that the moon which I 
see, and my seeing it, are not two things, but one and the 
same thing, he will answer his purpose less by arguing 
this point in plain English, than by confounding the two 
under one name - such as that of impression." (Essay I 
Chapter 1, Hamilton's Reid, P.228). On the other hand, the 
doctrine of representative perception (for example, the id- 
entification of the visible object with the retinal image) 
no doubt involves a correction of common sense or language 
too, but not one that is illegitimate - provided a case be 
made out for it. - But now to turn to the km other topics. 
As regards Reid's discussion of the relations of colour 
and visible figure, a quotation will perhaps help us to 
glimpse its point. "There is a tribunal of inquisition er- 
ected by certain . Jodern philosophers, before which every- 
thing in nature must answer. The articles of inquisition 
are few indeed, but dreadful in their consequences. They 
are only these : Is the prisoner an Impression or an Idea. 
tfrai Before this dreadful tribunal, cause and effect, 
time and place, matter and spirit have been tried and cast; 
how then shall such a poor flimsy form as visible figure stand 
before it? It must even plead guilty, and confess that it 
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is neither an i.roression nor an idea. For alas, it is 
notorious that it is extended in length and breadth." 
(Beginning of Chapter 8 - with an omission). - Apparently, 
then, the position Reid is about to attack is the position 
of Hume that visible extension is nothing but a series of 
unextended colour - sensations. Now in opposition to Hume, 
Reid proposes the position that 'visible figure is never 
presented to the eye but in conjunction with colour, although 
there be no connection between them from the nature of things,' 
and, u,s a first step towards effecting this separation, he 
suggests it would be perfectly possible to conceive an eye 
whose operation "would be precisely similar to that of hear- 
ing and smell; it would give no perception of figure or ex- 
tension, but merely of colour" - just as hearing gives no 
perception of figure or extension but merely of sound. "Nor 
is the supposition we have meat," he goes on, in defence of 
this speculation, "merely imaginary." Certain of Cheselden's 
patients, Reid points out, "see things as through a. glass of 
broken jelly; they perceive the colour but nothing of the 
figure or, magnitude of the object ", and to be aware of 
an object of vision as something shapeless and sizeless, Reid 
might have gone on, is not to be aware of it as extended at 
all. Finally, building on this fact, or alleged fact, Reid 
concludes that colour is unextended in al5tIfy and a sensation 
in much the same sense as sound or smell is. According 
the only difference between seeing and hearing, Reid says, 
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is that the sensation of colour is /as a matter of fact, 
always, in ordinary circumstances, accompanied by the per - 
ception of a position, indeed of a shape, whereas the sen- 
sation of sound has no analogous perception accompanying it. 
Obviously, however, Reid has not yet gone very far to- 
wards establishing his thesis that the experience of colour 
and the accompanying experience of figure are contingently 
related as sensation and perception, and he now takes a fur- 
ther step in that direction by an argument of the following 
kind. Starting from the sort of sharp distinction between 
colour and visible shape described in the last paragraph, 
1-> 
he goes on to maintain (for the most arguing, like Hume, a- 
gainst Berkeley's paradox - see Essay 2 Chapter 19, in the 
Intellectual Powers) that, in the sense in which it is proper 
to regard the colour of a body as being neither like or un- 
like its tangible shape, in this same sense it is equally Pro- 
per to regard the visible shape of a body as either like or 
unlike its tangibid shape; indeed, "small figures such as 
can be seen distinctly at one view have not only a resemblance 
to the corresponding tangible figures, but are to all sense 
the same ", provided these plain tangible figures - it is a 
tangible surface with length and breadth that he is talking 
about - are Placed directly in front of the eyes. But - 
to come now to Reid's main point - the visible figure not 
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merely resembles the tangible figure in question in a sense 
which the colour doesn't resemble it, but, in addition the 
visible figure is necessarily connected with tangible figure 
in a sense in which the colour is not. Reid's point here in 
fact is that "the visible figure and allied qualities of a 
body may, by mathematical reasoning,be deduced from the real 
or tan7ible figure, and he elucidates this position in the 
following way. "May not a blind man be made to conceive 
that a body moving directly from the eye, or directly tow- 
ards it, may appear to be at rest? and that the same motion 
may appear quicker or slower, according as it is nearer to 
the eye or further off, more direct or more oblique? May he 
bot be made to conceive, that a plain surface, in a certlin 
position may appear is a straight line, and vary its visible 
xmxfa figure, as its position or the position of the eye is 
varied? - that a circle, seen obliquely will aD-oear as an 
eclipse? Dr. Saunderson understood the projection of the 
sphere, and the common rules of perspective; and, if he 
did, he must have understood all the things I have mentioned. 
If there were any doubt of Dr. Saunderson's understanding 
these things, I may mention my having heard him say in con - 
versa.tioh, that etc. etc." Now it follows from this fact, 
Reid continues, that the blind, who have no notion whatever 
of the colour of bodies, may attain a distinct conception of 
the visible figure of bodies. No doubt a blind mathematician, 
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Reid admits, will in the first place associate the two 
dimensional visible figure with hardness and smoothness, 
since he is accustomed to tangible diagrams.' But, surely, 
he may in the next place eliminate this kind of difference, 
by ding very much what ppople do who form a d4stinct 
notion of a parabola or a cycloid without seeing them drawn, 
and from the definitions only. In the end, the figure the 
blind mathematician is conversant with will be, qua figure, 
as 
indistinguishable from what is called visible figure, any 
sort of discussion with Dr. Saunderson will prove. But, this 
being so, awareness of the sort of two dimensional figures 
we call visible is, Reid concludes, conceivable apart from 
the experience of colour, and it follows that the relation 
of the one to the other is the quite contingent one of sen- 
sation to perception. 
On subsequent reflection, Reid seems to have felt, or to 
have been made to feel, that he had gone a bit too far in 
these arguments based on his encounter with Saunderson, 
during a visit to Oxf ßrd; Dugald Stewart toot him to task 
about this very passage in the Inquiry, in a letter written 
about 1783 -84 about the time the Essays were going to press; 
and it was very likely the same passage Hume had in mind, 
when in the letter he wrote Reid in 1764 about the MSS of the 
Inquiry he speaks about an error in the chapter on vision 
Accordingly, in the Essays, Reid makes no use of the point 
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about the blind mathematician, nor, for that matter, of 
the point about Cheselden's patient, and indeed, what he 
has to say in this latter book about the relations of col- 
our and extension is said,for the most part, not in the 
chapter on perception discussing the distinction between 
perception and sensation, but in the chapter on abstraction 
discussing thc, distinction between perception as judgment 
and simple apprehension. Even this new discussion of the 
subject, however, under the head of abstraction is, as we 
have suggested earlier, not as clear as one could wish it 
to be, and perhaps one reason for this unclarity is the con - 
tinuigg influence in his mind of some of the doctrines of 
this present passage in the Inquiry, likely enough of the 
doctrine based on Cheselden's report, a doctrine which vir- 
tually concedes colour to be a simple impression in Hume's 
sense and is not very easy to reconcile with general tend- 
ency of Reid's doctrine of abstraction. 
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Chapter 4 
This new chapter is concerned with the same two 
questions as its predecessors - the question of the ex- 
ternal world (i.e. do the objects of perception have á dis- 
tinct existence ?) and the question of the primum .congitum 
(i.e. are the objects of perception genuine complexes or 
sets of simples ?) and our purpose here is to describe the 
debate on these two points that comes as a sequel to Reid's 
reply to Hu;ae. More precisely our theme will run from 
Dugald Stewart's attempt to clarify the two issues involve:?., 
through Brown's criticism of Stewart's assessment of the 
situation, to Hamilton's criticisms of Brown and. 
and reappraisal of Reid. Not that these were the only 
philosophers who took up the questions where Reid and Hume 
left off, but this trio is specially interesting as con- 
stituting the chief intermediate links in an intellectual 
descent that went from Karnes and Reid right down to Ferrier 
and beyond. 
Dugald Stewart, although Reid's pupil in 1771 and his 
friend and admirer in later life, is nevertheless not to 
be ranked as a disciple of Reid, in the strict sense, - at 
least on the problems concerning us here. The fact is that, 
in addition to being an admirer of Reid, he was almost eq- 
ually an admirer of Adam Smith, being a close student of 
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his occasional writings on the present themes contained in 
the Essay on the External Senses, and the Essay on the 
Formation of Language. Accordingly, kit in this department 
of his work, Stewart went to work by comparing the rival 
views of Reid and Smith with one antlier, and, in the result, 
found himself almost as much indebted to the latter as to 
the former. 
On the question of the belief in an external world, 
Stewart makes a careful attempt to define the exact scope 
of Reid's achievement, and he does so by saying that Reid's 
distinction between sensation and perception, so far as it 
is valid, has a bearing on Hume's point about distinct ex- 
istence only and has no bearing on his point about continued 
existence. "Although Reid has shown our notions concerning 
the primary qualities of bodies to be connected, by an or- 
iginal law of our constitution, with the sensation which they 
excite in our minds, he has taken no notice of the grounds 
ooh 
of our belief that these qualities have an existence independ- 
ent of our perceptions." Stewart is here speaking about 
Reid, of course, and he goes on to explain his point more 
clearly in a foot -note to this passage. "A distinction, coin- 
ciding exactly with that in the text, 'is stated by Mr. Hume 
in his Treatise of Human Nature, which makes it somewhat sur- 
prising that it should have been overlooked by Dr. Reid ", 
and having said that, Stewart proceeds to quote in full the 
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Treatise passage about distinct existence and continued 
existence : "We ought to examine apart etc. " In short, 
Stewart's point is that Reid's discussion of belief in an 
external world can be taken seriously, only if considered 
as a discussion of belief in distinct existence. (The ref- 
are 
erencelo Stewarts : Works, Vol.5, P.105,106. - Hamilton's 
edition). 
Now if one grants Reid's distinction between sensations 
of touch and perceptions of touch, one has already gone most 
of the way, Stewart thinks, towards upholding the belief in 
distinct existence in a. basic department of experience in- 
timately connected with common sense, and accordingly it is 
a. very important qúestion for him as to how fdr this tac- 
tual version of the distinction can be upheld in the sharp 
form it requires, to serve its purpose in regard to the 
problem of the external world. For example, is Reid's thesis, 
W S i c k 
that solid object felt is external in a sense4the concomitant 
feeling of strain is not external, compatible with a fact, 
pointed out by Berkeley, and impossible to deny, - the 
fact, namely, that "Both hardness and resistance" which 
wor.she (Berkeley) considers as perfectly synonymous with 
solidity, "are plainly relative to our senses; At being 
evident, that what seems hard to one animal, may appear 
soft to another who hath greater force and firmness of limbs." 
Now this Berkeleian point does, Stewart admits, make a 
certain difficulty for Reid, but not, he goes" on, a serious 
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one, and all will be well if we restate Reid's fact in 
a more precise manner than he did himself. What one must 
do, Stewart says, is to introduce a sharp distinction be- 
tween the solidity of the body and the shape accompanying 
the solidity, and to point out that whereas the solidity 
of the body is a quality varying from one observer to an- 
other, its shape is a quality constant for all observers. 
In that case, the solidity of the body will have the same 
sort of relationship to its shape and measurable features 
(what Stewart calls - "the mathematical affedtions of matter ") 
as the visible figure of the body already, in Reid's theory, 
bears to this tangible shape, and this tangible shape itself 
will remain real and external in a sharp sense of these 
words, just as before. (Works, Volume 5 Pp.98 -100 and Pp. 
113 -116). 
Having introduced this alternation, Stewart is apparently 
satisfied that Reid's theory of touch can now serve its 
original purpose better, and the only other thing he does 
in this sphere of inquiry is to reaffirm one of the main 
points Reid made against Hume - namely, that out tactual 
perceptions are quite disparate from our tactual sensations, 
in the sense of its being impossible to explain the former 
as "logical constructions" out of the latter. What concerns 
Stewart here, however, is not the Hu_- eian version of this 
reductive thesis, but an alternative version, now becoming 
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fashionable, to the following effect. We get our experience 
of tangible or real shapes (i.e. of Stewart's 'mathematical 
affections of matter') by moving our hands or fib %ers over 
the surface of the body whose size or shape is being as- 
certained, and this _qovement of the hand, which is - accord- 
ing to the argument - quite indispensable for measurement, 
appears in the experience of the person measurinm by touch 
as a series of purely temporal feelings of strain. All this, 
it is contended, will be granted by everybody, and it is 
further laid down, as a quite reasonable supposition, that 
this series of feelings of strain varies concomitantly with 
the movement of the hand (i.e. the visible movement of the 
hand in its movement for the outside observer), and that 
according as the hand moves over an area of greater or lesser 
extent, the chain of feelings is proportinately larger or 
shorter, in a temporal sense. But, this being so, there is 
no objection in principle, the argument concludes, to regarding 
the t ctual perception of spatial extensions as reducible to 
the tactual sensations of non - spatial trains of feelings, 
or, in other words, we can apply Occan's razor to the tact- 
ual perceptions, congrd,erea AS separate processes, and still, 
in their absence, talk intelligently about differences in 
real or tangible shape or size. 
In reply to this argument, Stewart does not challenme 
the premises as to the exact co- relation of manual movement, 
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and of internally felt strain, but proceeds to object to 
the reductionist tactics simply on the ground of their 
mn.ing nonsense of common sense. - But let us quote the 
long note which is Stewart's first and last word about a 
matter which, evidently, interest him greatly. "I intended 
to have introduced here some doubts and queries with res- 
pect to the origin of the nation of extension; not * ** with 
any view to an explanation of a fact I consider as altogether 
unaccountable, but to direct attention to a more accurate 
examination than has hitherto been attempted of -the occasions 
on which this notion is at first formed by the mind. It was 
long ago remarked by Dr. Reid and, indeed, by other writers 
of a still gm earlier date, that to account for the idea 
of extension by the motion of the hand is a paralogism, as 
this supposes a previous knowledge of the existence of our 
own bodies. Condillac does not appear to have been sufficient- 
ly aware of this; nor even that most acute and profound 
philosopher, the 1 t M. Smith. In his Essay on the Ex- 
ternal Senses (published in his posthumous volume), kj.e all 
along supposes the mind in possession of the idea for the 
origin of which he is attempting to account. HoW do we 
get the notion of what Mr. Smith calls externality, and 
Berkeley outness? Is not this only a particular modification 
of the idea of extension? The same remark may be applied to 
0k 
some late speculations ön the subject; by M. Destutt7iTracy. 
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They are evidently the result of great depth and refinement 
of thought; but, like those of idr. S_lith, they will be 
found, on an accurate examina.t _ on, to involve what logicians 
call a jetitio principii. I em strongly inclined, at the 
same time, to think, that the idea. of extension involves 
the idea of motion, or, to express myself more explicitly, 
that our first notions of extension are acquired by the ef- 
fort of moving our hands over the surface of bodies, and by 
the effort of moving our own bodies from place to place. 
The reference which Smith and Destutt de Tracy, as well as 
many earlier inquirers, have made to the motion of the hand, 
in their attempts to clear up this mystery, furnishes a 
strong presumption, that motion is somehow or other concerned 
in the business. I differ from them only in this : that 
whereas they seem to have considered their theory as affording 
some explanation of the origin of the idea, to me it appears, 
if well -founded, to exhibit this problem in a form still 
more manifestly insoluble than that in which it is commonly 
viewed. - One observation I may add without the slightest 
hesitation, that if the idea of Extension presupposes that 
of motion, it must, ,of necessity, presuppose also that 
of time: The prosect lion of this last remark has led me 
into some speculations, which appear to myself to be inter- 
esting; but to which I find it impossible to give a. place 
in this volume." (Volume 5, Pp.431,432 - the passage being 
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a footnote to P.119; the concluding lines by the way are 
cited X477 merely to r_;ive a taste of a, Dugald Stewart note). 
For the purpose of exhibiting Stewart's point of view 
more exactly, we will try to elucidate in detail the refer- 
ence to Adam Smith. - Now our starting -point is the fact that 
Smith, as a glance at his Essay will show, is not explicitly 
following out a reductionist programme in the sense in which 
Destutt de Tracy is explicitly doing this, and, for that 
matter, is primarily interested in the origins of our idea 
of externality of independence, rather than in the origins 
of our idea of extension. That then, is Stewart driving at 
in these remarks? Probably, we answer, something like this. 
In the first place, Stewart must be referring to the fact 
that Adam Smith does explicitly, (though rather by the way), 
describe a baby as getting its first idea of its food i.e. 
the object craved by its hunger as being something with a 
shape and extendedness solely from the experience of the 
instinctive movements of its lips as they gape and clamour, 
and before ever food has actually touched the lips. But 
now, on the strength of this passa.Te, Stewart very likely 
assumes Adam Sm.th to hold that the experience of the lips' 
movement is nothing but an experience of non - spatial mus - 
cular strains, and ^oord_ CJ --agi = that, in consequence, to -J 
have experience of non - spatial strain is, ipso facto, to have 
experience of spatial extendedness, or in other words, the 
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the latter is reducible to the former. (Stewart, we may 
remark, is very puzzled as to the meaning of Smith's teach- 
ing on this point - see Vol.l P.595 - but the line he takes 
of grouping Smith with De Tracy is q quite plausible line 
of interpretation). In the second place, starting from 
this interpretation of Smith as a reductionist after the 
faxim fashion of De Tracy, Stewart probably concluded that 
the doctrine of Smith derivi_.,g our notions of externality or 
independence from our experience of encountering acklatmmx 
obstacles that resist and press upon our fingers and prevent 
the clenching of our fist is equivalent to a doctrine making 
our notion of external or independent existence consist 
the experience of muscular 
sensation (such as we have when we clench our fully extended 
fingers) suddenly stop short of its usual length. But now, 
if the difference between the experience of my own body 
by itself, and the experience of my on body in relation 
to (pressed by) a body not my own, reduces simply to the 
difference between a longer chain of muscular feelings, and 
one that stops short, despite my efforts to prolong it, how, 
Stewart presumably asks (using a standard retort), can such 
an experience give rise to the notion to be accounted for, 
the notion of a reality independent of o my feelings? 
In short, Stewart's point probably is this : if yòu take away 
the idea of extension, you take lar away the idea of independ- 
ence or externality, because, once the idea of e74-&trenae is 
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taken away, there is nothing left, so to speak, to be 
independent. That, or something very like, is no doubt 
what Stewart means by his query : "how do we get the notion 
of what Mr. Smith calls externality? Is not this only a 
particular modification of the idea of extension ?" Indeed, 
Stewart is here assuming that the notion of externality 
or independence is equivalent to the notion of extension 
as being distinct from, in contrast to the feelings of 
strain. (See Vol.5 P.419, including footnote). 
Before leaving the question of touch, it should be 
noticed that both Stewart and the philosophers he argues 
against here seem to accept, as much as did Reid, the Ber- 
keleian doctrine of the identity of tangible shape and size 
with real shape and size. To be sure, this is not a. topic 
they discuss directly, but their agreement with Berkeley 
on this important point is evident from a controversy of 
vet 
the kim t1.yiNe about the relation of touch (i.e. manual 
touch) and the other senses. - The subject of this..contro- 
versy was. the 'celebrated doctrine' of Helvetius that "if 
w r tÇt 
the wrist of man had been terminated by the hoof of a horse, 
the species would still have been wandering in the forest," 
and Stewart's contribution to the controversy was as follows. 
"Suppose, for a moment, that in our species, the wrist had 
been terminated by a hoof like E horse, what would have been 
the consequence? A n li*wx considerable part of a man's lice 
-200- 
must necessarily have been employed, in learning to supply 
the dfblidtx defects of his original perceptions,by comparing 
them together and correcting them by each other, and, of 
muck . 
course, mush time would have been lost. But he would have 
been still a man, in possession of all the powers which are 
characteristical of his nature, and would have attained in 
part, by experience and by the resources of his own mind, 
those advantages which other men enjoy in consequence of 
the use of the hand." (Vol. 4, P. 283, 284) . That is to say, 
the question,. so far as it is strictly concerned with the prob- 
lem of cognition, probably took the following form, at any 
rate for Stewart. It was agreed by all parties that touch, 
so long as the organ was hand, was -free, and 
a guide to real shape add size, whereas other avenues of 
sense, sight, for instance, was deceptivein the sense of 
giving inaccurate delivances as to shapes and size. Now 
the doctrine of Helvetius, Stewart tells us, "was evidently 
suggested by the philosophy which teaches that all our know- 
ledge is derived from our sensations." (P.282) Accordingly, 
the point of Helvetind doctrine, at any rate as interpreted 
by Stewart, would probably be that, if the only class of 
our sensati ong (i. e. perceptions) that is veridical were taken 
from us, our notions of things would be necessarily inac- 
curate, and science would be impossible. If so, then 
Stewart's rejoinder is that, even if we were reduced to 
those classes of our sensations which are deceptive, we 
would still be able to get accurate knowledge, because of 
our being intellectual and not sensational creatures i.e. 
because of our exercisin judgment, and comparing and cor- 
recting the sensations by reference to one another. (See 
also Vol.2 P.15 Para. 2,0) . 
But let us now pass from touch to sight, and see how 
there too Stewart defines and re- affirms Reid's position 
by reference to Smith's. Smith it will be remembered, is 
a votary of the sort of position Reid attacks, the one that 
regards the objects of vision as being naturàlly and orig- 
inally seen as being within the eye, and, in the course of 
discussion, cites a passage in Cheselden in confirmation 
of his position. Stewart's reply to Smith is hidden away 
in a footnote, and we had better quote it in full. (These 
footnotes, it may be remarked, are being quoted and brought 
together here, because, Stewart not having written system- 
atically on perception because of his agreement with Reid, 
they constitute the only evidence of his having gone deeply 
into questions of this kind, and because, in addition, 
they sometimes (as here) provide an indispensable guide to 
what Reid probably meant) . - 'When the young gentleman said, 
(I quote Tyr. Smith's words), that the objects which he saw 
touched his eyes, he certainly could not mean that they pressed 
upon or resisted his eyes; for the objects of sight never 
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act upon the organ in any way that resembles pressure or 
resistance. He could mean no more than that they were close 
upon his eyes, or, to s ;eak more properly, perhaps that they 
were in his eyes. hr. Smith's idea in this last (underlined) 
clause was, I presurie, that the local situation of the ob- 
ject was referred by the patient to the retina where the 
( --p;: v\ sal} 
image of the object is painted. Now I confess, for my own 
part, that I em by no means satisfied that the emendation 
4r. Smith has suggested of the young gentleman's description 
is unexceptionable; for it does not appear to me, that time 
impression of a moderate ag light on the retina is accompanied 
with any perception of the part of the body on which the im- 
pression is made.' When the light, indeed, is so .powerful 
as to produce pain, the case comes to be different, for a 
sensation of touch (Reid and Stewart tend to class pains 
with strains) is then united with the proper sensations of 
sight; and it is characteristical of all sensations of 
touch that they are accompanied with a perception of the 
local situation of their exciting causes, (that is, of the 
local mum situations of the unfelt material impression or 
agitation of one's own body). This, however, it is well 
known, does not take place with respect to the sensations of 
smell and of sound; nor do I imagine it to take place, 
prior to experitbnce, with respect to the sensations re- 
ceived by the eye, (i.e. by 'prior to experténce' is meant 
prior to becoming empirically tkm aware of the connection 
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between seeing and,ta.ngible orb called the eye). And, 
therefore, if a patient in such circumstances should be 
led by his first visual perceptions, to connect them locally 
with the organ by which they are received, I should be in- 
clined rather to ascribe this to concomitant feelings of 
-pain, (produced by the recent operation, or by the too 
sudden impression of a strong light,) than to any of those 
sensations which are exclusively appropriated to the sense 
of sight." (Vol. 4, Pp. 309, 310). 
Here Stewart is of course following Reid fait fully 
in the doctrine that we know the object of vision to be 
external to the eye, because we know of the existence of the 
fdrmer, before we know anything about the existence of the 
latter. Indeed Stewart, in this argument against Smith is 
concerned with distinguishing between the ordinary cases 
of vision where there is no reference whatever to the eye, 
and the extraordinary ones where there is,Ats probably el- 
aborating a point made by Reid in the following striking 
passage. "Though all philosophers agree that, in seeing 
colour, there is sensation, it is not easy to persuade the 
vulgar that, in seeing a coloured body when the light is 
not too strong nor the eye inflamed, they have any sens- 
ations or feeling at all. -- Te say that we feel the tooth - 
abit ache, not thst we perceive it. On the other hand, we 
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say that we perceive the colour of a body, *ot that we 
feel it. Can any reason be given for this difference in 
phraseology ?" (Hamilton's Reid, Vol.]. P.319). 
It is on the subject of the relation of colour to 
visible figure that Stewart begins to move away from Reid. 
The- subject he brings up here is Reid's doctrine of In- 
quiry Chapter 6 Section 8 that colour and sound are both 
unextended sensations differing' only in the fact of the 
forger's being accompanied, a matter of sheer brute con- 
tingency by visible figure, and the latter's being unac- 
companied by anything analogous. But now this doctrine of 
the brute rely tior of colour, as an unextended sensation, 
to visible figure is not, Stewart admits, easy to reconcile 
with the undeniable fact that people confess to seeing; 
colour spread -out over shape, or, at any rate, to feeling 
an intimate connection between the one and the other. (Vo1.1 
P.128 and P.129).. 
Now, according, to Stewart, it is only by * id crit- 
icising Reid's version of this sort of theory, that we can 
oroducd an alternative version more in line with the fact 
of common sense in question. Take the fact Reid relies on 
to prove the inexplicable contingency of the. ration of the 
experience of visible figure to the experience of colour - 
the case, namely, of the "class of broken jelly" through which 
we can see colour without seeing shape. But now this fact, 
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Stewart argues, does not warrant the conclusion Reid 
bases on it - to grit, that there is no explaining why the 
4 
seeing of colour is attended^with no perception of'visible 
tI tyL S 
figure in other cases. On the contrary,ra good enough 
reason, Stewart thinks, for the absence of visible figure 
is this one case and its presence in other cases - viz. that 
in the case where we see colour without any shape, the 
colour we see is a unifor colour, and the case where we see 
colour accompanied by shape, the colour we see is a diver- 
sified colour. But, this being so, it is, Stewart argues, 
quite proper to regard the seeing of colour as being in a 
certain sense regularly connected with the perception of 
visible figure, and, in this way, we can up to a point ex- 
plain the feeling of common sense about the relation between 
colour and ,shape. 
But here let us quote the words Stewart uses on P.132 
of Volume l in dealing with the problem. "All these sen- 
sations were plainly intended by nature to perform the office 
of signs, indicating to us the figure and distances of things 
external. Of their essential importance in this point of view, 
an idea may be formed by supposing for a moment the whole 
face of nature to exhibit only one uniform colour, without 
the slightest variety even of light and shade. Is it not 
self -evident that, on this supposition, the organ of sight 
would be entirely useless,_ inasmuch as it is by the varieties 
A I n p a v° ce.Vofi o 
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of colour alone that the outlines and visible fi-°ures of 
bodies are so defined, as to be distinguishable one from 
another ?" 
Before we go further, we had better make it clear why 
we regard this observation of Stewarts as expressly dir- 
ected against Reid, and as being significant for Stewart 
dhiefly in relation to Reid. for this purpose, we will have 
tó cite the foot -note to the last quoted passage (begin- 
ning on P.132 and continued over the next two pages). "In 
Dr. Reid's Inquiry, he has introduced a discussion concerning 
the perception of visible figures which has puzzled me 
since the first time (more than forty years ago) that I read 
his work. The discussion related to the question - -- that 
"our eye m..ght have been so formed as to suggest the visible 
figure of the object, without suggesting colour" - (Inquiry, 
Chapter 6, Section 8). To my apprehension, nothing can ap- 
pear more manifest than this, that, if there had been no 
variety in our sensations of colour, and still more, if we 
had no sensations of colour whatsoever, the organ of sight 
could have given us no information with respect to figures, 
and, in cOnsequence would have been useless." (The Ency- 
clopaedia Britannica Dissertation where this is written was 
published in 1815; Stewart's first reading Of the Inquiry 
he 
must therefore have taken place between 1771 -2 whennwas 
Reid's student, and 1775 : a -part of an old draft letter 
from Stewart to Reid on this very topic was included by 
Hamilton in the footnote). 
But now what Stewart is doing in this foot -note is vir- 
tually to repudiate Reid's speculation as to the possibility 
of a blind mathematician's genuinely forming an idea of vis- 
ible figre. But his main point in reference to these chap- 
ters of Reid is, we think, not so much concdraed with what 
Reid asys about the blind but with -.what Reid says by way 
of contrasting colour -experience with sound -experience. In 
raising this last part about sight and hearing in the present 
context, Stewart does not indeed mention Reid by name in 
this connection, but he does so in the other passage where 
the subject comes up - Vol. 2 Pp.495 -497, in the last para- 
graph. 
That said, it becomes possible to explain Stewart's 
psxnÌxtta± full meaning here by contrast with Reid's. Both 
start from Hutchexon's point that, as a matter.of brute fact, 
figure accompanies colour and doesn't accompany sound, and 
these disagree as to how far this is a matter of brute fact. 
According to Reid there are (one might say) two brute facts 
here; namely that while no reason can be given why colour 
sometimes suggests figure and sound never does, no reason 
equally can be given with respect to colour 6y sFse(. 
as to why it sometimes suggests figure, and sometimes doesn't 
(a.s in the Cheselden case). Now Stewart's main point would 
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simply seem to be that Reid's brute fa.zt number two is 
not abrute fact at all, that - to be more precise - the 
relation of colour to figure is up to a point invariable 
sequence; uniformity of colour suggesting no figure, div- 
ersity of colour suggesting figure. On the other hand, 
Stewart does not interfere with Reid's brute fact number 
one, except by way of stating it more precisely, i.e. he 
leaves it as an inexplicibable fact that, on the one hand, un- 
imforxm fortuity of colour and uniformity of sound do not 
either of them suggest figure and on the other hand, diversity 
of colour does and diversity of sound does not suggest 
figure. 
Stewart's root problem here, it will be remembered, 
is the question as to how this "Cartesian" (P.129) view of 
the disconnectedness of colour and figure as representing 
sensation and perception can be reconciled with the plain 
man's conviction about their relation. Accordingly he 
does not think that the point made in the last argument 
about there being a certain connection between the sen- 
sation of colour and the perception of figure has gone all 
the way to meet the plain man's feeti.n.. about the colour as 
being out there on the bodies, i.e. to account for the ten- 
dency of the mind to "transport its sensations out of itself 
and spread them, as it were, over a substance to which they. 
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cannot possibly belong." (P.129). 
Stewart tries to deal fruitfully with this point in a 
further argument. On the Berkeleian theory, "lineal dis- 
tance from the eye is not an original perception of sight." 
But "in the meantime" (i.e. before there is any evidence 
as to anything in the object of vision being distant or 
near (see P.544 i.e. Stewart's own note to the passage]), 
"from the first moment the eye opens, the most intimate 
connection must necessarily be established between the no- 
tion of colour end the notions of visible extension and 
figure." This intimate connection, he tells us on the same 
page, involves our regarding the first, the sensation, merely 
as the means to the perception of, i.e. as the sign, of the 
second, and, from the nature of a sign -relation, involves in 
fact, our disregarding the first in a certain sense, and 
regarding only the second. (He means by this, a:pParently, 
that we are attentive to, and take note of, in the first 
instance or naturally, differences of shape only, and do 
not, in the same way, take note of difference of colour). 
But, this being so, at the next stage, "when a comparison 
between the sense of sight and touch has taught us to refer 
to a distance the visible figures, the indissolubly ass- 
ociated sensations of colour must of course accompany them, 
however far the distance may extend." That is to say, 
there is no regard paid to colour on its own account until 
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after it has already been transported "out there." 
(Pp.131 and 132). 
It should be mentioned that, according to Stewart's 
declaration, the problem ultimately interestin to him in 
this whole topic was the account, the somewhat confusing 
account, Reid gives of the contrast between the relation 
of colour - sensations to visible figure, and sensations of 
strain to tangible figure. Stewart's work here in fact 
can be viewed as an attempt, to clear up points Reid leaves 
unclear, and he does this, first by pointing:out the.exis- 
tence, unnoticed by Reid, of a connection between colour 
and visible figure, and second by bringing out in a way 
much clearer than Reid ever does (in order to make Reid 
clear at this, point, we confess to having read back 
Stewart's doctrine into him) the absence of any kind of 
natural reference or instinctive reference to the organ of 
sight in our experance of the objects of sight, as in his 
argument with Smith over Cheselden's case. 
But now, before going on to anything new, we had better 
say a word about the relation of our few quotations to 
Stewart's volumnious works. The fact of prime importance 
here is that, though Stewart apparently lecturesi on per- 
ception (see his Outline), he never wrote systematically 
about it. That is to say, whine his views on the other 
chief problems of philosophy are dealt with at length. and 
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.in same order in the three volumes of his Elements,. his 
views on perception and on Reid's theory are scattered, 
mainly in notes, through his Dissertation, (a historical 
survey), and in his Philosophical Essays, and are touched 
on briefly and at random even there. This failure to treat 
Perception fully is the more surprising as Stewart, it must 
be obvious, was very interested in the subject, but, as 
we shall find, it was quite usual for philosophers of Stew - 
art's school to behave in this way, saying their best things 
in packed, brief foot- notes. 
On the other problem we have in view, the problem of 
universals and abstraction, Stewart was much less indebted 
to Reid than he was on the problem of the perception of an 
external world. In this field, indeed, it was to the no- 
minrlism of Adam Smith, and not to the concdptualism of Reid 
that he adhered, and he seems to have taken from Reid only 
such oihts as enabled him to restate the nominalist posi- 
tion in such a way as to exempt it, apparently, from the 
reproach of being "a.tomistic ", that is, tied to a. metaphysic 
of simple isolated impression. As for the rest of Reid's 
discussion, that is, i parts like Essay 6 Chapter 1, 
which are obviously incompatible with a nominalist approach, 
these parts he passes over in silence, presumably regarding 
them as confl. sed, and it looks as if he regarded Reid's 
whole discussion as composed of two contradictory parts, 
-212- 
one of them brief and lucid, and the remainder impenetrable 
by sense. 
Now there is obviously no means of directly proving 
the thesis that Stewart passes over in silence many pages 
of Reid because of his finding them incomprehensible. How- 
ever it is forbunt f *,easy in this case to prove the thesis 
indirectly, first by showing that on the subject of origins 
of language Stewart and Reid were quite out of touch with 
one another, and second by showing that Reid's theory of 
the origin of language is intimately connected with the chap- 
ter in the Essays which Stewart overlooks. 
On this question of language, Stewart is taken up with 
a kind of apparent antithesis between the position of Adam 
Smith, and the position of Leibnitz and Turgot, and he ap- 
proaches the question by assuming that Smith must in the 
main be right, but that there may lurk in the pages of the 
rival speculators some partial truth missed by Smith but 
reconcilable with his position. However the details of 
this controversy must be left till later, and for thr present 
we need only give a few basic facts. 
Now Stewart approaches this whole matter, by assuming, 
tentatively indeed, and with a view to reappraisal, the 
thesis that society originated before language, and asking 
in r espect of the origin of language, which parts of speech 
come first. "According to Mr. Smith, the first step that 
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men would take towards the formation of a language would be 
the assignation of particular names to denote particular 
objects - or, in other words, the institution of nouns 
substantive; which nouns, it is plain (according to this 
theory, would bd all proper names. Afterwards, as the ex- 
perience of men enlarged, these names would be gradually 
applied to other objects tesembling the first; in the same 
manner as we sometimes call a great general, Caesar, or a 
great philosopher, a Newton; .tha and then those words which 
were origianlly proper names would gradually and insensibly 
become appellatives." (Vol. ', "forks, P.24). But in a foot- 
note, Stewart proceeds thus ó It is someWkat curious that 
Lei nitz seems to assume the contrary of Mr. Smith's doctrine 
as an axiom. In the first sentence of the following para- 
graph, he lays it down as a self- evident principle, that all 
proper names were at first appellatives; a proposition, which 
must now appear nearly as absurd as to maintain, that classes 
of objects existed before individual objects had been brought 
into being." (loc.cit. P.25). - Smith's theory of language, 
and Stewart's discussion of it, by the way, cover many topics 
besides this one, the meaning of the word'I' for example; 
however we will leave all that aside. 
But now, while Stewart, on the question of the origin 
of language, is syimpathetic to a. theory like Adam Smiths, 
and indeed does not seriously take into account the possibility 
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of any other sort of theory, Stewart's friend and master 
Reid, in touching lion this same subject in a letter writ- 
ten in 1787 to his relative Professor Gregory, (co- dedicatee 
with Stewart of the Intellectual Powers), shows himself 
ic*z to be beyond all doubt, hostile to theories like Adam SmithAs 
as, for example, here "That parts of speech should be con- 
ceived before speech was in use, and that speech should be 
at first formed by putting together parts of speech, seems 
to me altogether incredible; no less incredible than if it 
should be said that before men got the conception of body, 
they first framed the conception of matter, then the con- 
ception of form, and, putting these two together, they dot 
the conception of body, which is made up of matter and form." 
As against this sort of theory, Reid states his own thus. 
"In speedo, the true natural unit is a sentence. No man 
a 
intends less than he speaks; what is less thanAcomplete sen- 
tence is not speech, but a part or parts of speech; to divide 
a sentence into parts requires great_ abstraction than to dit- 
ide the unit into fractions of a unit. It is, therefore, 
extremely probable that men expressed sentences by one com- 
plex sound or word, before they thought of dividing them 
into )arts, signified by different words. One word signified, 
v, bk -h.,r 
give me bread; r t, take bread; another bake bread. As 
all these sentences have something common in their meaning, 
the natural love of analogy would lead to something common 
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in the word by which they were expressed; and in the progress 
of language, that which was common in the sound of all these 
sentences might be separated from that which was proper 
to each, d by being thus separated, it becomes the part 
of speech we call a substantive noun, signifying bread, 
which substantive will be fit to make a Dart of many other 
sentences." (P.71, Vol.1, Namilton's Reid). 
Reid and Stewart, then, would seem to be here poles 
apart, the former opposing, the latter advocating Adam Smith's 
theory of the origin of language. Nor is their divergence 
from one another on this point a mere incident, but rather 
must be regarded as part of a general cleavage between them 
on a whole range of topics. In the case of Reid, the view 
of the first words as being, so to speak, sentences is ap- 
parently bound up with his doctrine that perception involves 
a judgment, and not just a simple apprehension, whereas, so 
far as Stewart is concerned, the doctrine of the first words 
as the names of individuals evidently is meant to have a 
close connection with his doctrine that "by our perceptive 
powers we are made acquainted only with what is particular 
or individual." (Outline Sec.5. - P.22 of Vol.2 of the 
works) i.e. with the sort of doctrine Reid wants to oppose. 
Stewart, we may add, does not hold, and nowhere mentions 
Reid's doctrine of perception as judgment. 
Now Stewart is, on the present range of topics, aware 
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of his divergence for Reid, but is not, apparently, aware 
(or does not M. own to being aware ) of the extent of his 
divergence for Reid, and in particular, does not seem to 
suspect Reid of taking a very different view of the origin of 
language from the view he himself takes. Indeed, Stewart's 
ignorance in this respect comes out very clearly in the 
criticism he passes on the eighty-three .year old Reid in Vol.I 
of the Elements, (Vol.2 of the Works), a book dedicated to 
Reid himself. "The long experid.nce I have had of the candour 
of this excellent author, encourages me to add, that in stating 
his opinion on the subject of universals, he has not expressed 
himself in a manner so completely Bkat satisfactory to my 
mind as on most other occasions. That language is not an es- 
sential instrument of thought in our general reasonings, he 
has nowhere positively asserted. At the same time, he has 
not affirmed the contrary; and his silence on this point is 
the more to be regretted, as it is only the only point about 
which there can be any reasonable controversy." (Works Vol.2 
P.191 - abridged) . But now tiimg Stewart is here obviously 
assuming in good faith that Reid would be willing to accept 
as crucial and ultimate a question as to whether - xxxax#RAxm 
supposing appellative words.or general terms were removed, or 
else not invented - we could still think and reason about 
classes and generalities, and, in so far as he makes this 
assumption, he is oblivious of the fact that Reid, in virtue 
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og his doctrine of the original words as being sentences, 
the original perceptions as involving judgments (i.e. of 
appellations as being in some way implicit in all language) 
mi_ht very likely have refused the supposition basic to 
the question, - the supposition, namely, of the removability, 
or the adventitiousness of appellatives. 
But in the second place, Stewart is not apparently pro- 
.. 
ceeding at random in his thus imputing to 'Reid t doctrine 
r rte, 
that the names of individuals WK the first names we give, 
or (what apparently amounts to the same thing) that in 
perception we are acquainted only with the, individual on" 
particular, and, if his interpretation of Reid on this point 
had been challenged, he would in all probability have re- 
ferred us-to the very text of Reid in Essay 5 Chppter 3 
which we have already discussed - tht text that "whilla we 
cannot generalise without abstracting, we can abstract 
without generalising." Certainly, it is to that,text of 
Reid that Stewart reverts when he'is engaged in defining 
quite pe oe. 14.g his own position. "I shall only observe 
further, with respect to the nature and province of this 
faculty of mind "(i.e. abstraction) "that notwithstanding 
its e99enti3 ̀
 -1 subserviency to every act of classification, 
yet it might have been exercised, although we had been 
acquainted only with one i ridividual object. Although, for 
example, we had never seen. but one rose we might still have 
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been able to attend to its colour, without thin; >ing 
of its other properties. This has led some kp philosophers 
to suppose that another faculty besides abstraction, to 
which they have given the name of generalisation , is nec- 
essary to account for the formation of genera and species; 
and they have endeavored to show that although generalis- 
ation without abstraction is impossible, yet that we might 
have been so formed as to abstract without generalising. 
(Works Vo 1. 2, Pp. 164, 165) . 
Now Stewart obviously has Reid in view here, and in 
particular the passage in Reid just cited, and he is indicating 
what he takes to be points of a.gteement and the points of 
disagreement between himself and Reid. But the points of 
argument are, in Stewart's estimation, that we become aware 
of a solitary object (like Hume's white globe) as a complex, 
simply by xt±tix attending to one of its aspects to the ex- 
clusion of the other aspects inseparable from the first, and 
that, in the next place, Perceiving another individual ob- 
ject, and analysing it in a similar way by shifts of atten- 
tion, we then find a. resemblance between that one of the in -. 
separable aspects sin.71ed out from the second object and that 
one of the inseparable aspects smiled out from the first 
object; and the point of difference, also in Stewart's 
estimation, is c. only on the question whether or not this 
awareness of resemblance that provides a foundation for 
-219- 
for using a general name involves some kind of awareness 
of a non -empirical entity called an "abstract of general con- 
ception." 
Stewart, then, seems, we may conclude, to base his in- 
terpretation of this part of Reid's doctrine almost wholly 
on the first few paragraphs of Reid's Essay 5 Chapter 3, and 
for that matter, we could never guess from Stewart's account 
(or rather accounts), that there are passages in Reid on the 
same subject, and in the same part of the same book, of a 
very different tendency. In particular, Stewart never 
refers (so far as I can find) to the most outstanding of 
these passages of a different tendency, namely the discussion, 
in Essay 6 Chapter I of the laxxxxgxx paradoxes involved in 
the dlctrmne of perception as involving judgment, and one can- 
not help wondering if Stewart saw Reid's point here. 
Now we are inclined to believe that the sharp diver- 
gence between Stewart and Reid over this range of subject has 
to do with the latters taking paradoxes of a certain sort 
seriously, and the formers not taking; them seriously at all. 
No doubt, our suggestion here is a mere guess in regard to 
the question of Stewart's silence about Essay 6 Chapter 1, 
but it is not quite a mere guess with regard to Stewart's 
divergence from Reid on the subject of language, as the 
following Quotations from Stewart show. "Mr. Smith, it must 
be owned, he s rather slurred over a very specious and 
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puzzling objection recently stated by Rousseau, not only 
to the theory of Condillac, but to all speculations which 
have for their object the solution of the same problem. 
"If language ", hx says. Rousseau, "be the result of human 
convention and if words be essential to the exercise of 
thought, language would appear to be necessary for the in- 
vention of language. " (Works Vol.1, P.361). 
Now in connection with this difficulty Stewart makes 
mention of Reid, referring to a passage in his Inquiry, 
Chapter 4 Section 2. "That men never could have invented 
an artificial language, if they had not possessed a natural 
language, is an observation of Dr. Reid's; and it is this 
indisputable and self -evident truth which gives to Rousseau's 
remark that imposing plausibility, which at first sight, 
dazzles and perplexes the judgment. I by no means say, that 
the former proposition affords a key to all the dif- 
ficulties suggested by the latter; but it advances us at 
last one important step towards their solution." (P.361). 
Now the point of interest to us here is this. The 
speculations of both Stewart and Reid in reference to lang- 
uage have apparently a common source - a set of cautious 
observations /in the litter's Inquiry of 1764 as to how to 
deal with the sort of paradox Rousseau evolves as to the im- 
possibility of regarding lan-ua.ge as in any degree man -mode. 
From then on, however the master and disciple proceeded 
on entirely different lines, Stewart seeing no difficulty in 
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co_moining in one theory Reid's answer to this kind or par- 
adox and Adam Smith's theory of the origin of lenguage, and 
Reid on the other hand finding it impossible to work out 
the implications of his originally very sketchy answer with- 
out rei3.udiating altogether theories like Adam Amith's, and, 
in short, whereas Stewart saw no reason to alter what was 
then the popular, almost the orthodox view of the matter 
( Condillac and Adam Smith coincide here - as so often) on 
account of Rousseau's paradox, Reid felt the paradox could 
not be got rid of without abandoning this standpoint about 
the origin of len?ua.ge. 
But now Stewart's discussion of the problem of univ- 
ersals,. while being in the respects mentioned independent 
of Reid's discussion, is at the same time, in other ways, 
much indebted to Reid, or at least introduces themes which 
from 
look as if the_; were adapted Reid. In the end of the day, 
therefore, there is almost perhaps almost as Much Reid as 
Adam Smith in Stewart's doctrine ( as well a.s, of course, 
a great deal belonging to neither), and the main interest 
of his discussion consists in his attempt to develop a sort 
of nominalism that allows for, and does not neglect, some 
of the standard anti- nominalist agruments. 
Our first task is to make clear just what it was in 
Adam Smith that specially appealed to Stewart. Now the 
important fact in this connection would seem to be this: 
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while Smith allows the fransformation of a proper name 
into an appellative to take place, "through the application 
of the name of an individual to a great number of objects 
;hose resemblance recalls the idea of that individual, and 
of the ne.me that expresses it' he at the same time insists 
on regarding this kind of thing e.s hhppening 'not by any 
deliberate or sceintific exercise of abstraction' but 
'by a gradual and insensible rocess'. Now, to all appear- 
ances, it was the doctrine implied in these underlined 
clauses that took Stewart's fancy; or, in other words, 
Stewart was encouraged by Adam Smith's example to regard 
the process whereby a name acquired general significance as 
being in a very considerable degree an arbitrary process, 
that is, a process not based on awareness of exact resem- 
blance in a certain respect (i.e. not based on 
deliberate or scientific abstraction). - The phrases used 
about Smith are to be found in Stewart Vol.2, P.160 and 
Vo 1. 4, B.24. 
According to Stewart, then, the merit of Adam Smith's 
view of general names lies in its being on the whole a. "con- 
ventionalist",view, and he tries on his own account to 
bring home the point of "conventionalism" in these matters 
by referring us to a story told by Captain Cook. The story 
is about some South Sea Islanders who were acouainted with 
no other land animals except hogs, dogs and birds, or rather 
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a large numer of species of birds, and the point interesting 
to Stewart is that these islanders, on being; shown sheep 
and goats for the first time, confidently referred to them 
as birds. The odd nomenclature, Stewart goes on, "probably 
aid not arise from their considering a sheep or goat as 
bearing; a more stri :ing resemblance to a bird than to the 
two classes of ouad_cuped with which they were acquainted; but 
to their lack of a. generic ord, wuch as 'Quadruped' compre- 
hending these two species which men in their situation would 
be no more led to form, than a person who had seen only one 
individual of each species, would think of an appellative 
to express both, instead of applying a proper name to each. 
In consequence of the variety of birds, it apoears that they 
had a generic name comprehending all of them, to which it 
was not unnatural for them to refer any new naima.l they met 
with." (Vol.2, P.161.). 
Now here Stewart abruptly switches over from Smith to 
Reid and having begun by saying that appellatives in some 
sense do not presupooe the deliberate exercise of abstraction, 
he goes on, with apparent inconsequence and without preparing 
us to state in the next paragraph that appellatives do in some 
sense oresuppo se something very like the sort of abstraction 
010'1%4511 gtit1hy1 akrme 
Smith had spoken slight4ly of. As olA ects of sense ens corn - 
olex, and no two of them alike, the application of one name. 
to two objects in virtue of a resemblance, "supposes" says 
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Stewart, "a. power of attending to some of the attributes, 
and neglecting the rest." (Vo 1. 2, P.161). But now to all 
appearance a view of abstraction as an indispensable fac- 
tor in the formation of general words is not at first 
d.ight easy to harmonize with a view of abstraction, as, 
in some vcxym sense, an unimportant factor in the process, 
and though Stewart never admits the existence of an apparent 
contradiction here, he was likely enough quite well aware of 
the difficulty, since most tamxt.km of the rest of what 
he says on this subject (whether here in Vol. 2. of the 
Works, or twenty years later in Vol. 4 of the '. Torés,) can 
very plausibly be viewed as an attempt to reconcile Rei.d 
with Smith by modifying both. 
Stewart's chief step towards clearing up the riddle 
about the exact part played by abstraction in the formation 
of appellatives is not taken till Vol. 3 Pp.173 -176 of the 
Torés (i. e. Vol. 2. of the Elements). "This remark of Smith 
- that appellatives originate insensibly out of proper 
names - becomes, in my opinion, much more luminous and ime 
portant by being combined with another very original one, 
.rhi ch is ascribed to Turgot by Condorcet, " (P.173 to c. cit. ) 
and which, resembling a little the heibnitzian dictum e- 
* rr 
bout the priority of appellatives over proper na.mesisome of 
our most abstract and general &max ideas are among the ear- 
liest we form." Now Turgot's observa.tion,, Stewart assumes -, 
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in no way contradicts Smith's position that knowledge begins 
by being conversant solely with the particular -since, cc- 
cording to Stewart's interpretation, Turgot was engaged in 
obj ecting "to the common doctrine of logicisms that our know- 
ledge begins in an accurate and minute acquaintancw ±xh with 
the characteristical prpperties of individual objects" and 
was pmoposing in its place, the counter -doctrine that - to 
quote Turgot's own words, - "we see at first only a, small 
number of qualities" and fail to native ±112Et some that turn 
out to be distinguishing features. But a theory like Smith's, 
Stewart goes on, could be put in a much more satisfactory 
form, by distinguishing, in the light. of Turgot's remark, 
between names which are vaguely generalised, due to imprefect 
observation of the objects the name in question applies to, 
and names which are methodically generalised, in virtue of 
"an abstraction based on a careful study of the particulars" 
of each of the objects a_given name applies to. In short, 
the upshot is, according to Stewart, that those appellatives 
that originate insensibly and without the deliberate and 
scientific exercise of abstraction are for the most part ap- 
pellatives of the vague kind, and the sort of appellative 
Stewart has in mind here is doubtless illustrated in a 
quotation he has given in Vol.2 P.161. "They expressed great 
surprise at seeing a cow on board the 'Briton', and were in 
doubt whether she was a great goat, or horned sow." 
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In the notes at the end, Stewart tries to bring home 
the point mede here, by an argument that Smiths own. version 
of the proper name theory is at one, point infected by a 
confusion through failure to take into account the sort of 
point Turgot had drawn attention to. In support of his 
theory, Smith, Stewart tells us, had cited the following 
fact : A child who is just learning to speak calls every 
person who comes to the house its papa or its mamma; and 
thus bestows on the whole species these names which it bad 
been taught to apply to individuals. "Now this example, 
Stewrt.rt says, "is of no ust to confirm the theory it Was 
brought to support," and its irrelevance consists in the 
fact that "it is not an instance of any disposition to 
eralise proper names, but merely of imperfect and indisting- 
.wishing perception "in a period of infancy -.-hen "notions of 
similarity and identity cannot fail to be sometimes one end 
not 
the same" (loc.cit. P.382). In kx short, it is case of 
the transformation of a proper name into an appellative, 
even a vague appellative, but rather, orobebic of the mis - 
application of a proper name. 
For the rest, Stewart is engaged in trying to Prove 
against Reid that nominalism is enough, and that there is 
no need to speak of "abstract general conceptions." -4/In 
order to justify his own expression of conceiving univer- 
sals, and in opposition to Berkeley and Hume, Dr. Reid is at 
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pains to illustrate kn a distinction between conception 
^nd imagination. "A universal," says he, "is not an oThject 
of any external sense, and therefore cannot be imagined 
but it may be distinctly conceived. I can conceive a pro- 
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positmmn or demonstration, but I cannot imagine either, .Aun - 
derstanding and will, virtue and vice, and other attributes 
of the mind, but I cannot imagine them. In like manner, I 
can distinctly conceive universals, but I cannot imagine 
them." It is grafted on both sides, Stewart goes on, that 
we cannot conceive universals in any way at all analogous 
to that in wh0h we conceive an absent object of sense." 
But it appears from the passage by conceiving universals, 
Dr. Reid means nothing more than understanding the meaning 
of propeksitions involving general terms, "and, in the second 
place, when we speak of conceiving or- understanding a 
general proposition we mean nothing more than that we have 
a conviction that we have it in outr power to substitute, 
instead of the general tern, some one of the individuels 
comprehended under it." "Therefore, Dr. ' eid's argument. 
+I,e 
does not in the least invalidate the doctrine ofAnominelitis" 
(Vol.2 Works, ?p.191 -193, abráa4ged). 
Now in this dispute, both sides are of course agreed 
that if one understands :_ . g eneral term in a ?proposition, 
one must be able to produce a particular instance of the 
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sort of thing referred to by the general term, and the 
chief point at issue is, accordingly, whether in the case of 
certain basic general terms like colour -words or shape - 
words, it is possible to produce the particular instance in 
question by itself, in an uncomplicated way, or, in other 
words, in isolation from aught else. Now Stewart is quite 
cognisant of the x*fR difficulty here, and in a passage 2mom 
found first in Vol.2 P.163, and repeated in Vol.3 about page 
83 in his renewed discussion of Reid on universals, he is very 
it 
insistent that jog is, in such cases, quite impossible to pro- 
duce the instance by itself in a direct way, quite impossible, 
that is, to point at or imagine the blue of the sky without 
simultaneously pointing out or imagining the expanse of the 
sky. However, he believes himself able to overcome the dif- 
ficulty by the claim that the isolating of an inseparable 
aspect can be virtually accomplished by a shift of attentimn. 
"A person who had never seen but one rose (it has already 
been mentioned) might yet be able to consider its colour apart 
from its other qualities, and therefore, (to express myself 
in conformity with common landuage (he means, the fashionable 
terminology, nót colloquial language)) there may be such a 
tiring as an ir_'ea which is at once abstract and particular." 
(V01.2 loc. cit. ). 
Stewart, by the way, was a pioneer in the matter of at- 
tention ?in general : "This act is one of the simplest of all 
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our intellectual operations, and yet it has been very 
little noticed by wHters on pneumatology. " (Vol.2, P.21). 
Oddly, enou7h, however, the main effect of this innovation 
of Stewart's was to bring back an old exploded entity, Hurne's 
simple impression by a round about wry. This fact emerges 
not merely in the doctrine of abstraction by shifts of 
attention, but siso in a. curious speculation on Stewart's 
favourite subject of visible figure somewhat out of line 
with his other speculations on the subject, and introduced 
by Stewart not to solve riddles about visible figure, but to 
illustrate the laws of attention. That he does there is to 
argue that our perception of visible figure is the result 
of a =maxim succession of perceptions of one point after 
another of the points constituting the outline, each point 
being equated, in Humeian fashion, with a minimum visibile, 
and the grounds he gives for holding this paradoxical doc- 
trine is first that all perception involves attention, and 
second that we cannot attend to more than one thin; at a 
time, and cannot look in two directions at once. - It should 
be added that Stewart regards this speculation as a sort 
of mnaaxxxx unproven hypothesis, implicit in his general 




From Stewart, the pupil of Reid, we pass to Brown, the 
,pupil of Stewart, Remarkably precocious, Brown produced its 
first philosophical work, the examination of Erasmus Dar - 
win's views, before he was out of his teens, and almatt before 
he was out of Stewart's class -room, and had already, by his 
mid -twenties, produced a book that was at once goma and still 
is accepted as being in its way a classic - the Essay on 
causality. Accordingly, when Stewart retired from active 
duties in Edinburgh in 1810, Buywwn was appointed his colleague 
and successor, but died prematurely in 1820, leaving behind 
for publication his volunnious lectures, and alshort book, 
on the human mind, which contains a su me..ry of the first Ealf 
of the lectures. 
Without any further preamble, we will plunge into Brown's 
discussion of the problem of universals, a subject on whtth 
he sides with Reid and joins issue with Stewart. Naturally 
enough, he goes pretty circumspectly about the business of 
criticising views held by one who was his teacher, his 
patron, and his colleague in the chair, and names Stewart 
only once, although Stewart is apparently in his mind through- 
out the whole discussion. All the same, he leaves no doubt 
as to where he stands. "The view which I have given, though, 
I flatter myself, more clear in its analysis, is in the main 
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the same with the doctrine of Locke and Reid."' (Lecture 46 
sentence abbreviated). 
Let us begin with Brown's theory of abstraction, and in- 
troduce the topic with a quotation indicating the way in 
which he puts the prablem. "Substances are not conceived 
by us only as composed of certain elementary substances which 
constitute them, by t,hevr mere ;; t cáx .dposition, in apparent 
contiguity and which may exist apart, after the division. 
They are also conceived by us as subjects of qualities, which 
co-existTx2Ihmxic in them, and which cannot exist apart, or, 
in other words, they are capable of affecting us as sentient 
beings in various ways. The conglomerated flakes in a. snow- 
ball are not more distinctly parts of the mass itself which 
we consider, than the coldness, whiteness, gravity, softness 
QYL, 
or hardness, ease felt to be parts of our complex notion of 
snow, as a substance. 
"When I think of cases, in which the relation is of a 
substance to parts that are themselves substances - as when 
I say that a room is part of a house, or that a. tree has 
branches, it is qlite evident that in these very simple pro- 
positions I merely state the relation of parts to a. compre- 
hending whole. But is the statement at all different in kind 
when I speak in the common forms of a proposition, of the 
qualities of object, when I say, for example, that snow is 
white? Do I not merely state one of the many qualities, 
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comprehended in that totality of qualities, which constitutes 
the subject as known to me? I do not indeed divide a mass 
into its integral parts, but I divide a complex notion into 
its parts, or at least separate from that complexity a qual- 
ity which I feel to belong and state to belong to that 
whole complex notion from Which I have detached it.". (Lec- 
ture 48 - with an omission). 
Now Brown's point here is obviously a claim as to the 
existence of an analogym a quite fundamental reapect between 
a proposition like 'this tree has trunk and foliage,. and 
a proposition like 'this tree has form and colour. As to 
the meaning of this claim, Brown's intentions become clear 
only when we read othér lectures of his ?fin kindred themes, 
and find him primarily concerned with the gúestion as to how 
we distinguish on the one hand between the trunk and foliage, 
of the tree, and on the other hand between the colour and 
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form of the tree, or, in other words, arr how we manage to 
verify either proposition. 
For the moment, let us set aside the question as to the 
distinction between the treels trunk and foliage, and confine 
ourselves to the distinction between the tree's colour and 
form. In this connection we find Brown emphatically re- 
pudiating Stewart's faculty of abstraction. This, he says, 
is "a faculty by which we are supposed to be capable of sep - 
era.ting in our thought certain parts of our complex notions, 
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and of consc 'eying them abstracted from the rest. This 
supposed faculty, however, is not merely unreal as ascribed 
to the mind, but I may add that such a faculty is impossible, 
since every exertion of it would imply a contradiction. For 
what is the state of mine immediately preceding this inten- 
tional separation - its state at the moment the supposed 
faculty is conceived to be called into exercise? Does it 
not necessarily involve the very abstraction it is supposed 
to produce? If we know, what we single out, we have already 
performed all the separation that is necessary; if we do not 
know what we are singling out, and do not even know we are 
singling out anything, the separtte part of the complex whole--- - 
cannot arise by '. he operation of my voluntary faculty." 
(Lecture 51). 
Brown's remarks here are best understood in the light 
of the kind of experience he has in mind - the feel, say, of 
a snow flake. It is, he assumes, a matter of common sense 
that when we already know the snowflake to be both soft and 
cold we can single out for special attention its temperature 
alone, and disregard the concomitant features. But it is, 
he further Postulates quite a reasonable uupposition that one 
might quite well experience the feel of snow without knowing 
one had to deal with a. two -fold object; in the case for example' 
of an initial experience of touch, one would have no evidence 
surely enabling one to distinguish between the two simul *aneously 
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given constituents. In these circumstances, when we don't 
know as yet the object of experience to have parts, or be 
complex, it doesn't make sense to sad- that we can single 
out for attention a )art at will. In bhort, the exercise 
of the supposed faculty, he concludes is unnecessary in 
the case where we already know the object to be complex, and 
impossible in the case where we have no such knowledge. 
Nevertheless, abstraction, Brown goes on, does unquest- 
ionable occur in the sense in wh h Berkeley denied it to 
occur, and if we are not to explain the process by reference 
to Stewart's faculty of abstraction, we must explain it by 
some other means. He then proceeds as follows. "To that 
principle of relative suggestion, by which we feel the res- 
emblance of objects in certain respects, to the exclusion, 
consequently, of all the otter circumstances in which they 
have no resemblance, by far the greater number of our ab- 
stractions and those which most commonly go under the name, 
ma 1t in this ma. - ner be traced; since in consequence of this 
principle of our mind, we are almost incessantly feeling 
some relation of similarity in o' j ects, and omitting in con- 
sequence, in this feeling of resemblance, the parts or cif - 
cumstances of the complex w whole, in which no similar- 
ity is felt. What is thus termed abstraction is the very 
notion of partial Similarity. It would be as impossible to 
regard objects as similar in certain respects, without having 
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the conceptions turned abstract as to see without vision 
or to hope without desire. The capacity of feeling- resem- 
blance, then, is the great source of the conceptionStermed 
abstract. (Lecture 51). 
Here of course, we return, to the theme we have already 
encountered in Rule, p nd it is li :e ly enough that Brown, a 
very close student of Hume, ads the Essay on Cause and Effect 
shows, has that very passage of Hume in mind. It will be 
sufficient, therefore, by way, of comment, to quote Hume's con- 
cluding sentence. "A person who desires us to consider the 
fig_tre of a globe of white marble without thinking on its 
colour desires an impossibility, but his meaning is, that we 
should consider the colour and figure together, but still 
keep in our eye the resemblance to the globe of black marble 
of that today other globe of whatever colour or substance." 
(Treatise I Part I, Section viI). 
Brown, however, does not stop here, and goes on to 
raise a. further prdblem about abstraction, which we might 
introduce thus. "Even though objects had been concretes of 
many qualities - in the sense presenting their look, their 
feel, their sound to us always simultaneously - the capacity 
of relative suggestions by which we feel the resemblance of 
object" Brown says, in concluding the previous discussion, 
"would be of itself, ai I have said, sufficient to account 
for the abstraction of which philosophers have written so much." 
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But objects are not, he goes on, concrete in this way-all, 
in that, through the shuttinn of this or that avenue of our 
senses, they present themselves now with, now without a given 
equality. But now cannot this sort of experience account for 
a great many of our abstract ideas? For instance could we 
not account for the fact that we can imagine an aeroplane 
in flight without imagining its noise by reference to t m 
experience of looking at it while holding our ears? 
Now -the sort of thing Brown has in mind here can best be 
brought out by a quotation from Laromnuiere, a Trench phil- 
osopher of the same epoch. "The hur_ian body, if we may so 
speak, is thus itself a kind of abstractive machine. The sen- 
ses cannot but abstract. If the eye did not abstract colours, 
it would see them confounded with odours and tastes, and o- 
dours and is rtes would necessarily become objects of sight. 
The abstraction of the senses is tints an operation the most 
natural; it is even impossible for us not to perform it. Let 
soh 
us see whether abstract' by the mind be more arduous than 
that of the senses" (quoted in Hamilton, lectures on Meta- 
physics 2 Pp.284,285). -Lgromiguire, we should_ add, is ar- 
guing for the existence of the sort of faculty of abstraction 
1'n 
Brown condemns; his point is that if the abstracts of the 
senses is automatic, so must be the abstracts of the mind. 
Brown of course, admits the occurrence of a .difference here 
LO..Yar,Iv orc. 
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in that whereas in tbm other sort of case we don't experience 
the parts in isolation for the whole, in this case we do ex- 
perience the part in detachment, by itself. But he goes on 
to point out that in spite of this difference there is a fund- 
amental resemblance between the two cases. The point is -to 
take the case of the aeroplane - that we do not become aware 
in retrospect of our original auditory- cum -visual experience 
as a complex experience immediately or automatically after 
first hearing the aeroplane in the dark or with our eyes 
shut, and that in order to detect xammexix complexity in the 
earlier experience, we must, through comparison, become aware 
of a relation between the two. 
But let Brown speak in his own peculiar terminólogy. "The 
same power, that without any effort of our volition - -- brings 
- 
before us only three out of four circumstances that co- existed 
in some former perception, might as readily be supposed to 
bring xx before us two of the four or only one; and the ab- 
straction would be thus as independent of our will as the 
simple suggestion; since it would be, in truth, only simple 
suggestion under another name, being termed on abstraction only 
because, in certain cases, we might be able to remember the 
complex whole with the circumstances omitted in the former 
partial suggestion, and thus to discover, by comparison of 
the two co- existing conceptions, that the one is to the other, 
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as a whole to =_ome part of a whole." (Section 51). 
It might be as well to say a word about Brown's point 
here, since, although it does seem to cover ha.romiguiére's 
case, it is concerned with a somewhat different matter. In 
order to understand it, then, we must make two assumptions, 
first t at we are someti:aes aware of the coming into conscious- 
ness of what Locke or Hu e would call a simple idea i.e. of 
our kxxxicximilg imagining a flavour by itself unaccompanied by 
any other sensible qualities, and second that whereas in some 
cases or normally,we would at once pronounce this new feeling 
to be xx a case of imagining the flavour of a pineapple, or 
hot 
some such thing, in other cases perhaps we would4be able, and 
perhaps wouldn't try to identify the feeling. These assump- 
tions made, Brown's point becomes clear enough and turns out 
to be that only in the former of these cases - the one where 
the flavour is identified - does anything occur deserving 
the name of abstraction, or singling out from a complex, and 
that, for the identification to occur, we must obviously 
remember the complex of qualities called a pineapple, and judge 
the present isolated flavour to be virtually part of this 
whole. 
ref 
In the present context,. Brown says no nom, but What he 
has already said does provide some sort of clue to max an 
understanding as to why he regards a. proposition'the tree has 
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trunk and foliage' as being in a fundamental way analogous 
to a proposition 'the tree has colour and form'. In the 
first place, the kind of distinction involved in the relation - 
I a. t P A. Y l{ 
ship between the trunk and foliage of a tree is -4 
analogous to the kind of distinction involved in the cases 
covered by what Laromiguiére calls 'abstraction of the senses', 
since just as we can taste the pineapple's flavour without 
seeing it or otherwise being directly aware of it, so we 
can see the foliage without seeing the trunk. In the second 
place the principle involved in the other case where we were 
dealing with sensible qualities of a thing never round in 
separation from one anòther is not very different, according 
to Brown, from the principle involved in the case where we 
are dealing with sensible qualities of a thing found empir- 
ically gm by themselves. Accordingly we now have some light 
on the difficulty for which we started our discus ion of 
Brown. 
ct.r 
Now this feeling of a whole-pa ; relationship is as 
basic in Brown as his feeling of resemblance in certain 
respects, and receives from him a peculiarly paradoxical 
rormuZ Fior, at which we must glance. Two quotations from succes- 
sive paragraphs will suffice. "It mxgkÌ may indded be said 
with truth that the different feelings - the states or af- 
fections of mind which we term complex - are absolutely 
simple and indivisible, as much as the feelings of affections 
of mind which we term. simple. Of kkxx this there can be no 
doubt." Having said this, he then goes on to explain his 
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meaning as follows. "I use the word 'compound' to express 
merely that what is thus termed compound or complex is the 
result of certain previous feelings to which, as if existing 
together, it is felt to have the virtual relationship of 
equality, or the relation which a whole bears to the parts 
that are comprehended in it." - These quotations come from 
Lecture 10, and a similar point is made in Lecture 45, and 
Irown illustrates the point by saying that the idea of an 
army is as much a simple idea as the idea of an individual 
soldier, the dAea of two trees as much a simple idea as the 
idea of one tree. 
Now Brown is here apparently on the sane theme as be- 
fore, when he gives us to underhand that - to take an easy 
case - the sound of two voices singing together is just 
as much one indivisible object of experience as the sound 
of one of these two voices by itself. That is to say, 
his point is that we do not discover the sound of the two 
people singing in unison to be a blend of two sounds by 
listening to it by itself or by considering it by itself, 
and that the discovery of the sound as complex consists, first. 
in remembering the sound of one of the voices whiÌ in 
question while one is listening to the duet and, second,in 
feeling the latter to be related to the former in such a 
way as virtually to contain it. - "It is this feeling 
of the relation of certain states of mind to certain 
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other states of mind which solves the whole mystery of 
mental analysis, which seemed at first so inexplicable - 
the virtual decomposition, in our thouMht, of what is, by 
its very nature, individible. 11 (loc.cit. Lecture l0). Thy t 
is to say, when Brown says that com ilex ideas or objects e.f 
experience are in a real sense simple, his meaning (roughlk 
pct-rt5 
speaking) is that the las4lats of an object like the sound 
of a choir einging,xxx do not present themselves originally 
as distinct, and are distinguished from one another only 
by the intellectual process just explained i.e. what RME we 
originally hear is one sound. But see later under Hamilton. 
No do"bt, . a good deal remains to be explained, and in 
order to 'o this, we had better turn to a passage where Brown 
replies to the holders of the rival position. In the first 
glace, they would, he seems to think, begin by criticizing 
his account of singling out for attention as hkx being ser- 
iously incomple=te in the sense of omitting all reference to 
the most striking fact involved in the process - the sudden 
fading out or disappearance of the parts of the complex whole 
other than the part that attracts one's attention, and they 
would go on to point out that this omission of features is 
a phenomenon taking place suite automatically and independently 
of the -)erceivers will. In the second place, they would go 
on to argue that the fact in question is alite capable by it- 
self of explaining what takes place in the singling out process 
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i.e. of explaining what it is t at raakes one part of an 
object outstanding on its own account: for example, in 
the originally mentioned case of the feel of snow, all 
that would take _place, on this view, would be that, while 
at first, no doubt, the cold and the softness -present 
themselves to ';ether and, so to speak, equally, - suddenly 
oicyraSSls-4 
the cold becomes all- enggssing to the exclusion of the 
other feat .res which cease to interest, and are as if they 
were not there. In short, what Brown calls singling out 
may well be explicable without reference to intellectual 
processes like feelings of relation. 
Now this criticism contains two points - first, the 
strictures on Brown's theory for having left out of view 
an important feature of the process under disc7ssion, and 
second the formulation, in terms of this omitted feature, of 
La theory Emil antagonistic to Brown's, and thricxxmm±ittat 
±Inctxxx accordingly Brown's reply touches on both the topics 
in. question. On the one hand, he tries to fill up the om- 
ission in his own theory, and on the other hand, he crit- 
icizes the rival theory in the version offered by Condillac. 
- As to why he picks upon Condillac, the cause is likely to 
be found in the influence Condillac had on Stewart to this 
sort of topic, and indeed on Adam Smith too perhaps: it 
was doubtless from Dondillac thatAtook over his :notions 
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about the possibility of attending exclusively to one 
thing at a. time - notions which are apparently involved in 
his postulation of a. faculty of abstraction. 
Brown proceeds by pharaphra.sing Condillac as follows: 
"Though the whole sweep of the country was shown to us 
rout for an instant, we must have seen every object which 
it co;i rehends within our sphere of vision. This first 
instant, however, though it showed all the scene, gave us 
no knowledge of it; and if the window were to close again 
at once, there is not one of Idua us who could have ventured 
to give the slightest description of it - a sufficient 
proof that we may have seen many objects and learned no- 
thing." (Lecture 31) 
The pharaphra.se proceeds towards Condilla.c's main 
point a "To have a knowledge of the scene, then, it is 
not sufficient to behold it all at once, so as to comprehend 
it in a single gaze; we must consider it in detail, and 
pass successively from object to object. This is what 
Nature has taught us all. If she has given us the power 
of seeing many objects at once, she has given us also the 
faculty looking at but one, - that is to say, of directing 
our eyes on one only of the mmltitude; and it is to this 
faculty - which is the result of our organisation, says 
Condillac - that we owe all the knowledge which we re. - 
f-ar sight. " 
1 
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Brown thus proceeds with his criticism. "We see 
a multitude of objects and have one complex indistinct 
feeling," and thereafter the process of the singling out, 
and of the fading from view of the object singled out takes 
place. But "it is vain fer Condillac to say that this 
happens in consequence of a. faculty we have of directing 
our eyes on one object, a faculty wmich is the res'llt of 
our organisation and is common to all mankind; for in the 
first )lace, if this direction of our eyes, of which gk 
he speaks, on a gingle object, be meant in its strict 
sense, it is not true that we have any such faculty. We 
cannot so direct our eye as not to com prehend in our fat 
field of vision many objects bedides that single object 
which is supposed to have fixed our attention." (Lecture 31). 
Brown considers Condillac's point now sufficiently 
met, and he passes on to the other topic, without pausing 
to work out his own theory of singling out in connection 
with the present case. This omission, we believe, is to 
be regretted, end we must content ourselves, on this point, 
with a brief remark eLlewhere, that our feeling of a 
scene such as Condillac speaks of would have remained one 
indistinct feeling, but for the rise in our mind of feelings 
of resemblance in a certain respect, and feelings of whole - 
part relationship. 
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The question then, according to Brown, has_noto be 
put as follows. For some reason, the desire arises in us to 
know a certain pr- rt of the scene more accurately. (Of course, 
before this can happen, we must, in Broom's view, already 
know the scene to have parts). Very well, then, we have a 
desire to know better one of the component objects, and we 
look at it intently. "No sooner has all this taken place, 
than instantly, or almost instantly, without our consciousness 
of any new or peculiar state of mind intervening in the 
process, the landscape becomes to our vision altogether dif- 
ferent. Certain parts only, those parts which we wished to 
know particularly, are seen by us; the remaining parts seem 
almost to have banished. It is as if some instant enchantment, 
obedient to our wishes, had dissolved every reality besides, 
and brought closer to our sight the objects we desire to see." 
(Lecture 31) 
Now if the question is put in this way, the cause of 
the increased vitidness in the one part of the scene, and of 
the comparative indistinctness in the other part can, 
according to Brown, quickly be made plain, as existing in 
that feeling of desire with which this transformation is l- 
ways accompanied. "It is of the nature of emotions of every 
sort" he goes on "to render more vivid all the mental af- 
fection5with which they are combined. This vivifying effect 
is brought out w'; ̂ en the feelings with which the emotion is 
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combined are themselves peculiarly faint, as in the case of 
mere memory or imagination. The object of any of our emo- 
hecaw,eS 
tions, thus merely conceived by us, boa ees in many cases 
so vivid as to render even our accompanying perceptions com- 
paratively faint. The mental absere5fof lovers, for example, 
is proverbial." (Lecture 31). 
With that, cur exposition of Brown's fundamental argu- 
ments comes to an end, and we begin to want some kind of uuc- 
cinct exposition of what he regards a.s his central position. 
In fact we do find something of this kind Lecture 32 and 
33, the lectures immediat-ly succeeding the one we have just 
drawn on. ';That Brown does there is to explain his position 
as being a kind of middle way between the excessive simplif- 
ication of principles found in Condillac, and the excessive 
multipication of principles found in Reid. 
It with Condillac that Brown is chiefly concerned, 
and it will be as well to cite the paragraph which Brown 
quotes as summarising Condillac's whole doctrine in respect 
of mind. "If we consider that to compare, to judge, to 
dt tinguish, to have abstract ideas, to know truth, whether 
particular or general are but so many modes of being attentive; 
and that attention in itself, in its origin, is nothing 
but a mode of sensation, we cannot but conclude that sen- 
sation involves in itself - enveloppe - all the faculties 
of the soul." (Condillac - Traité des Sensations Part I, 
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Chapter 7, Section 2 - quoted by Brown in Lecture 32). 
Now Condilla.c's position apparently stands or falls 
with his pecul:ar theory of attention, as a single quotation 
will make plain. "A child gives the name of tree to the 
first tree which we scow him. A second tree which he sees 
afterwrds recalls to him the sane idea; he gives it the 
same name; and so on with a third, with a fourth, and there 
you have the word tree, given first to an individual, becoming 
for the child a class -name, and abstract idea comorehending 
all trees in general." (f,uotation found in Stewart Works 
Volume 2, P.381). But obviously this theory has a good 
deal in common with Steart's and Smith's, as the former 
indeed admits, and it obviously implies, in the present case, 
the oossibility of the empirical self- presentation in isol- 
ation on the part of the single tree - i.e. minus its 
xxm environment. 
Dismissing Condillac 's theory of attention, Brown pro- 
ceeds to sum up his position in somewhat the following man- 
ner. On the one hand, Condillac misled by his view of at- 
tention, holds the unsatisfactory theory, that judgment is 
-nothing but a mode of sense, and Reid, by comparison, is on 
firmer ground in distinguishing sharply between sense pre- 
vious to judgment as vague and uninformative, and sense 
posterior to judgment as alone yielding knowledge. On the 
other hand, Reid complicates the situation too much by 
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speaking as if the faculty of judgment that transforms klux 
sense into knowledge is accompanied by the allied faculties 
of generalisation and of abstraction. The fact of the matter 
is that it is necessary to speak only of sefse,as one in- 
distinct feelin previous to feeling the relationship of 
reseblance in a certain respect, and the other reslationships, 
and as yielding information only ; osterior to the appearances 
of these intellectual states called feelings -of relation, 
and that Reid's faculties of gmmx generalisation and abstraction 
are really indistinguish from the feeling of resemblance 
in E certain respect, while Reid's faculty of judgment is 
indistinguishable from these feelings of relationship in 
general. 
Before we go further, we had best indicate the connection 
between the two groups of lectures we have dráwn on - lectures 
31 -33 and, again, Lecture 51. The point to note is that the 
earlier items and the later item are related not merely as 
being concerned with aspects of a single theme, but even as 
being respectively preface and postscript to an intermediary 
group, especailly lectures 45 -47 dealing with the prdtblem of 
universals. 
The most striking xxxxgra passage of Lecture 3Z is con- 
cerned in stating what one might regard as Brown's main 
-remises for his discussion of the problem of universals. 
You find, he says, that a sheep resembles a cow in a certain 
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respect, namely of being a quadruped. But now think away 
this resemblance in a certain respect, and you are left with 
a feeling of the object of perception as being two items, 
as being a whole with two co- existing parts. Finally, take 
away this latter feeling of comparison altogether, and you 
land in a position such that, while the object of perception 
remains tom± just what it was before, words and sentences 
altogether fail you to describe anything. 
But let us have Brown's words. This feeling of resem- 
blance in a certain respect is a new state of mind as dis - 
tinct from the perception of two objects as the '1 c of 
bola objects is distinct from the perception of one of them. 
"To compare one animal with another, is, indeed, to have 
different visual images, but the mere co- existence of visual 
images is only a group larger or smaller as the images are 
more or fewer. innume,ealle objects may be, and continually 
are, present to us at onee, so as to produce one complex 
affection of mind, - fields, groves, mountains, streams; 
w+ e 
but the co- existence of these, so as to form in our 
thou hts one scene involves no feeling of comparison; and if 
the mind had not been susieeptible of other affections then 
those of sense, or of mere rememberance of the past images 
of sense, either in whole or in part, it might when such a. 
scene was presented have existed for ever in a state which 
forms the complex perception of the xmogrunxx scene, without 
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the sli htest notion of the relation of its parts to the 
T:=' ole or to each other." (Lecture 33). That is to say, the 
rind would exist in the state,Awbich - to quote Brown's 
words from Lecture 31 - "we see a. multitude of objects and 
we have one indistinct feeling" i. e. in the state the mind 
u 
exists in when vouchsafed only a momentary glance at a scenes 
not being able to give the slightest description of it." 
(The last sentence quoted would seem to be Brown's final 
comient on Condilla..c's account of looking at "the whole sweep 
of country, "). 
Brown's thesis here, we believe, suffers from a certain 
amount of obscurity, due probably to his not explaining very 
carefully the relationship between his feelings of whole- 
part, and his feelings of resemblance in a certain respect. 
Accordin ly we will try to o a little way towards elucid- 
ating this point, and we will take as our text his finals . 
su_iming up of his main premises in reference to the problem 1 
of universals. It runs as follows. "The feeling which con -, 
stitutes our conus.risoe of our sensations, or, in other 
words, our belief of their agreement of disagreement is itsel 
a state of mind, different from either of the separate sen- 
sations we compare, and different from both, as merely co- 
existing." (Lecture 33). 
Let us define the issue a little more closely. Brown's 
standard formula, repeated, es Hamilton grimly remarks, no 
less then nine times iS that the generalising process is, 
first, the perception or conception of two or more objects 
f 
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and, second, the feeling of their resemblance in certain 
respects. Now it is this making the perceptions of co- 
existing objects precede our comparison and judgment about 
them thEt is the fact giving rise to our problem, and the 
question at stake concerns the nature of this primary ex- 
perience. 
No/it appears that the difficulty can be cleared up 
if we interpret what Brown says above about this primary 
phase of the processi in terms of his doctrine of "virtual 
complexity" or virtual co- existence, as he sometimes calls 
it, that is to say, if we equate his "perception of two 
objects" with an experience is4volvi_nz awareness of the dis- 
tinction between two sensations as co- existing and the same 
two sensations in their separateness. .Accordingly, let us 
proceed to explain the matter with.help of a speculation, 
¡Urr lo 
ón Hume's lines, about isawam. bodies, and start from a pre- 
viously dark sky wherein suddenly appear at the same time 
two bright objects, one round and white, the other round' 
and yellow. Now in the circumstances, the only description 
we could give theme and then of this experience is, accord- 
ing to Brown's doctrine, that something has appeared or 
that one thing has appeared, since, owing to the simultan- 
eity of their appearance, there is, so far, no evidence of 
their being a pair. At this point, let us make one of the 
two objects disappear, the other remaining as it is, any, 
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according to Brown's doctrine, there is now nothing to 
prevent the occurrence to us of the feeling that what we 
now have before us is in one way different and in another 
way the saine as what we lately had before us, and that, in 
fact, the present object is related to the first object as 
part to whole. In the third place, let us now make the 
vanished object re- appear beside the other and our attitude 
towards the object of perception as it now is will be dif- 
ferent for our attitude towards the same object of percep- 
tion as it was originally before the MY, xialag vanishing of 
)ne of the items. That is to say whereas we previously called 
the pair something or one thing, we are now in the position 
to call the pair, a pair, and to be aware of it as a 
plex of two items. That dogs, we have reached the end of 
the process, and explained what on Brown's view is involved 
in his initial state in generalisation, the perception of 
two objects. Only when this is done, is it possile for the 
feeling of resemblance in certain respects to begin. 
We have no7. said enough by way of introduction to 
Brown's discussion of the problem of universals, and we now 
tarn to lectures 46 and 47 where the discussion in rfuestion 
is to be found. It begins on a theme already debated be- 
tween Reid and Stewart. "It remains for me" says Stewart, 
in a passage on Pages 91 -93 of Volume 2 of his Works, "to 
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examine an attempt which Dr. Reid has mede to convict 
Berkeley of on inconsistency in the statement of his ar- 
gument against abstract general ideas." Now Reid, continues 
Stewart, does this, simply by citing the passage in -'e_r- 
keley to the effect that "an idea, which, considered in it- 
self, is purticula.r, becomes general by being made to re- 
present or stand for all other particular ideas of the 
same sort," and then proceeding to claim that Berkeley, in 
IA 
making use of the expression of the same sort" admits the 
existence of common ettri -sites i.e. abstract general ideas. 
"I must takt the liberty" Stewart concludes, " of remarking 
that in the present instance Berkeley appears to me to he.ve 
been treated with undue severity. By ideas of the same sort 
it is Plain he meant nothing more than things celled by the 
same neme , and consequen tly, (if our illustrations are to 
be borrowed from methe_m tics) comprehended under the term5 
of the same definition. In such cases, the individuals 
classed thus together are completely identified es sub- 
jects of reasoning." . 
Now Br wn enters this controversy on the side of Reid. 
Without general notions, he sa; s, "there can be no res- 
triction of eny sign to ideas of the same sort." "If we 
have previously e. notion of what Berkeley himself rather 
inconsistently c,lls e. line in general, ,we can easily under- 
stand hoar the word line may be limited to ideas of one sort; 11 
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but otherwise not. 
But of course there remains Stewart ' s ,point that by 
pleax ideas of the same sort Berkeley means things called by 
the same name. Now, if this point is to have any weight, 
Stewart, Brown thinks, must imply the doctrine that the 
name forms the class, and accordingly he proceeds to '.efine 
the Question arising out of this. "If it were the name which 
formed the class, then might anything be classed with any- 
thing and classed with equal propriety. Ally which would 
be necessary, would be 'merely to apply the same name uniformly 
to the same objects; and if we were careful to do this, John 
and a triangle might as well be classed together under the 
same name man as John and Willia.m." But, inI-act, Brown goes 
on, words are not used in this way, our general terms 
extend to certain obj ects only and not to all obj ects, we 
give "the name of man, for instance to John andjTilliam 
rather than to John and a triangle." Accordingly the Question 
at issue is whether or not our actual classification depends 
on "the mere givi g of a name at random," whether or not 
ß1. y 
it is "arbitrarily and withoutilreason whatever that we do not 
class a rosebush with birds, or an elephant with fish." (All 
the Quotations are from Lecture 47, except the last which 
comes from a parallel -passage in Lecture 46). 
Now the only piece of evidence Stewart ever 72roduces for - 
the random and casual origination of general names is the anec- 
dote out of Captain Cook. This anecdote, however, is by no 
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means, Brown thinks, as favourable to the conventionp list 
theory as Stewart would have it. Stewart, he points out 
with the ttmost x±xxx circumspection and politeness, - this 
is the only ,lace where Stewart is introduced by name - 
has altogether left out of account one vital circumsta.ncé 
in Cook's narrative, namely that the islanders were on that 
occasNion shone for the first time not merely sheep and 
while 
goats, but also horses and cows, and that wok they inter- 
ested themselves in the first-named pair, and classified 
them as birds, "they ere afraid to come near our cows 
and horses, nor Jid they form the least conception of 
their nature." (Cook). Now the vital question is "why did 
they not class the cows and horses with birds as much as 
the goats and sheep ?" Surely the omission was not accidental, 
but rather the bulk of the animals was the cause of their 
distinction. "A bird, in their mental definition of it, 
was certainly a living thing, (a land animal) of certain 
various sizes familiar to them and not a dog or a hog. A 
sheep or a goat was seen by them to be a living thing, not 
a dog or a hog, and of a size that implied no remarkable 
opposition to that involved in their silent mental defin- 
ition of a bird. In such circumstances it was classed, by 
them as a bird with as much accuracy as is to be found in 
our ordinary classification of the ant that creeps with 
the gnat that flies, and with equal accuracy they excluded 
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the cows and horses that did not coincide with the general 
notion of which resemblance bug in size formed an essential 
part." (Lecture 47). . 
The first stage in Brown's argument is now over, and the 
position he conceives himself to have reached contains two 
items. In the first place, the very invention of P. general 
terns, and the extension of it to certain ohjects only, not 
to all objects, implies some reason for this limitation - 
some feeling of general agreement of the objects included in 
the class to distinguish them for objects not included, in 
it." In the second place, this feeling of general gme agree- 
ment is no doubt a feeling of resemblance, but "we surely 
cannot perceive objects to resemble one another without 
perceiving them to resemble each other in certain respects 
rather than in others; and this very notion of the respects 
in which they are similar is all that is meant by the general 
relative feeling." (quotation of this kind abou-d in Lectures 
46 and 47). 
In preparation for the second stage of Brown's argument, 
we had better cite Stewart once again, quoting his main com- 
ment on Reid's thesis that "a universal is not an object of 
any external sense, and therefore cannot be imagined,. but 
it may be distinctly conceived." It will be granted, says 
Stewart, "that we cannot conceive universals in any way at all 
analagous to that in which we conceive an absent object of 
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sense." But this being so, "why" he asks "should we employ 
the same word conception, to express two opera.tiems of mind 
that are essentially different ?" (Works Vol.1 P.191,192). 
Now there is perhaps more in this urbane remark of 
Stewart's than meets the eye. All he says, to be sure, 
is that a body existing out of sight and out of .reach may 
plausibly be described as not being an object of sense, 
and therefore as being in its present situation, not imagin- 
able but only conceivable, that a universal, what ' else it 
may be, is nothing like a body present to or absent from 
sense, and that therefore it is not illuminating to speak 
of the one in the same terms as one speaks of the other. But 
at the same time, he must have known perfectly well that 
Reid's way of speaking about universals, however awkward in 
other connections, hp s a fairly definite meaning in its own 
context, a.s employed in reference to certain nominalistic 
arguments of Hume. Accordingly, it is quite probable that 
Stewart is here trying to convey, in the politest possible 
way, his opinion of his then octogenerian friend's arguments 
against Hume on this point as being a total failure. 
Here let us look at the passage in Reid in reference to 
which his description of universals as unimaginable but dis- 
tinctly conceivable reveals itself as being at any rate lea.n- 
ingful. He begins by recapitulating the argument of Hume that 
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"every object of sense - that is, every impression - is an 
individual having its determinate degrees of quantity and 
quality; but whatever is true of the impression is true of 
the idea," and therefore "all ideas are individuals" or, in 
other words, no ideas are un- individual i. e. are things ab- 
stract and general. Now all this, Reid allows, is quite 
sound, crovided idea, as used here, is taken as equivalent 
to image; but, he goes on, "though there shoüld`be no abstract 
(general) ideas, it does not follow that things abstract and 
general may not be conceived." That is to say, in order to 
prove that there are no 'things abstract and general', Hume , 
according to Reid, would have first to prove that our only 
states of mindfa,re that of having impressions, and that of having 
ideas which are mouwirTER7 copies of impressions. But now, in 
the second place, Reid goes to treat Hume's next -point as 
being in effect a retort to his counter -move and as containing 
a claim that, even though there were states of mind other than 
that of having impressions and that of having ideas, these 
other possible states of mind could not have as their object 
'things abstract and general' since the very notion of these 
latter implies a contradiction. Now Hume's point, he notices, 
is simply that "everything in nature is-individual, and it is 
utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent which 
has no precise 'ro portion of sides and angles" i.e. absurd to 
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suppose inindivi dual aktxe .x being;, really existing. Now 
the leading principle here - "everything in n,--tune is in- 
dividual" is, Reid begins, a tautology, and therefore un- 
exceptional no doubt, but settling; very little. "I acknowledge," 
he says, "it to be impossible t- at any being should exist 
that is not an individual being; for I think, a being and 
an individual being mean the same thing." This being so, 
he proceeds,. it certainly follows that it is a contradiction 
to speak of there being, in the, some sense of 'be', indiaid- 
ual beings and non -individual beings, but it by no means 
follows that it is a contradiction to speak of there being 
attributes of beings as well as beings, of there being attrib- 
utes common to individuals we ill es of their being indiv- 
iduals, since in this case the word 'be' is used in two sense's, 
- "Universals" he Eagx elsewhere says, "have= no real exis- 
tence and when we scribe existence to them, it is not an ex- 
istence in texmx time or place. - Accordiigly, there is no 
contradiction in the supposition that in addition to the 
faculties presenting the individuals namely seBe and im- 
agination, there is also an additional faculty presenting the 
attributes coy ion to the individuals. (Hamilton's reid, Vol.l 
Pp. 410, 411) . 
Such, then, is Reid's main point, but in what he says 
on the rest of the same Page, we find indications of a more 
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precise and discussable way of formulating his thesis. Now 
the difficulty here is the meaning to be attached to the phrase 
attributes common to, and Reid, in a passage already dis- 
cussed at length, goes some way towards clearing this dif- 
ficulty up by maintaining emph. ti cally that the unfamiliar 
expression "attribute common to individuals" is presupposed 
in the more familiar expression "resetbiance between indiv- 
iduals in a certain respect: "there can be no resemblance be- 
tween objects that hove no common attribute" he tells us , 
if we understand by 'resemblance' 'distinct resemblance'. 
Accordingly, in the light of this elucidation, his thesis 
in the last analysis would seem toaMount to this : that while 
individuals are oT. j ects of the sense and are therefore imagin- 
able, resemblances in a certain respect between individuals 
are not obj acts of the senses, and these cannot be imagined, 
but they can be distinctly conceived in and through some quite 
distinct and peculiar mental faculty. 
Now it is here that Brown links up with Reid, since his 
statement of the Conceptualist thesis differs from this one 
implicit in Reid only in being much more precise. "The word 
conception seems to individualize its object and is commonly 
employed to signify some faint revival of a past feeling. But 
in these general notions, according.; to the view of them taken 
by me, there is nothing whtth can be said to be a conception 
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or fat t:c. transcript of the past. The feelin.M of the 
relation of similarity is no part of the perception or con- 
ception of the separate objects that suggest it. It is a 
feeling a different s ,ecies, absolutely new - a relation 
and nothing more; and the general term, ,-hich is notAex- 
pression of what can be strictly termed a conception, is in- 
vented only to express all that multitude of objects, which, 
however different in other respects, agree in exciting one 
common feeling of relation - the relation of a certain sim- 
ilarity." (Lecture 48). 
But Brown not only subscribes, in a manner of speaking, 
with Reid's thesis that universä.ä.s are not objects of the 
external senses, and therefore cannot be imagined, but they 
may be distinctly conceived; he also subscribes in his own 
fashion, to Reid's other point that an attribute common to 
inditiduals is not a being in the sense in which the individ- 
uals are beings. It is legitimate, he says, to regard ind- 
ividuals resembling one another in certain respects as ind- 
ividuals having "a common nature in certain respects," but 
it is illegitimate and contradictary to go further, and 
try to regard this "common nature "jai something in common, as 
itself so_;ie sort of inc.ividua.l. It is absurd, he says, to 
"require that our mental notion of the common properties of 
triangles whould itself be a. triangle "; we must not "attempt 
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to farm an individual representation of what is in itself 
enera.l and, thereffore, by its very n. ̂ tune incapable of being 
individually represented." (Lecture 48). 
The clearest statement he gives to this point is to 
be found in his unfinished "S'Letch of a system of philosophy" 
- the synopsis of his lectures. "It is not in an idea or 
conception (i.e. image) that I find the source of tk our gen- 
eral term; it is in a feeling of a. very different kind, the 
relation of similarity. We have, therefore, no general idea 
of a triangle; for a Relation is as little an Idea, and ad- 
mits as little of in('_ividual representation as an Emotion., It 
is a feeling of its own kind, of which it is the very nature 
always to extend to more objects than one, and which may ex- 
tend in its general bearings to innumerable objects. But, 
though we have no gèBeral idea of a triangle, we have a gen- 
eral notion of the common nature of triangles, or, in other 
words, have a. general feeling of a relation of similarity 
of all the figures." (P.288 with omissions). 
Brown's theory of universals, then, would seem to.a 
reply to Hume's theory, very much on the lines of Reid's 
reply to Hume, with, however, - to ret to to Brown's general 
position - the fundamental difference that Brown, in. effect, 
virtually tries to turn the concluding portion of Hume's char- . 
ter on universals against the preceding portions of it, or, 
more precisely to show the incompati ility of Hume's admis- 
sion of abstract particulat ideas with his rejection of 
abstract general ideas. That is to say, Brown might be 
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represented as starting from the dictiii of Hume (found in 
his second defence of distinctions of reason) that "all 
abstract ideas are nothing but 'Y rticular ides viewed in 
in a certain light," and going on to declere this dictum to 
mean, according to Hune's own explanation of it, net 
while our only mode of awareness is awareness of individual 
* 
objects (purple patches, whiie globes etc. )^with or without 
attending especially to and singling out a particular aspect 
of them, according PS we do or do not compare them in point 
of their resemblance in a certain respect. But now, on 
Hume's own view, he might go on, the attdnding to the p& rtic- 
ular cidaigm aspect of the sensible individual is aopa:rently 
posterior to "the viewing of the sensible inxisa individuel 
rin a certaih light" or, in other words, bying aware of its 
resemblance-relations in a certain res- 2ect with other sensible 
individuals. This being so, what Hume's main point would seem 
to amount to is that while our only mode olr awareness is aware- 
ness of sensible individuals, this mode of awareness occurs 
both attended by and unattended by awareness of the resem- 
blance of these sensible individuals in a certain resPect. 
But now here the crucial question, Brown might proceed, begins 
to arise - the 'uestion whether this awareness of resemblance - 
relations betty -en sensible individuals is ksaxxxxx in some 
way nothing but the awareness of these sensible inailtiduals, 
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is in some way nothing but the awareness of these sensible 
individuals, or whether the former is a quite different 
type of awareness froïa the latter. Now this of course, 
is, Brown might ad :-'.it, a difficult question, and many 
philosophers - for instance those who hold the sort of view 
of attention Condillac propounded - would certainly want 
to regard awareness of the resemblance of sensible individuals 
Pe being in some way nothing but the awareness, of the 
ice sensible individuals. To be more precise, the main 
point at issue here is apparently whether or not the appear- 
ance of a set of sensible individuals alters according as w e 
do or do not ca.-'Pare them in point of resemblance, whether 
or not for instance them appearanee is different after the 
comparison and what one remembers it to have been before. 
But now if the comparison or awareness of resemblance between 
the sensible individuals takes place after the manner in 
which Hume seems to regard it as taking place, that is, 
takes place prior to the singling out of the particular 
aspect of sensible individuals, let alone the brightening 
up of these particular aspects, and the fading out of the 
concomitant aspects, then in that case it becomes impossible 
to avail myself of arguments like Condillac's for the id- 
entification of the awareness of resemblance -relit .on with 
the awareness of the sensible individuals that resemble, and, 
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pending the a.;)pearan.ce of some new counter -argument, it 
becomes hard to p.e!rSI*.t in the claim that awareness of in- 
dividual in sense or imagination is the only sort of w^..re- 
ness, end, r5 : - being so, Ilume's aan± x argum ,'nts in 
favour of Nominalism lose their foundation, 
Now the kind of argument we find in Brown on the sub- 
ject of universals is of much the SET. tendency as the kind 
of argumentation we find in Reid on the same subject, and 
some emmparison of the two men is therefore quite appropriate. 
As soon as this question of comparison is raised, it becomes 
clear that Brown is in many ways immensely superior to Reid, 
but at the same time in :.o way falls short of Reid in cer- 
tain, one might say subordinate,a.spects of the Problem com- 
mon to hak them. A case in point in Brown's discussion of 
the Ade -1 Smith -Condillac theory of proper names as being 
the first words, and of general names as evolving out of 
proper names. On the subject, Brown commends the Smith -Con- 
dillac theory as gmite sound, provided that we take for 
granted the previous existence of general relative notions 
- i.e. their existence prior to their being expressed in a 
distinctive verbal form. Now Brown's doctrine here is too 
brief to be clear, but presumably his point is that while 'from 
the beginning so to speak singular Propositions are taken 
for granted both by speakers and by their audience as being 
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asserted in verbal interchanges, yet at the earliest stage, 
only one word or sound is s'oken aloud, and that word a 
wore which, if the unexpressed items in the proosition un- 
derstood all round as being asserted were to obtain ex- 
pression, would clearly reveal itself to be functioning 
as a proper name, as the subject of the sentence. But, if 
this is what Brown means, surely it would have made for 
clarity to bring out the fact that the solitary word uttered 
is gnly implicitly a proper name, and stands for thee 
subject of the singular roposition mentally entertained 
only potentially and not actually. This granted, however, 
it at once becomes a discussable issue as to whether it 
would not be better to follow Reid's suggestion about points 
like thisAto say that the solitary word stands for the 
whole proposition and is understood by speaker and hearers 
as a sentence. 
Brown, then is not very clear on this subj ect of the 
invention of proper names, and, as we shall see later, has 
left the part of his doctrine dealing with our apprehen- 
sion of the sim-gle, the particular and the individual in 
and unelaborated and confusing state. However, in spite 
of his weakness, the fact is that as far as IsTursm*icbg. the 
principle of the thing goes, 3rown has indicated his pos- 
ition in reference to these matters with quite enough - 
clarity. For example, take his doctrine that awareness of a 
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resemblance in certain respects between the parts of a com- 
plex whole precedes the singling out of one of these points 
for special consido :ration. Now the very point he is con- 
cerned to make he is the point Reid makes in saying that 
a judgment of sense precedes a simple apprehension of an 
abstract aspect of a thing - i.e. the abstract particular, - 
and the chief difference between the two would seem to be that, 
whereas Reid exp'ains the point at issue better, Brown's ar- 
guments about the point are xl fuller and more decisive than 
Reidt s. 
Turning now to Hamilton, we had better begin by mentioning 
that he entered philosophy, or rather the philosophical move - 
wefare 
ment/\considering, by a somewhat different route from the ore 
his predecessors had taken. At Glasgow, he was probably 
not impressed by his teacher, Professor hylne, a competent 
philosopher, by all account$, in what one might call the Adam 
Smith tradition, but apparently more empiricist than Smith 
i. e. indebted to Hartley as well as to Condillac. At Oxford, 
w1ere he went next, he seems to have been chiefly occupied 
in acquiring a familiarity with the Aristotelian commentators 
and the mediaeval scholastics that was very unusual in those 
days, and would be almost as unusual now and also in perusing 
thw x±±111 wrttings of the German Idealist philosophers in a 
somewhat more sympathetic and understanding spirit than almost 
anybody in these illands had done before. Accordingly, it 
is likely enough that Hamilton did not seriously commence 
philosophising in the rather special tradition we are dis- 
cussing here until after settling in Edinburgh as an advocate 
about 1815 and gaining the friendship there of the aged,. 
but still alert and productive Dugald Stewart. In a way, 
perhaps, Hamilton may be reckoned Stewart's disciple, and 
the impression Stewart made on him is peculiarly xx3 
tx discérnible in relation to the topic concerning us now - 
unirversals. At the time Hamilton arrived in Edinburgh, 
Brown, b course, was at the height of his fame, but to- 
wards Brown Mamilton took up a decidedly unsympathetic. 
attitude, and one of his main purposes in philosophy might 
be said to be that of keeping alive Stewart's theories by 
detecting weak points in Brown's counter- positions.. 
We will start off with Hamilton's . criticism of Brown's 
theory of universals, at the point where the topic is the pro- 
position "This individual object and that one are both 
triangular." - "In the example we have taken of the equi s. *;rl d 
and rectangular triangles, the resemblance between these 
figures lies in their trian,ul6 rty, and the notion or feeling 
of resemblance in which Dr. Brown placea the generality must 
be a notion or feeling of ±r±±± triangularity, Bud' 
the natix trgngularity thus conceived must be one notion, 
- one triangularity; for otherwise it could not be, (what 
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is supposed), one common or general notion, but a. plurality 
of notions. Again, this one triangularity must not be the 
triingularity, either of the equilatral triangle, or of the 
rectangular triangle alone for in that case it would not 
be a general notion - a notion common to both. Of such a 
triangularity, however, it is impossible to form a notion, 
as Dr. Brown aa.zits; for triangularity must be either rec- 
tangular or not rectangular." 
But in this case, what, Hamitlon goes, are we to make 
of the notion or feeling of similarity between the two 
triangles? "As a general notion, " conta.inkng under it par- 
ticular notions, it must, he replies, "be given up; but it 
may be regarded as a particular relation between the .?articular 
figures. And thus by a. different route, we. arrive again 
at the same conclusion, - that Dr. Brown has mistaken an 
individual, particular relation for a general notion. He 
clearly saw that all that is pictura.ble in imagination is 
ddterminate and individual; he avoided, therefore, the 
absurdity involved in the doctrine of the old concent- 
ualists; but he was not warranted (if this was indeed the 
ground of his assumption) in .assuming that beeause a notion 
cannot be pictured in imagination, it is,- therefore, general." 
(Quott-tion from Hamilton, Metaphysics Vol. 2, Pp. 318, ,°a9 ). 
For the sake of bringing .out a new point, let us quote 
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from Hamilton lt ano ther version of his main thesis. "Dr. 
Broon seems to hove had some faint perception of the dif- 
ference between intellectual notions and sensibly represent- 
ations" - a difference, he says on the previous page and 
elsewhere, which is of course mndeniable and is understood 
much better in Germany, "the most metaphysical county: in 
_ urppe" than it is here. "But Brown, " Hamilton continues, 
"mistook the nature of the intellectual notion, which con- 
nects two Particular dualities by the bond. of similarity, 
and ims'-ines that there lurked under this intangible rUation 
the universality which, he clearly saw, could not be found 
in a representation of the related objects, or of their 
resembling qualities." (Lectures Vol.2 P. :313 -also Vol.3 
P.136, and fhe footnote on P.412 of Vol.1 of Hamilton's Reid). 
Hamilton's point tricxx then is this; Brown's argument, 
he points out, consists of two steps ; the first issuing 
in the conclusion that over and above 'impressions' and 'idease 
of individuals, there is the quite different mental state 
of feeling a relation of resemblance between these individuals; 
the second going on to maintain that a resemblance between 
individuals, in the sense explained, presupposes their having 
a common nature. Now there is no difficulty, Hamilton goes 
on, about accepting the first step, but bewilderment arises 
over the second step, and in particular over its implied thesis 
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that a resemblance -relation, becomes unpicLurable, may oe 
regarded as a general relation, a relation of having some- 
thing in common. "It was primarily incu;nbent on Dr. Brown 
to prove the reality of this basis. But he makes not even 
an attemtp at this. He assumes all that is in question. 
To the noun-suostantive "feeling of resemblance ", he prefixes 
the adjective "general "; but he does not condescend to evince 
that the verbal collocation have any real connection." 
(Lectures Vol.2, P.315). 
Now in his argument, Hamilton tries to settle this whole 
business for good and all, by producing a proof that a 
similarity relation need not be interpreted as a general 
-relation, i.e. as a relation involving so to speak community 
between individuals. On this subject, he makes tuw quite 
first 
distinct points and it is the xxxxicracx of these we shall con- 
sider just now, reserving the other till later. "sghat 
is a feeling or notion of resemblance? Merely this; two 
objects affect us in a certain manner, and we are conscious 
that they affect us in the same way as a single object 
does, when presented at different times to our perception. 
In either case, we judge that the affections of which we 
are conscious. are similar thr the same. There is nothing 
general in this consciousness, or in this judgment. At all 
events, the rila.t.,on recognised between the consciousness of 
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similarity produced on us by two different eggs, is not 
more general than the feeling of similarity -:produced on us 
uy the successive presentation of the same egg. If the 
one is to be general, so is the other." (Lectures, Vol. 2, 
P.311). 
For the sake of precision. let us cite a passage there 
Hamilton puts his point about similarity more lucidly. "Two 
objects have similar qualities only as these qualities afford 
a similar presentation in sense or a similar representation 
in imagination, and qualities are to us completely similar 
Ohe seems to mean, objects are completely similar ±n their 
qualities), when we are unable to distinguish their cog - 
nitions. But what we cannot distinguish, is, to us, the 
same; therefore', objects which Atimmaxx determine undisting- 
uishable impressions rn us, are perceived and represented 
in the same mental modification, and are subjectively to 
us precisely as if they were objectively identical." 
(Lectures Vol.3, 2.124). 
Now no doubt, it is very true that in the case of ob- 
jects as like as two peas, the likeness in cuestion is eq- 
uivalent to virtual sameness, or, in other wordst: the ffi 
critvrAGA of exact similarity is the indistinguishability 
of the onelobj ect from the other, when they are presented 
at different times. But even so, Hamilton's case against 
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Brown is still far from conclusive, and the issue depends on 
whether the s - rt of similarity Brown is talking about 
i.e. the similarity obtaining between h duck and a. hen 
egg whik.:h one coula perfectly well distinguish apart - c ̂.11 
be regarded as a special case of the sort of similarity 
Hamilton it talking about - the similarity obtaining between 
two hen eggs as like as trao peas which one could not pos- 
sibly distinguish apart. 
Hamilton, however, has no doubt whatever about the 
feasibility of the redudtion of Brown's similarity in cer- 
tain respects to the other sort of similarity, exact all- 
over similarity, and, in the passage immediately succeeding 
the paragraph just quoted, he tries to show how such a red - 
uction can be carried through. "But the consciousness of 
identity is not merely the result of the indiscernible 
similarity of total objects, it is equally the result of 
the similarity of any of their parts, - partial characters. 
For by abstracting observation from the qualities or ia-: 
in which objects differ, and limiting it to those in which 
Lhey agree, we are able to consider them as Identical in 
certain respects, however diverse tney may appear to be in 
others, whi cn, for the moment, we throw out or view. or 
example, let B,C and D, represent a series of individual 
o bj ects, which a.11 agree in possessing the resembling 
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attrioutes of y, y, y, and severally differ in each respectivw- 
ly possessing the non -resembling attributes i, o, u. Now 
in so ffar as we exclusively attend to the resembling qual- 
ities, we, in the first place, obscure or remove out of 
view their noìi- resembling characters i, o, u, white we re- 
main exclusively conscious of their resembling qualities 
y, y, y. But in the second place, the qualities expressed 
by y, y, y, deterTüine in us cognitive energies which we are 
unable to distinguish, and which we therefore consider the 
same. We, therefore, view the three similar qualities in the 
three different objects as also identical; we consider the y 
in this, the y in that, and the y in the third object, as 
one, and, in so :Car as the three objects participate in this 
oneness or identity, we regard them also as the same. In 
other words, we cla.ssifyB,.C, and D under y; y is the genus, 
B, C, and .D are its individuals or species, severally disting- 
uished from each other by the non -resembling properties i, o, 
u. Now it is the points of similarity thus discovered and 
identified in Lie unity of consciousness which constitute 
Concepts of Notions." (Lectures, Vol.3, P.125). 
Now let up put Hamilton's point here in such a way 
as to 'show its bearing on Brown's point. The case we envisage 
is that of two pairs of Siamese twins so related by a freak 
of nature that one member of each pair is exactly similar to 
the correspondinf,ly placed member of the other pair, whereas 
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their respective yoke - fellows differ from one anotaer in a 
normal way, and from the other two also. If now we call 
one pair the Joneses and the other pair. the Smiths, then 
Hamilton's analysis of resemblance in a certain respect 
would work out all right, and to say that the joneses ex- 
actly resemble the Smiths in one respect would be to say 
that one of the members of the Jones -pair is indistinguish- 
able from one of the members of the Smith pair, when the mem- 
bers in q uestion are presented successively in circumstances 
where their fellow- members are hidden from view. 
But now here the saine question recurs as before - namely, 
as to whether this Hamiltonian analysis of similarity in a 
certain respect is as well adapted to the Lind of case Brown 
has in view - the partial similarity of a swan and a snow - 
pall as it is Lo the present case of the Siamese twins. Ham- 
ilton however has no doubts about the analogousness of the one 
case and the other, and argues the point three times, always 
as a preface to a statement of the .doctrine we have just stud- 
ied. Here, for example, in summary forms the whole story 
as told in Lectures Vol. 2, Pp. 293, 294 in a. passage that is 
introductory to the discussion of Brown on universals. He 
begins in a now familiar strain. "There is nothing necessarily 
connected with generalisation in abstraction. Generalisation 
is indeed depends on abstraction, wn.ich it supposes; but 
abstraction does not involve generalisation." He goes on 
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next to quote witrl approval the remarks of Stewart about 
the abstract particular and the person who had seen but one 
rose. Then having thus made it clear that cognition beging 
simply in acquaintance with these abstract particulars, he 
goes on briefly to repeat the same account of the formation 
or general notion, as we have just quoted. "A general 
not_.oxi is not.ning but the abstract notion of a circumstance 
in which a number of indiviaal objects are found to agree, 
tnat is, to resemble one another. In so far as two objects 
resemble each o i,n.er, the notion we have of them is identical, 
ano, therefore, to us the objects may be considered as the 
same. Accordingly, having discovered the circumstances in 
which the object agree etc. etc." 
In order to make quite clear how very "atomistic" are 
Hamilton's presuppositions in relation to the present ques- 
tion, let us have yet one more version of his fundamental 
doctrine - ;;his time a version whi cn is not a mere para- 
)riraae of Stewart, but is Hamilton's own work. "The notion 
of trie figure of the desk before me is an abstract idea - 
an idea which makes part or the total no';,ion of iii.at body, 
and on which I have c;ncentratea my attention, in order 
to consider it exclusively. This tti idea is abstract, but 
it is at the same time individual; it represents the figure 
of this particular desk, and not the figure of my other body. 
But had we only Individual abstract motions, what would be 
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our knowledge? :e should be cognisant only of qualities 
viewed apart from their subjects; (and of separate phenom- 
onen there are done in nature); and as these qualities 
are also separate from each other, we should have no know - 
leuge of their mutual relations." Thus having said this, 
Hamilton adds as an afterthought in his margin: "we should 
also be overwhelmed with their number." (Vol.2 Pp. 237, 288). 
Obviously, 6uen, the issue of the debate now hinges 
chiefly on whet ier Hamilton can do anything to vindicate this 
Stewartian faculty of abstraction against the criticisms 
of it made by Brown as an essential part of the theory of 
universals unaer uiscussion. In tact, however, Hamilton 
does not seem to feel that this doctrine of abstraction stands 
in any need of defence, and, for that matter, is plainly 
unaware that it had ever seriously been attacked by Brown 
or Hume or anybody else, and accordingly, his whole argument 
against Brown misses the mark as completely as any argument 
can. 
Hamilton's oase, however, is by no means complete, and 
he has yet ano- ner argument in store of a very atfliamat 
different scope, which we will encounter in :Ïciue course. Mean - 
while, let us pugsue further this interesting topic of Ham- 
ilton's miSunuerstanding of Brown, and, with this view, set 
forth an acco rat of a somewhat different aspect of Hamilton's 
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discussion of trie ,;roblem of universals, where he takes up 
the question already canvassed by Stewart about the Tival 
theories of the origin of language, that of Adam Siflith and 
Oondillac, on the one hancz, and of Leibnitz and Turgot on the 
other. . 
Noirjust as Stewart had modified Smith considerably in 
the light of Turgot, to Hamilton, proceeding further along 
this same line, but producing no new linguistic facts, pro- 
poses a theory intended to conciliate the two opposing views. 
"As our knowledge proceeds from the confused and vague to 
the distinct and the determinate, so, in the mouths of chil- 
dren, language at first expresses neither the precisely gen- 
eral, nor the detex:mina.tely individual, but the vague and 
confused." (Lectures Vol.2, P.327). 
In fact, Hamilton is, as the extract suggests, interested. 
in this question much more for its epistemological than for 
its philological bearings, and, at the outset of his dis- 
cussion, (loc.cit.) at once refers us back to the question 
of our knowledge of the particular, as treated by him both 
in Lectures Vol.1, Pp.240 -252, and in Lectures Vol.2, Pp.144- 
152. n The crucial point at issue, he tells us in the last 
mentioned passage, is as follows : ".whether in Perception, 
do we first obtain a general knowledge of the complex wholes 
presented to us ley sense, and, then, by analysig and limited 
attention, obtain a special knowledge of their several parts; 
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or do we not first obtain a Particular knowledge of the 
smallest parts to which sense is competent, and then, by 
synthesis, collect them into greater and greater wholes ?" 
(Vol.2, P.144). 
Now the point of contrast between the one theory and the 
other is something like . this. On the one hand, we have 
Hamilton's holding forth thus. "I say, them, that the first 
procedure of the mind in the elaboration of its knowledge 
is always analytical. It descends from the whole to the parts, 
- from the vague to the definite. Definitude, that is, a. 
knowledge of minute differences, is not, as the opposite 
theory su noses, the first, but the last, term of our know- 
ledge" (Lectures Vol.2, P.328). On the other hand, the rival 
theory regards as nonsensical the conception of a. knowlege 
of the whole which can take place without there being any 
knowledge of the parts, and which, moreover, is described as 
a confused or vague knowledge. It is axiomatic surely, it 
maintains that one cannot know the whole without knowing its 
parts, since the whole is nothing but the sum of its parts, 
.: nd that, therefore, the so- called knowledge of the whole by 
itself and apart from its parts, so far as any fact or phen- 
omenon corresponding to this description occurs, must be - 
nothing but a xxima special form of the knowledge of the Parts:- 
illustrate the rival principle, Hamilton quotes two 
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different versions, one from JblIrt5 Mill, and the other from 
his own, and. Mill's, mentor, Stewart. The passage from Stewart 
is taken from his speculative wort {îng out of trie hypothesis 
that we can only attend to one thing at a time and is =tut 
the that-We-have ;.7mentioned. His point is that we can't 
attend to the chord, we can attend only to its component notes,' 
one at a time, in rapid succession, and that what at first would 
appear to be the perception of tne chord as a whole without 
distinguishing its notes in nothing but a series of acts of 
attention "performed with such rapidity that the effect with 
respect to us is the same as if the perception were instantan- 
eous." Stewart himself states his paradox thus.. "It is com- 
monly unu rstood, I believe, that, in a concert or music, a 
good ear can attend to the different parts of the music separately 
or can attend to them at once, and feel the full effect of the 
harmony. If the doctrine, however, wrli ch I have endeavoured 
to establish be admitted, it will follow, that in the latter 
case the mind is constantly varying its attOtion from one part 
or the music to the other, ana that -its operations are so rabid, 
as to give us no perception of an interval of time. (Stewart 
Worres Vol.2, and Hamllton'tyb -th his discussions). 
- It should be mentioned in passing that the clear -cut 
opposition here is between HaMi ton and Mill. Stewart, on the 
other hand, is in a way, the parent of both views, his specul- 
utew 
ations on attention perhaps suggesting Mill's, ana his borrowing 
-281- 
from Turgo c likely enough leaa_LxIg on to Hamilton. 
Here we wiii,qu.ote from Hamilton's reply to Stewart on 
the experience of music. "In this respect, it is felo de se. 
It is maintained that, as we cannot attend at .once to two 
sounds, we cannot perceive them as co- existent - consequently 
this feeling of harmony of which we are conscious, must 
proceed from the feeling of the relation of these sounds as 
successively perceived in different points of time. We must 
therefore compare the past sound, as retained in memory, 
with the present as actually perceived. But this impossible 
on the hypotiesis itself" w since we cannot according to 
Stewart attend to two things at once. (Lectures Vol.1 P.244) 
Now Brown noes not formally discuss this problem at all, 
but there is a passage, introductory to the discussions of 
Condillac's theory of attention, which shows him to have been 
at one with Hamilton in his opinion of Stewart's doctrine 
here. "Innumerable objects are constantly acting together on 
our organs of sense; and it is evident that many of these can, 
at once, produce an effect of some sort on trie mind, because 
we truly perceive them as a co- existing whUle. It is not a 
single point of light only which we see, but a wide landscaper 
and we are capable of comparing various parts of the landscape 
with each other - of distinguishing various odours in the 
compound fragrance of the meadow or the garden - of feeling 
the harmony of various co-existing melodies" (-'vawn, Lecture 7)1) 
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Brown does iiot indeed at this point discuss the topic 
at issue in a regular way, bUt the ultimate trend of his 
thought is evi ueilt enough in the next two paragraphs. "The 
various sensations, then, may co- exist so as to produce one 
complex affection. When they-do co- exist, it must be remem- 
bered, that they- are Ind.ividuallÿy less intense. The sane 
sound, for example, which scarcely heard in the tumult of 
the day is capable of affecting us powerfully, if it recur 
in the calm o2 tue night; not that it is then absolutely 
louder, but beea,6e i is no longer miggled with other sounds, 
and other sensations of various kinds, which rendered it 
weaker by co- existing with it. It may be considered al- 
form of say, that 
where many sensations co -exist each is not merely weaker, 
but less distinct from the other with which it is combined." 
(Lecture 31 loc.cit.). - Now Brown is here doing nothing more 
than pointing out features of ordinary experience, but what 
he says has a proper philosophical meaning only if one allows 
that one would never have been able in the f'irst'place to pick 
out the noise from the blended tumult of the day, if one had 
not already heard a noise exactly like that by itself in 
the still night. 
At the risk of being wearisome, it would be as well to 
mirk clear the respective positions of Mill (Analysis of Sen- 
sations 1828) Brown l Lecture delivered as from 1810 and 
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published in 1823) and Hamilton (Lectures, delivered as from 
1837) in relation to one another, taking as the whole in 
question a duet of two voices singing in unison. Now according 
to the standpoint that reduces the perception of the whole 
to nothing but the perception of the parts, it.would necessary 
to listen to, and indeed hear each voice only by turns, and - 
to bring out the chief paradox in the position':- it would_ be 
possible, even if one had never previously heard either voice 
by itself, to pick on the first voice heard, concentrate 
thereon, and never hear the otéier voice at all. But according 
to tn.e opposite standpoint - a standpoint shared by Hamil- 
toil and Brown, - it would be quite impossible to do this 
sort of Cuing, at a first hearing, and what one would hear, 
in the tent n
' itista7412e, would be something called by Hamilton 
the general sound of the whole without the details, and by 
o\ 
Brown "one indistinct feeling or souna, i. e. apparently, one 
sound, whose parts are not distinguishable. So far, then, 
Hamilton and Brown are agreed, and the difference between 
them is that wn.ereas HaanilLon believes in the possibility 
of one's going on, without more ado, to single out and to 
hear each component voice separately, "by analysis and limited 
attention," Brown on tne o rner hand evidently holds that thas 
kind of thing would not be poss.iule unless one had previously 
the experience or each of t«ese voices singing alone, and were 
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to compare the memory of what was heard then with what one 
is hearing now i.e. the duet. 
Here let us contrast Brown with Hamilton by explaining 
more precisely Just what they have in common. 7irst hear 
Brown. "The mind is susceptible of a variety of feelings, 
each new feelin ; being a change of its state ]Lx; and indeed 
it is by such changes alone hat it manifests itself in our 
own consciousness. - -- It is, perhaps, even not too extrav- 
agent an assertion of Hobbes, who supposes a mind so constit- 
uted as to )erceive only one colour, and to perceive this 
constantly; and affirms that, in thin case, it would be ab- 
surd to sa that it had any perception at all, being rather, 
as he expresses it, stupified rather than seeing. ',Attonitum 
esse et fortasse aspectare eum, sed stupentem dicerem, videre 
non dicerem; adeo sentire semper idem, et non sentire, ad 
idem recidunt.'" (Brown Lecture 11) Now hear Hamilton, 
speaking of the con.ditionsfof consciousness. "Independently 
of the cottrá st between a subject and an object, there must 
be a plurality, alteration, difference on the part of the 
perceived object 3r objects, and a recognition or discrimin- 
ation thereof the part of the perceiving subject. It has 
been well saio. Uy Hobbes, in regard toktthis fact); Sentire 
semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt. (Elem. Philos. 
P.4 c.25 5)." ur to give another version of the fact, found 
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a. few lines belu; "we are only conscious of perceiving, as 
we are consciuú perceiving something as discriminated 
from other co- existent things." (Hamilton's Reid, Vol.2 
x 
Note D P.878). 
Now Hamilton's position, as stated here, and indeed as 
stated in other places, and mays too, sounds very like Brown's 
position, and, in order to prevent all confu i on, we had 
better explain just where the resemblance stops and the dif- 
ference begins. On the one hand, one important conseaueñce 
of this common acceptance of Hobbes dictum is that H: ilton 
and Brown both regard perception as involving a judgment 
or feeling of relation. On this point, the evidence in i egard 
to Brown's teaching has already been given, and, as far 
Hamilton, our assertion can be verified in the para.gra.phs 
immediately after the one last quoted. On the other hand, in 
virtue of their difference about abstraction, or, as one 
might put it, -about Hu.ne's dictum on the subject of "the 
globe of white marble," Hamilton and Brown do not mean the 
same thing at all by judgment, the latter always referring 
to it as a feeling of relation incertain respects i. e. between 
two complex individuals, or between a former state of one 
complex individual and a new state of the same individual, 
the forMer, on the contrary, speaking of it only as a dis- 
crimination, a feeling of differente between one simple par- 
ticular and another : "discrimination, contradistinction, 
being in fact only the denying one tht 9-' of another." 
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(Lectures Vol.1 P.204 in a passage of which t:re one in the 
notes to Re iu ju :,t cit,a is nothing but a more careful re- 
statement). 
It would perhaps do no harm to state the same point 
thus. Brown, it will be rememoered, lays it down that 
abstraction (or, if you like, awareness of the particular) 
and generalisdLtion (or, if you like, awareness of the 
general) both coincide with (o:r presuppose) judgment of 
a certain sort, namely feeling of resemblance in a certain 
respect. Hamilton, ontcre other hand, wriile making abstrac- 
tion prior to generalisation, at the same time mazes ab- 
straction coincide with or presuppose judgment in a rather 
special sense of the term, in the sense of discrimination, 
- differing in this point from Stewa_':t, who, whatever his 
position may ìße, ct:rtainly resembles Condillac in making 
abstre c bion, in the sense of singling out the particular, 
precede judgment. 
Before we leave the wholes question, a considerable dig- 
ression will be required on the question as to whether 
Brown's position in relation to Hamilton's has not been 
somewhat misrepresented here. The fact is that, in Ham- 
ilton's opinion, Brown, on topics line the present one;'" is 
much closer tJ Stewart, or to Mill than to himself, and that 
Hamilton tries to back up this opinion by producing evidence 
of a very plausible Kiria. The relevant part or Hamilton is 
Volume I of the lectures, lecture 13 P.242,243, and the 
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paragraph quoted here occurs as the immediate sequel to a 
long quotation from Stewart on she topic or the impa.ss.iuiiity 
of attending to inure than one hang at a ti;,ie, aanu o the 
consequent necessity of our experiencing a W. role as a seq- 
uence of minillia1 parts. "On this point" Hamilton goes on, 
"Dr. Brown not only coincides with Mr. Stewart in regard to 
zhe special fact of attention, but asserts in general that 
the mind cannpt exist at the same moment in mo different 
states, that is, in two states in either of which it can 
exist separately," 
Let us now have thq quotation from Brown in question. 
"If the wind of man" he says, "and all the changes that take 
place in it, from the first feeling with which life commenced 
to the last Wi Lh which it closes, could be made vi d.ible to 
any other tiinking being, a certain series of feelings alone - 
that is to say, a pertain number of successive states would 
be distinguishable, in it, forming indeed states of mind, 
but all of them existing individually and successively to 
each other, To suppose the mind to exist in two different 
states in the same moment is a manifest a.bsrudity. (Brown, 
Lecture 11). 11 
Now before examining this quotation we had better draw 
a distinction between what is almost certainly invalid in 
Hamilton's claim about Brown, and on theliOther hand the part 
of the claim that might perhaps have something it. That 
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is to say, we will dismiss out of hand Hamilton's claim 
that Brown coincides with Stewart in regard to the special 
facts of attention. This is a topic we have already con- 
sidered, and, in the light of what we said about Brown's 
doctrine of attention, it is, in uur opinion, pretty 
certain that Hamilton is simply mistaken here. Accordingly 
the question that is left is whether Hamilton is in any 
way justified in his suggestion that the tendency involved 
in Brown's geixeral view of the mind as "never being in two 
states at once" is to some extent in line with the tendency 
of Stewart's doctrine and the peculiar view of attention 
involved in it. 
Treat we have to do here, then, is to examine the quot- 
ation Hamilton gives from a Brown - a quotation the purpose 
of which in its context, Brown Lecture il, is to sum up 
results obtained in previous lectures. But now, if we read 
the quotation carefully in the tight of these previous lec- 
tures, we find there is apparently some point to Hamilton's 
vi -w of Brown, as being, in a certain way, at one with 
Stewart, since the doctrine implied is a. doctrine that 
reads very like Stewart's, being to the effect that each 
new successive o uj ect of awareness is a simple o bj ecit, or, 
as Brown puts it, C e Lund exists in a series of successive 
states, each oz these states being a simple state. 
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Now here of course it will at once strike us that Brown 
and Stewart, though they coincide verbally, do not mean by 
any means the same thing by their expressions, and we might 
go on to note in confirmation of this that Brown spends a 
good deal of time and care in sharply distinguishing his 
own doctrine from Stewart's doctrine in the very respect in 
question. (See especially the whole remarkable passage in 
the second half of Lecture 39). That is to say, whereas 
Stewart's successive simples are all minima sensiñilia, 
Brown's successive simples include virtual complexes, as he 
calls them, as well as simples in Stewart's sense, the former 
being the predominant, and, as Brown tells us, usual sort of 
simple object. 
For clarity's sake, let us remind ourselves here of the 
difference in point of view between the one man and the other, 
taking the same sort of example as we took before - i.e. the 
case of first hearing a violin and piano duet, and then hearing 
first the piano play the same. tune over alone, and the violin 
do likewise. Now by this "case of hmujolg hearing the instru- 
ments first together, and then solo" we mean, as Stewart and 
Brown, dealing with this sort of th.ing,meant, a case where 
the ordinary plain man would admit baying the musical experiences 
so named, and the question at issue - to view the matter in 
pretty much the light it was viewed by Brown and Stewart - is 
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a question as to the actual sense -data the said plain xxx± 
man would have on these occasions, that it to say, a question 
as to what residue would be left to the series of exper- 
iences, if we put out of account the "intellectual states" 
supposed to accompany the experiences ana transform them 
into knowledge, the "feelings of rèlation" as they are called 
by Bro;.n, and the "fundamental laws of belief" as Stewart 
styles them. But that part once.unaerstood, it becomes 
clear that there is the greatest possible difference betty en 
the views of the two protagonists, and that whereas for 
Stewart, the first experience, the hearing of the two in- 
struments together is, in principle, nothing afferent from 
the second experience, the hearing of the instruments sep- 
Ì arately and in succession, except for the succession 
being in the former case, much more rapid than it is in the 
latter case, for Brown, on the otrier hand, the first exper- 
ience, that of the duet, is quite, different experience from 
that of hearing the in,cruments play solo and successively, 
and the former is not reducible to the latter. That is to 
say - to put the matter briefly - whereas for Stewart, there 
are only two "simples" in question here, the sauna of the 
piano ana tine sound of the violin, for Brown there are three 
quite distinct "simples" 61 the sound of the piano, the sound 
of the violin, and the sound of the violin -piano duet. 
Stewart's doctrine, then, and Brown's are.of very dif- 
ferent tendency, and the question naturally arises as to 
-291- 
whether, once allowance is made for the distinctive nature 
of Brown's doctrine, his coincidence with Stewart is any 
more than a verbal or accidental one, or whether, on the 
contrary, Haviit.n was right in his impression of an ul- 
timate kinship between Brown's doctrine, and Stewart's 
doctrine - or rather, to be precise, Stewart's speculation, 
since he doesn' -t quite fully commit himself to the position. 
In order to settle his point, we will have to explore to 
an extent we have not hitherto done the meaning Brown attaches 
going 
to his doctrine, and we will begin by Oadong over familiar 
ground yet agaiil. Let us first fix our attention on the 
main fact on whion Brown's doctrine is based. "As, in 
chymistry, it of ten happens, that the qualities of the sep- 
arate ingredients of a compound body are not recognizable 
by 4.ßs, in the apparently different qualities of the com- 
pound itself, 50, in this spontaneous chyrnistry of the 
mind, the compouhu sentiment that results from the association 
of former feelings, has, in many cases, on first consider- 
ation, very little resemblance to these constituents of 
it, as formerly existing in their elementary state" (Lecture 
10). Here Brown is speaking with particular reference to 
on 
the question oí' T'associatx of ideas" - a subject he treats 
iri very original way - but what he says about "ideas" he also 
says about "im essions ", since he regards the two cases as 
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parallel. "Various conceptions" he says "which arise at 
different moments, may co -exist and form one compound 
feeiling "(by reason, he explains, of the earlier continuing 
still in the miuü when the lEtbr arises) in the same manner 
as various perceptions, that arise together, or at different 
moments, may co- exist and form one compound feeling of 
mother species." ( Lecture 41). But this being so, it is 
pretty clear in what sense the duet - to keep thix to our 
example - is analogous to a chemical compound. The point 
is that we do not know and cannot tell the sound in cues - 
tion to be a compound except ny a careful comparison of it 
with the sound of the solo piano, the sound of the solo 
violin, and various other sounds which turn out to be 
irrelevant but which we do not know beforehand to be ir- 
relevant - a comparison which involves a certain amount of 
experiment with sounds, or rather, of close observation. 
Now here Brown taes his next step, a step we have not yet 
sufficiently consiaered, and his starting -point is a fact 
supoosed to be established by what has gone before, that 
the souna of the auet, considered in itself, i. e. apart 
from the comparison described above, i.e. the sound as 
it is originally given - has been considerea merely as one 
souna, new ana strange no aouot, but' bearing in itself no 
trace of composition. In view of this last point, he in- 
sists, we ou ght to call an object like the sound of the 
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duet a virtual compound, a. seeming complex (to use two of 
his terms), to Dark the fact that the object in nuestion 
considered in itself, or rp .rt from the comparison, presents 
itself merely as one sound, and takes on the appearance of 
complexity only in the light of the said comparison. Here 
we had better have a long quotation to show how insistent 
Brown is on all this. "Of the nature of this latter species 
of virtual, but not absolute co- existence, I have already, 
sPdtken too often to require again to. caution you against 
a. .i stake, into which, I confess, the terms, which the pov- 
erty of our l n7ur e obliges us to use, might of themselves, 
very naturally lead you; - the mistake of supposing, that 
most complex of mind in 
very essence, rs much e.ae and indivisible as those we term 
simple - the complexity and seeming co- existence which they 
involve being relative to our own feeling only, not to 
their own absolute nature. I trust I need not repeat to 
you that, in itsif, every notion, however seemingly complex, 
is and must be truly simple. Our conception of a. whole 
army, for example, is as truly this one mind existing in 
this Tetta state, as our conception of any of the individuals 
that compose an army." (Lecture 45). 
Ntw, in the light of all this, let us reconsider thq 
relationship of Stewart's position with Brown's. Each 
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successive object of .sense, Stewart suggests, is a minimum 
sensibile and as auah is devoid of composition. Brown 
on the other hand does not deal much in minima sensibilia 
at all, and hit is apparently even willing to admit it 
to be possible (without however believing it to be, in 
fact, the case) that nowe of the successive objects of 
sense are ever minima sensibilia. Even so, however, he 
still insists that each successive object of sense really 
a simple, in Stewart's sense of that word. Take, 
the case of the sound which after comparison, and the 
'feeling of relation' we recognise as a duet; prior to 
this comparison, was it not the case that we were aware 
of the sound only as one sound, and could not detect the 
least trace of composition in its nature?. It follows, 
then, that the said object of sense, considered in it- 
self, or, as it really is, turns out to be a simple in 
the precise sense of the word.. 
To go back now to our original question, it is prettSr 
clear that the coincidence between Brown and Stewart is not 
just an apparent or merely verbal one. But this being so, 
two points would seem to follow with respect to Hamilton's 
attitude e.ttitu4e to both. In the first place, we must 
allow him to be 80 far right in classing Brown with Step; - 
art as an atomist, in spite of his errors as to the former's 
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exact position on these topics, and, in the second place, 
we can now have some sort of understanding for his motives 
in failing to differentiate Brown's position carefully 
for Stewart's and in proceeding in his discussion as if 
Stewart's position were the only one, or at least the chief 
one in question; very likely, he thought that a sophistic- 
ated atomism of Brown's sort, whatever its exact drift 
might be, would never have arisen, but for Stewart's 
re- introducing and taking under his patronage atomistic 
doctrines of a more ordinary type, concerned with minima 
sensibilia. 
It would appear then, that we have here an aspect of 
Brown's doctrine not so far discussed, and an appropriate 
starting -point for such a discussion is to be found in the 
one and only passage where Hamilton ever makes an attempt 
tö differentiate Brown's doctrine of simples from Stewart's. 
"Dr. Brown" Hamilton begins abruptly, "calls the sensation of 
sweet one mental state, the sensation of cold another; and 
as the one of these states may exist without the other, they 
are consequently different states. But will it be maintained, 
that we cannot at one and the same time, feel the sensations 
of sweet and cold, or that sensations forming different states 
apsEtt do, when co- existent in the same subject, - form only a. 
Ek single state " (Hamilton, Lectures Vol.I Pp. 251, 252) 
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- There Hamilton stops, never again, so fF,r as I know, 
to write another word on the subject. 
Now Hamilton, while not probably, understanding at 
all well Brown's position as a whole, has, we believe, 
got hold of an interesting point here, and the line of 
criticism we take to be implicit in his remarks might per- 
haps be developed along the following lines. - The object 
giving rise to the co- existent sensations of cold and 
sweet, that is, the ice - cream, presents itself, says 
Brown, as, being, really, or when considered in itself, 
simple, and presents itself as being only apparently, that 
is, when. considered in relation to - say - the taste of 
sugar, complex, and the ground of this assertion of its 
original or essential simplicity is that, when, considered 
in itself and apart from the said relationships, it ex- 
hibits not the slightest trace of parts or composition 
in its nature. But now th .ire+ is surely a difficulty here 
which Brown - at least if our interpretation of hinSbe 
sound - has overlooked. The, point is - to revert to 
our musical exaln9le - that in the sense in which,the duet 
if considered in itself, has no appearance of being anything 
two - fold, the solo corresponding thereto, if considered 
in itself, and apart from comparison, must surely, by 
the same token, have no appearance of being anything one- 
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fold. Or, to Put the matter more plainly, prior to com- 
paring the sound we later recognise as the duet with the 
sound we correspondingly recognize as the solo, we could 
not, apparently, on the sort of principles Brown himself 
follows, tell the one sound to be complex or the other 
sound to be simple; and all we could say, in either case 
is that we had to deal with one sound in the succession of 
sounds, and that the nature of this sound, whether it was 
simple or complex, was so far unknown. In short, one 
could describe what one had to do with only as being one 
indifferentiated sound, or, perhaps more properly a something 
new in the sense of being a non -visual, non- tactual phen- 
omenon, but in other respects impctuou3 or indeterminate. 
Now we have made the claim that this line of slot 
criticism is implicit in Hamilton, and the grounds of our 
claim mast surely be obvious. Hamilton and Brown, according 
to the interpretation we gave earlier both agree as a- 
gainst Stewart and Mill that, when put. in the presence of a 
complex object, we become aware of the whole prior to be- 
coming aware of the parts, but whereas Brown speaks of our 
prior awareness of the whole as being an awareness of á 
special sort of simple object, Hamilton, by contrast, makes 
this sort of primary awareness consist in the awareness of 
a vague object; for example, he speaks of "the vague know- 
ledge which makes every sheep as it were only a repetition 
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of the same undifferentiated unit," (Lectures Vol. 2, Pp. 328, 
329) in reference to the case of the visitor to the country- 
side who sees sheep after sheep for the first time, and with- 
out instituting any comparison between them. 
h 
But let us mhowAthe contrast between the two stand- 
points occur in Brown's own text. After a momentary glance 
at a scene through a window, "there is not one of us," 
says Brown; "who could have ventured to give even the 
slightest description of it - a sufficient proof that we 
may have seen many objects, and yet have learned nothing." 
Now Brown here is paraphrasing, he tells us, Condillac, and 
to 
the standpoint expressed is pretty close ak Hamilton's i.e. 
all that is claimed is that something was seen, we can't 
say parecIttA ' what. But now, in the second place, when 
Brown, on the same page, is restating his paraphrase from 
Condillac, the passage becomes: 'we see a multitude of ob- 
jects and have one complete indistinct feeling. ' (Brown, 
Lecture 31) and still seem to keep pretty much the same 
meaning as before; indeed the words recall Reid, who is 
fond of speaking of such experiences as experiences of the 
indistinct and complex. Finally, when Brown in Lecture 7,3 
returns to the attack on Condillac, he puts much the same 
point thus; "If the mind had not been susceptible of other 
affections than those of sense - --- it might, when such a 
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scene presented itself, have existed for ever in the state 
which forms the complex perception of the scene, without 
the slightest notion of the relations of the parts to 
this' whole or to each other." But here again it would 
be lass* hard for Brown to say that this sort of complex 
perception, unaware as it is said to be of whole or parts, 
was a simple perception, in the sense that the perception 
of a minimal part would be a simple perception, and in 
short, it would appear as if, when Brown were analysing 
definite cases and not arguing in a. general way, his 
language begins to resemble Hamilton's. 
To make the issue clearer, let us recall (for the last 
time, we hope) Hume and his white globe : "the mind would 
not have dreamed of distinguishing figure fin the body 
figured, (i.e. roughly speaking, shape f& vcolour) as being 
in relity neither distin.uishible., nor different, nor 
separable, did it not observe that, even in this simplicity, 
there might be contained many different resemblances and 
rleations." Now here Hume plainly implies that the wite 
globe, considered in itself, bas to be regarded as a simple 
object, whereas : eid, it will be recalled, pronounces Hume's 
opinion on this point ridiculous and tip uld. seem to want to 
regard the object in question as vague. In short, much the 
same issue arises between Hume and Reid, as arose later 
between Brown and Hamilton. 
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But it is now time to ha_Sten On to another philosopher, 
and, meanwhile, out last word on Hamilton, at least in his 
present role, will be to point out that while he perhaps 
regarded the issue last- discussed to be t'ne outstanding 
one between Brown and himself - the issue as to what it is 
we are aware of in being aware of the whole on its own 
account and independently of its parts, he seems to have 
bey n completely unaware - far more unaware than Reid, for 
example, was in the corresponding case - of the existence 
of the other, and, it would seem, more serious point of dif- 
ference between gown and himself as to Whether our aware- 
ness of the whole in its details and parts is due to Stewart's 
faculty of abstraction on the one hand or to ''feelings of 
relation in a. certain respect, on the other. Indeed, 
so blind is Hamilton, in this respect, that it looks as 
if he had never bothered to read Brown's Lecture 51, the 
one on abstraction, or to understand the part of Brown that 
riNA- 
seems to be complementary t'- ereto,Acriticism of Condillac's 
theory of attention. 
We come now to Ferrier, the last of our philosophers,al,o( 
the only of them to be born in the nineteenth century, 
and, for the understanding of Otis position, it is necessary 
to point out that, in the first instance, he had very likely 
been drawn to philosophy, not so much by the unspectacular 
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analysesn,so to speak, bla,kk and white, traditional in 
his own country, as by the daring and dazzlingly coloured 
speculations of the German Romantic thinkers. In the 
sequel, however, Ferrier seems to have -?ut all this some- 
what to one side after he had settled, as advocate, in his 
native Edinburgh, and, there, under the stimulus of the 
close friendship he had formed with Hamilton, he set him- 
self to read Stewart and Brown, and to master the problems 
and the methods of philosophy, as they were understood in 
the circle he now mixed with. He continued to work, more 
or less, along these lines until 1845, in which year he 
went to a chair at St. Andrews, and began to break, in 
certain respects, with the tradition of Reid, the common 
sense tradition, and to develop a new way of thought, very 
much his Own, but having a certain amount in common with 
the way of thought now fashionhble on the continent. 
Now Ferrier died prematurely at the height of his 
powers, while his philosophy was still fluid and developing. 
Accordingly a question arises as to the relation of the 
new departure in philosophy he was trying to promote to 
the tradition he had inherited, and had originally worked 
in, and this question proves surprisingly difficult to 
answer, and surprisingly interesting, because of the fact 
that Ferrier, as his yout' ful writings show, was one 
of the greatest masters of the psychological or phenomenological 
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tradition he was later tr -ing to extirpate, root and 
branch, and that Ferrier himself, even at the height of 
his revolt and innovations, was quite well aware of the 
value, not perhaps of the "pgychological" tradition as 
a whole, but at least of his own contribution to it - a 
contribution which had once been his pride, but which he 
seems to have temporarily set aside as irrelevant to the 
real purpose of philosophy, whatever its merits in other 
respects. But, this being so, it is always possible that 
Ferrier, if granted a longer life, would have had to qualify 
his kridl hostility to coñingent truth in philosophy, and 
would have come to see himself as standing much closer to 
Reid than, in his published works, he ever admits to 
being. 
For the present, however, we must leave this h rge 
question aside, and concentrate simply on showing in ref- 
erence to the narrow _ ~ issue of universals, in the sense 
it has already been discussed, just how far Ferrier con- 
tinues the line taken by Reid and Brown, and how far he 
breaks with this line. Accordingly we will go first to 
the Institutes of lTetaphysics (1854), the book in which 
Ferrier's break was announced to the world, and proceed to 
discuss the small, but important part of it, concerned 
with making a pronouncement on Brown, Hamilton, Stewart 
and the others on the subject of universals. 
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Now looked at from this point of view, Ferrier's argument 
in the pages that concern us, has four distinct stages to 
it. The first three of these are each occupied with con- 
sidering a different theory of universals, the theory being 
in all three cases, of a Conceptualist tendency, and the 
question at issue is whether any of these theories can stand 
against the stock counter -arguments of the Nominalists. In 
fact, each of these theories is a sort of imp,Orvement on the 
preceding one, and whereas the first two do not manage to sur- 
vive the ordeal of criticism, in the respect in question, the 
last. one, in Ferrier's opinion, certainly does% Finally, 
we come to the fourth stage of the survey, the point of which 
is to note that the theory remaining intact involves a 
peculiar, unfamiliar difficulty of its own, and in considering 
what steps can be taken to meet it. However, we will not 
follow Ferrier in his attempt to overcome this obstacle; 
the sort of theory he produced is not one that is customary 
to find entering into a discussion of the problem of univer- 
sals, and it would tkke us far too long to explain why it 
came to be propounded. Accordingly we will miss out the 
fourth stage altogether, and, with it, everything that is 
subsequent to it, and confine ourselves solely to what goes 
before, that is, to the discussion of the three theories or, 
in other words, the introductory parts of Ferrier's doctrine. 
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Let us start with the third of these theories, Perrier's 
own. "All knowledge," he says, "is of necessity a synthesis 
of the particular and the universal," meaning thereby "Par - 
tiiular cognitionsS, which involves no generality, are not 
conceivable, any more than general cognitions are conceiv- 
able which involve no particularity," (P.191) and he Proceeds 
to explain .hat this means as follows. "Our p J c.hnlo Mi st s 
may guard and explain themselves as they please, but their 
attribution to man of a faculty called abstraction has been 
from first to last, the most disconcerting and misleading 
hypothesis which either they or their readers mziod could 
have entertained. We are supposed to have a power of forming 
abstract conceptions, but it is obvious from the fore-going 
observations that we have no such po,.xer, and that no abstract 
ideas, either particular or general can be attained by any 
intelligence. Such conceptions can only be approximated. 
When the mind attends more to the particular than to the 
universal element, or, conversely, more to the universal 
than to the particular element of any cognition, the ab- 
stract particular - that is, a thing by itself, or the ab- 
stract general - that is, the genus by itself, is approached 
but neither of them is ever reached. To reach either of 
them is ±mlaxxxx impracticable, for this would require the 
entire suppression of one or other of the factors in all 
cognition, and such a suppression would not be op& equivalent 
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to the attainment of the abstract, but to the extinction of 
knowledge and intelligence." (P.194). 
Ferrier sums up the position now reached in the follow - 
ing words. "Abstract thinking is a contradiction, and has 
no place in the economy of the intellect. All knowledge 
and all thought are concrete, and deal only with concretions 
- the concretion of the particular and the universal." (P.195) . 
Now at this point, it is important to grasp just in 
what sense Ferrier is denying abstraction, and, in order 
to make this point clear, we had better give his second, and 
fuller statement of the first theory : "They held that all 
our knowledge is, in the first instance particular; that 
we start from particular cognition; but that the mind, by 
a process of abstraction and generalization, which consists 
in attending to the resemblance of things, leaving out of 
view their differences, subsecuently constructs general 
notions or universal cognitions fabricates them." (P.185). 
Now the point to notice here is this : Ferrier, in his 
attack on abstraction, means to deny the other items in 
this theory, but does not, it would appear, mean to deny 
that 
abstraction occurs, in the sense of "attending to 
the resemblance of things, leaving out of view their dif- 
ferences." 
This point is made clear, when he distinguishes between 
the "ontological" theory of generalisation, and his own 
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"epistemological" theory of generalisation. The "ontological 
theory" he says "is this. "We perceive a number of living 
creatures. Overlooking their differences and attending to 
their agreements, we give the name "animal" to the sum 
of agreements observed in these creatures, i.e. by over- 
looking the differences and attending to thelresemblances 
of singulars we form a genus. But the epistemological theory," 
he goes on, "is altogether different. It has nothing to 
do with things, but only with cognitions of things.. We 
have 4umher of cognitions of things; living creatures, 
for example. Overlooking the differences as much as pos- 
sible and attending to the agreements of those cognitions, 
we give the name of "animal" to the sum of their agreements 
- not assigning it, however, to any resemblance in the 
creatures, but only to a resemblance in our cognitions of 
them." (P.206-208. much abridged) 
But now this difference in nomenclature, however im- 
portant it may be for Ferrier's ìiaid.er purposes, is not 
material for the small pc rt of his doctrines that concern 
us here. Or rather, its only relevance to the present 
topic is that it enables Ferrier to equate the relation of 
universal and particular with the relation of sense and 
thought, and thereby to repeat the doctrine already delivered 
in other and more emphatic terms later. "Mere objects 
of sense can never be objects of cognition; in other words, 
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whatever has a place in intellect (whatever is known) must 
contain an element which has no place in the senses; o_:, 
otherwise expressed, the senses by themselves, are not com- 
%etent to pl^.ce any knowable or intelligible thing before 
the mind. They are faculties of nonsense, and can present 
to the mind only the nonsensical or contradictory" (P.257). 
By now, we hate completed our quotations from Ferrier 
on the subj ct of the last of the three theories of, as we 
said, a conceptualist tendency, and it is now time to 
begin our commentary, starting at the end with Terrier's 
discussion of the third theory, the one he approves of. 
Now the first thing that strikes us here is that Ferrier's 
opinions coincide to a remarkable extent with Brown's 
opinions. For example, take the assertion of Brown's "This 
supposed faculty (of abstraction) is not merely unreal, but 
every exertion of it would imply a contradiction" or again, 
take Brown's complementary asertion as to what abstraction 
is : "We are almost incessantly feeling some relation of 
similarity in objects, and, omitting in consequence, in this 
feeling of resemblances, the parts or circumstances of the 
complex whole in which no similarity is felt." (Quotations 
from Lecture 51) 
]`Moreover, we can dtfine quite precisely the area of 
agreement between the two. Ferrier, in the long passage 
quoted against abstraction, apparently would seem to have 
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bdén objectihlaf to the same doctrine^Brotim objects to - 
namely the doctrine of Stewart's adopted and commended by 
Hamilton which runs as follows. "A person who had never 
seen but one rose, might yet have been able to consider 
its colour apmtt from its other qualities; and therefore 
there may be such a thing as an idea which is not once 
abstract and particular. After having perceived this 
quality as belonging to a variety of individuals, we can 
consider it without reference to any of them, and thus form 
the notion of redness and whiteness in general, which may 
be called a general abstract idea." ( Stewart's Works, Vol.2 
P.165). 
Ferrier, we may add, is not expo }nding systematically 
the theory of universals in question, but simply indicating 
allusively its main points. Now the main point of Brown's 
theory is that the relation involving the general notion 
is one of resemblance in certain respects and difference 
in others. But this is also, apparently, the case with 
the theory Ferrier is expom.nding, and, up to a point, 
approving of. All the resemblances in our cognitions are, 
from a higher point of view, regarded as differa ces. thus 
the resemblance in the cognitions expressed by the word 
"animal" is a difference when set off against the resemblance 
in the nagniztanxx cognition expressed by the word "tree ". 
(P.209). 
There is, then, a considerable coincidence of opinion 
between Ferrier and Brown on the topic of universals, and 
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OUT business in the rest of the chapter will be to inquire 
just how far this coincidence goes. Now of the various 
questions at issue here, the first arises from the fact that 
whereas Ferrier would aoparently be quite willing to admit 
the existence in Brown of an "anti- atomist" tendency 
similar to phis own, he nevertheless goes on to accuse Brown 
of taking up the contradictory position of admitting in one 
way, and denying in another way, the initial knowledge of 
this unrelated particular. (Institutes Pp.186,187). 
Now Ferrier, as a. matter of fact, is in the habit. of 
accusing all philosophers, Kant included, and excepting only 
Plato, of the same crime as he accuses Brown, and one 
might be tempted, on that account, not to take the charge 
vary seriously. However, the point had better be argued, 
since something might be said in favour of Ferier's inter- 
pretation of Brown, by the simple process of referring back 
to some things we said about Brown's position in the latter 
part of our discussion of Hamilton. Brown, according to our 
statement there, admitted the existence of an original 
awareness of a succession of simples or singulars, i.e. an 
awareness of them antecedent to feelings of relation, and 
does not such a doctrine involve th?t very giving priority 
tó knowledge of the bare . singulars, dxxxxictugaich Ferrier 
charges Brown with? 'Now, it is perfectly true that we 
described Brown's position ih this way, but, as it h.alpens, 
our description of it there was, intentionally, incomplete, 
and when the missing bits are added. to Brown's doctrine, it 
1h,ot 
seensAto be liable to the sort of objection Ferrier brings, 
whatever other difficulties it may involve. A quotation will 
kmmax whow what we mean. "The belief of our identity is 
intuitive and irresistible, and the only inquiry that 
remains is as to the circumstances in which the belief 
arises. Identity is a relative term. It implies, of 
course, in every instance a double observation of some 
sort. The dicxx identity of our mind is its continuance 
as the subject of various feelings, or at least as that 
which is susceptible of various feelings. The belief of 
it, therefore, can arise only on the consideration of its 
sucessive phenomena, and is indeed involved in the mere 
consideration of these as successive." (Lecture 13) Now 
what we have here is a doctrine, quite central to Brown, 
and developed at great length (Lectures i1 -15), and its 
point is, roughly speaking, that if we think away our 
feelings of resemblance in certain respects, and feelings 
of comprehensiveness, the fact we are left with is that of 
myself aware of having some exres :ion now and of having 
had some other experience Previously, but unable to give 
a. description of these experiences except in the vague, 
restricted terms he employed, and, that, in the second 
place, the fact, this isolated as being prior to the feelings 
-311- 
of resemblance 'and comprehensio'0v has to be accepted as 
an ultimate fact, behind which analysis cannot penetrate. 
But, thid being so, it would appear that Brown can be 
absolved on the spót from the sort of charge of "atomism" 
which Ferrier. brings against him, dnce ,Ferrier's own doc- 
trine "that mere objects of sense can never be objects of 
cognition" is, as a glance at -the Institutes will show, 
a doctrine very much of the same sort as Brown unfolds 
here - a doctrine, namely, that awareness of the successive 
serest- data involves awareness of a continuing self. (See, 
especially, Ferrier, Lectures and Remains Vol.2 Pp.489 -492). 
It is not indeed very easy to catch Brown in a down- 
right contradiction on this subject, but, in order to give 
Ferrier every chance, let us try another passage that might 
seem to tell in his favour. It comes in Lecture 51 Flso, 
just at the end of the passage on abstraction, and IB 
Brown's last word on the subject. "I have now, then, 
brought to a conclusion my analysis of the intellectual 
phenomena; and have showy, I flatter myself, or at least 
endeavoured to show, that all these phenomena, which are 
commonly ascribed to many distinct faculties, are truly 
referable only to two - the capacity of simple suggestion, 
which gives to us conceptions,of- external objects formerly 
perceived, and of all the variety of our past internal 
feelingsias mere conceptions, or fainter images of the past; 
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¡rid the capacity of relative suggestion, by which the objects 
of our perception or conception, that are themselves separ- 
ate, no longer appear to us separate, but are. instantly 
invested by us with various relations that seem to bind 
them to each other, as if our mind could give its own unity 
to the objects it comprehends, and, like that mighty spirit 
which once hovered over the confusion of unformed nature, 
converts into a universe what was only a chaos before." 
Now of course, it must be admitted that Brown does 
here own to holding the very position Ferrier charges him 
with holding. Brrown, that is to say, does here speak as if 
the objects of perception appear to us as being separate, 
prior to our awareness of relations, such as comprehensions 
(whole and part) or resemblance. Even so, however, this 
fact is not enough in itself to establish Ferrier's case. 
The important point here is that having first spoken as 
if pure sense were a manifold, Brown goes on to speak a.s . if 
this manifold were a chaos. But now when this qualification 
of Brown's is taken into account, there is no longer any- 
great plausibility to Ferrier's claim that Brown thinks 
differently from himself in this department of the sùbject, 
for the simple reason that Ferrier himself, in the solitary 
attempt he ever made, on this subject to be specific and 
particular, describes the naked data of sense in pretty much 
the same terms as Brown - namely, as a chaos. "If the mind 
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had no idea of resemblance etc." (see below) - Indeed one 
might c ite fairly go on to point out that Brown's doc- 
trine is not only close to Ferrier's but is cleverer 
than Ferrier's. The fact is that Brown distinguishes quite 
Sharply between the feeling of relation of the sense -data 
as being successive x objects of a continuing mind. on the 
one hand and the feeling of relation of sense- data as re- 
sembling one another in certain respects, and related as 
whole and part on the other, lainly regarding the former 
feeling of relation as prior to, and more fundamental than 
the other, and, this being so, his point in speaking of 
the experiences as appearing separate byt chaotic is Drob- 
ably that, prior to the rise of the feelings of resemblance 
and comprehensiveness, one is ewsre on one's having present 
experiences and of one's having had other past experiences 
and accordingly of one's hag in this sense, separate 
experiences, but at the seine time one has no power, at that 
stage, to describe these experiences in any more precise 
may, and accordingly has perforce to regard them as being 
chaotic in the sense of indttermina.te. 
And yet perhaps we being a little unfair to Ferrier here. 
The fact is that there are certain confused or apparently 
confused passages in Brown, which, if read by themselves, 
would tend to give the impression of his allowing a knowledge 
of the bare individual or particular. It is "the general 
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xtai notion of the feeling of resemblance in certain 
respects which is signified by the general term, and with- 
out this relative suggestion as a. previous state of mind, 
the general term would have been as little invented, as the 
names of John and William would have been invented, if there 
any 
had been no perception of mx individual being whatever, 
to be denoted by them. " (Brown, Lecture 47). Now Brown 
never discusses in me any detail the point raised in the 
last part of this sentence - the point about the significance 
of proper names, - except for the brief and not very sat- 
isfactory attempt to adapt to his own system the Condillac- 
Adam Smith theory of the prior invention of the names of 
individuals and accordingly he leaves a good deal of room 
here for misunderstanding of his system. -All the same, what 
he says should, it may be remarked, mislead no -one who had 
read his Lecture 51 on iticxg±ix "singling out." 
However, now that a doubt has arisen about our faiess 
or unfa tness to Ferrier, let us ta.'::e up, in a more reg- 
ular manner, the question as to whether Ferrier, in accusing 
Brown of atomism, was not perhaps concerned with atomish 
in a somewhat different sense from the one that has so 
far preoccupied us. Let us put the matter in this way. 
Ferrier presumably understood Brown pretty well; the proof 
is that his conclusions in this matter of universals not 
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merely coincide. with Brown's, but are recognised in a 
sort of way by ::'errier himself as coinciding with Brown's. 
But now if Ferrier understood Brown in the :ray as being 
close to himself, presumable he took the trouble to find 
and look through the lecti?.res containing Brown's fundamental 
argument in defence of t;iese positions - that is, the 
Lecture 51 containing what one might call a restatement of 
Hue. on the distinctions of reason, and the Lecture 31 
containing the criticism of Condillac on attention. This 
being so, the question arises as to whether Ferrier did 
not detect, inherent in these tR-mmx lectures which are 
n.ot, in the ordinary 'way of things, atomistic at all, 
certain Î traces of something/ which is atomistic in an 
aspect of thing that has not hitherto strufck us as important 
enough to mention. 
Now when we reconsider Brown's arguments from this 
point of view, one fact suddenly stands out which we had 
neglected before - the fact that Brown's chief arguments 
are there all factual, and do not try to convict the 
principle he is controverting as nonsensical or contradictory. 
The argument against Condillac is obviously case in 
,oint : what Brown does there is simply to maintain that we 
never do in fact =Ex see one single object by itself, 
that we always in fact see object plus environment. But 
the factual nature of Brown's approach, his preference for 
treating all truth as contingent truth, comes out even 
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more clearly in his version of the thesis that abstraction 
Is involved in awareness of partial resemblance; that 
abstraction coincides with generalisation. On the one 
hand, he does not follow Hume's procedure of first positing 
the shape, of a thing as inconceivable apart fron(i.e. un- 
imaginable apart from) its colour, and of then going on to 
ask how, in that case, we can ever manage to distinguish 
or single out the sha e from the colour. On the other 
hand, he almost .goes out of his way to admit that him the 
sort of abstraction M. Laromiguiére calls the abstraction 
of the senses - the abstraction that regards objects as 
j*rt distinguishable only in so far as they are empirically 
deparable - might have been, so far as a priori considerat- 
ions go, the onay form of abstraction required and he 
rests his case for regarding abstraction, as involving 
itt Hume's sense a distinction of reason)on the brute 
fact that things, practically speaking, are concretes 
of qualities, and that, in so far a s things are like this, 
the most important form of abstraction happens, as a mat- 
ter of fact, to consist in awareness of resemblance in a 
certain respect. In short, none of Brown's arguments 
in those key- passages are arguments concerned with logical 
necessity with the one exception of his attack on Stewart's 
"faculty of abstraction ", as being a. kind of nonsensical 
addition to Condillac's straightforward scheme. 
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Now let us turn at once to the introduction to the 
Institutes of - Zeta.physics, and resume, in a few sentences, 
its central theme. "Our philosophical treatises" says 
Ferrier, "r re no more philosophy than _Fu.stathius is Homer 
or Malone is Shakespeare," and the cause of this, he goes 
on, is, that philosophers occupy themselves with contingent 
truths, i.e. that "philosophy is not reasoned." "Philosophy," 
he explains, executes her proper functions only when dealing 
with necessary truths ", and despite "the effrontery with 
which their investigation has been prescribed as an illegit- 
imate pursuit ", despite the Atimxm±xwmt determined resolution 
to 'keep them down" -- "ultimately they will blaze out as 
lucent as the stars; and, like the stars, it will perhaps 
be found that they are nu 1 drless. " (Institutes Pp. 6 -29 ) 
Now in the facts just detailed -. ould seem to lie the 
ultimate reason for Perrier's repudiation of Brown's theory 
of universals in spite of its being, in many ways, so like 
his own. From Ferrierls point of view, a theory like 
Brown's, however anti- atomist in its conclusions, was 
bound to appear favourable to atomism in a quite fundamental 
way from the very j a ct that it did not presume to prove 
atomism to be nonsensical or logically impossible. Indeed 
it is likely enough that Ferrier, once having found 
Brown's arguments no good against atomism when they were 
considered uner this.- to him - all- important aspect of 
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logical necessity, would not have stopped long to wonder 
if these same arguments wiz were some good against atom- 
ism, when they were considered in their own terms.' 
But here we had better explain more orecisely the dif- 
ference between Perrier's position on universals and Brown's 
so fear as it has to with necessary truth, in the accept- 
ation of this term peculiar to Ferrier. As a guide to 
Ferrier's contrib Lion on this point, we will go to an 
English philosopher of the next generation, who had, we 
believe, no personal contacts with Ferrier, but who, like 
others of his time, and country, studied the Institutes 
to some pur ;o se, - Shadworth Hodgson. "It is" he says, 
"only on supposing things to be separate that the question 
of their nexus arises. It is a case of what should be called 
Ferrrier's theorem, from the clear way in which it has been 
stated and due emphasis laid on it by him." (P.47.6 Vol.1 
Philosophy of Reflection - 1878). Now what Hodgson expres- 
ses somewhat obscurely as a theorem about a nexus, appears 
in Perrierts page* as a doctrine asserting the reality and 
importance of a. relation, both then and previously, in the 
circle we are concerned with, more less ignored or denied 
by implication - the relation, namely, of being disti nguish- 
able but inseparable from one another. This being so, 
the difference between Ferrier and Brown would seem in 
the last analysis to be that whereas Ferrier is very insistent 
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about the need to retard the universal and the particular 
as distinguishable but inseparable from one another, Brown 
on the ot«.er hand refers to the universal dnd the particular 
as being distinct but always <.s a matter of fact found 
together, and never tries to describe their nexus as being 
anything more intimate than this. 
Now, in order to explain how Ferrier goes about the 
business of introducing and defendin~; this relatively novel 
notion, we must turn from the question of his relationship 
to Brown to that of his relationship with Hamilton. ''J hat 
we want to do is to show how the doctrine of Perrier in 
uestiaon arises out of e criticism of a doctrine of Harnil- 
ton's. Now, in general, the difficulty in identifying Per- 
rier's opponent Hamilton is much the sane as the difficulty 
in identifying Brown's opponent as Stewart; in both cases, 
a favourite disciple is arguing against a friend and patron 
much respected in the land. Here however there is hot much 
doubt about the point at issue, since it can be made pretty 
plain on internal evidence that a rather unusual distinction 
taen for granted by Ferrier as fundamental cores >>onds en- 
tirely with a rather unusual distinction fou d in one of the 
not very lucid summaries of points to be made which Ta dlton 
put at the beginni g of each argument in his volumes on 
Logic, presula.bly for dictation purposes. -- The lecture 
of Hamilton's, to which the passage to be quoted serves as 
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a. synopsis, is, it may be remarked, the lecture in his 
volumes on Logic from which we drew e good deal of matter 
some pages back when explaining the point of Hamilton's 
reply to Brown. 
Here we had better have the passage from Hamilton. 
"In our consciousness, - prehension of an individual 
object, there may be distinguished the two following cog- 
nitions : 1. ,The immediate and irrespective knowledge 
we have of the individual object, as a coin ,lenient of cer- 
tain qualities or characters, considered simply as belonging 
to itself. 2. The mediate and relative knowledge we have 
of this object, as comprising qualities or characters com- 
mon to it with other objects. The former of these cogn- 
itions is that contained in the presentations of sense and 
xxx=or representations of imagination. They are only of 
the individual or singular. The letter is that contained 
in the concepts of the understanding, and is a knowledge 
of the common, general or universal" (Lectures Vol.3 Pp.121, 
122). 
In order to complete Hamilton's point, let us also 
have a passage from the end of the same lecture. "A con- 
cept or notion, as the result of comparison, necessarily 
expresses a relation. It is, therefore, not cognisable 
in itself, that is, it affords no absolute or irrespective 
object of knowledge, but can only be realised in consciousness 
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by applying it, as a term of relation, to one or more 
of the objects, which agree in the point or points of 
resemblance -rhich it expres ;es. "In this (last) 
paragraph, (if I may allude to what you may not all be a- 
ware of) is contained a key to the whole mystery of 
Generalisation and General Terms; for the whole disputes" 
between the Conceptualists and Nominalists, (to say nothing 
of the realists), have only arisen from concepts having 
been regarded as affording an irrespective and independent 
object of thought" (Lectures Vol.3 P.128). 
Here let u's turn to Ferrier, and look at the two 
other themes which we mentioned before as pre -occupying 
him, over and above his own theory. Now the rein point of 
the first of these is this. "Every cognition is either 
particular or universal. Thus, there is one kind of know- 
ledge which is particular and another which is universal." 
(Institutes P.179 and passim throughout the chapter) - 
meaning, thereby, that each kind of knowledge is independent 
of the other, that the general is thinkable out of relation 
to the particular, and vice versa. B'it, now, this position, 
as stated and explained by Ferrier, coincides exactly 
with the position Hamilton is, by implication, attacking 
in the above note; it is the position which allows us to 
have "an immediate and irrespective knowledge of the indiv- 
idual", and, at the same time, allows our "knowledge of the 
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common, general, or universal" to be, in some sort also 
'absolute and irrespective. Moreover, Hamilton and Ferrier 
coincide entirely in their mode of illustrating historically 
this very general theory; it is, they say, found in one 
form in the old exploded Realism, and in another less un- 
plausible form in the old Conceptualism - e.g. Locke's. 
Next we go to the other theory that interests Ferrier. 
"Conceptualism" he says, is supposed to recover her position 
or at least to effect a compromise with her adversary 
(i.e. with Nominalism), by affirming that the object which 
the mind contemplates when it employs a general term is 
some resemblance, some point or points of similarity which 
it observes among a number of particular things." (P.186). 
Now this theory, Ferrier points out, will not ällow "our 
knowledge of the common, general, or universal," to be 
"absolute and irrespective" but it leaves our knowledge of 
the individual in the same irrespective state as it was 
on the old theory. "This is proved by the consideration 
that in the estimation of (this theory) of Conceptualism, 
our particular cognitions precede the formation of our 
general conceptions, which they could not do unless they 
were distinct and completed." (P.187). But here again we 
have nothing but pure Hamiltonianism, i.e. Hamilton's own 
theory. In the first place, the statement in Ferrier as to 
the object the mind contemplates when it employs a general 
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term is precisely equivalent to the stete.ent in Hamilton 
that "a concept or notion, as the result of comparison, 
necessarily expresses a. relation." In the second place, 
the rest of what 'Perrier says corresponds entirely with 
Hamilton's assertion that we have an irrespective knowledge 
of the individual as a complement of cïua.lities but a 
mediate or relative knowledge of the individual as having 
these qualities in Ram= common with other objects, and 
consequently no absolute or irrespective knowledge of the 
common at all. In the thilEd -glace - and this is the most 
important point because the lest obvious - Perrier's des- 
cription of this position as being one in which, conceptualism 
is 
effects a com promise with its adverse, probably suf- 
ficient in itself to identify the position as Hamilton's, 
since, as above, he always maintains that, in a sense, the 
controversy between Conceptualists and Nominalists was never 
e real controversy, and ceases when the notion,- of an irres- 
pective knowledge of the general'is given up. 'At first 
sight, indeed, this would seem, Hamilton ;points out, to 
be an outri 1 victory for Nominalism. But really, he goes 
on, this is not so. The position reached is that "e con- 
necessarily 
cept, as the result of comparison, isms g expresses (only) 
a relation", but the relations in ruesti on - those of 
simarility and difference - cannot BEd= seriously be 
regarded as objects of sense or imagination, and, this being 
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so, the conceptualists are so far right, at least against 
the extreme Nominalists, and it becomes nonsense to say 
that "concepts are mere words ", that, "there is nothing 
gcneral in thought itself" (Lectures Vol.3 P.136). 
By means of this tedious preamble, we have at length 
established the fact that Ferrier has Hamilton's position 
in view in a precise way. This doni, we can now go on 
to show how Ferrier criticises this position, and we will 
r.:uote a, long passage to the effect that the position 
Hamilton wants to set up in place of the old Conceptualism 
is no better than the old Conceptualism. "Conceptualism 
perishes in consequence of the principle ± m which it 
starts - the division, namely, of Mir cognitions into kinds, 
and not into elements. The dilemma to which it is reduced 
is this: it must either stand to that distinction, or it 
must desert it. If Conceptualism hands to the distinction, 
and. mixx maintains that general conceptions are distinct 
cognitions - are Aea.s cognisable by themselves, and in- 
dependently of the particular cognitions - in that case the 
general concept ions evaporate in mere words; for it is quite 
certain that the mind cannot think of any genus without 
thinking of one or more of the particulars that rank under 
it. Again, if conceptualism deserts the distinction and 
admits that general conceptions are not cognitions which can 
be entertained irrespective of the ' ?articular cognitions - 
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in that case the general cognitions are reduced from cogn- 
itions to mere elements of cognition; for a thought which 
cannot stand in the mind by itself is not a thought, but 
only a factor of thought. And thus we have a. most incon- 
gruous doctrine, - an analysis which divides our cogitions 
into a kind and into an element. For conceptualism still 
cleaves to the doctrine of particular cognitions as dis- 
tinct from the general ones, although, when hard pressed, 
she seems willing to admit that the letter are not distinct 
from the former. Here the confusion becomes hopeless. This 
is as if we were, first, to divide human beings into men 
and women, and were then to affirm that the men only were 
human beings, and that the women were mere elements of human 
beings, - and finally, were to declare that although the 
men were different from the women, the women were not dif- 
ferent from the men." (Pp. 188 -190) . 
Now Ferrier's line of argument is obvious enough here. 
He' starts from Hamilton's point about our having an absolute 
knowledge of the individual object, as a complement of 
qualities, considered in their particularity, and a relative 
knowledge of the individual object, as a coy element of ru,,1- 
ities considered in their universality. Then, following, 
the Hamiltonian elucidation, he asserts the meaning of 
the theses here to be that we can have a knowledge of the 
said qualities in their particularity without having a 
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kno; ledge of the. in their universitality, but that we 
cannot have a knowledge of the said qualities in their univ- 
ersality without having a knowledge of them in their par- 
ticularity. This done, he concludes that we have a con- 
tradiction here, that it is nonsense to spew. of No.1 as 
distinguishable i rom and separable from No.2 and, in the 
same breath, of No.2 as distinguishable from but inseparable 
from No.l. The pact is, according to Ferrier, that No.2 
cannot be inseparable from No.1 unless No.1 is inseparable 
from No.2. 
Now the thing to note here is the mode of argument 
Ferrier uses to defend his view of the relation between 
particular and universal as being one of distinguishability 
but inseparability. Obviously, the mode of argument in 
question is an ad hominem mode of argument, intended to 
be valid against Hamilton and valid against Brown. (In 
introducing the argument he speaks of it as being against 
_gown, and does not mention Hamilton, although tri fact 
it is Hamilton he is directly concerned with.) The point 
is that Hamilton in allows ug our knowledge of the universal 
to be a merely relative knowledge, Brown in allowing, in 
a like manner, no knowledge of the universal apart from 
knowledge of the individuals have already introduced the 
notion of the universal as distinguishable from, but 
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inseparable from the particular, and That Ferrier, starting 
from this concession, tries t,J deduce therefore, by a 
.' 
bries, neat argument of a kind we ha <.ve ̂ met with before, 
the impassibility of the bare r absolute knowledge of the 
particular which Hamilton had believed to a fact, and which 
Brown had not been able to atta.c: except by means of psy- 
chological ,arguments. 
Here let us cite a passage which would seem to show 
Ferrier as being conscious of doing what we say he is 
doing. "All knowledge is of necessity a synthesis of the 
particular and the universal. Particular cognitions (the 
cognition, for example, of this pen by itself) are mere 
words, just es much es the general idees expressed by 
tree, man, animal, and so forth, taken absolutely by them - 
sieves, are me: e words. Particular cognitions, which in- 
volve no generality, are not conceivable, any more than 
general cognitions are conceivable which involve no Par- 
ticularity." (Institutes P.191). 
Now the importent sentence here is the middle one, 
since it contains one of Ferrier's rare attempts - nere, 
that is, so far as the Institutes are concerned - to ex- 
plain or illustrate what he is d ing in any terms other 
than technical ones, or metaphysical ones of a general 
kind. As a help towards understanding his point, let us 
cite one of these not very illuminating passages in Brown, 
-328- 
remarked on a few pages heck, in which the meaning of proper 
names is mentioned. "The circumstances in Which all ind- 
ividual men agree form my general notion of ma.n or human 
na háre. When I hear the term man, these general circum- 
stances of a.greeS' occur to me vaguely perheps and indis- 
tinctly, but probably as distinctly as the conception of 
the individual John orH'1illiam, which recurs when I hear 
one of these names" (Brown Lecture 47). Now first let us 
be. 
menti n the -point \ Ii ch seems ton actuälly present to Brown's 
mind here, in order to dismiss it as irrelevant. Very like- 
ly he has in mind P. dispute between Reid on the one hand, 
and Hume and Principal Campbell of Aberdeen on the other 
as to whether general terms do ndtjhave precise meaning at 
all in the sense in which -proper names have a precise 
meaning, and his thesis here is that Reid is right in 
claiming for general terms as least as much definiteness 
in meaninr;, and indeed more, than can be claimed from 
proper names. But now if all this is set aside as irrelev- 
ant, we find with regard to Brown that while he states ex- 
plicitly that words like 'man' or 'humanity' have no meaning 
for us unless we are already aware of the fact of the resem- 
blance to one another in certain respects, and unlike -ness 
to one another in other respects of John, William, Thomes, 
etc., on the other hand he does hot state at all that a 
word like "Johrthas no meaning for us unless we are already 
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aware of the fact of the resemblance to one another in the 
same respects PS those just mentioned of this individual, 
that individual, and that other individual. Here now 
we can return to Ferrier with the remark that the sentence 
in the above quotation, to which we have m± specially 
drawn attention, would_ seem to have been written in view 
of passages like that just cited from Brown, and written, 
moreover, with special purpose of pointing out the very 
thing Brown has omitted, explicitly enj directly, at any 
rate, to say. T'-t- is"- to --s^y, T'errier's point is that 
paxgox proper names and general names have a meaning only 
in contradistinction to one snother as parts of speech in 
sentences after the ga.shion indicated above. 
Here we will leave Ferrier's discussion of universals° i'n 
the Institutes of Metaphysics (1854) since the rest of it, 
though interestin7 in itself, is not so much concerned with 
the problem as inherited from Reid and Brown, and go in- 
stead to his discussion of the same subject in the Lectures 
on Greek Philosophy (Vol.1 of the Remains) written between 
1857 -1861. The doctrine in both books is, we shall find, 
exactly the same, but whereas in the earlier work the ex- 
position tries to be as a priori as possible, and does not 
exactly rely much on empirical illustration, in the n.ew 
work the principal emphasis is on the factual side. Per- 
haps this difference is due to the fact that Ferrier seems 
to be becoming; dubious of the notion of philoso Thy as a 
guest for necessary truth by itself, free from empirical 
contamination. Risr> ,vie truth, " he says, in his intro- 
duction to the Lectures (Vol. 1 of Remains P.10), "absolute 
truth is the principal, indeed the groper object at which 
philosophy aims," but nevertheless "philosophy must not 
overlook altogether the consideration of relrtive truth, 
because perhaps a finer analysis will show us that the two 
are ever blended together in an essential and inseparable 
contrast." (he uses the terms 'absolute and relative truth' 
here instead of 'necessary and cóntingent truth). On the 
other hand, in the Institutes, his claim. clout nezessary 
absolute truth as the object of philosophy is put 
ward in an unmodified form. 
Ferri er' s _gain .point here is one like Reid's, and possibly 
even deriving from Reid's - the point, namely, that per - 
ception involves a. judgment of a proposition to be true. 
(cf. Vol.1 Pp. 330 -332 with Vol. 2.. Pp. 515 -519) . But here let 
us give the main steps in Ferrier's argument in his own 
words in the Remains Vol.l. ' ":Then you look at a. chair, so 
- long es you have merely a sensation of it, your sensation 
is a sensation of that particular chair, and nothing else. 
Such a state of mind is scarcely conceivable; but we mry 
conceive it to be the predicament in which our domestic 
animals are placed when they contemplate our household 
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furniture. Such a state of the human grind, I say, is hardly 
conceivable, because in looking at a. chair we instantly 
think it. But thinking it, what do we do? We think 
not only it, but much besides." (P.25). Thought, then, 
does not begilx wi. bh the singular; but, he says, "begins 
absolutely wit« something more than the particular thing 
before us. " He uwells on this latter point at some length. 
"You now know what the fact is, that in all thinking, there 
is "something rmore" than the thin; directly thought of, and 
that this fact has given rise to the problem, what is 
that "something more." (Pp. 229 -234.) "This 'something more' 
cannot, says Ferrier proceeding to his second point, "be 
again the particular. For example, suppose that in thinking 
a gs.rticul ̂r object, the a.ddlitionsl something I thought 
of were one other pa,rtic .lar object, or ten other particular 
obej cts; in that case, I maintain _that no thinking would 
have taken place, for I would still be confined to the Par- 
ticular, and ten particulars, per se cannot be thought of 
any more than one particular can be thought of. ilhen ten 
particulars are thought of, or ten hundred particulars, 
there always emerges in\ thought an additional something, 
which is the possibility of other perticlUars to. an indefinite 
extent. In the operation of thinking, any" given number 
of particulars are always reduced to so many instances, 
and the indefinite something which they are instances of 
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is a universal." (P.376). But <<r',.at is involved in this 
reduction of particulars to instances of a universal? 
Ferrier replies that it consists in awareness of the par- 
ticulars as resembling one another in certain respects. 
Universals, he says, "are not merely indefinite possibilities 
which no given numer of instances can exhaust, but they 
are principles by which the variety and multifariousness 
of faxxxxxmm our sensible impressions are reduced to order. 
Resemblance, for example, is the greet principle of ar- 
rangement and classification. But resemblance does not come 
to us through the senses, or b-? way of sensat .on; it is no 
sensible impression, it is s. pure idea" (he means, in the 
Platonic sense, i.e. a u-iversa.l). Resemblance is a rel- 
ation, and, as such, it cannot be seen, or touched, or 
apprehended by any of the senses. These apprehend only 
the thin s. Their relations of resemblance and difference 
are apprehended only by the intellect, and if the mind 
had no idea of resemblance, and no idea of difference, it is 
mànifest that our cognitions would have no unity, order or 
coherence; our mental state would be no better then a. 
chaotic dream. So essential are idees (i.e. universals) to 
the existence of kno-;rled.ge, so impo 'ee -nt are sensá.tiongl, 
without ideas, to instruct us even in the most elementary 
truths." (P.339 -340). 
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Now so far as we hate gone with Ferrier's stet.enient 
of what is the fact, as he calls it, there is nothing here 
that differs very ,,such from Brown or even from Leid. How- 
ever, in the sequel, we coe upon a feature of Terrier's 
position that hrs no parallel in that of the twp others, 
and arises from Ferrier's innovation in regarding the re- 
lationship of universel and particular, of thought and 
sense, Es a relationship of being distinct from but in- 
separs.blc from one another. "It is of the utmost con- 
sequence that you should verify in your consciousness the 
truths in regard to thought and sensation which I have 
laid before you and which I have yet to lay before you. 
You must practise the "know thyself ", otherwise all I am 
se in; will go for nothing. There is one thing, however, 
which I must impress upon you by we.j; of caution; you must 
not expect to be able to verify the fact of sensation and 
the fact of thought apart from each other. That is impds- 
sibie, because, in the very act of studying the sensation, 
you must think it; so that is impossible to lay hold of it 
by 'itself. But still, although the two must be taken together, 
this need not prevent us from obtaining a distinct con - 
ception of each, or from perceiving that the one element 
id quite different from the other, that each is, indeed, 
the opposite of the other." (P.238,239). - This passage, 
by the way, comes at the end of the first part of the 
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discussion of universals (Vol.l Pp.220 -235), the second 
part ()more or less a continuation) .being found ink in the 
same volume Pp.330- 344. 
Now a difficult;: arises out of this last part of 
Ferrier's theory, to some extent comparable to the dif- 
ficulties arising in the case of Brown, out of his peculiar 
doctrine of ,prof er names or, in the case of Reid, out of 
his vague or ambiguous remarks about abstraction without 
generalisation. That is to say;.: it is here, if anywhere, 
that we find an apparently weak point in Perrier's front 
such as to give some sort of opportunity for the doctrine 
oo:?osed by him to counter-attack with some hope of success. 
Now the .point at issue here could be put in a variety 
: °of ways. To take the simQlest first, it might have been 
asked what justification Ferrier could offer for his asser- 
tion that 'although the two (scsnsátion and thought) must be 
taken together, this need not prevent as from obtaining a 
distinct conception of each'? Or again, to put the matter 
in a way it r i_ght have peesented itself to someone of Per- 
rier's own generation, a query might have been put as to 
whether Ferrier, by the very fact of allo\,ring this kind of 
unexplained distinction between inseparables, is not per- 
haps reintroducing,in a somewhat new role/that very "faculty 
of abstraction" to which he himself, like Brown, had 
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objected so strop ly. Or, in the third place, to alit 
look at the thin. from i the point of view of people a 
generation or so 7.-.ter tha :n merrier, it.micht have been 
-possible to ±Tliiu. oases where an appeal to what Shadworth 
Hodgson called " Ferrier's theorem." of the peculiar sort of 
nexus in question had been used to justify as ultimate 
and undeniable certain very debatable distinctions such 
as that of act and object of sense which Ferrier himself 
would never have accepted as ultimate, and which he would 
never have dreamed of defending by a mere appeal to his 
"theorem." 
Now Ferrier, we believe, would have coped bettér with 
this sort of difficulty if he had been willing to make a 
still closer study of "the facts" than he ever seems to 
hNs 
have done in this part of,philsophy, and if, in particular, 
he had been willing to overcome his strange disrespect for 
the man who had studied most closely the facts especially 
relevant to this difficulty - namely Reid. Take,fp' the 
examples Reid's remarks - made in connection with his doc -. 
trine of the relation of the judgment of perception to the 
simple apprehension - on the distinction between the usage 
and meaning of on the one hand "whiteness" and on the other 
hand "The whiteness of ". The relevant fact here is trriat 
the distinction Reid draws here between "whiteness" as ex- 
pressing the common attribute and "the whiteness of" as 
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exoressin, the individual quality would seers to he nothing 
but a more precise formulation of the very distinction 
that formed Ferrier's starting -point - the Hamiltonian. 
distinction of a. character or quality, considered in its 
particularity, and the sO M ch,_racter or quality, considered 
in its universality. But, if so, tchen it would be possible 
to restate Ferrier's main point that knowledge of the 
universal and tcno,.'ïe , 2;e of the particular are distinct 
taut inseparable, in trie kind of form suggested by Reid, 
namely, in the form that the understanding of the state- 
ment 'I see the ball to be white' is distinguishable from. 
but inseparable for the understanding of the statement 'I 
look absorbedly at the whiteness of the ball. $ But when 
the thing is put thus, it begins to be ea ser to unaerstand 
now we manage, in the first place, to distinguish between 
these inseparable a .so cts,the universal ana the particular. 
The point is, it would seem, that, when the various items 
involved are made xpot explicit in some such wa; as this, 
we are in a position to compare the one half of this in- 
separable whole with the other, and make what Hume calls 
'a distinction of reason'. However, this sort of elucid- 
ation woiÀld have availed Ferrier very little against critics 
of another type. The traditi'na.l distinctions of meta- 
physics, they w uid admit, rest doubtless on the distinct es 
of ordinary language in very much the way Reid said they did, 
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but tnett distinctions of ordinary language, they would 
go on, a:L e unemselves arbitrary, and misleading; for 
example, there is really no difference whatever between 
'whiteness' and 'the whiteness of' since both expressions 
must ultimately be explicable by reference to a. simple un- 
analysable ultivatt expression such as 'white here now. 
But in order to deal with and assess this kind of criticism 
it would most likely be necessary still to produce more 
'facts' - but in tliis case, facts ofAkina that _Pretend to 
go behind, a:nd thr oe li _ht on the meaning ordinary la.ng- 
uage; fact, for example like those Reid tries to cäll atten- 
tion to when he claims the t judgments with vague notions 
Drecee clear Hume 
tries to c-11 attention to in what he says of the white 
globe of marble, or those which are dealt with by Hamilton 
and Brown, when they discuss wholes and parts. 
Tod justice to Ferrier, it ought to be pointed out that 
on the side of the topic most interesting to him, i.e. on 
the, so to speak, unhackneyed side, he was very seriously 
c incerned inc7_ded to deal with the difficulties involved in 
this notion of universals, and particulars as distinguish- 
able but inseparable. The basic question, he says, is this: 
"Is the analysis of knowledge a division into elements, 
(G particular element and a universal element), or is it a 
division into kinds (a particular kind and a universal kind) ? 
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When the chet.ist (to illustrate. this matter) analyses cer- 
tain substances - salts, or example, - into elements, finds 
a cam:Ion base on the one hand, and certain sPecific dif- 
ferences on the other, we should fall into a serious 
error, were we to suppose that each of the elements was a 
kind of salt; just as we should fall into an equal error, 
if, on his dividing salts into classes or kinds, we were to 
suppose each of these classes was a mere element of salt." 
(Institutes Pp.1 71,172). But here Ferrier has to cope with 
the objection that there is really no analogy between the 
elements combining to form a.sa.lt, and the elements related 
as distinguishable but inseparable, since the former sort 
of elements are not merely not salts, but are something 
on their own account xxximmx± outside the salt, whereas 
the latter sort of elements, while doubtless not being form:; 
or kinds of cognition, apparently have no existence bn their 
own account outside the compound entity comprising them. 
This sort of objection, Ferrier retorts, is without found- 
ation, or, in other words, the analog in question can be 
shown to hold in a fairly legitimate way. HTake away from 
the system of things by which we surroanded the essential 
element that enables us, and all intelligence, to know and 
ap?rehend it, and it must lapse into utter and unutterable 
absurdity. It becomes - nót nothing - remember that - not 
nothing, for nothing, just as much as thing, rec+uires the 
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presence of the element we have supposed to be withdrawn 
(i.e. the universal element); but it becomes more than 
nothing, yet less than anything: what the logicians term 
"an excluded middle ". (Institutes P. 279). 
To conclude this part of our discourse, we had better 
go back to a point mentioned earlier, namely that Perrier 
himself subscribed only with certain reservations to the 
theory we hive been treating; as his. Our business now is 
to indicate in a rough way' just what these reservations 
were, and, to do this, we must first go back to Hamilton. 
"In the explanation of the process of generalisation," says 
Hamilton (Lectures Vol.2 P.295) "all philosophers are at one; 
the only differences that arise among them relate to the 
co c.)1 
point - whether we can form an adequate4of that which is 
denoted by an abstract general term." Now Hamilton's point 
here in the .very same as that which we have represented 
as Terrier's point, viz:- that all philosophers accept the 
distinction between a kind of knowledge concerned with the 
particular, and another kíngl of knowledge, having as its 
object the universal, that all philosophers make the kind of 
knowledge concerned with the prrticular the initial kind.of 
knowledge, and that the great debate between them is whether 
the subsequent and separate knowledge of the universal is 
4rs.. 
toAinterprrtoa, realistically, conceptualistically, or 
nominali sti cally. Now Fert.ier doubtless took over this 
doctrine from his friend, but, in the statement he gives of 
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it, he differs from Hamilton sharply on one historical 
point:- whereas H ..î ilton says that all previous philosophers 
accepted this division of kno ledge into kinds, Ferrier 
never tires of saying ti r t Plato, the inaugurator of the 
;problem, is en exception tás this rule, that Plato vittually 
divides knowledge into elements, not kinds, that, in a. word, 
Plato was not a realist in the sense he is usually supposed 
to be. 
Now these notions of Ferrier about Plato are of con- 
siderable interest and even historical importance on their 
own account. He never tees us, indeed, what exact grounds 
he has for this opinion, but, we know that he was a diligent 
student of the Theaet /etas, and dialogues of that kind, and 
accordingly his point very likely amounts to this : that 
Plato's maturést views on knowledge are to be sound in the 
Theactretus group of dialogues. In a case, he was very 
well aware of' having novel views to propound about. Plato, 
and always is coming back to the theme that the interpretat- 
ions of Plato's theory of ideas current in his time Pre un- 
ximix satisfactory and vague, and make Plato look ridiculous. 
out 
In order to bring ±tm the novelty and the importance 
of Ferrier's notions about Plato, it is necessary to remember 
that in 1854 the Theact)tetus group of dimgra dialogues was 
not regarded as late; and that the work of Lewis Campbell 
on the chronology of the dia.lo-ues was not published till 
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some twenty -five arr more years later. Indeed it is worth 
noting that Campbell, on coming a.s Professor to St. And- 
rews as a young man, tellu us of having some conversations 
with Ferrier on Greek philosophy in the few months in 
1863 -64 that intervened between his first arrival and Per- 
rier's death, and that, therefore, perhaps Perrier had 
something to do with the direction of Campbell's researches. 
Now Ferrier quite clearly regarded his rediscovery, 
or what he took to be a rediscovery of Plato's main point 
as being of immense importance for the problem of univer- 
sals as then conceived. Accordingly, both in the Institutes 
and in Vol.1 of the Remains what he professes to be doing 
is to expound an approach to the problem of universals, 
which is not perhaps exactly Plato's approach, but is 
implicit in the Dialogues, and is, in that sense, genuinely 
Platonic. Volume 1 of the Remains, is,indeed,Anothing sur- 
prising in its being preoccupied with Plato exclusively, 
where the question of universals is concerned. But the 
Institutes, which is a: systematic exposition of a system of 
philosophy, is nothing different, in this respect, from 
Volume i; there, too, Plato is the central theme of the 
fifty pages on universals, and there is no mention by name 
of any other philosop?er except the passing uncomplimentary 
reference to Brown. Apparently Ferrier's point is that 
there is much more to be learned on that subject from Plato 
)1, 1:4) iv &* <ol krs 4orl 04. h1,1(oso 01% Ì ti" o'. . S. t F! \g "surhrt$ t1 
U-. m.. f.. e. tA.rliv1 4 ate - 
-342- 
- at least the Plato of the Theaet/etus - than from Brown, 
the that no fu ±ther advance on this topic can be made ex- 
cept by going back to Plato, assimilating his insights, 
and then considering jam in what way the Platonic theory 
is still defective. 
Here we must leave the tonic of iniversals. 'Ve have 
no time to explain in what way Ferrier proposed to emend 
the "Platonic" theory, or wherehe found it defective, 'büt, 
if anyone is curious about these matters, the requisite 
information can be obtainéd in the observations on Pro- 
position Seven of the Institutes, where the whole thing 
is explained with Ferrier's "incomparable lucidity ". Ac- 
cordingly there is no need for us to say anything more on 
the subject, except to point out that the line taken by 
Ferrier is his criticism of Plato coincides pretty nearly 
with the line taken by Hamilton in his most telling crit- 
icism of Brown, in a, passage which, unfortunately, we had 
to omit from our discussion entirely, but which is to be 
found towards the foot of P.311 of Hamilton's Lectures 
Vol.2 - Not that we mean thereby to imply any criticism 
of Ferrier's original suggestion about the meaning of 
Plato, or of his advocacy of an approach to philosophy that 
was not so exclusively centred on Locke, and Locke's fol- 
lower s in France and Scotland, Condillac, Hume, Reid, 
`sauTta..o op 
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In dealing with the problem of the external world, 
Brown, Hamilton and Ferrier each bear :characters very 
different from those they bore in dealing with the -prob- 
lem of universals. Brawn, who on the other subject, up- 
held the orthodox common sense distinctions, is here the 
most venturesome of reductionists; Hamilton, who hitherto 
has 4.1.4 4,19 shown himself to be somewhat unsympathetic, and 
even superficial, manages) at more than one turn of the 
ensuing discussion ,to strike s note of genial surprising 
originality; and as for Ferrier, we are going to see him 
in the course of this chapter behave in a fashion which 
beliel5ç.; his claim to be the root and branch opponent of 
Reid and his mthods, and reveals instead a sort of pro- 
found latent affinity between himself and Reid, beneath 
the difference. Horeover, the inter- relations of the 
three thinkers are correspondingly different, and whereas 
on the problem of universals' Ferrier was much closer to 
Brown, than to Hamilton, on the present problem, Ferrier 
and Hamilton stand united against Broim. 
Two question,., we shall find, are at stake on the 
present theme. One of them is an argument about what is 
given, about the exact nature of sense -data; the other is 
an argument about what is beyond the given, about the exact 
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nature of transcendence. For clarity's sake we will 
try to keep both questions pretty separate, and we will 
begin with the for:aer. 
Almost from the outset of Brown's discussion of per, 
caption, he calls in question the assumption baxic to 
Reid's whole rather easy -going approach to the question of 
externality - the assumption, namely, that tangible mag- 
nitude and shape are identical with real magnitude and 
shape, or in other words that we have an original,tactual 
perception of real shape and magnitude. "-Then a body 
which we do not see, is pressed on any part of our tactual 
organ, do we ini ediately discover its form - as immediately 
as we are sensible c' sound, when a cannon is fired beside 
,us? This we certainly should do, if figure were as direct 
an object of the sense of touch au sound is of the sense of 
hearing." To settle the question, "let irregular figure, - 
of any shape, and of the same temperature with the hand, (to 
render the experiment as simple as possible), be pressed 
on the palm of any one whose eyes have been previously 
closed; and let him be required, in these circumstances, 
to state its magnitude and figure. It will be found, that 
he will form a very obscure and inaccurate guess as to its 
magnitude; and that hd will very sëldom, or, I may say, 
never, be exactly right as to its magnitude." (Brawn, 
hecture 22, and the corresponding passage in the Sketch of 
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a System) . 
Of course to complete the criticism of Reid's thesis 
that touch is, so to speak, illusion -free, it would be 
necessary to produce a case of a genuine illusion of touch. 
But this is just what Brown proceeds to do. "Let any one 
try an experiment with any surface that is familiar to 
him, - the desk, for example, at whic1 he is in the habit 
of sitting, or the book which he may have been reading. 
If he shut his eyes, and move his fi'rger from one end of the 
desk to the other, or from one end of the volume to the 
other, he will find, in spite of all his previous exact 
knowledge of the xxx form which he presses, his notion of 
the length of the surface to vary exactly with the time. 
I maps venture, with perfect confidence, to assert, that, 
when he moves his finger with great slowness, he will 
believe that he is on the point of touching the extremity 
of the surfa.ct before half the necessary motions have been 
performed. Tie previous knowledge will be as little cap- 
able of correcting the illusion, while the slow motion is 
continued, as the previous knowledge of the exact distance 
of thy object in a familiar scene can prevent us from 
regarding the object as nearer, or farther, when we look 
alternately through the different ends of a telescope." 
(S :etch 1820. Pp.96,97). 
Now, in the liTht of new facts like this, Stewart's 
rejection of De Tracy's'reductionismt or Reid's rejection 
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of Hume's seemed to Brown to be no longer particul rly 
plausible, and he ?roceeds to re -open the old question, 
bile at the same time, beine careful to note, by: way of 
preface, that the point he has just made about tactual 
experience is an important contribution on its own account, 
and will still stand even if his speculation about the 
"muscular strain" hypothesis prove inacceptible. "The 
proof that our perception of extension by touch is not an 
original and immediate perception of that sense, is al- 
together independent of the success of any endeavour which 
may be made to discover the elements of that compound 
perception." 
Here we had better inquire as to why this novel fact 
about tactual illusion made the reductionist thesis a live 
issue within the common sense school, i.e. for a philosopher 
like Brown who, in his way, and, up to a point, seems to 
have genuinely wanted to follow Reid in the matter of res- 
pect for common sense, and of, so to speak, anti- reduct- 
ionism on principle. In order to get some light on the 
subject, let us contrast Stewart's views about it-with 
Brown's. On the one hand, so far as Stewart was concerned, 
whereas our feelings o,f non- apa.tia.l muscular strain are 
no doubt exactly correlated with our perception of tangible 
shape and magnitude, these latter, or rather our repeats 
about these latter coincide erïtirely with our common sense 
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beliefs about the shape and size of thin,' s in question, 
and, on the other hand, so far as Brown is concerned, 
wiereas the said strains are no doubt correlated with 
intretNir tactual perception in question, our reports about 
the latter by no means coincide with the corresponding 
com :r.on. sense beliefs about the things in q.stion. This 
being so, it would seem that while, frot Stewart, our 
tactual perception and commonsense beliefs are virtually 
one, and accordingly any proposal to treat tactual perceptions 
as uneces'sary entities is tantamount to a proposal to 
reject common sense, for Brown, by contrast, our tactual 
perceptions do not doincide with our common sense beliefs, 
and'therefore any proposal to apply dccam's razor to the 
former, will not necessarily affect the latter. Accordingly, 
for some such °rt an as this one, - he doesn't say precisely 
what - Brown feels it possible both to be a sort of common 
sense philosopher, and at the same time to make a daring 
essay in reductionism. 
Brown does not sperla long in explaining the details 
of his reductionist scheme, and neither will we. The 
hand, he *w X tells us, is the gréa.t organ of measurement, 
and he carefully directs our attentióñ to the sort of 
experience, we would have of our hand, and of our finger's 
movement, if we had never actually looked at our hafd, or 
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explored its contours with another limb. - i.e. to the 
sort of original experience a baby will have of its hand, 
in the process of opening it out and then clenching its 
fist. "In the early half- instinctive contractions of the 
fingers" he points out "sometimes more, sometimes fewer, 
of these are brought down upon the palm; and though the 
complex feeling, ;;,rhich arises from the simultaneous cor- 
traction of the whole fingers, would be relatively to the 
sentient mind like one simple feeling, if the contractions 
of the whold were uniform, it ceases to be regarded ss 
simple, when fren!uent r_ ept..i_ti ns of the partial contractions 
have shown the elements of which the complex whole was 
composed." (P.103, Sketch) . But now, as the result of 
making this analysis, what information will the infant 
met, purely,. in terms of muscular strains, about the clen- 
ching of its outstretched fingers of a: hand - leaving for 
simplicity's sake the thumb altogether out of account? 
According to Brown, it will already be able to distinguish 
the simultaneous occurrence of fur successions of muscular 
strains, each of them parallel to the other, in the sense 
of having four outstanding successive internal twit es 
corresponding to the selquence formed by the bending at 
the knuckles, then the bending at the middle joint, next 
the berìain<g at the upper joint, and lastly the c ̂  \act of 
fingers with palm. But no, the infant, granted it can 
distinguish all this, ham already a serviceable criterion 
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for differen.cesof spnt.i_el extension, at least in two dim- 
ensions; for example, when it closes its 'ist on different 
material objects, it will be able to compare them f s dif- 
fering in óne way - say in respect of the ..act t one in- 
volves only three finger's breadths, the other four 
finger's breadths, and as clifferttg in another way - in 
respect of the fact that one of the objects - say a pencil 
- permits all three joint-bending sensations, and prevents 
only the last item, .tae sensation of contact, whereas an- 
other object - say a match box - R±±± allows of only the 
experience o,f the first two b nds. In short, the infant 
has experience of only -pure temporal, non- spatial strains, 
and yet is able to recognize differences in size, at least 
in two dimensions. In principle, thew:, the reduction, 
Brown thinks, is effected; for example, it would not be 
sufficient to work out a theory as to how the infant could 
tell the difference between a curved body, and a rectilinear 
body, and, as for the third dimension, it was considered 
quite proper for speculate IsD in this ± field to leave it 
to one side as constituting a specially difficult problem. 
Broom is perfectly frank as to the basic principle 
behind this speculation. "I am inclined to reverse exactly 
the process comp only sup,?osed; end instead of deriving the 
measure of time from extension, to derive the knowledge and 
original measure of extension from time." The Aimidosimmx 
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4, 
decisive fact here, according to him, is that the notion 
of time, i.e. of feelings past and present, precedes the 
notion of external things in the infant mind, and involves 
the notions of length and divisibility" in, Brown stren- 
uously maintains, a. Quite literal sense. (Lecture 23). That 
is to say, the principle of the reducibility of space to 
time is based, according to Brown, on the i ea that we 
can distinguish and count, on the one hand, the numbers 
of coexistent but separable chains of muscular strain, and, 
on the other hand, the numbers of individual strains to 
each chain. 
'What now remains for us on this subject is to explain 
more exactly in what sense Brown permits the existence side 
by side with these sensations, the perception of an ex- 
ternal world. "Though the notioh of extension may arise 
in the manner I have supposed, this, it may be said, is 
not the notion of external existence. To what, then, are 
we to ascribe the belief of external reality, which now 
accompanies our sensations of touch? It ap --ears to me to 
depend on the feeling of resistance - a musclar feeling 
- brea._,in without any known cause of difference, on ah 
accustomed series (of these sensations) and combining with 
the notion of extension, and consequently of divisibility 
previously acquired. Extension and resistance; - to com- 
bine these simple notions in something which is not xxx 
ourselves, and to have the notion of matter, are precisely 
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the same thing."- °Lecture 24). 
Now we can appraa.ch the main point Broom has in view 
here, only by understanding that, so far as reason r-oes, 
awareness of independent reality; of the kind spoken of 
here, is nothing but awareness of one of our customary 
chains of muscular sensatións as stopping short of its 
full unrolling as the result of the operation of some 
cause, not consisting of ourselves and our desires, but 
otherwise unknown, and unknowable. But n-ow, this being 
so, the cuestion arises as to whether it is worth preserving 
the belief in externality at all, when it is reduced to 
Hit this attenuated form. Faced_ withquesion, Brown would ap- 
parently agree that, from the standpoint of mere reason, 
this sort of objection is cuite cogent, but would go on to 
argue that, in the last anUysis, the deciding factor here 
is not reason, but instinct, and that the same instinct 
.:hich forces the unknowable objects with all th-- character- 
istics of material realities, -- "To this scepticism, 
as to a world of masses that have qualities corresponding 
with our perceptions, there is no evidence of mere reasoning 
that can be opposed, except that which is founded on our 
actual impossibility of disbelieving the existence of such 
asses." (Sketch - P.116) 
Turning now to the subj ect of vision, we find Brot,Tn 
6i/if on S CAASC, 41,\veSILS 
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taking for granted the doctrine common to Reid and 
Stewart that we are aware of colours as being, in the first 
instance, unextended, and going on to consider the ques- 
tion that, troubled Stewart so much as to how it is, if 
colours are in themselves unextended, that we can't help 
seeing them as spread out over visible figure, and can't 
conceive them apart from visible figure. Put now, Brown 
suggests a short and ingenious way of disposing of this 
whole problem. Taking his case, perhaps, from a naive 
remark of Reid that, prior to Berkeley, no -one had so much 
as suspected the existence of two - dimensional shapes pec- 
uliar to sight, Brown proceeds to denounce the whole notion 
of visible figure as a fashionable crochet of metaphysicians, 
and the whole problem it creates as a bogus problem. Sight, 
Brown goes on to maintain, is an entirely nuchmx±nAmk subord- 
inate sense, exactly on a level with hearing, taste and 
smell, and just as the only objects the plain A regards as 
noisy are, the solid material shapes encountered in touch- 
experience, so too, he points out, the only objects the 
plain man regards as coloured are, in precisely analogous 
fashion, these same solid material shapes encountered in 
tactual experience. There is, he goes on, no more reason 
to suppose the existence of so- called visible figure than 
there would be to suppose the existence of audible figure. 
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thesis that we are originally aware by sight of these so- 
called visible figures, and only by a slow process come to 
associate the visible figure with t e corresponding real 
or tangible figure, a series of observations developed at 
length by Adern Smith in his Essay on the External Senses, 
to the effect that new -born animals do not seem to have 
to _o through this long process of-associating visible 
figures with real figure, but get notionsby sight of real 
Îk:Á figure and distance as soon as they open their 
eyes. But this being so, Brown argues, "there is no physic- 
al impossibility in the suppotition that a similar original 
suggestion may take place in man." Of course, a hypothesis 
of this kind is a. matter, he goes on, for observation and 
M 
experiment, and its relevance to the present topic consists 
solely in i..he fact that it shows how animals in fact do, 
and men might, get on cuite well in a situation where there 
is no meaning in talk of visible figure, where vision 
somehow suggests real figure or distance immediately. (This 
argument is found at the end of Lecture 28; the other 
arguments are contained in Lecture 29). 
In addition to these sophisticated arguments, Brown 
has another argument of e. solider type, end in order to 
understand ik` x fts force, we must first explain. we 
take to be its presuppositions. Rou Mly tprzking speaking, 
it may be said that Brown is here taking for granted one of 
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the main )oints mace in Reid's discussion of the view 
(found, for example, in Adam Smith) of the object of 
vision as identicl with the material impression on the 
retina. That is to say, he agrees with Reid that the ex- 
perience informing us of the existence of the object of 
vision is quite xepa.ra.te from, and previous to, the ex- 
perience informing us of the existence of the dye, and the 
material impression thereon, and that therefore there is 
no necessary connection between the former entity and the 
latter. This being so, the undeniable fact of the extended- 
ness of the material impression on the eye, Brown probably 
went on, cannot afford the least presumption that the ob- 
ject of vision corresponding; thereto is also extended and 
figured. 
Such presumably is Brown's silent preamble and if he 
does not maké, the point explicitly, the 'reason is that he 
has Ix= already made the same point at great length in 
regard to the fact of touch, and that, in the present 
context, (Sketch of a' system 13.155 : and the parallel 
'passage in the lectures) he is content to mention and re- 
fer us back to -:hat he said about the matter, while dealing 
with touch. For ,example, "we, the observers, know that in 
touch)an object of a certain form is pressing on an organ 
of a certain 'form," but it does not follow "that the infant 
must also have this knowledge." "The infant does not 
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know that he has any organs, but he is susceptible of many 
feelings which may arise successively and be remembered 
as past." (S' etch of a system) P.93). 
Brown's argument, then, sup -.Doses this sharp distinction 
between the material impression on the organ of sense, on 
the one hand, and the object of sense on the other. Ike 
then proceeds to rest his conclusion on an analogy. It 
is granted that in smell and hearing the extendedness of the 
material impres ion does nö.t involve any extendedness, in 
the corresponding object of sense; why, then, granted the 
principle of uniformity expect the object of vision to pos- 
sess extendedness in tire, way the material impression on the 
eye does? Now there is nothing; difficult here, but as 
Brown's ,point is important for subsequent discussion, we 
hhd better underline it, by repeating it in his own Tw:rords. 
/1f this supposition of the necessary perception óf form, 
in conseruence of the mere extension of the number of co- 
incident rays of light at the retina, were truly of any 
force, it must be of equal force wherever there is a similar 
extension of particles of any kind that are capable of in- 
ducing sensation, in cont /act with the nervous expanse which 
they affect. There should, therefore, in conformity with 
this supposed xmÌ result be a gustual figure and an odor- 
ous figure as much as a visible figurel_ for, though we can-- 
not show the fragrant or sapid corpusles, that are s,t any 
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moment acting on the nerves of any one of these senses, 
we are not the less sure that these particles, to a 
certain limited extent, in contact with the organ, are 
truly affecting a. certain nervous expanse. But 
though a figured surface (of the organ) is affected in 
thdse cases, it does not follow, nor has it ever been 
. asserted, that in smell, taste, or hearing, we have a 
perception of fragrant or sweet or melodious figure; and 
as li tle are we entitled, from the mere fact of lbhe 
affection of a. *ilf definite portion of the nervous sur- 
face, in contact with a definite number of corpuscles - 
which is common to sight with all the other senses - to af- 
firm'that, where there is no conscious perception of any 
smell visible figure corresponding with the extent of the - 
rays of light at the retina, (he means by 'no conscious 
perception' the plain man's unawareness of visible figure), 
there must yet have been, at every moment of our vision, 
that very perception of which we have no present conscious- 
ness and no rememberance." (Pp.156 -158 - Sketch). 
Here we must pass from Brown to Hamilton, and in our 
preliminary statement of the latter's position, we will 
note carefully the extent of his agreements and disagree- 
ments with Brown, but leave aside till later the crucial 
a r5umentation in defence of these disagreements. Now the 
fact of most importance here is that Hamilton at no time 
-359-. 
accepted. Brown's paradaees about vision. In the Lectures, 
for example, after a careful restatement of the last 
argument of Brown's considered above, the "physiological" 
argument about vision, Hamilton, abruptly and without at- 
tempting to answer the point at issue, proceeds to expound 
the following position. "Now in all their elaborate 
argumentation on this subject, these philosophers seem never 
yet to have seen the real difficulty of their doctrine. It 
can easily be shown that the perception of- colour involves 
the perception of extension. It is admitted that we have, 
by sight, a perception of colours, consequently a perception 
of the difference of colours. But a perception of the dis- 
tinction of colours necessarily involves the perception 
of a discriminating line? and therefore of extension. 
-(Lectures Vo 1. 2 P.165). Brown, that i s to say, admits that 
we are aware of the co- existence of different colours, but 
awareness of such co- existence, Hamilton flatly asserts, 
involves awareness of extension. 
However, at the time of writing the lectures (1837), 
Hamilton seems to have coincided with Brown in regard to 
the facts of touch as much as he differed from him as re- 
gards the facts of vision. He cites the same sort of point 
as Brown about tactual .errors. "A blind- folded person will 
make the most curious mistakes in regard to the figure of 
objects presented to him, if these are of any considerable 
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circumference" (Lectures Vol. P.176). Moreover, the 
interp°retet1° óf these facts he favours is quite similar 
to that favoured.by Brown. To persons whose sole source 
of informa.tiòn about extension and shape is the sense of 
. touch, "in fact, to those born blind, time serves instead 
of ix space. Vicinity and distance mean in their 
mouths nothing more than the longer or shorter time, the 
greater or smaller number of feelings, which they find neces- 
sary to attain from some one feeling tb so:e other." 
(loc. cit. P.174; Hamilton is quoting with ap-.?roval from 
a German source) . 
When we come to the Reid, published in 1846, and cont- 
aining his maturer doctrines on the subjects discussed, we 
find that Hamilton has brought his doctrine about touch 
inbb line with his doctrine about vision. He admits, in- 
deed more emphatically than ever, the fact of tactual il- 
lusion, but he now accounts for it by allowing that the 
óbj ect of touch is tangible fibre, i.e. figure which is 
"unreal" in the same way as visible figure is unreal. Por 
instance, take this foot -note to Reid. "If tore be external 
objects" Reid is saying, "which have a real extension and 
figure, it must be either tangible extension and figure, 
or visible, or both." But on this assertion of Reid's 
Hamilton co=ents thus : 'Or neither. And this omitted 
xaf supposition is the true. Por neither sight ror touch 
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give us full and accurate information in regard to the 
real extension and figure of objects.' (Reid Vol.1 P.326). 
iamlto 
Indeed n is constantly referring to the fact that 
'the magnitude perceived by touch is as purely relative as 
the magnitude perceived by vision; for the same magnitude 
does not appear the same to touch at one part of the body 
and to touch at another" (Reid Vol.2 P.885). 
This change of view of Hamilton's about touch is not 
however a drastic one. He continues to regard Brown as 
being on one essential _point right as against Reid : "the 
views touching the functions of the will, and of the muscular 
sense, constitute, in this relation certainly, not the 
least valuable part of Dr. Brown's psychology." (Reid 
Vol.2 P.868). That is to say,Hamilton still refuses to ac- 
cept in an unqualified way Reid's view that extension and 
figure are perceived through the sensations of touch, and 
insists instead that 'to allow this statement to pass, it 
would be necessary to suppose that under touch it is meant 
to comprehend the consciousness of locomotivd energy, and 
of the muscular feelings." (Vol.2 P.885). Nor is there 
any doubt as to the meaning of this modification of Reid 
Hamilton's point, to all appearance, is, that the experience 
of a body as a solid tangible shape is nothing but the ex- 
perience of the movement of a limb, and the arrest of that 
movement, and that our awareness of this movement and its 
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arrest is awareness of mere muscular strains as beinrn 
space -related as well as time -r_elE ted. Accordingly, 
Hamilton does not dispute Brown's ,point that awareness of 
tangible figure is nothing but awareness of co- existing 
series of muscular strains, but simply insists that this 
awareness of co- existence is not merely awareness of sim- 
ultaneity, but also awareness of space- relatedness, or 
mutual externality. 
"In the deduction of superficial extension, Brown is 
equally illogical; for here, too, his process of evolution 
only in the end openly extracts what in the commencement ib 
had secretly thrown in. The elements, out of which he 
constructs. the notion of extension in the second dimension, 
he finds in. the consciousness we have of several contempor- 
aneous series of muscular feelings, or lengths, standing 
in relat _on to one another as ,proximate, distant, intermediate 
etc. -- Proximate: 'In what? In time? No; for the series 
are supposed to be co- existent; and were it otherwise, the 
process would be unavailing, for proximity in time does not 
afford proximity in space. In space, then? Necessarily." 
(Reid Vo 1. 2 P.869). 
Having now stated Hamilton's counter- position, we must 
now indicate the point at issue. Hamilton's claim is 
as we have seen, that just as awareness of the .co- existence 
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of colour-sensations involves awareness of /1 oundsry line and 
so of outline, so awareness of the co- existence of cer- 
tain kinds of sensations of strain - those in the touching 
hand - involves , in some analogous way, awareness of 
outline and. of space. But now the difficulty here is that 
awareness of co- existing sensations does not always involve 
awareness of outline or space - for example, awareness of 
sounds does not, nor does awareness of sensations of strain 
when I move a limb freely. That is tolsay, the difficulty 
springs from Brown's insistence on the necessity of res- 
pecting uniformities, and the principles of analogy. If 
awareness of co- existent sensationsK sometimes does not 
involve awareness of outline or space, why =art should 
it ever do so? In any case, Brown maintains, there is no 
need to nostula.te awareness of outline or space; it can be 
"logically constructed" according to the principle ex- 
plained. But now Hamilton does not, in fact) dispute the 
.possibility on principle of such a logical construction. 
How then does he propose to vindicate his assertions about. 
space -perception? 
Hamilton's discussion of this topic is perhaps his 
most notable achievement in philosophy, and in order to 
comprehend his starting-point, we had better recall the 
dóctrine of Stewart's that varieties in our. Perception of 
colour are the means to our perception of visible figure. 
bir po t (tom o P 8C I of. 
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At any rate, this doctrine of Stewart's is one which Ham- 
ilton very much admires - he goes to considerable trouble 
to prove Stewart's claim to be the first of the mractierlIS 
to announce it (Stewart, Works Vol.5 pp.ix and x) - and 
Hutcheson Stirling is probably nuite right in seeing it it 
the key to the meaning of the Hamiltonian theory of sensation. 
Hamilton, then, seems to have argued in this way. 
Stewart, he commenced, states tt to be a fact that while 
the perception of co- existing; wolour- sensations is attended 
d.evhe,rcahuh 
by the perception of a line of demaration, and so by the 
pmiR perception of space, the perception of mo -exis- 
ting sounds is not accompanied by the perceAmnn of outline, 
and therfore not by the perception of space. low the 
second item in Stewart's doctrine, Hamilton sew, roes back 
to Hume and Reid, at any rate, and is based on the fact 
that it is neither sense nor common sense to speak of- 
sounds as having shapes, and on the inference drawn there- 
fore that because sounds are shapeless, they must also be 
shaceless. But this latter inference, Hamilton seems to. 
have thought, involves a very dubious step indeed; on the: 
one hand, its conclusion - that sounds are nowhere - is 
almost as much at variance with common sense as its premise 
- that sounds do not have shape - is in accordance with 
common -sense, and, on the other hand, the presuppositions 
sustaining the inference are the -presuppositions behind 
Hume's theory of simples, the presuppositions about the 
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cle ̂ .r- cutness of primitive notions and data.ut now 
Hamilton, as we saw in the last chapter, considered it both 
legitimate and necessary to allow our notions of data to 
be vague and indefinite, end., accordingly,7in site of 
their having no definite whereabouts, are nevertheless 
not nowhere in respect of one another. 
Í 
In the upshot therefore, he proposed. to restate Stew - 
art's fact in the form awareness of co- existing colours 
is accompanied by awareness of their definite place -rel- 
ations, whereas awareness of co- existing sounds is accompanied 
by awareness of their indefinite place-relations. In this 
way, he thought to get rid of flume's paradox tbout most 
things that exist existing nowhere, and, at the. same time, 
to defend our ordinary view of objects like sounds as being 
somewhere. 
Any doubts as to the approximate accuracy of our inter- 
pretations will, we believe, be removed by reeding, the 
sequel to the P.861 passage - a .sequel which extends to 
P.864. In that passage, Hamilton is a.ttempting to explain 
this thesis of his that awareness of the co- existence of 
sensations is attended, in the case of some of the senses, 
by awareness of definite space -relations, a.nd in the case of 
others by awareness of indefinite or less definite sece- 
relations. He indicates roughly which senses fall into 
which class, end apparently regards touch as falling into a 
Nccorat.i'+nq(), woad- ftiá c hihJc 
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class by itself. But here let us have the c'uota.tion, pre - 
mising that by 'perception' Na,,ilton means here awareness 
of primary dualities i.e. of the shape of things, of their 
size, of their location, of their movement. "If we take a 
survey of the senses, we shall find, that exactly in pro - 
;ortion as each affords an idiopathic sensation more or less 
capable of being; carried to an extreme either of pleasure 
or pain, does it afford, but in inverse ratio, the con- 
dition of an objective perception More or less distinct." 
- -- "In this sense (of Sight), perception - the objective 
element - is here at its minimum. Hearing is much less 
extensive in its sphere of knowledge or perception than 
sight, but in the same proportion is its capacity of feeling 
or densation more intensive" (Interpolated from parallel 
passage in Lectures Vol.2 P.100, as mofe illuminating for 
our purposes : we return to Previous passage here) "In 
Touch or Feeling, the same analogy holds good and within 
itself; for in this case, where the sense is diffused through- 
out the body, the subjective and the objective vary in 
their proportions at different parts. The parts most sub - 
juctively sensible, those chiefly susceptible of pain and 
Measure, furnish precisely the obtusest orlgans of touch; 
and the acutest organs of touch do not possess, if ever 
even that, more than an average amount of subjective sens- 
ibility." (P.863. - The passage is intended here by Hamilton 
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simply to illuminate his main point about the difference 
betkeen those various avenues of sense- perception so fir 
as it consists in the fact of their all perceiving space- 
relations, but perceiving them with various degrees of 
distinctness). 
By this time, we have set forth what we tae to be 
la.nzilton's most distinctive and important contribution on 
the present subject. However, in addition to making this 
point, he :hakes several other points also relevent to the 
problem, and in order to explain the significance of these 
letter, we will have, for the moment, to love him, and to 
institute an incuiry on our own account into the sort of 
premises which the Ha;r.i ltonian argument sketcheiakilmix 
above require. Now, to put the matter briefly, the problem 
here has to do with the "lawn which we, like Hutcheson 
Stirling, conceive to be Ha..ai lion' s starting ;p) int - the 
law that the perception of a variety of co- existin7 colours 
involve the p.erceDtion of outline, and that thr. ;perception 
of a single colour does not. But obviously we have two 
theses here - the one already explained as being generalised 
by Hamilton in the form that the awareness of co- existing 
sensations involves the awareness of space- relations, in 
some cases of the definite kind involving outline and in 
other cases of the indefinite kind.not iÌ involving out- 
line, and the other thesis of an indefinite kind not so fax 
explained to the effect that if we have a single sensation 
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at a time, we are altonether unaware of space; and it is 
this latter thesis, the unexplained one, that we must 
now consider : :ith a view to finding how much'meaning 
and value t'sere is in it. 
Here we will take xp the total thesis. as stated in re- 
ference to vision, and show that this latter, item in 
it would seem to have been transmitted from Hamilton's 
friend and mentor Stewart to Hamilton's friend and protege 
Fer rier, presumably through the intermediary of Hamilton, 
although perhaps without his agreement. _'irst let us hear 
Stewart. "Supposing for a moment the whole face of nature 
to exhibit only one uniform colour without the slightest 
variety even of light and shade. Is it not self- evident 
tlh.a.t, on this supposition, the organ of sight would be en- 
tirely useless, inasmuch r,s it is b. _ the varieties of 
colour alone that the outlines or visible figures of bodies 
are so defined as to be distinguishable from one another." 
iA,:r, we turn to Perrier, to e.n article he jublisl?.ed in 1842. 
What we have to note is how Hamiltonia.xz is Perrier's ter - 
minology on this subject; for exal?le, Ile speaks of sight 
as having an "original intuition of space or of the recip- 
rocal outness of its objects, - in other. words, of colours 
out of colours." (P.363, Volume 2 of the Lectures and 
Remains). But now let us have his restatement of Stewart's 
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thesis. "Let us ask, than, what do we mean when we say 
that a. colour is seen to be external? .Te mean that it is 
seen to be extenal to some other colour which is before 
us. Th &s, we say that white is external to black, be- 
cause we see it to be so. It is only when we can mokd a 
comparison between two or more colours that we can say 
that they are seen to be external - i.e. external to 
each other. But if there. were no colour but one before 
us, not being able to make any comparison, we should be 
unable by sight to form any judgment at all about its 
we 
outness, or to say . tha. ̂  s w it_ to be out of anything." 
(hectures and Remains P.327). 
Now here we can raise our Question as to what meaning, 
if any, can be attached to the part of the thesis regarding 
the alleged. experience of a single colour and occurring 
in one version in Stewart and another in Terrier. Here 
however, it is proper to observe, as we already observed 
in dealing with Stewart, that the part of the clause in 
question here very likely had a pretty precise meaning for 
Stewart, and certainly had a very precise meaning in the 
passage in Reid which Stewart has in view in formulating 
his law - i.e. the passage about "the glass of broken jelly" 
where certain patients of Cheselden are said to have been 
able to report with fair accuracy the colours of things 
shown to them, but not to have been able to report their 
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sizes, or sha.pe5. Accordingly, we will transform our ques- 
tion as to meaning of the one- colour experience into a 
question about the meaning of the kind of situation im- 
pliciti the account given by Cheselden. 
Now the question at issue here with respect to Chesel- 
den's account is not 1,f: ether. it is true or false, but 
whether it makes sense. But once the question is put in 
this way, the following observation =met becomes an 
obvious one. On the one haña, there seems nothing unreason- 
able in the supposition of there being an intelligent 
creature, fiNkKÉ gifted with sight, who lives surrounded 
by a fog or a fluid permeated successively by light first 
of one uniform hue, now of another - reddish, then yellowish, 
then greenish and so forth. On the other hand, it seems 
equally reasonable to suppose that, while such a creature 
would be able to talk and think a .bout. the likeness and un- 
likeness between colours, and Shados .of colour, and about 
the colours as varying in intensity, or "warm" or "cool," 
it wo,.ild surely be impossible for him to think of the 
colour as spread out or space -occupying because he would 
have no experience of the likenesses and difference of shapes, 
or even,(on the hypothesis followed of a. succession of unif- 
ormities in the visual field) of nearness or farness, how- 
ever vague, in the Matter of position. In short, there 
b seems to sense in Chelelden's point et least if understood 
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in this speculative way. 
Here let us sum up the position so far reached. In 
our opinion, Stewart and Perrier are very likely right 
in stating the fact or law in question in the form 
awareness of co- existent sensations involves awareness of 
space, and awareness of the single sensation, or rather 
of a succes ion thereof, in so far as it is possible, 
involves no awareness of space. At any rate, as we see 
the matter, the important thing here is not only that the 
second clause is not devoid of sense, but also and especially; 
that the first clause loses most of its point, if the 
second clause is annulled. 
Now Hamilton, appear, not 
at all. It would. damage his case against Brown (he'per- 
hops thought) even to admit the possibility of colour ex- 
perience that is not also experience of extension and 
space. Had not Reid's citation of the Cheselden report 
been, in a way, responsible for restarting the very trend 
of reductionism against which Reid himself had fought 
so long? Accordingly, Hamilton seemed to think it neces- 
sary to the conclusiveness of his case against Brown to 
hold not merely that awareness of co- existent sensations 
is impossible without awareness of space but even that 
awareness of one unifo'rim sensation is also ir_apossi' le 
without awareness of space. 
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"Reid" Hamilton says, "misinterprets Cheselden, in 
founding (5n the expressions of this report a proof of h.is 
own )aradox, that c lour ca-n possibly be an object of 
vision, apart from extension. The report, " he goes on, 
"contains a.bsolut.ely nothing to invalidate; and much tó 
support the ( counter -) doctrine that, though sensations 
of colour Iley be experienced through the x_edium of an 
imperfect cai.Arct utile the figures of the external objects 
are intercepted or broken down, yet that, in these sen- 
sations, colour, being diffused_ over the re-tine, ;lust ei - 
-ear to us extended, and of an extension limited by the 
boundaries of that sensitive men ibra.ne itself" (Reid Volume 1 
_'.145). Hamilton, then, is of the opinion that, in cases 
like this, one could describe oneself as seeing coloured 
extension devoid of shape, end the question arises es to 
whether he means, es lab well might in viewAf the doctrine 
reported earlier, that we are aware of vaguely differentiated 
coloured blurs as being vaguely distributed in space, or 
that we are aware of seeing a uniformly coloured extension. 
But now, apparently it is the latter end much more dubious 
line that Hamilton in fret intends here rather than the 
former, and cuite readily defensible line. "Tr.7e are cons - 
cious" he says "of the affection of colour either as one 
colour, or as e. :lura.lity of colours. On the former alter- 
native, one homogeneous colour occupies the whole field of 
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vision" (Reid Volume 2 P.919.). But nów to the question 
of 
whether we are not in this case .e4 aware the colour e.s un- 
extended, Hamilton Proceeds to reply as follows. "The 
apprehens -.on of parts exterior to parts is, in like ==.nnner, 
but even more obtrusively, involved in the latter case, 
where a homogeneous colour is supposed to occupy the whole 
field of vision. .^or tIlmx this field has a right and a 
left, an upper and an under side, and may be divided into 
halves, quarters etc. indefinitely. " (P.920). 
Now, in order to understand what Hamilton is doing 
here, we had better recall the case, discussed at length 
by Hume, of the experience of seeing nothing but the 
pitch- black night, of a uniform darkness. Apparently, 
then, Hamilton is making claims as to what we could immediate- 
ly apprehend in the situation directly counter to the 
claims made by Hume as to what we could immediately ap- 
prehend. 
However, the real difficulty for Hamilton here is not 
Hume, but the fact rather that his own assertions about 
space -apprehension in this part of his doctrine run counter 
to his own assertion about space- apprehension in the other 
part of his doctrine, given earlier on the same page. In 
this latter passage, he is making his main point about 
Brown's theory of vision, and his doctrine is this : "It 
is admitted that we have by sight a perception of colours, 
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consequently a. perception of the difference of colours. 
But a perception of the distinction of colours necessarily 
involves the perception of a discriminating line" (Lectures 
Vol.2 P.165 - but the same point is r epeated on the Page we 
have been dealing with P.919 Reid Vol.2). But obviously 
there is a marked discrepancy between Hamilton's approach 
to the matter in this passage, and in the one about one 
homogeneous colour. In both cases, indeed, -^e are said 
to end up witla an apprehension of space or the mutual 
exteriority of parts, but between the two cases there is this 
great difference that whereas in the case of the co- existence 
of colours we really do see the parts on their own account, 
independently of the spatial relation, in the case of the 
homogeneous colour (e. g. the pitch black), we don't really 
see an arts at all on their own account, and so don'ts 
so to soeak, have any plurality to consider as spatially 
related. 
As to Hamilton's reason for giving his initially acute 
and promising cloctiine this strange turn, the following 
extract is illuminEting. I-Ie is speaking about "the doc- 
trine of those -!philosophers who, as Condillac in his 
earlier writings, Stewart, Brown, Hill and J. Young hold, 
that extension and colour" can be, and are, given separately. 
He ends up his criticism of their position thus. "Though 
I reject this I do not reject it as 
it?? 
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destitute of truth. It is erroneous, I think; but every 
error is a truth bused; and the abuse in this case seems 
to be in the extreme recoil from the counter -error of the 
common opinion - that the ap?rehension through sight of 
colour, and the apprehension through sight of extension 
and figure are as inseparable, identical conitóns of id- 
entical objects. " (Reid Vol.2 P.860). Now, though Hamilton 
does not explain himself further, his description of. "the 
common opinion" seems ,to contain an echo of the language,. 
Hume uses in discussing the white globe. Apparently, 
theredore, Iis iilton's sù.ggestion that colour and extension 
are not quite identical,would seem to be inspired by his 
doctrine which we have already considered at great lenth 
about "the faculty of abstraction:" 
Let us conclude this Aaole d.isctssion by indicating 
tentatively, on our own account, what we take to be in- 
volved in the doctrine under review that awareness of the 
co- existence of colours, or sounds involves wwareness of 
thQrrbeing in some ways spatially related. Now, in 
order to make this doctrine clear, we have, it would seem, 
to indicate the limiting case (if we could call it that) 
mentioned by Perrier, that if we were aware of nothing but 
a single uniform colour or sound, or even a succession Of 
such sounds, and colours.- uniform in the sense of filling 
the auditory or visual field, though each differing for the 
other in quality, intensity etc., then we would not be aware 
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of spatial rel Lion. =ut now, in addition to this reser- 
vat_on, there is another equally important one, no men - 
toned. by Stewart or Ferrier, to the effect that if we were 
to be shown a varying plurality of colours in fixed 
soatial relations - if, for exaaple, our visual field were 
always to be divided into c uar sers, fixed and constant, 
but the four different colours occuppmng these quarters 
were to change from time to time, it is (or so, it would 
appear) very doubtful as to whether, in that case, we would 
get any notionsof shape at all or s )s.Ce. Granted, of 
course, this matter is a. difficult one and perhaps can't 
be disposed of in s. couple of sentences, but it does 
appear to be the case, Hume's point about the 
white globe is is sound, that in order to get a proper 
notion of outline, we would have to see the colours related 
by variety of boundaries - now straight, now curved. 
Here, however, we had better try to glimpse Hamilton's 
doctrine on this matter as a whole. But when we do this, 
it becomes reasonable to say that, while he probably got 
lost in details and went astray as to foundations, his 
main point against Brown and his reduction: still stand as 
quite a notable achievement. No doubt of course, people 
will debate endlessly about the merit 7)r demerit of t7:ds 
or that doctrine of this or that philosopher, but in con- 
firma' ion or rather exolana-'-ion of our h_irh opinion of 
Hamilton on this one point, li would. be as well to mention 
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that these doctrines of his about s a ce -a reh.ension, 
so far at any rate as they are a development of Stewart's 
original point, i. e. so far as they are sound and fruitful, 
would seem to constitute the part of Tsyiilton's teaching 
that Fernier must admired and took over. That is to sa-7, 
as 
so fariq erri er ever was Hamilton's di sci-plr, he was his 
disci ;le in these matters and followed his lead in the at- 
tack on Brown's clever, but, as it WFS generally felt, too 
clever reductionism. But if this is ED, does it not tend 
to establish the fact that, at least for the point of 
view of the present study, concerned as it is with a cer- 
tain tradition or movement, the doctrines and discussion in 
question here Hamilton's notable achievement? 
However to put our contentions about Ferrier here beyond 
reasonable doubt, let us cite the evidence regarding* his 
relation to Ilsìnilton on this point. Part ,_}f that evidence, 
we have of course already cited, - namely that he speaks in 
much the sale way as Hamilton about awareness of the "recip- 
rocal externality of colours," and it remains only to add 
that Ferrier puts this doctrine or way of talking to pre- 
cisely the same use as does Hamilton i. e.he uses it to 
expose certain confusions created by Brown's reductionism. 
(See especially : Lectures and Remains Vol. 2 Pp. 352 -354, 
thtourh the whole context has to be read if Ferrier's rooint 
is to be understood). Moreover, another point emerges in 
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the same passage that is c ccisite, not in an indirect 
way, but in a d i±ect way, of 0117 contention :out I +errier's 
relation to Hamilton on this topic. In dealing with the 
phy_iolo7ic:1 argument of Brown's in favour of his theory 
of vision, Terrier produces some counter- evidence in the 
form of a:. passage from "Filler's Physiology ", and acknov1d.ges 
thanks to ;:ir " Tilli.,n iIaailtonnc1inr;e1: in a. subsequent 
publication (Ferrier )uhlished in 1842, Hamilton in 1846) 
deals with the sa.. e sort of topic as Ferrier, the signific- 
ance of Treviranus' physiological discoveries for refuting 
Brown, (Reid Vol.2 P.862), and, contrary to .ghat usually 
happens, Ilamilton's discussion is subtler, in this case, 
and more critical than ï errier's. 
About the physiological side of all this we will be 
brief, lthough it is oerhoos, despite its incohateness, the 
most interesting thing in Hamilton. Apparently, this line 
of speculation had its immediate source in Brown, in , i12 
argument of his on vision to the effect that th, z is no more 
reason to expect the object of vision to be visible figure 
because the i._nresion on the retina is ey-tended, than there 
is to e7-)ect the object of hearing to be audible figure,' al- 
though, i n fact, the impression on. the auditory nerves is, 
_ 
in all probability, extend.edAsPace just as mucb as the i.m- 
-oression on the optic nerves is. I?ow errier, in the Passage 
already .referred to, tries to reply, by -lointing out that 
!t t¡ 
ol. Y te. W l yttit 9 'S c 1 !Y {I ta bawt 1to tit -o r . 
+, S< I N a S t. ir S+. g, ua c. N E 1ut 1)4 , -Ia.ï1±pn k i V ._ 
rjw Ar'IC eheh \ Q, w 1Ly 
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Brown's argument would be -olausible if the structure of 
the mechanism of the retina- was analogous to the structure 
of the auditory end-organs, but that, in fact, recent 
physiology has shown this sup)osed analogy to be ground. 
-less. Hamilton, then, is concerned with the same sort of 
question as Ferrier, and in particular with the claim, im- 
plicit in Perrier, that the sharp distinction of outline 
found among co-existent colours, and the merely vague place- 
difference found among co-existent sounds have their coun- 
terparts respectively in the fine ana delicate distinctions 
between the papillae in the optic nerves, and in less delic- 
ately defined mtrmmtaxxx distinctions between the fibres 
in the other nerves. Tow the point at issue here interested 
1-lamilton very much, and, like :Terrier, he takes it up in 
the course of his reply to Brown's reductionism, and of his 
development and explication of his main thesis in that 
connection about the reciprocal externality of sensations 
of all sorts, and about ±is its vagueness in some cases, 
and well-defitiedness in others. In fact, his management 
of this question is very impressive indeed, and, while he 
is mainly concerned to make .laci fx.dEnst defend the same kind 
of a claim as Ferrier does, as to the existence of analogy 
A - 
between the structure of the auditory field as revealed by 
phenomenology, and the structure of the auditory nerve as 
revealed by a. different but appropriate kind of experience, 
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and as to the existence of the same thing with regard to 
the other senses, nevertheless, at the same time, in spite 
of his being thus favourable to the claim, he gives much 
of his space to citing out of physiological text -books, 
facts which seem to be expeptions to the law he would like 
to believe exists. In short, his discussion constitutes a 
very stimulating presenteti on of e problem, end it is e 
Pity that space forbids us to auote..(See Pp.861 -863). 
Now granted this point of mew, a problem is already 
raised as to hoer far the object of a given sense is to be 
identified with the material impression on the corresponding 
organ of sense, for example, how far the object of hearing 
is to be identified with certain physical evdnts supposed 
to occur in the tangible,visible ear (visible in a mirror, 
anyway) i.e. with something which in its way is an object 
of experience too, at least in the sense that we can under- 
stand as occurring in our own case what the physiological 
tells us about it. Now Iii ilton is preoccupied with this 
problem as well es the other, and, in the same passage, 
(p.861) considers the. issues vdry carefully. Whereas in 
SkohvAd0-S {h it.. .4.4. 6-Onk - RA.á VwQ2, 
his earlier ti,Ls ( .7) he has 
spoken as if the object of sense and the material impression 
on the organ could be unhesitatingly identified, in the 
present passage, he expressly speaks of that doctrine as 
too precipitate and raises the question as to whether the 
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ndrvous events identifiable with the object of sense are not 
perhaps rather events high up the sensory nerve in ques- 
tion, where it unites with the rest of the brain rather 
than the events at the periphery. Now his discussion of_ 
fac 
this matter is, on any standard, very acutQ indeed, 
and what he does is,in effect,to produce somd. evidence 
suggesting that, while it is still proper to regard the 
object of sense as being identifiable with or the counter- 
part of the physical events in the sensory nerve in ques- 
tion, it is nevertheless perhaps,in principle, impossible 
to answer the ce estion as to whether the object of sense 
is to be identified with the events at the periphery, i.e. 
in the organ, or with the events at the centre i.e. in 
brain. The fact Hamilton cites as decisive or rather 
suggestive here is the case of the "phantom limb "; it 
would appear that, no matter how much a nerve or set of . 
nerves is cut short, much the same set of sensations is 
felt - in this case, a set of vague organic =It strains 
and twinges, related in a familiar pattern of spatial 
connections; and, this being so, it does not seem reason- 
able to identify the area felt with any particular section 
of the group of nerves in question. "A whole line of nerve. 
affords, at all its points, only the sensation of one 
determinate .point" or, in other words, what is inwardly 
or far feeling a point is outwardly, for physiology, a line. 
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So much, then, for the. second_ phase of the argument 
against Brown, i. e. the argument conducted by Hamilton, 
apparently in collaboration with Ferrier, against Brown's 
physiolo ,icl defence of his ppradoxes. The most important 
aspect of it for further developments is that just as 
Brown had, it will be remembered, started the 'argument 
in question by accepting Reid's view of the "material 
impression on the organ" as having nothing to d.o with the 
object of sense, sea Hamilton, and, likewise, to some ex- 
tent, Ferrier, are led, in the course of rejecting gown's 
conclusion, to the point of going back on Reid, and of 
regarding the object of sense as being, for all practical 
purposes, identical with the material impression on the 
organ or in the nefves. Hamilton, in particular, takes 
this whole matter so seriously as to abandon, as often as 
not, the "sense -data language" i.e. the phenomenological 
mode of stating_ the facts of perception, and to adopt 
instead physiological language. In his official formula, 
he says, "I hold that the only object perceived is the 
organ itself as moc_ified." (P.885), and statements to that 
effect abound in his writings. 0.. Rt1I( VrLZ, 
All the saoìe, it would be wrong to see in this develop- 
- ment any radical departure from the "pher_omenolonical" or 
mainly phenomenological standpoint inherited from Iium; 
and "Reid. That is to say, the physiological question at 
issue between Brown, on the one side, and Hamilton end 
Pra.vta'w 4e6.wa11-ai1 kal 0410w4116. iol k {ri (AAi" 
I L rS W. 0 -rt ,. f ̂ 6.e. 
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Ferrier on the other is simply a question as to whether - 
say - the object of hearing i.e. the co- existence of sounds 
is the counteroart of, has a parallel structure, to a 
certain object of touch, pamximxx±hx.Immihrov possessing there- 
fore size and shape, ._ = called_ the ear, or rather 
to certain movements, in principle explorable by instru- 
ments, within that tangible ear. In short, the physiological 
aspect of the problem of perception can apparently be stated 
in phenomenological terms. 
Here, in conclusion, we had better say a word about 
the relevance or irrelevance to the firaoi total problem at 
stake, the pveblem as to the nature of the sense -data, 
and (to mention the other half) as to the nature of trans- 
cendence, of these physiological speculations and inquiries 
that come into prominence with Brown, and are taken very 
seriously by Hailton and Ferrier. All we want to point 
out is that it is surely not possible off -hand, and in a 
kind of a priori way to pronounce this line of inquiry as 
useless and leading nowhere, and that, inconsequence, it 
will be as well to be patient i th Hamilton's often con- 
fused attempts to use the physiological data to some 
,purpose. Who knows but that something of interest may 
suddenly leap to the light? 
Here let us pass to Brown's discussion of the belief- 
in an external world. This belief, of course, is something 
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which he never drea:as of callin-A- 
point 
nuesti on, and the only 
at issue, therefore, for him is how far anyone has 
ever done anything to elucidate its foundations. In par - 
ticular, the main object of his discussion is to ineuire 
whether the chief difficulties of the problem have been, 
in any way, lessened by Reichs distinction of sensation 
and perception. 
Let us begin with Brown's final answer to this topic, 
noting how it sharpens the issue by maing prominent a 
- )o.i_nt Reid slurs over "The philosophy of Mr. Hume e.nd the 
philosophy of Dr. Reid, on this subject, on which, to ord- 
inary observers, they may seem to bewholly at variance, 
appear, if we examine them more clesely, to have no 
real discrepancy. The doctrine of both is composed only 
of two propositions; one of which is, That no argument can 
be offered to show by mere reasoning the existence of ex- 
ternal causes of our feelings, - The other, that it is ab- 
solutely impossible for us, in the various states of mind 
which we term Perception, not to believe in external causes 
of our feelings. The whole seeming difference is merely 
this, - that each philosopher, though affirming both pro- 
positions, dwells a lone, time on one of them, and short 
A 
time on the other; and that the particular proposition they 
dwell on the longer, is not, in both cases, the same." (P.144 
Sketch of a system of philosophy of the Humeian Mind. 
Edinburgh 18204. 
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Now, in a way, there is really nothing here which 
Stewart has not alreedT;- conceded. Granted, Brown says in 
effect, that Reid does -.rove against Hume 'distinct 
existence" or "double existence" to be a fact of experience, 
nevertheless this correction of Hume - if correction It 
be - does nothing whatever to Drove against Hume the validity 
of belief in independent existence, since ?the belief in 
iiidepenaent existence is, a belief about sornetru.ng wnich 
is, by j iti k definition, beyond experience, and so not 
a fact of experience. 
:`ow in his criticism of Reid, Brown apparently has in 
mind one passage especially from the Inçuiry thut into the 
itunen hind, where the distinction between sensation end 
perception is formulated in a somewhat different, and 
7t.tx clearer way than it usually is in Reid. Here is 
the passage; it is not, It may be noted, vital to Reid 
in thet it states more than Reid ever tries to prove, but 
it is important in itself as raising the problem of "real- 
ism". "The same mode of exprIession is used to denote sen- 
setion and perception; and, therefore, we are at to look 
upon them as thine ;s of the same nature. Thus, I feel a 
pain; I see a tree; the first denote5a, sensation; the lest 
e. perception. The gre.im a.tic, l analysis of both expressions 
is the saT:me; for bosh consist of an active verb and an 
object. But if we attend to the things signified bu these 
expressions, we shall find that in the first, the distinction 
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between the act and the object is not reel but gramflatica.l 
in the second, the distinction is not only grammatical 
but real." (inruiry into the 7urirn find Chapter 6 Section 
20). 
Now the first point Brown makes is a. quite simple one 
and is easily comprehended, or regarded as plausible, in the 
light of Reid's extended doctrine on the subject as it was 
given before. "It is only in a single Blass of sensations 
- that which Dr. Reid ascribes to touch - that perception, 
which he regards ^.s a peculiar faculty, extend-in' to all 
our pensations, can be said to have any primary opera-` on "; 
and again, "even on his own principles, I repeat, it (per- 
ception) must be confined to the single class of feelings 
which he considers as tactual" (Brown, Lecture 26). T'.a.t is 
to say, according to Brown, Reid's distinction between sen- 
sation and perception, if we stick to Reid's clear statements 
about the matter, is applied in a serious way only to the 
facts of touch, is not applied in the same systematic war 
to facts of hearing, taste and smell, and is not, on Beid's 
own showing }, applied at all to the facts of vision. 
This preamble over, we come to Brown's main point which 
consists in as :inr on what evidence is based the doctrine 
implicit in the passage quoted that there is a real distin- 
ction between the act and object of feeling, where it is a 
case of feeling a solid shape, but no real distinction between 
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the act and object of feeling, where it is a. case of ,feeling 
pain or. strain. "Sens. ton1 says_ Dr. Reid, 'can be no- 
thing than it is felt to be. ltí very essence consists 
in being felt, and when it is not felt, it is not." But 
this, Brown goes on, "is surely equally lame of the mental 
state he terms perception. Its very essence consists in 
being felt and when it is not felt, it is not." (Brown, 
Lecture 25). The decisive consideration here, - according 
to Brown, is that there is no more empirical evidence in 
this latter case - the case of feeling .$. solid shape - to 
justify us in regarding the object of feeling as detati ch- 
able from the act of feeling, than there is in the former 
case - the case of feeling pain - where the distinction is 
universally admitted to have no foundation. 
Brown goes on to take a. pretty strong line in this 
matter, and to assert that the sharp distinction between act 
and object of perception, though no doubt relevant in 
gram -Aar, has no real foundation, and is, in fact, meaningless. 
"Though he (Reid) .cloes not inform us what he méans by the 
term object, as peculiarly applied to perception, - (and, 
indeed, if he had explained it, I cannot but think that a 
great part of his system, which is founded on the confwii.o yt 
of this single word, must have fallen to the ground) - he 
} f 
yet tells us, very explicitly, that to be^ object of perception 
is something more than to be the external occasion on which 
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the state of mind arises which he terms perception - Did 
Dr. Reid then, suppose that the feeling, whatever it may 
be, which constitutes perception as a state of mind, or 
in short, all which we are exclusively conscious of in per- 
ception, is not strictly and exclusively mental, as much 
as all of which we are conscious iB love and hate; or did he 
wish kx us to believe that matter itself, in any of its 
forms, is, or can be, a faint= part of the phenomena or 
states of mind - a part, therefore, of the mental state 
which we term a. perception ?" Put if Reid believed that, 
Brown concludes, he believed in something absurd. Ila.tter, 
or what we thus regard as extended and resisting is known 
to us only by the feelings which it occasions in the mind. 
What matter in its relation to the percipient mind can be, 
but the cause aÎ or occasion, direct or indirect, of that 
ciass of feelings I term sensations or perceptions, it is 
absolutely impossible for me to conceive." (Brown, Lecture 
25). 
N here. When Reid ow Brown's mea,- ing 1 s clear enoug'. a ;,, 
says that we are aware of the extended solid object of 
feeling as being really distinct from our act of feeling it, 
his meaning, according to Brown, might at first sight seem 
to be that we are aware of ourselves as perceiving or ex- 
periencing a part of the material world. But the material 
world, Brown goes on, is, by d_Efinition, what exists 
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ind.eTefl .ently of us, ile. what exists whether it is per- 
ceived or not; and accofrd.ingly the notion of unperceived - 
n.ess or unperceivableness is inseparable from the notion 
of the material world. Accordingly, if we were to tale 
Reid's doctrine about acts and objects seriously, we would 
have to cfedit him with the view that we are aware of 
ourselves as Perceiving a world that is 
i^n 
some way be-rond 
reach of perception, and surely Reid, whatever exoressions 
he used, did not mean to propound any doctrine so ridicul- 
ous, and, on the point in question, really saw eye to eye 
with Hume. 
Brown concludes his ri-n m criticism of Reid thus. 
it is evident, was not sufficiently in the habit 
considering the phenomena of mind - its perceptions, as well 
as its remembrances, judgments, passions and all its other 
affections, -:hatever these may be, - in the light in which 
I have represented them to you, merely as the mind affected 
in a certain manner, according to certain regular laws of 
succession, but as something more mysterious than the subject 
of this sequence of feelings; for, but for this. notion of 
something more mysterious, the object of perception, and the 
exter, al occasion of that state of mind whiuz we term 
perception must have conveyed precisely the same notion." 
(Brown, Lecture 25) . 
"Dr. 
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TTow here inBrown, discussion of the question of belief 
ti 
in externality is very much mixed up with a. rather special 
C 
discussion as to what Reid really .meant byAformula.e, and 
the same thing happens. in Hamilton, and even, to some ex- 
tent, t in Ferrier. Accordingly e. word had better be said 
abuut this latter discussion, the discussion about Reid, in 
order to discover its relation to the former discussion, 
which is the one that really matters to us. Brown, then, 
in the passages under review, opens the debate by accepting 
Reid's point that I feel a solid shape only when I feel, 
in the first place, certain sensations of muscular strain, 
and proceeds to raise a question which, read in the light of 
Reid's text, has a very definite meaning. The question he 
raises is, in effect, a question concerning the preferability 
of one or other of two 'apparently alternative analyses of- 
fered by Reid of the fact in question, the one that - to 
quote his usual formula.- I have a conception and belief of 
a solid, external body, on the occasion of having sensations 
of touch, and the other - the one in question above - that 
I am aware of a solid, material object of feeling and, in 
contradistinction, of my act of feeling it, on the occasion 
of having the said sensations. Now, according to Brown, 
the latter, act- object, formula is indefeasible and not 
nmi x seriously intended by :Zeid,but the former is accept- 
able enough, provided it be understood as meaning that on 
the occasion of feeling the sensations of strain, a belief 
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arises as to the existence of external corporeal causes of 
these strains. But at this point, Hamilton enters the de- 
bate, and maintains, on the contrary, first, that an analy- 
sis of the act- object was not a blunder at all but represents 
Reid's real positión, because the act -object analysis 
alone dines gpustice to the facts fa of corl -,o.n sense belief, 
and because Reid, pro:-essedly, wants to defend common sense 
distinctionsof this kind, and in the second place, because 
Reid's formula. about having a conception. and belief of an 
external body is not really in contradiction with the other 
formula, because, on account of Reid's denial of the exis- 
tence of mental images, conception is for him a species of 
immediate awareness, and is distinguished as imagination or 
perception according as it is accompanied or una.ccompa.nied 
by belief. Hamilton's view, that is tó say, is that Brown 
has completely misinterpreted Reid, although. he goes on to 
concede that Reid's terminology is so vacillating end vague 
as to invite misinterpretations like Brown's. Finally, 
Ferrier tries to settle the dispute, by advancing, the thesis 
that, while Hamilton is doubtless right against Brown on the 
question as to what Reid's position really was, the act -object 
analysis, as put forward by Reid, is even rlo_re indefensible 
than Brown had, in-the beginning, said it was. 
(This debate, it may be remembered, is e. very long and 
complicated one. It began with the publication of Brown's 
Lectures in 1823, was entered by Hamilton in 1830 with his 
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'Edinburgh Review' article on 'Perception', and. again in 
his Lectures (1837) anC. in his Reid (1846), and wr'.s con- 
cluded by T'errier's long; review of the Reid in B.12.0 mood's 
Magazine in 1847. (Perrier's Lectures and Remains Vol.2 
Pp.407-459). As regards, its complexities, a considerable 
part of it is taken up with a learned argument as to who, 
if any body, accepted what Reid calls "the ideal system. " 
Our account, accordingly, is only rough and ready). 
But what, then, is the significance of this famous, 
or rather, notorious controversy for the events which form 
the substance of our narrative? In one respect, indeed, it 
was very important, in that it was the means of bringing 
once again to the light those more difficult aspects of the 
problem of the external world which had constituted the 
ori;inal issue between Berkeley and Hume, and which Reid - 
almost deliberately, one might say - had kept in the back- 
ground. Aside of this, however, the twenty -five years de- 
bate wotld seem to have contributed very little to philoso- 
phy, or even to have added to the confusion inx certain ways. 
In the first place, concerned as it was with the question of 
the meaning of Reid's doctrines on the one part of the prob- 
lem of perception on which he had very little to say, it 
offered very little guidance as to the meaning of his doc- 
trine on the parts of the problem where he had a lot to say, 
and even perhaps had the effect of producing a general im- 
pression that there is nothing else to Reid's theory of 
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percept ion but r. few ambigious or indefensible formulae. 
In the second p1Ç.ce, whilQ Brown uses the discussion of 
Reid es a means of making cle -r his own personal views 
on the point at issue, neither Hamilton's views about the 
problem, nor Terrier's are illuminated very much by their 
=put respective contributions to the Reid controversy. 
Our notion, the -, is that the debate about Reid is 
to be regarded as a by- product, and that accordingly serious 
misunderstanding will result if we read whet ITsi lion a.nd 
Ferrier say hartit about the belief in externality in general 
in the light of what they say about Reid. But let us illus- 
trate the point by reference to the case of Ferrier. The 
amusing article on. Reid in 1847. is, we must admit, a kind, of 
manifesto in favour of Berkeleienism, snd is, in fact, a 
deliberate attempt to reverse a trend which had been dominant 
since the days of Turnbull and the Rankeni.an society. But 
the impression whibt. we get there, end which we are apparently 
intended to get there, of Ferrier as being overwhelmingly 
Eerkeleian, which being accurate enough so far as the major 
portion of his philosophical career is concerned, does not 
in the least hold good of the period we are discussing in 
this chapter, i.e. the very early period in Ferrier's life, 
when, in fai- ly close association with Hamilton, he was 
busy wrestling with the problem 6f belief in externality ea 
it had been posed by Reid and Hume. Consider, for example, 
this extract from a. footnote to s Blackwood's article of 
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1838. "Widen the immaterialist or mentalist comes forward, 
it is his business to displace matter entirely, substituting 
"mind" in place of it. (But) if he attempts (this), he in- 
volves himself in a mere play of words. If he maintains 
that all the material phenomena are in fact mental phenomena, 
he does nothing but quibble. The author of the 'Natural 
History of Enthusiasm' has g L irously mistaken the potency 
of this position. (See The Physical Theory of another Life 
P.14). It is plain, we say, that in this case the i--^meter- 
ialist resoles himself into a mere innovator upon the or- 
dinary language of men. He MMH± merely gives the name of 
"mental" to that which other people have chosen to call 
"material ". The thing remains precisely as it was." (Lec- 
tures and Remains P.48) - But now if we follow up the re- 
ference and read pages 13 -17 of Isaac Taylor's forgotten 
book, we find the thesis there sustained of a. Berkeleian 
kind to the effect that an independently existing external 
world might quite well be treated as an unnecessary entity 
i.e. that one can't prove the existence of, and perhaps 
can dispense with' íi°nperceived objects. In that case, it 
is seems plain that Ferrier is here doing something which 
nobody would ever guess from his 1847 a ±ticle on Reid - 
namely, accepting as in some sense conclusive against 
Terkelei rani sm t'ie traditional objection about tempering with 
the distinctions of colloquial language. 
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Fow Hamilton end Terrier - to resume once more our _.rein 
narrative - when they make their most serious attack on 
the question of externality, have Brown chiefly in mind, 
and accordingly we h<d better set North shortly the doc- 
trine on the subject which Brown developes in the course of 
his critique of Reid. In the first niece, he accepts the 
notion common to Hamilton and Ferrier (at ie . st, in those 
days), as also to Hume and Reid that the belief in extern- 
ality, as being a common sense belief, has to be accepted 
and res_o cted Ps a. fact, and he agrees moreover, with Reid 
and the others, that, if one is not to get rid of the belief 
in externality and regard it as nonsensical, one must 
make some sort of a distinction between sensation and. -oer- 
ception. Now in his closer examinetion of the issue, it iS:, 
of course, taken for granted that in sensation there is 
no di scértible distinction between the act and the object of 
feeling, end, the only r_uestion st stake for him is whether 
the perception that accompa. vies the sensation differs from 
this latter in respect of its involving a distinction be- 
tween act and object of sense, or whether on the other hand 
the perception is an inference, or perheps intuition of 
the external corporal cause of the sens.ntion. ue goes on 
to argue that, in reference to the kind of cognition ack- 
nowledged on 211 hands to be a. perception, - the cese of being 
aware of a solid external body on the occis 'kion of feeling 
sensations of strain - the elleged act- object analysis is 
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quite unmeaning and devoid of empirical fmaaltdmt±x found- 
ation, whereas the alternative theory that speaks of a. 
casual inference, or intuition, is cnulte legitimate. His 
great point is that in t is latter case no mystery is in- 
volved, since the relationship of sensation to perception 
is, in that case, only the normal relationship of a de 
facto invariable sequence of sensation followed by belief 
as to the existence of something beyond corresponding to 
it. ( See Brown Sketch of a. system Pp. 125, 126 for a partic- 
ularly clear statement of this point). Finally, he passes 
to the question as to whether this perception is to be 
regárded as an intuition, as Reid holds, or at least ought 
to or as an inference as he himself holds, or is in- 
clined to hold. Brown, however, does not waste time on 
this last issue, since the decision of it, he tells us, 
depends mainly on one's attitude to the "reductive" theory 
of tactual experience. The relevant point here is that, on 
the reductive view, the external body is something regarded 
as the cause of the sensations of strain, and described in 
the shape and size language rendered meaningful, in the first 
place, only by reference to the sensations of strain, but 
instinctively applied to the external, inferred counterp*i.ts 
of these strains. 
";Te pass at once to I smilton3 and we must note, in 
the first placeythet his discussion of the problem of the 
external world falls into two quite distinct parts. On the 
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one hand, we have E set of arguments e ;inning in the 1831 
article and continued in the Lectures written in 1837 -38 
which ere chiefly taken up with a reply to Brown end which 
so to speak, are concern -:d only with. presenting a realist 
theory of perception; on the other hand, we have a long 
discussion in the notes to the Reid Vol.2, which, in a. way, 
begins from where the Lectures ttop. but tries to elaborate 
a véry different theory of perception. But now between 
these two na' .ts there is a very decided e.p -.. 
ot 
the second part isAintended as a sequel to the firstt bert; 
there is, ,.: _ -'7u.G logicE l connection between the two and 
the earlier discussion can be understood and profitably 
studied to the 
Our 01-St concern of this hr wwciì for reasons that 
will appear later, is with Hamilton's earlier discussion . 
in the Lectures, and such parts of the notes to the Reid 
which develop and clarify points already made, or almost 
made in the Lectures. Accordingly, let us begin with his 
criticisms of Brown. - In the hands of Brown, "the dis- 
tinction" betw -en sensation and perception is, according to 
Hemilton, "superficial and manifestly of no imnort." (P.105 
Lectures Vol.2). His point here is that the distinction be- 
tween sensation and perception does not serve the purpose 
for which it is introduced - that of doing justice to the 
fact of common sense belief in externality - whet' Brown's 
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view of perception is adopted. The natural conviction of 
mankind in this case, Hamilton says, is that "the exter- 
nal reality itself is the object of which I am conscious 
in perception,-" (Discussions P.89) or, to ruote a phrase 
of Hume's used by Hamilton, that "the very perception 
of sensible imegp is the external object" (Discussion 
P.95). Now what Brown does, Hamilton points out, is to 
admit one half of this natural belief - namely, the h ̂lf 
asserting the existence of an external reg.lity - and to 
reject the dither half of it - namely, the half asserting 
the identity of the external reality with the object of 
perception. But surely this procedure, Hamilton argues, 
is if it is permissible one half 
of a. natural belief, it is surely equally permissible to 
reject the whole of it. In other words, James Mill would 
seem, in Hamilton's opinion, to be quite justified in tak- 
ing over Brown's reductive theory of sight and touch, a.nd- 
âs 
in rej ecting^a superfluity Brown's perceptual inference to 
a transcendent source of the sensations. In short, if one 
is going to be a. reductionist at all, one might es well 
go all the way. "This philosopher (Brown) denies an im- 
mediate knowledge of aught beyond the accidents of mind. 
(I. e. the muscular. strains). The accidents which we refer 
to body, are, as known to us, only states or modifications 
of the percipient subject itself; in other words,.the 
qualities we call material are known to us to exist, only . 
-399- 
us 
as the -r are known to,_tm inhere in the same substance as 
the qualities we denominate mental. There is an apparent 
antithesis, but a real identity. On this doctrine, the 
hypothesis of a double principle, losing its necessity, 
becomes philo sophicr-.11y absurd; on the law of parsimony, 
a psychological unitarianism is established." 
Now Hamilton's first step in deference of the "hypo- 
thesis of a double principle" would seem to be that of 
rests ting Reid's doctrine of a. double object of experience 
in such e way as to elude Brown's criticisms of it. The 
position of Reid, it will be remembered, had been - to 
confine ourselves to touch - that on the occasion of feeling 
muscular strains, I have experience of a. solid shape. Then 
Brown had produced the retort that there are not two ob- 
jects of experience here, but only one, namely the muscular 
strains, that our notions of shape, size, solidity are 
"logically constructed" oust of dies nuscular strain; and 
that so far as a second or external object enters into 
as 
the question, it has to be regarde( Aa.n inferred object, or en 
intuited object, not an object of experience. Now Hamil- 
ton' does not,, apparently, dispute Brown's criticism of 
Reid; according to him, too, nothing; is experienced but 
the co- existence of muscular strains, and though he ta'ces 
a very different view of the nature of the co- existence 
from the one Brown takes, he is, even so, still left with 
only a single object. But here Hamilton goes on to 
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differentiate hi ,elf sharply from Brown by drawing at- 
tention to a new aspect of the tactual situation, and whereas 
Brown would seem to regard the muscular strains that give 
information about shape and size as indifferent, i.e. 
neither Dle,Esant nor painful, Hamilton explicitly and em- 
,Dha ti c- ily to 71.es a very different view of them. According- 
ly, for Hamilton, our tactual experience of the co- existence 
of muscular sensation has after all two aspects - one of 
them that of giving information about shape and size, and 
the other that of being agreeable or disagreeable, and in 
this way we get a double object - a subjective object or 
subj ect- object, and an obj ective -object or object-object, 
to use Hamilton's peculiar thrminolo:rJy. 
Hamilton was quite well xxrx aware that there are ob- 
j ectimns to this denial of indifference. " ïheth.er -each 
such a state of indifference do ever actually exist; or 
whetter, if it do, it be not a complex state in which are 
blended an equal complement of pains and -pleasures, it is 
not necessary, at this stage of our progress :to inquire." 
(Lectures Vol. P.437). However, as sometimes happens 
with him, he never seems to have set dorm his reasons 
for the opinion he formed on the point at issue, and all 
he does is merely to make it -perfectly clear that the ver- 
sion he xmolgxm favours of the distinction between sensation 
and perception is founded on this denial of indifference. 
"Cognition and feeling are always co- existent. The purest 
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act of knowledme is always coloured by some feelings of 
pleasure of pain; for no energy is absolutely indifferent, 
and the grossest feeling exists only as it is known in 
consciousness. This being the case of cognition and feel - 
ing in general, the sane is true of perception and sen- 
sation in particular. Perception proper is the conscious- 
ness, through the sensestof the dualities of an object 
known as different from self; Sensation proper is the con- 
sciousness of the subjective affection of pleasure or 
pain which accompanies the act of knowledge." (Lectures 
Vol.2 Pp.98 and 99). 
So far, we have discussed only Hamilton's application 
of his formula-to touch, and we must now go on to note that 
he cla ims an analogous relation exists in all the five 
senses. (See Reid Vol.2. Pp.883,884). NtJ the crucial 
case ioIXE71 here is that of sight, where, according to Stew- 
art and Peid, the sensation -perception concomitance is not 
found, and, in order to exhibit more thoroughly that we 
have done the foundations of Haoilton's doctrine, we had 
better recall a passage in Stewart. "It does not appear 
to me that the impression of a moderate light on the retina 
is accompanied by any _perception of the part of the body 
on which the impression is mnde. When the light, indeed, 
is so powerful as to produce pain, the case comes to be 
different; for a sensation of touch is then united with the 
proper sensation of sight; and it is cheracteristical of all 
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sensations of touch, that they are accompanied with a 
perception of the local situation of their exciting causes." 
(Stewart, Works Vol.4. P.310). Now this passage exhibits 
pretty closely some of the chief opinions that the Hamilton- 
._ 
ian version Of the distinction between sensation and per- 
ception is intended to correct, and the relevant points to 
note are that Stewart' in the first _place, regards a feeling 
of pain as a feeling of the same kind as a feeling of 
and 
strain/Ain the second place regards pains and strains as in- 
stinctively localised_ in the organ affected, and in the 
third place regards the experience of vision as normally 
indifferent. But now Hamilton, on the contrary, rejects 
as Brown him the notion that pains strains 
are instinctively localised. It is indeed not a c.uestion 
explicitly touched on by him (though it is by Brown), but 
the ground of his opinions are pretty obvious; instinct, it 
will be remembered, had bern introduced by Reid to explain 
how non -spatial pains and strains come to be localised, 
and the need to postulate instinct accordingly disa.p nears 
as soon as it is suggested that we are originally aware 
even of pains as in some way space -occupying. But, this 
being so, it becomes possible to reject the doctrine implied 
by Stewart above as to the existence of a certain discrepancy 
between tactual experience and visual experience, End to 
regard the relation of our tactual . experience, and the strains 
therein to our knowledge of the hand as a body, as being in 
in all respects D ra,llel to, ^n t just ns emDiricr l end 
non -instinctive as, the relation of our visual experience 
to our knowledge of the eye. But now, in the second 
place, the )e.rallel betzreen si -ht F..nd touch does not stop 
here for Ho ilton_, but, in virtue of bis denial of indif- 
ference, can be carried much further. The particular means 
of this advance would seem to consist in denying the 
thesis of Stewart that main is a sensation of touch, not 
pain is, so to speak, severe strain, and in teaching, on the 
contrary/ that Pain (and_ pleasure) are distinct from 'out 
co -exist with awareness of strain just ais, in much the same 
way} pain (and_ pleasure) are distinct from and co -exist with 
of colou_, or, to ,ut matter in e more precise 
and Hamiltonian way, thot awareness of co- existent strains 
or of co- existent colours, a.s it involves awareness of 
outline, tangible or visible as the case may be, also is 
accompanied in both cases by feelings of the experience in 
question as agreeable or disagreeable. 
Our account of Hamilton's reasons for holding this 
this 
position is, to be sure, Pretty conjectural, but that kt7x11 
is the sort of position he holds there con be hardly any 
doubt. The important point here is that there is a close 
connection between the doctrine studied here mtatxmx about 
sensation and perception and the doctrine studied earlier 
about the Perception of space and outline, and. that Hamil- 
ton's total programme (though not the mode of its elaboration) 
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is clearly and strongly stated in those places in Reid 
Volume 2 where he . utt rs his final word on the subject. 
Here, for example, is a decisive quotation: already in- 
troduced to explain Hamilton's point about the perception 
of space and outline, and how it varies in distinctness 
from sense to sense, and now relefrant again to explain the 
rel ation of sensation and perception. "If we take a. sur- 
vey of the senses, we shall find that exactly in pro ior- 
tion as each affords an idio- pathic sensation, more or less 
capable of being carried to an extreme either of pleasure 
or of pain, does it afford, but in an inverse ratio, the 
or 
condition of an objective perception moreAless distinct." 
(Reid Vol.2 P.863. Vie cjyote here only the first sentence. 
But there are many passages in the Reid which reveal Hamil- 
ton's intention to produce a connected doctrine. See, for 
example, P.880 Column I). 
We have now said enough about the foundations of Hamil- 
ton's doctrine about the co- existence of sensation and per- 
ception, and we must now go on to explain the particular 
aspect of his doctrine which he regards as especially novel 
and important. He introduces the matter by speaking of 
"the ignorance of our psychologists in regard to the law 
by which the phenomena of perception and sensation are 
governed in their reciptocal relationship. This law is 
simple and universal : perception and sensation, though 
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always co- existent, are always in inverse ratio of one 
another." (P.99). 
To show what he 7ZeenE,, we had better cite some of his 
illustrations. First, we will quote from his comparison 
of one sense with another. "Hearing is much less exten- 
sive in its sphere of knowledge or perception (e.g. about 
the whereabouts of events) thi=n sight; but in the same 
proportion is its capacity of feeling or sensation greater: 
concords and discords, in the one sense, affect us more 
agreeably and disagreeably than any ,codification of light 
in the other." (Lectures, Vol. 2, P. 100: abridged) . The 
some sort of relationship as obtains between sight .and 
hearing also obtains between the different avenues of 
tactual experience. "In those _-arts of the body where 
sensations predominate, perception is feeble; and in those 
where perception is lively, sensation j.s obtuse. In the 
fitter points, tactile perception is at its height, but 
there is hardly another.part of the body in which sensation 
is not more acute." (Loc.Cit. P.101). 
So much then, for the exploration of the generality 
of Hamilton/5 principle. But if we are to understand its 
relevance or alleged relevance to the problem of belief 
in externality, we must go on to study Hamilton's further 
claim that "the analogy which we have seen to hold 1400d t 
among the several senses in relation ta one another prevails 
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likewise anion the several impressions of the same sense. " 
The case Hamilton takes i5 the: sense of sight, and he 
begins statin. or. e accurately than hitherto, the facts that 
give rise -to his law. Perception and sensation, he points 
out, do indeed vary inversely but this variation ta_es 
place only in certain limits, and the business before us 
is to rake clear just That these limits are. "It cannot 
certainly be said that the minimum of sensation infers 
the maximum of perception; for perception always supposes 
F certain quantum. of sensation; but this is undeniable, that, 
above a certain li mit, Perception declines, in proportion 
as sensation rises. Thus, in the sense of sight, if the 
impression be strong we are dazzled, blended, and conicious- 
tisóa is limited to the pain or pleasure of the sensation, 
in the intensity of which, perception has been lost." (102) 
-.Cow here, in this visual experience where we are aware only 
of being pained by the dazzle and brightness, and where we 
get no knowledge of the colour of things, let alone their 
outlines, sensation is at its mrrium, and perception has 
disappeared altogether. In this way, we fix one of the 
limits within which the two vary, and the next thing to do 
is to fix the other limit. In order to do this, Hamilton 
proceeds in this way, anal; sin g ordinary visual experience, 
Sight is cognisant of colour, and, through colour, of 
figure." But of course there can be perception, Hamilton 
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implies, of colour a.c well as of figure; for 'example, we 
cr.n --et the information that the colour of this thing is 
brighter then or matches the colour of that, as well PS 
the information that the shape or size of this th.irig is 
so and so compared with the shape and size of this other 
thing. But all the same, "in the vision of colour, there 
is more of sensation, in that of figure, more of perception. 
Colour affords our faculties of knowledge ak far smaller 
number of differences and relations than figure; but at 
the se .e time yields our capacity of feeling ak far more 
sensual - enjoyment." (P.102). His main point here is that 
"though figure is known only through colour, a very imper- 
fect cognisance of colour is" sufficient "for a clear and. 
distinct cognisance of figure," and the impression in general 
conveyed by the discussion is that for Hamilton visual per - 
ception is at a. maximum and visual sensation at a. minumum 
when one is getting imfaxmx±karda information by sight 
about the relations of figures which are in black and white, 
and in which,therefore,the distraction of colour is as far 
as possible removed. 
Here we will try to make Hamilton's point clearer still 
by citing first another statement from him of his general 
point, and then by showing how the two contrasting extreme 
c-= ses appear, in the light of his general point. "Although 
we can only take note of, that is, perceive the special 
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relations of sensations, on the hypothesis that these 
sensations exist; a sensation, in proportion as it rises 
above a low degree of intensity, interferes with the per- 
ception of its relations, by concentrating consciousness 
on its absolute affection alone." (Reid, Vol.2, P.880). 
I ?ow, apparently, the cases covered by "perceiving the special 
relations of sensations" are, in the case of sight, those 
both of getting information about colour -relations, and of 
getting information a'Dout shape, size, etc, 2n:c7_ it is in 
this latter case that perception is at its maximum. "Where 
the objective element predominates, -70rhere matter is known 
as principal in its relation to mind, and mind only as sub- 
ordinate in its relation to matter r we have perception pro- 
per rising superior to sensation; this is seen in the 
Primary Qualities." (Lectures Vol.`? P.115). - It is to 
be noted that by 'mind' here Hamilton intends to refer to 
pains and pleasures i.e. to what he comes to call "subject- 
objects" i.e. objects not regarded as independently exist- 
ing. - So n zch for the one extreme. The other extreme is 
apparently reached when the perception of what Hamilton 
calls 'the special relations of sensations" is abolished 
through -the intensity of the sensations, a.s when we are dcx- 
zled. "Consciousness is limited to the -vein and _lers-17re 
of the sensation, in the intensity of perception has 
been lost." That is to say, we have only a subject -object 
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here, not a. subject -object plus an object -object. Per- 
ception, then, disappears, but not, Hamilton is careful 
to state knowledge. "The grossest feeling exists only as 
it knows in consciousness" (P.98). 
For the sake of clarity, it might be as well to illus- 
trate more carefully what we take to be Hamilton's mean- 
ing - We awake in the middle df,,nirrht in a. dark room, an'd 
we switch on the light. Now, in this situation, the tactual 
side of our experience remains constant; and our tac- 
t al sensations are accompanied by and, indeed, overshadowed 
bÿ our tactual perceptions; but, by contrast, in the first 
moments of switching on the light there is no correspondence 
between our visual experience, and our tactual experience, 
and the difference could be put in Hamiltonian language 
by saying that we have visual sensations - the experience 
of being painfully dazzled - but no visual perceptions, i.e. 
no visual information about shape, sizes, places. 
It might be as well to show how the same pair of ex- 
tremes are found in tactual experience. Por this purpose, 
we will have to go hac to Reid, who, for the matter, cites 
most of the facts Hamilton cites, without, however, trying 
to relate them systematically. "If a. man runs his head 
with violence against a pillar - - -- the attention? o -' the 
mind is entirely turned towards the pai nf7l feeling, and 
to speak in the common language of mankind, he feels nothing 
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in the stone, but feels a violent pain in his head. It 
is quite otherwise, when he leans his head gently against 
the pillar; for then he will tell you that he feels nothing 
in his head, but feels hardness in the stone. Hath he 
not a. sensation in this case as well as in the other? 
Undoubtedly he bath, but he cannot, without great difficulty 
attend so much to the sensation as to be persuaded_ that 
there is anything distinct from the hardness it signifies." 
(Reid, Inguirv, Chapter 5 ;:action 2:- P.120 i Hamilton's 
Reid). 
Now in order to come at last to the ?point, and to 
grasp the bearing of all this analysis on the problem of 
belief in externality, we must remember that Hamilton has 
chiefly Brown in view throughout. In his Lecture 24 .- the . 
one we have been expolnding - Havailton sums uP the position 
thus. "Brown Misstates the phenomenon when he asserts 
that, in perception, there is a reference from the inter- 
nal to the external, from the known. to the unknown. That 
this is not the fact, an observation of his phenomenon will 
at once convince you" (Lectures Vol.2 P.106). Hamilton's 
intention then is to show that the fact of experience 
in question involves not, as Brown claims, our being aware 
immediately of one object, and our believing the existence 
of a second object outside experience and inferred, but 
rather our being immediately aware of two objects, one of 
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which is not regarded as independently existent, and another 
- the object of perception i.e. the shapes - t,,b.ich is 
regarded as external, and distinct from the Pct. But 
now while it is by a. comparison of what we have called 
the extreme cases that the facts about the object of per- 
ception are most clearly brought out, nevertheless a defer- 
ence to these extremes cases would, taken by itself, prove 
_nothing except when viewed in the light of the whole preced- 
ing argument. Accordingly, Hamilton sums up his position 
by sa ing tha:..t his inverse law is meant to defend, especially 
against Brown, the intuitive theory of perception i.e. 
the theory that "in this act (of perception) I am conscious 
of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external re- 
ality' as the object perceived." 
'Here we had better look at Ha iilton'w own-account of 
his position. o'That the doctrine of an intuitive perception 
is not without its difficulties, we allow. But these do 
not affect its possibility; and may in a great measure 
be removed by a more sedulous examination of the phenomena. 
The distinction of perception proper from sensation proper, 
in other words, of the objective from the subjective in 
this act, Reid, after other philosophers, has already turned 
to good account; but his analysis would have been still more 
successful, had he discovered the law which universally 
governs their manifestation" i.e. the law of inverse ratio. 
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T.;ie must now pass to the second. and :.ore interesting 
part of the discussion in Ha . lton's Lectures - that is, 
we nOw leave Lecture 24 on the distinction between sensat- 
ion and perception, and pass to the Lecture 25 on objec- 
tions to the doctrine of natural realism. So far ss he 
has gone, Hamilton has been analysing the ordinary cons - 
ciousness, and arguing that, for all the avenues of sense, 
there are two objects of experience, the one, feelings of 
pleasure and pain, regarded as subjective or internal to 
our act of consciousness, the other, the outline or i tua.t- 
ion of things, rega: ded as obj ective, or external to (dis- 
tinguishable from) our act of consciousness. But, at this 
point, Hs lton has to face the objection of Frown that 
if the facts of corn on sense are such as TTa° iiton represents 
therm to be, then common sense, is deluded and false, that 
these outlines and shapes, so far as they are objects of 
experience, must have the seine kind of status as iains and 
pleasures, and that, in fact, the alleged sharp distinction 
between act and object of :?ind has no foundation whatsoever. 
Now in order to understand Hamilton's point of view 
about this sort of problem, we had better look at Chaptrr 
.25 as a whole. Now when we do this, the most striking and. 
distinctive feature is that TTav,.ilton takes very seriously 
this sort of objection - the objection, that is, that 
insists in regarding perceived shapes as "modifications 
of _wind" i.e. as having the same status as pains - and, 
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by contrast, does not take seriously at all the other 
w t a stend..a.rd objection to rep .Lis_-, the ojecticYln, 
that is, that insists on the discrepancy between the real 
shape and size on the one hand, end the visible and the 
tang7ible she pes and sizes on the other. Or rather, to 
put this point, in a somewhat more accurate manner, the 
characteristic turn Hailton :4ives to the disclJssion is that 
he is prepared to be "positivistic" about this latter dif- 
ficulty, provided he can make a stand against "positivism" 
on the former difficulty. 
But here we had better explain what we mean by asser- 
ting that Hamilton seems to be, to all intents 'and purposes, 
a positivist on one side of the question. In fact, Hamil- 
ton does not explain himself very much on this topic of 
shape and size at all, but in so far Es he sets aside as 
frivolous the obj e,ctdon'that common sense is deluded, be- 
cause the visible-size is not the same as the real size, 
the size believed in by common sense, his point probably 
is that so far as experience is concerned, real size and. 
shape is E. "loc;ical construction" out of tans i.ble end vis- 
ible size and shape, that, for example, in pronouncing the 
cavity in one tooth to be really bier then the cavity in 
another, we are claimin ; to have felt the size of both 
cavities with the same visible finger, and claiming; not 
to have felt the size of the one with this visible find r, 
of the other with a visible toe. This sort of topic, indeed, 
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is not one which Hamilton ever dwells on in detail, in 
ws, later to do, but the solitary 7=xquotation 
of Hamilton's on ':he subject, once it is translated_ into 
more intelilglc,le language, woula seem to suggest that 
he uoes not regara a "posiLivlstiC" treatment of this 
side of the suojecc as being out of place in a aetendèr of 
- common sense belief. The quotation is this, "The primary 
qua.lit_.S of things external to our organism - -- we only 
learn to lu_L er, from the affections why cii we í;.,l i6. TO T lnld 
that they deter .ine in our organs; - the affections -:r'-lich, 
yielding us a perception of organic extension, we at length 
discover; by observation and induction, to imply a co rres- 
poñding extension in the extra- organic agents." (Reid, 
Vo 1. 2 P.881). But now *hathappears to be saying here is 
first that "neither sight nor touch gives us full or accur- 
ate information about real shape and size," and second that 
this information about reel shape and size, is not by "ob 
servation and induction" i.e. by comparing the size and 
shape of a. thing as revealed in experience with the help of 
one empirically known organ of sense, with the shape and 
size of the thing, revealed in experience on the same oc- 
casion with the help of another empirically 'mown organ of 
sense. That is to say, the inference spoken of above wm ld 
seem to be the se ma thing as the observation and induction 
spoken of later in the same passage, end so, from first to 
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last, the process of discovering, real s' -yes and size 
w lild seem to be a proces concerned with notin .znifor.- 
irdctte.b 
mities holding, in the r.es_pects1 between objects of sight 
and objects of touch. 
MIDE 
But let us try to make this same point in another, 
and perhaps more accurate way. Hamilton , we may note, 
takes up much the same attitude as Reid does to Hmmm 
Hume's difficulty that "the table whichw e see seems to 
diminish, as we remove further from it; but the real 
table which exists independently of us suffers no alter- 
ation." Reid, we may remember, dismisses this difficulty 
on the grounds of its arising from Hume's failure to dis- 
tinguish the visible size from the \re -1 size, the size for 
coinon sense. But Hamilton, we find, does much the same 
thing. "This objection to the veracity of consciousness 
will not occasion us much trouble. Its refutation is, 
in fact, contained in the very statement of the real, ext er- 
nal object of perception. " (Lectures, Vol. 2, P.131).. 
But now Reid, it will be remembered, goes on to complete 
this approach to the matter by adopting a very "sophistic- 
ated" or, if you like, "-positivistic" view of the relation 
o the co=on sense size to the visible size. Presumably, 
therefore, IIa. zilton's line imp is pretty similar to Peid's, 
in this latter part of the Problem too, wit, of course, 
the difference, that whereas for Reid the only -problem 
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is that of the relation of visible size and shape to 
real (= tangible) size and shape, Hamilton has to consi-'.er 
the relation to real size and shape not merely of visible 
size and shape, but of tangible size and shape. 
Here, however, we had better take steps to prevent 
this last statement of ours, about the relations of Reid 
and Hamilton bein : isunderstood. It would indeed seem 
na:twal to regard Hoilton as following Reid on this paint, 
because the doctrine of the one is pretty much perallet to 
the doctrine of the other. However, it is very likely the 
case that Hamilton is not indebted to Reid here, the proof 
of our assertion here lies in the fact that Ha .ilton has 
apparently no idea as to how 11sophisticated" Reid is on prob- 
lems like this. For example, Hamilton several times euotes, 
as a.n instance .of Heid's naivity,a statement of his that "when. 
ten men look at the m.00la they all see the same individual 
object." (Lectures, Vo-L. , P.158). Reid, in fact, how- 
ever, did insist very explicitly that "the visible appear- 
ances are innumerable when We confine ourselves to one ob- 
ject," (Hamilton's Reid, P.304, Vol.].) and accordingly, 
white he sees no. reason to disavow the coin ion sense account 
seeing-, the moon, he argues explicitly in favour of his 
right to' interpret that statement of the plain men in a 
"philosophical" way. 
This failure to appreciate Reid's point, is, we may 
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remark, a very noticeable feature of the phase of the 
philosophical Inovcment ;;re are consi c:_ering. The fact it 
that both Hamilton and :Terrier are strangely unsympathetic 
to the apostle of common sense," as ?eerier calls him, 
and tend to underrate hL:n very 7fi..1.ch. No doubt, this at- 
titude, taken up to s :rn.e extent by 7: amilton ,anc_ even .-,ore by 
Terrier, is understandable enough in view of the fact that 
the really hard part of the Droblemn of the external 
world had been alïiost deliberately set aside by Reid. rut 
all the sa -ie, the tendency was brought into being by them, 
and more especially by Ferrier to suppose that because of 
the - Problem of externality, there is nothing .good in Reid 
on the problem of externality at all. 
Here let us pass abruptly to Hamilton's discussion of 
this latter aspect of the problem, the aspect concerned with 
externality and independency. How his position on this 
new problem is 'Orobably best understodd in the light of 
his position on the part of the problem just treated. That 
is to say, in order to appreciate his point of view, or 
what seems to have been his point of view, we had better 
in the first ?lace regard him as setting aside real shape, 
inax/and size as constructions or inferences, and in the 
second place regard him as concerned). solely with visible 
size and she.pcs, and tangible sizes and shapes. That is to 
s , the fact giving rise to the great problem in Hamilton's 
_CCws ricer h0tbh QGOq h ÌfO 0..21 02 t (tiSr40.- 
IeLA - o R- ro (r..is ePtFe-1^41 
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case, is - to repeat quotations given earlier, - is the 
fact that, in Hume's words, the very perception or 
sensible image is believed to be the external object, or 
that, in Hamilton's own words, the external reality itself 
is believed to be the object I am conscious of, in per- 
ception. The belief in question here is,of course, the 
plain man's irresistible natural belief, Ind_ the question 
at issue is whether this belief can be justified, or at 
any rate,whether this belief can be defended against ob- 
jections. 
Now the problem facing Hamilton here is a generalised 
form, so to speak, of the problem facing Reid in the case 
of sight, and, by reference to Reid's discussions it is 
easy to show that the problem he.s tti.o parts to it. On 
the one hand, there is a question touching the foundations 
of the common sense belief that the object of sense is be- 
yond its respective organ of sense, and is external in 
that sense; and on the other hand, there is another Ques- 
tion touching-the foundation of the common sense belief 
that the object of sense in question - isnt an object 
with the status of pain or pleasure, and, in other words, 
that the object of sense is distinct from the act of 
sense. That is to say, there is, the problem, which Reid 
discussed especially with reference to sight but also with 
reference to touch, of the r elation of the object of sense 
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to the material impression on the organ, and there is 
also the .7r>blem, which Reid is aware of, but omits al- 
together to discuss, of the validity of the notion of dis- 
tinct existence, so far as distinct existence implies a 
reference to transcendence or existence beyond sense. 
Now Hamilton's treativnt of the total issues here is 
most easily comprehended by ;.means of e comparison with 
Reid's treatment of the parallel ft slit,5. (Indeed, it may 
be remembered here that not merely Hamilton, but also Fer- 
rier very often begin to appear incomprehensible a.nr even 
eccentric except when viewed in relation to their back- 
ground, and especially to Reid, and that, in consequence, 
Hamilton and Ferrier were unwittingly preparing the way 
for their own oblivion, by treating Reid as if 1Txx he were 
of very little account, and even (in Ferrier's case, any 
way), by wanting to discourage the study of Reid al- 
together). If then, we look at Hamilton's discussion of 
the problem of the external world in the light of Reid, 
the case stands pretty inch as follows. I'1ith the second 
part of the problem - how can we be become owere of the 
ob:i ects of sense' like visible shapes, as being independent 
of sense? How in s'i,ort can we become aware of shapes ex- 
in 
isti ng unperceived? - Hamilton, we may spy, deals a. much 
fxxtxxxxxid franker and fairer - tanner than often happens 
x in the case of other champions of common. sense, and speaks 
where Reka IS silent, On Elne a--er ho_nd, 
out with the first pert of the problem, the pert in wb i ch 
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Reid is very much et home, Hamilton does not by any means 
do well, and his remarks on that hee.c. are at first sight 
full of confusi ,ns and. even contradictions. A quotation 
from Ferrier will s ow the confusions into which. IIa °iiton 
,Tot here. It is fr.ani tlJe letter, written in 1851, but 
(perhaps, understandably) never actually sent. 
"l'7y Dear Sir .ïillieni, 
There is an ambiguity or inconsistency in 
your doctrine -- -which I have often intended to speak to 
you about. You say, ;-eid P.805 (i.e. Vol. 2), "In a. pres- 
entation or immediate cognition there is one sole object." 
What is this one sole object? Our organism, you answer. 
I rom which it of course follows that everything- beyond 
our organism. is a mediate object of cognition. This is 
indeed expressly admitted. "The primary qualities of 
things external laxtm to our organism we do not perceive 
- i.e. immediately know," P.881. And yet, in the face of 
this statement, I read, P.810, "The primary qualities of 
matter or body, now and here, - that is, in proximate re- 
lation to our organs - are objects of immediate cognition 
to the natural iRIR realists. " These two statements are 
absolutely contradictory and irreconcilable. Of course, 
the primary qualities, when "in proximate relation to our 
organs" are, therefore, according to passage in P.881, not 
immediately known; and yet, according to passage in P.810, 
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they are objects of immediate cognition to the natural 
realist." Does not this require some amendment ?" (1 er- 
ri er' s Lectures and Remains, Vo 1. 2, P p. 542, 543) . 
row Hamilton was undoubtedly very confused on this 
1 hfìle subj ectI but a few more quotations will show that he 
was struggling with a quite difficult point. Let us begin 
by showing, in the first place, that he understood pretty 
by 
well the grounds given Reid and Stewart for regarding as 
justifiable the plain man's belief of the object of sense 
as being beyond the organ of sense. "We must be careful 
not to confound the perceptions (visual) of mere externality 
or outness, and the knowledge we have of distance through 
the eye. The former may be and probably is natural; while 
the latter, its a great but unappreciable measure, is acquir- 
ed. In the case of Cheselden, the patient, though he had 
little or no perception of distance i.e. of the degree 
of externality, had still a perception of that externality 
absolutely. The o': j ects, he said, seemed to "touch his 
eyes as what he felt did his skin ", byt they did not ap- 
pear to him as if in his eyes, far less as a mere affection - 
of that organ." (Reid, Vol. I, P.177). - It should be men- 
tioned in passing that, in the course of this passage, 
Harlilton mentions Reid as differing from him on this point. 
But Ha Altoj as so very often happens, is unaware of his 
own relationship to Reid. The fact israther that Reid 
1 
6k-e b r a rk C rr, +n al, t S 
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generally, (though hot in the actual passage Hamilton 
is commenting on) takes up a position like Hamilton's and 
that, moreover, this very passage from Hamilton would seem 
to derive from a passage already quoted in which Stewart 
restates Reid's position in opposition to some views ex- 
pessed by Adam Smith about this aspect of the Cheselden 
case. 
But, in the second plE. ce, Hamilton not merely cditncides 
with Reid and Stewart as regards the general thesis that 
the :object of v_ Sion is seen as external to the eye; he 
also understands and appreciates one of the reasons given 
by Reid in defence of this position. The passage in Reid, 
is one already quoted. "Nothing can be dore unphilosophi_ cal" 
-Chan the identification of the object of vision with the 
pictures on the retina. This notion path no foundation 
in fact and observation " because the images found in 
the bottom of the eye "are not perceived at all or felt 
by the mind, " -Now i-ia :. ",ilton, instead of ind.Ú1ging in 
his usual practice of making unsympathetic and sometimes 
unnecessary objections to Reid, here writes a foot -note 
comciending and developing the above remark. "This (the 
perception of the retinal images) would rerui re e second 
eye behind the retina.; which eye would see the images 
as bent, as they are _pictured on the concavity of that 
membrane." Accordingly, therefore, Harilton understands 
quite well Reid's line of objection to the Adam Smith position 
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Hamilton,: then, agrees on this point more or less 
with Reid and ; tewa.rt, and the point which brings on his 
head di :c.iculties that did not trouble them is a point 
previously dwelt -on at length, namely that Hamilton, 
unlike Reid and Stewart, takes very seriously the evidence 
indicative of an identity between the objects of. sense 
and the material impression on the organ in the nervous 
system. That is to .say, Hamilton's-difficulties, in our 
opinion arise, from the fact ±biziodt that whereas he 
understood the arguments already mentioned in favour of 
the common senses belief of the object of vision as be- 
yond the eye, he also understood and took seriously the 
arguments - explained much-earlier in this chapter - ih 
favour of ?uttinc ,the object of vision in the eye. In a 
word, Hamilton very likely did not find a means of recon- 
ciling the two different pieces of evidence, 
But let us be more precise. The difficulty hei is 
that of reconciling the evidence derived from within i.e. 
from one's on vision, and the evidence derived from with- 
out i.e. from one's to "other senses or from physiolo^y 
on the question of the relation of the object of sen e. to 
the organ of sense. Now the interesting point is that 
on :inally, Hamilton was as little troublecl by this dif- 
ficulty as were Reid and Stewart. That is to say, the 
sympathetic account of the doctrine id entifyin; the object 
sense with the material impression on the organ or with 
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the events in the sensitive nerve -i given in Volume 2 
of the Reid, the section of the work which apparently 
iras written l¡.test. In earlier writings, the Lect).res or 
the footnotes to :Reid Volume 1, Hia. ilton would seem to be 
unaware of the difficulty, and to have accepted the 
opposite view. 
Let us quote a footnote from Reid I which indicates 
Hamilton's earlier Dosition. "The image on the retina is 
not itself an object of visual perception. The total ob- 
ject of visual perception is thus neither the rays in them- 
selves, nor the organ in itself, but the rays and the 
living organ in reciprocity; this organ, however, is not 
to be viewed as merely the retina but the whole tract of 
nervous fibre pertain _ng to the sense. In the act of 
vision, so also in other sensitive acts, I am th14 conscious 
( the word should not be restricted to self -consciousness) 
or immediately cognisant, not only of the affections of 
self, but of the phaenomena of soie thing different from 
self, both, however, always in relation to each other. Ac- 
cording as in the different senses, the subjective or the 
objective element predominates, we have sensation or per - 
cP.ption. " (Hamilton's Reid Volume 1 P.160 in e foot -note 
to the text of Reid's Inou ,r). 
low the doctrine given here _ s nothing bit e. fuller 
statement fo the doctrine of the lectures. "To say that 
we perceive by sight the sun or moon is a false or ellip- 
tical expression. 'Te perceive nothing but certain modific- 
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modifications of light in immediate relation to our 
&ow, 
organ of vision, and so farADr. Reid being philosophically 
correct, when he says th .t "when ten men look a.t the sun 
or moon, they ell see the same individual object," the 
truth is that each of t -ese persons sees a different ob- 
ject because each person sees a. different complement of 
rays, in relation to his individuál organ. - - -- It is 
enough that perception affords us the knowlecge of the non - 
ego at the point of sense. To arrogate to it the power of 
immediately informing us of external things which ere 
only the causes of the object we i i:Jedia.tely Perceive is 
either positively erroneous, or a confusion of ls.ncuageyi 
arising from an inadequate discrimination of phenomena. Such 
assumptions tend only to throw discredit on the doctrine of 
an intuitive perception; and such assumptions you will find 
scattered over the works both of Reid and Stewart. T would 
therefore, establish as a famdammnata fundamental doctrine 
of an immediate perception that all our senses are only 
modifications of touch; in other words, that the external 
object of perception is alweys in contact with the organ of 
sense." (Lectures Vol.`?, P.154). 
Now to understand the -point of these passages, we must 
recall the origine l question: is common s ense justified in 
its natural tendency to regard the shape seen or felt as 
being external in the sense of beyond or outside the organ 
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of sense? According; to Hamilton's notions, the point a.t 
issue here is something like this : on the one hand, we per- 
ceive a. visible shade, rnd feel cent in agreeable, though 
faint sensations on the other hand, as we learn from phy- 
siology or with the aid of another sense, light reys are pro- 
ceeding from a certain body to the eye, and there is a 
conseq=t agitation in the optic nerve. But this being so, 
is the plain man justifir d in regarding the shape seen as 
JalidawmaamitzmpmitLi having its counterpart in the phase of 
the external process that occurs prior to the nervous dis- 
turbances? But kat to this question, Hamilton replies that 
there is no reason to suppose the retinal image is the ob- 
ject of vision, and that there is nothing to prevent us re- 
garding the light rays in their impingement on the eye as 
the external counterpart of the object of visnel perception, 
and the distwibance in the nerves as the maxt external coun- 
terpart of visual sensation. But this being so, the common 
sense belief, he concludes, is quite justified. 
This, then, is the kind of view we find in the Lectires 
and in the footnotes to Reid Vol.I. It does not, it may 
be noted, differ very greatly from the view taken by 
Reid and Stewart. Hamilton, indeed, is very fond of drawing 
attention ts in the above passage - to the points of dif- 
ference between himself and his masters, but, from an ex- 
people 
ternal point of view, i.e. for Ìe who are outside the 
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common sense "school ", the differences are not very im- 
portnt ones. 
Now, some time after the lectures were written, there 
seems to have arisen, out of the attempt to answer system- 
atically Brown's reductive th.eor , a line of sped? la.tion 
tending towards the identification of the object of sense 
with the material impression on the organ_: a, line of 
speculation already described early in this chapter. As 
regards the datin, , the facts are that there is no mention 
Cu açf, ovt 
in the Lectures of the doctrines inhere, or of the termin- 
ology ddapted to them, and that the first reference to 
this new development occurs in the 1842 article of Ferrier, 
where he speaks as if he were maimattum almost collaborating 
with Hamilton. It is only in Vol.2 of the Reid, published 
with Vol.1 in 1846, but presumably written later, that 
Hamilton announces his version of the position, and it 
may be noted that his most emphatic statement is found in 
the passage where, taking for granted the identification of 
the object o2 sense with the processes in the organ of sense, 
he asks whether the nervous processes to be thus identified 
are those at the centre or the periphery. (Hamilton, Reid 
Vol.2, P.861). 
However we need not repeat our account of this part of 
the theory all over again, and in any case the position is 
clear enough. The plain man regards the object of sense 
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( say, the visible shape) as being beyond the organ and 
external, and the gnestion arises as to whether this belief 
is justifiable. But no,;, es the result of these new devel- 
opments, Hamilton now l.:1 .s to say that physiology i.e. the 
evidence about the sensory processes in question from the 
outside, instead_ of identifying the object of vision with 
li ht rays entering the eye, identifies the object of 
vision with processes in or behind the eye. This being so, - 
it is obvious that according, to the standard of justification 
adopted the plain man's beliefs about the externality of 
the object of vision are delusive, and accordingly the 
question arises as to whether e. new way can be found of de- 
finding common sense. 
Now %ae important thins for our purpose here is that the 
theory of perception found in Hamilton's official statement 
of his position in Reid, Vol.2 is probably best regarded 
as an attempt o get round this difficulty by means of a 
new d @fence of common sense, and, in any case, is utterly 
different from anything found on the subject in the Lectures. 
Here is a summary statement of it. "In Perception proper, 
the object-object perceived is, always, either a Primary 
quality, or the quasi -Primary phasis of a. Secundo-primary. 
The Primary qualities are perceived as in our organism; the - 
Q,uasi- primary phasis of the Secundo - primary as in correlation 
to our organism." Now the new defence of common sense is to 
be found in these references to Secundo -primary qualities 
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and a longer ouotation will begin to bring home Harilton's 
point. 11I hold that, on the one hand, in the consciousness 
of sensations, out of each other, contrasted, d .limited, and 
variously a= nged, we have 'tom*. Fercep` ion proper, of the 
primary qualities, in an externality to the mind, though 
not to the nervous organism, as an immediate cognition; and 
on the other, as a correlative contained in the conscious- 
ness of our voluntary motive energy resisted, and not resis- 
ted bé! aught within the limits of the mind and its subser- 
vient organs, we have e. perception proper of the secundo- 
prima,,ry quality of resistance, in an extra. -organic force, as 
an immediate cognition, and not merely as a notion or con- 
cept of a resisting something external to our body.41 (Reid, 
Vol.2 P.883 - the earlier cuotation is on P.8"l). 
Now it is easy to underdtand, in P. very general way, 
what is Familtonhs point here. It is impossible, he con - 
i v% 
cedes, to uphold the co=on sense beliefAthe object of vision 
as 
Gam, in any way,beyond the eye, or the object of touchAbeyond 
the organ of touch. even so, might it not be possible, he 
wonders, to uphold, in a limited way, the common belief about 
being aware of existence beyond the organ, by conceding that, 
in a special, but very important case, of the awareness of 
resistance to our voluntary motion, we are actually aware of 
something, i.e. of an existence beyond the organ? Of course, 
our awareness of this external something cannot, h.e concedes 
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be sensuouil reness ;.since there is no going aga_nst the 
fact that the object of sense - the coloured or solid shape 
- is to be identified with the orga.n,Aihe nervous processes 
therein. But could not one cla.i. i, in this special case, 
a non - sensous intuition? 
Obviously this is not going to be a very easy theory 
to defend, or/for that matter understand,- but, fortunately, 
Traazilton, in this case, rives a fairly ample i indication 
of his intentions. As he seems to h--ve viewed the matter, 
there are two separate difficulties he has to t, over. The 
first concerned of course the claim about non- sensous in- 
tuition in general, and what he wants to prove here is that 
we have information about our voluntary movements impossible 
to derive from sense. But, of course, it is not enough to 
establish even this fact; one mu t also produce some evidence 
that, granted an intuition of some sort here, this intuition 
gives us what we want - namely an intuition of an extra- 
organic existence. 
A word of introduction is necessary about the sources 
of Hamilton's a.ns- er to the first difficulty, since, apart 
from his reference to a source, or rather an analogous and 
antecedently published doctrine with which he admits acquain- 
tance, this part of Hamilton's teaching would be difficult 
to follow. In the first place, we had better have the facts, 
most of which are important only for dating purposes. Hamil- 
ton made his first brief mention of his doctrine of the 
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inverse relation of sensation and perception in 1830; in 
1834, he received from Victor Cousin a copy of a. boor by 
haine de Biran containing a similar. theory, but did not, 
he gives us to understand, notice the parallel; in 1840, 
he saw, in Rev is`..on's eview in the ;vue de Deux fond s, 
of the french translation of his own 7diirrh fieview art- 
icles, a notice not :_merely of the pera.11el between De 
Biran's and his own doctril-_e of sensation and perception, but, 
what is the thing really of importance here, an account, 
which has, in some bort become a classic of Trench philos- 
ophy, of the reletionti hip, in general, of rain de Biran to 
de Tracy, and through de Tracy to Oonclillac. (This info-- 
ation is given_ in, and, where not given, surmisable ?ira Yn 
Hamilton's fairly full account of the matter in Reid, Vol?. 
beprin 
P.888). In the second place, we must show the imummxTm of 
gill this on Haim lton's defence of intuitionism. The im- 
portant fact here is that just as Brown's treatment of the 
problem of the external world derives from de Tracy's, as 
Hamilton frer.uently mentions, so Hsn.ilton's second or later 
theory of the externel world, (the one we are di scussin; mere) 
is a.drlitted by Hemilton to be very close' to Heine de Biran's 
reply to de Tracy, at least so fer as the defence of in- 
tuitionism i concerned, i.e. so fer the first part of the 
theory is concerned. (Reid Vol.2 P.866: "the P-receding 
doctrine coincides, in result, with what T. Maine de Biran 
has so ably developed."). 
Here we will give an account of the doctrine in Ques- 
tion which is less indebted to TTa:_?ilton's tried .rema.rfs 
t 2.ß-n to Henii Gouchier's restatement of Ravaisson. 
(Oeuvres choisies de Maine de Biran Aubfß, Editions 
Montaigne Pp. 28 -33) . .T1T ke the expérience of pushing at 
a stiff door, so as to open it. One sees, of course, one's 
hand in contact with the door, and one -feels the flat 
surface of the door against one's hand. But noir, according 
to Brown and Hamilton, as also to de Tracy and ?:"aine de 
Biran, the object of touch here, the door, has its counter- 
part in the VF:S'u 
- field onot in the visible door, but in 
thé visible hand. That is to say, nothing is felt but co- 
-existent muscular strains, and there is no question in the 
present part of the argument of the claim arisingfhat the 
object of touch or pressure is in any way beyond the hand. 
The sole question here is whether or not in being aware of 
the fact of my hand's pressure against the door we have to 
dm only with the intimationyof sense, as Brown and De Tracy 
claim, or whether there also enters into the situation cer- 
tain intuitive intimations as Hamilton and De Biran -claims. 
In order to see the point of the em iricists here, let us 
recTll Brown's analysis of this experience : all that-hap- 
pens here, he says, , is that we find by experience e. desire 
to experience the unfolding of a. customary. series of mus- - 
culas strains is followed only by the partial unfolding of 
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the custol :l¡ry series in cuestion, i. e. that the only thing 
to occur in the experience of pressing one's hand egainst 
something is the stopping short of its usual length of the 
chain of sensations. But now, according to Hamilton a.nd 
hI-Line de Diran, this sort of analysis is not nil adequate 
to the common sense facts of the ce se i.e. to the fact, 
namely, that I would normally describe myself as "making 
an effort" on such ocassions to force the door open. That 
is to say, the total fact to be explained is that I desire 
to extend any arm (to experience the complete evolution of a 
customary chain of muscular sensations), make the effort to 
fulfil the desire, and find, despite my efforts, the chain 
of sensation will not completely unroll itself. But now 
Brown's analysis does nothing to explain these facts of ef- 
fort, and indeed he refuses, *ithout giving any reason, to 
admit the distinction, relevant to these facts, between 
will and desire. (See Hamilton, Reid, Vol. 2,.. P...531). 
But the role of this "effort" in volunt dry movement 
is most clearly seen, not where I am pushing against a door, 
4-live, arm 
but simply where the desire to stretch outAis followed 
by the stretching out of the OTIM i. e. where there is no 
extern 1 impediment to its movement. In this case, I have, 
according, to the common sense statement of the matter, to 
make sometimes greater efforts, sometimes lesser vFT efforts 
to carry out the desire; that is to say, here too I am aware 
of resistance to my efforts, and in this case tatim the 
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object resisting my efforts can be described only as some- 
thing in the organism i.e. this chain of must .lar sensations, 
or other connected musclar tra%ns are felt as containing 
the impediment, But, in view of this fact, it is cuite 
proper to distinguish my will - the source of these efforts 
of it mine to make the organism move - as cjyperorganic, 
the word being introduced by T Eine de Biran, and adopted by 
Hamilton (Reid, Vol.2, P.864). 
Now let us note carefully where the argument had led us. 
The first point established is, strictly speaking that, this 
n. technical Phraseology about t'zere being evidently 
in myself a hyperor ganic force opposed to an organic force 
is not an arbitrary innovation, but is îendered inevitable 
by the facts p common sense and ordinary language. The sec- 
ond Point established' is that this "hyperorga:nic force" is 
left out of account by Brown and by de Tracy, and is not 
directly at any rate exPlicable in terms of feelings of desire 
and aversion, and feelings of muscular strain - in terms of 
the data cited by the empiricists. Accordingly, the conclus- 
ion of Hamilton and de áir .n is that, for the present and 
pending the rise of counter -arguments, it is quite legitimate 
to regard our knowledge of this fundamental aspect of our- 
selves as non - sensous. 
In order to pass from the first part of Hamilton's argu- 
ment to the second, we will have a quotation from Gouhier. 
"The typical exa:__Zple of the "foi t primitif" is not the cf.-. 
fort to raise a burden or break a stick, that is to say, the 
experience of a conflict between two forces, the one in- 
ternal, the other external. The muscular effort gives me 
the feeling of a force that deploys itself against a res- 
istance, of a. hyperorga.nic force which deploys itself against 
an orgenic resistance, xidelaxamxxxx2mmEmmx without any refer- 
ence to an external object; the two terms are interior; 
their opposition is not in any manner that of the subject 
to the object, but that of the active to the inert, and of 
the one to the multiple." (Loc.cit. Pp. 1,32). 
Th ow Ha mi_l_ton has no quarrel ,.Tit.h the position as so 
far stated, and would be willing enough, in a provisional 
way, to regard, with de Biran the organic end the hyper - 
orgenic as :celeted, so to speak, as non -ego, and ego. The 
difference between Hamilton and de Biran arises rather on 
the question whether this statement of the case is, to any 
extent, compotible with a re; 1ism like Reid's. De Biran, 
here for his pert, - as is evident from ruoteti ons from his 
letters to Amp re - thinks not, and regerds Reid. PS attemp- 
ting the impossible in his distinction of the object of sense 
from the act of the sense. Hamilton, very netura.11y, would 
like to think otherwise, since obviously, if he gave up the 
claim to know directly existence outside the body and beyond 
lm 
the organ of sense, he would be givinAwe.y his case, on this 
vital point at least, to Drown, and would be mein g external 
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reality inferential. 
Now let us define this pert of the problem as 7amil- 
ton Sand it, and for that :¡purpose, ,o back to the case of 
making an effort to push the door open. The fact here, ac- 
cording to the above analysis, is that there is myself 
ma. ,-inch the effort (i. e. the hyperorganic, intuitable non- 
empirical force) to -prolong beyond_ a certain -point e. series 
of muscular st- a.ins and not succedding. Yaw, so far as we 
have gone, it is obvious that my exeri ente of the door 
and my hand against it is definable wholly in terms of co- 
existent muscular strains, and that the experience of the 
dotr's resistance to the arm's movement is as much en eXper- 
ience of the organism or muscular strain as is the experience 
of the arm's unimpeded movement. Hamilton, however, in 
trying to get a. way round the diffi c;r Ìty, is struck brr the 
idea that if there is evidence for the intuiti +ye ,' ., , non - 
sensuous knowledge of a hyperorga.nic force, there might be 
somewhat analogous evidence for the intuitive, non- sensuuds 
knowledge of an extra -organic force. Now, F.s matter of 
fact, Hamilton thought that he had found some cuite Bolicl 
evidence confirming this notion of his in the experimental. 
data cited by Sir Charles Bell in support of his discoveries 
in physiology, that the spinal nerves are the organs of 
motion through their anterior roots, of sensation through k.r 
their posterior. As regards the cazew which interested 
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Hamilton, these were all cases of paralysis where the sen- 
sation nerves were out of action, but the motor nerves 
were not, i.e. where the patient was able to move his 
arm, to push things and to grasp things without feeling 
any of the so called muscular sensations, or the cutaneous 
sensations i.e. where the patient had no notion of the object 
pushed or grasped as a solid tangible shape with a certain 
tangible size, and yet, apparently, was aware of the effort 
to move (the hyperorganic force) and of e. force resisting 
these efforts. -gut, now, these being the facts as cited 
by Bell, the .inference Ha_ilton draws from them is that 
this knowledge of a counter -force to my efforts, being ad- 
mitted to be na in no wise a. knoi:;lec'ge of a tangible shasDe, 
hard or soft, i.e. to be in no wise a knowledge in empir- 
ical ter,;is, will have to be regarded as on intuitive know- 
ledge. But if so, -,Thy not, he concludes, identify this 
intuited counter -force with the extra-organic force believed 
in by common sense? Indeed, what else con one make of the 
facts, if one does not do that; since in this cose one's 
body is not felt t all. 
Accordingly, Haslilton puts his conslusion thus. F'Taen 
I a.m. conscious" of as external impediment to a movement 
of man my limb, "I conñot be conscious of myself as the 
resisted relative, without being conscious i.e. i_lm.ediately 
percipient, of a not -self as the resisting correlative. In 
this cognition there is no subje.ctivo- organic affection. 
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I simply know myself as a force in energy, the not -self 
a counter -force in energy. dut though. such -pure per - 
ception may be detected in the simple apprehension of 
1,77x71 resistance, in reality it _'_ors hot stand alone, for 
it is always" (he .means - epa.rt from the pe.ra,.lytic cases) 
accompanied by sensations, muscular and cutaneous." (Reid, 
Vo 1. 2, P.866). 
In order to clarify Hamilton's position, we had better 
have a look at the facts he cites from Sir Charles P11. 
Our stand :Point in doing this will be to concede that T-eïi_l- 
ton has made out _ite a good case for his intuition of an 
extra -organic force, provided the paralytic's knowler.?e 
of that force axing does not come from some sense other than 
touch. In fact, ho'. <ever, in one ce se cited by Hamilton, 
and that the only illuminating one, it looks as if 'ft.^ know- 
ledge of the counter -force, and of what to do with the hand 
came from vision. Sir Cherles Bell records the case of a. 
mother, who, while nursing her infant, wee affected with 
paralysis or loss óf muscular motion on one side of her body, 
and by stupor or loss of sensibility on the other. With 
the arm capable of movement she could h-,ld the child to her 
bosom; and this she continued to do as long as her attention 
remained fixed upon the infant. But if surrounding objects 
withdrew her observation, there being no a.ch±lonitary sensation, 
the flexol- muscles of the ar m gradually relaxed, end the 
child was in danger of falling." ( Le; d, Vol. ̀l, P.865). 
But here, of Course, the Guest. i.on at once crises as 
to whether the :_,.other -would know whether or not she was 
moving her arm against an obstacle, and. having its move- 
ment impeded, or else moving it freely, if, by some further 
accident, she lost her sight and also the sensibility of the 
half of her body that still supplied her with tactual ex- 
perience? That is to say, the mother is certainly here 
conscious of making efforts to do certain things, and also 
of resistance to these efforts, but, so far a.s the evidence 
goEs, it would seem that she is conscious of these efforts 
as efforts to move certain visible things with the hea 
of a visible arm, or, a a.in, s.s efforts to keep that visible 
arm steady in a. certain Position in relation to other vis- 
ible things. 3ut, this being so, one can Perfectly well 
account for the woman's behaviour without having to postulate 
in her an intuition of extra -organic forces, or, in short 
there is apparently no fact that makes it necessary to 
?osti_.l? to an intuition of an extra -organic force, in the 
sense tl.iat there are facts that make it necessary to post- 
ulate, in reference to the same ±_±..ic situation, an 
intuition of a hyperorganic force. 
But i:' this is so, then this second attempt on the 
part of Hamilton to defend the ordinary belief in the object 
of perception's externality to the organ of sense has failed 
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as completely as his earlier <.tteraptt. î.ia.ine de Bira.n, 
a.p )arently, will not, so to speak, ;.;lens':_ with Reid, or, 
in other words, in order to preserve intact the,'fait 
pri; .iti :f' of .myself as Ç.. supersensible force making ef- 
forts ma :ins efforts in the face of #npirical obstacles, - 
for instance, making efforts to Push a door o }yen - one 
has apparently to identify both the limb under one's con- 
trol, and the body pressing against the limb es being both 
nothing but objects of sense - of sight or of touch - and, 
of course, in regarding the elements present in the situat- 
ion (other than the effortful self) as mire objects of sense, 
one is regarding them as not being beyond the organism, i.e. 
as being the mary qualities, which, Hamil- 
S 
ton, are perceived in the organism. ( R41.14 vJ2) 
Here we will pass from Hamilton to Terrier, taking as 
our starting -point the 1851 unposted letter from irhich we 
quoted at the opening og the present section of our dis- 
course. How, apparently, this letter is intended as a kind 
of comment on Reid, Vol.2, i.e. on Hamilton's exposition of 
his second and later theory. But in the course of this let- 
ter, (or frament of a letter), Perrier is doing two thin.7s. 
In the passage rammRAT4ax already quoted, he is drawing at- 
tention to a glaring contradiction in Hamilton, that is in 
itself cquJ te accidental and reziova le without damage to his 
argument, and that has crept into the text because part of 
one of the notes (Note B), out of which the volume is loosely 
pieced together, pe contains statements belonging to the 
earlier theory, (the Lectures theory) and inconsistent 
therefore with most of what is said in the rest of the book. 
However, as the letter proceeds, Ferrier ventures upon a 
critici m of his friend's _position of a more fundamental 
sort, the general :pendency of which criticism is that 
Hamilton would improve kk his theory somewhat if he gave 
up all claim to an immediate knowledge of the extra -organic. 
"You ex?ressly state," says Ferrier, ter:,iin ̂ .tine an 
argument of an obvious tendency "that the sole immediate ob- 
ject in perception is the organism; all that lips beyond 
is mediate. The organism is e 
so 
the sole immediate object 
in imaginatio_.; all that lies beyond is mediate. How, then 
can these two powers be discriminated as presente v e (im- 
mediate) and representative (mediate) ?" (i.e. itc&tJasnot 
make sense to say that what cannot be presented can be re- 
presented, that one can imagine what one can never perceive). 
Ferrier, then, proceeds this. "The argument by which you 
find an immediate non -ego in the organism I do not meddle 
with at present. but it seems to me that this argument, if 
sound, would be sufficient to establish your natural real - 
ism, without complicating the case with the distinction of 
present^uive end_ representative knowledge, a distinction 
which seems to me to be untenable as you put it, and which 
et any rate recluires some redding up at your hands. It is 
also very misleading; for I believe that unwary readers of 
Ilote P may be of the ()Pinion that you advocate an im....ledi<. te 
'.:nowled e of externs i objects be'rond the organism, and are 
thus a. champion of common sense." (Perrier, Lectures and 
Remains, Vol.`?, Pp. 54:x, 544) . 
Ido':r, in order to c lise at Perrier's point here, a little 
must be said about dates. Ferrier and Hamilton first met 
about 1831, according, to tradition, and, after their friend- 
ship ripened., saw one another "almost daily" (Appendix to 
the Institutes Vol.1 of the Lectures and Remains) until 
:Terrier was appointed Professor in St. Andrews in 1845. At 
the time of their first meeting, Hamilton had s.lree.c Publis- 
hed his two celebre.trd articles, but, he Pu-hli .hed nothing 
more on philosophy except a short article in 1839, until 
1846, the year of the Reid, being occupied in the meanwhile 
if'y'-t, with his writing of the Lectures for delivery (1837- 
38), and then with preparing the Reid. By contrast with 
Hamilton, Ferrier published a great teal in those years, 
contributing at least twelve long papers on philosophical 
topics to Bloc rood's between 1838 -1843. Yaw, in these 
papers, Merrier shows himself conversant with a good_ deal 
th<.t Hamilton must have thin;.ing and discussing in those 
years, and, ES we have seen, alludes to the ling Hamilton 
took asinst Brown's reductionism some four years before 
Ha.miltan published his doctrine on the subject. To r, r, 
there is nothing; in =v'errier's papers that . wo uld ir; i c- t This 
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being acquainted with the part of Hamilton we have been 
expleinin, namely the second theory defer.in7 the view 
that the object o perception, i.e. in. a certEin speciEl 
case, is be:'ond the ornism. 
¡Fiat Ferrier says here reds :Ts if it =e, jr judg- 
ent on certEin parts of .2.eid, Vol.2 which cqme 7S something 
o: a surprise to him, i.e. for -b.ieh he hed not been pre-P- 
ared by anythin7 he had heard from Hamilton before. Now 
Ferrier's opinion is summed up in the fact that he willina 
to let pass as more tolerable then the rest the part of 
Hamilton's theory that finds an immediate non-ego in the 
organism. For our purposes at any rate, it is the sentence 
containing this assertion and we can leave p.s- 
ide as irrelevant the rest of his remarks; that is to say, 
we can leave aside the argument to the effedt that H=iltoniS 
not even justified in claiming a mediate or indirect know- 
ledge of whEt is beyond the organism i.e. of the extra- 
organic, and also the to Hamilton (or what looks 
like E. reminder) that at one time he W2S agreed with :Terrier 
about the impossibility of an i-mmediate knowledae of the 
extra-organic. 
terrier, then, is prepared, one ui ht say, to let 7a7d.1- 
ton's theory pass ±an only in so far as it coincides iritb 
D7,ine de Tiran's theory, i.e. in so fer Es it asserts our 
being immediately conscious only of the hyrpororaanic force 
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on the one hand, and of the organism on the other, end of 
the opposition between them. But if this is so, what 
to 
grounds we -vintilask, has Berrier for hi farther assertion 
that c. limitcd theory of this kind is sufficient to estab- 
lish Hamilton's natural realism? On .the onAler( , natural _ 
realism - as Berrier knows well enough B,emains, 
yol.2, 2.'387) - is a theory that tries to defend common 
sense belief, c. theory that regards the object of y-2ception 
as being beyond the organ. On the other hand, the theory 
that findS an 1.medite non-ego in the organism is F. 
theory that the primay qualities are perceived es in 0127 
organism," i. e. a theory that identifies the shape seen F.s 
tsctuelly felt wth the materiel inpression on the organ. 
But, this beinr so, the latter theory is apparently 
just as much contrary to common sense as the former theor7 
is in favour of common sense, and in fact it would seem 
as if the one was inconsistent with the other, the one main- 
taining the impossibility our getting beyond the ore,en in 
perception, the other maintaining the possibility and indeed 
the fact of our getting beyond the organ in perception. But 
if so, it it not nonsense to assert as Bernier does thet the 
theory of the organism as non-ego is compatible with natural 
realism? 
Bernier, however, very likely knows whet he is doing 
here all,riq,ht, and, in fact, in one of his 1_847. 
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thought or imaging Lion will tolerate. If we turn the 
visible body, end all visible things into the ere, we 
must turn the e_ e of the visible body Elso into the eye; 
± a process which, of course, ¡.gain turns the visible 
body end all visible things out of the eye. " (Lectures 
and Remains, Vol.2, Pp.394 -396; a.bridhed). 
Je might perhaps explp i n the point at issue here in 
this way. .fe ordinarily believe the objects of vision 
to be beyond the eye, a.nd the same sort of objection to 
this common sense belief is to be considered as had given 
Hamilton so much trouble - the objection , namely, th" t 
the objects of vision are, a.ccordinm to the combined 
teachi= of phenomenology and physi olo7y, more properly to 
be identified with certain impressions in the back of the 
eye rather than with the bodies external to the eye that 
give rise to these impressions. I`ow, in order to do justice 
to Ferrier here, we had best envisage him as reste' ' to 
himself the physiological -phenomenological thesis in the 
form tx : the objects of vision are to be identified not 
with the tangible bodies external to the tangible eye -ball 
and reflecting light into it, but with the impressions 
this light makes in the back of the tangible eye -ball. Ac- 
cordingly, the idea behind Ferrier's suggestion here is very 
likely this ' that while we are doubtless not aware of the 
the objects of vision a.s being beyond the -eye, conceived 
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of as a tangible oTDj ect, we m y well be ati.r.a.re of the ob- 
jects of vision as being beyond the eye conceived of as a 
visible object. ITow the difficulty here is, of course, how 
we c<:..n manage to conceive of our o-.n ryes as visible objects, 
or, to put the same point in another way, how if we turn 
the visible body and all other visible things into the 
( tangible) eye, ' one can also turn the eye of the visible' 
body into the (tangible)eye.. The fact is that whih our 
tangible nose -tip, can, and sometimes does, imprint a col- 
oured impression of itself on the canvass of our retina, 
our tangible eye could not possibly imprint o coloured im- 
pression of itself on the canvass of our retina. Now Fer- 
rier, as we shall later, quite cognisant 
of this difficulty, but, in the present conteXt , he con- 
tents himself with pointing out that while we .are never a- 
ware of our own eyes - grey, brown, blue or green - as 
actual colour_ patches, we would seem to be aware of our 
eyes as virtual colour -patches is some sort of mutual exter- 
nality to the given colour-patches.- In sayi this, he is 
presumably insisting on it as a fact that in addition 
being immediately aware of other things as present given 
colour -patches, we are mediotely aware of our own eyes 
as absent unseen colour patches, and that, furthermore, in 
being aware of this, we are aware of the other objects of 
vision a.s being out of and beyond our eyes. put, this 
being so, Ferrier's conclusion is that the common sense 
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belief of the objects of vision as be.ng beyond one's 
eye, is cuite copatible with the scientific notion of 





But let us c;uote a oas sa,ge where Perrier outs his 
case in this way. "In the operation of seeing, ath ittinr 
the canvass or ba.ckgrouncl of our pitture to be a retina, 
or what we will, we maintain that we cannot stole here and 
never do stop here. . e invF- .riably go on ( such is the 
inevitable lays of our nature) kam to complete the -oi cture - 
the.t is, we fill in our own eye as e. colour within the very 
lecture which our eye contains we fill it in ce a. sens- 
ation within the other sensations which occupy the rest of 
t e field; and, in doing so, we'o necessity, by the same 
law, turn these sensations out of the eye, end they thus, 
by the same necessity, assume the rank of independent ob- 
jective existences. .-Low this operation (of filling in) is 
accomplished, is a subject of but secondary moment; whether 
it is brought about tk by the touch, by the eye itself, or 
by the iwer. ination, is a. question that might admit of 
much - iscus'nion; but it; is one of very subordinate interest. 
The fact is the ;;:min thing - the fact that the operation is 
accomplished in one way or another - the fe.dt that the sense 
comes before itself (if not directly, yet virtually) as one 
of its own :sensations = that is the -principal point to be 
attended to; e-nd we apprehend that, this fact is now placed 
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beyond the rea.ch of controversy." (lac. cit. P-0.393,394). 
By this time, we are in a better position to under- 
stand what probably lay behind the remark of Ferrier in 
this unposted letter that the ±trratly theory of the organism 
as the non -ego i.e. of the primary qualities as perceived 
within the organism is not incompatible with a standpoint. 
like natural rea.1isrn, a standpoint upholding common sense. 
The fact of the. matter would seem to be that Hamilton's 
first defence of natural realism, i.e. the theory on the 
same lines as Reid's found in the Lectures and footnotes 
to Reid's text, had to be given up about 1842 in the days 
when Ferrier and. he were criticising Brown's reductionism, 
that, from then on, Ferrier and Hamilton both P Ced the 
vr\ 
common problem of trying to -defend comon sense without dehy- 
ink, as Reid did, the identity of object of sense and mater- 
ial Impression on the organ, that Terrier oui c':ly found a 
solution satisfactOry (far the time being) to himself, and 
published_ it in iaack rood's in two arti Iles, ('-.he one cited 
and another) in 1843, and that TTaì ilton, ?.,Orkin, no ,:T independ- 
ently, elaborated -a quite different solution din his own 
account, the oncwhich is to be found in Reid, Vol.? and whilah 
Ferrier in this letter is criticising. No doubt, we are 
here guessing_on scanty evidence as regards dates but that 
something of this kind happened we see no reason to disbelieve. 
)¡&' re GS. 1*sS :. w< pot GON 1231f a 
jy1- ta Yr. I . y.- 4. eo. w A ta 4a e u v Y -- ea t-c. I itit '+ 
However, our business here is concerned not so much 
with discovering the influence of one man or another, as 
with understanding one man's theory in the light of other 
theories, propounded by other men working in the same place 
at the same time, and it will accordingly be proper to look 
at Ferrier's theory from this standpoint. On the one hand 
there is the position of Adam Smith. "A pair of spectacles 
form a sort of projected retina, not much, if at all, 
larger than your real retina.. Look at the tower, attending 
in some degree to the size of your spectacles, and you 
shall see that it does not stretch across one half of their 
diameter. And if a fairy pencil, as Adam Smith supposes 
etc. etc." On the other hand, against the inference 
drawn therefrom that the visible tower is painted on the 
retina, we have the previously quoted reply of Reid that 
this inference is unphilosophical, in the sense of being 
contrary to observable fact, because neither the optic 
nerve nor the eye are ever seen. Finally, we have 
Hamilton's elucidation of Reid to the effect that to speak 
of the retinal paintings As seen would be to suppose an eye 
within the eye. But now, having got all these positions 
together, we have all the materials that went to the making 
of Ferrier's theory, and all that is required to produce it 
is a clear statement of the various positions and counter- 
positions that we get in Reid or Hamilton (The quotation 
is from Ferrier himself: Vol. 2, p. 343; and on p.323 he 
shows some knowledge of the subtleties of Reid and Stewart 
about vision). 
We must now proceed to say something about Ferrier's 
theory of perception in general,. i.e. the theory presupposed 
in his solution of the difficulty which he and Hamilton had 
faced in common. It is indeed a theory that had a strange 
destiny. Nowhere systematically expounded, it grows up bit 
by bit in the anonymous Blackwood' s articles of 1838 -43, and 
thereafter, apart from one or two brief references, not of 
an explicit sort, but merely implied, it is never again 
mentioned 'by Ferrier, apparently for the reason that he 
set it aside as being unphilosophical, i.e. as being 
concerned with speculations about contingent truth. 
We start then from the series of seven long articles 
published in 1838 -39 (Lectures and Remains, Vol. 2, pp.1 -257). 
Now this 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness' as 
it is called is certainly unlike anything we have had 
occasion to mention in the course of our study. Indeed, on 
a superficial glance, the thing one immediately tends to be 
reminded of is not phenomenological analysis in the style 
of Brown or Hamilton, still less a priori analysis in the 
style of Ferrier' s own Institutes of Metaphysics (1854) but 
rather, perhaps, the metaphysical flights of Sartor Resartus, 
a book, be it noted, conceived in the same city and by 
another friend and admirer of Sir William Hamilton. At any 
rate, the basic point of view is much the same, and the style, 
though very different, equally mannered and poetical. "Look 
at thought, and feeling and passion, as they glow on the 
pages of Shakespeare. Look at the same as they stagnate on 
the dissecting table of Dr. Brown. Behold, how shapeless 
and extinct they have become: Man is a 'living soul'; but 
science has been trained among the dead" (Vol. 2, p.17). 
However, on a closer view, it becomes evident that 
the author of the "Introduction" is by no means a more genial 
and less powerful version of Carlyle, but rather a figure 
with every right to be included in the gallery we have been 
visiting. Leave out of account the rhapsodical moralisings 
embellishments which take up nearly half the 
book, and what you are left with is pure philosophy of a 
sort that derives from the tradition we have been considering 
and yet is strikingly original and up to date. The 
romantic attack on analysis turns out to be a protest against 
the kind of analysis which, like Brown's, tries to explain 
away the mystery of perception, and it is accompanied by a 
plea for a more searching kind of analysis that does not 
fight shy of mysteries. Indeed the fundamental theme of 
the book is the theme that has been constantly with us from 
the time of Reid - the theme of the relations of sensation 
and perception. 
Let us, then, consider the Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Consciousness with a view to discovering how 
it serves as a sort of transition from theories like 
Hamilton's to the sort of theory found in Ferrier' s 1841- 1843 
articles. The main problem facing us here is that of 
understanding the peculiar terminology which Ferrier uses in 
this book, but never subsequently, and which is often 
"romantic" in the bad sense of the word. Accordingly, 
our starting -point had better be a consideration of certain 
passages which make tolerably clear the intentions behind 
Ferrier' s language. 
The argument we want to consider is one which recurs 
several times in this repetitious book, for example, pp. 68, 
69, 115 -126, 181 -183, and its importance for us consists in 
its being expressly directed against a passage from Brown to 
the effect that "the relation of cause and effect is exactly 
the same in perception as in all other mental phenomena, a 
relation of invariable sequence of one change after another" 
(Brown's Sketch of a q stem of Philosophy, p.125 -6, cited 
in Lectures and Remains, Vol. 2, p.115 -6). Now in order 
to understand Ferrier's doctrine, we had better cite a few 
sentences from these pages of Brown in question, which 
Ferrier does not quote but which he evidently had in mind. 
Brown is criticizing Reid's doctrine about acts of sensation 
and acts of perception. "Dr. Reid, considering all the 
processes of thought in a more mysterious view, and 
attaching to the words act and aeration no very precise 
meaning, was influenced by an error of the same kind in 
supposing the word (22 1221 to express a relation different from 
the relation of simple and invariable antecedence which is 
all that we mean when we speak of causation, in other 
sequences of events, mental and material - - -- The belief 
or perception of a hard figured object (existing independently) 
is merely an intuition like any other intuition, in which 
we do not suppose the relation of the intuitive feeling to 
the feeling that preceded it to be at all different from 
the relation of any other feeling to any other antecedent 
feeling ". 
Now Perrier evidently wants to defend against Brown 
a version of the "more mysterious view" of sensation and 
perception, though not indeed the one attributed by Brown 
to Reid, but one of his own devising, of which he evidently 
has high hopes. Accordingly he proceeds by first defining 
and explaining Brown's view in this terminology peculiar to 
himself with a view to criticising Brown. His first step 
is to set forth a preliminary fact which Brown, at any rate, 
would not deny. "Perception" he says " is a synthesis of 
two facts, sensation, namely, and consciousness" (p.121), 
and then he proceeds to define the sort of view Brown takes 
of perception as being the view that "consciousness" is 
"the harmonious accompaniment and dependent of sensation" 
(p.182, to quote the most apt statement of the poing. That 
is to say, on a view like Brown's, "these two poles agree and 
act so harmoniously together, that the vividness experienced 
at one pole - the pole of sensation - is answered by a 
proportional vividness at the opposite pole of consciousness 
and that a depression at this latter pole again takes place 
in accordance with a diminished intensity at the former 
pole" (p.69). But if so, the conclusion follows or ought 
to follow "that sensation and consciousness are really 
identical, and that the two poles are in fact, not two but 
one" (p.69). That is to say, if Brown's view is carried 
to its logical conclusion, the distinction between sensatior . 
and perception (as Hamilton, we may note, had already said) 
becomes impossible to maintain. 
But is Brown's view correct? Ferrier replies thus. 
"This point, however, is not be settled by speculation 
or by abstract reasoning. What says the fact? The fact 
is notorious, that the degree of our consciousness or self - 
reference always exists in an inverse ratio to the degree 
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of intensity of Yy of our sensations, passions, emotions, 
etc., and that consciousness is never so effectually 
depressed, or, perhaps we may say, never so totally 
obliterated within us, as when we are highly transported 
by the vividness of any sensation This is decidedly 
a fact and there is no denying it. Look at a human being 
immersed in the swinish gratification of sense. See here how 
completely the man is lost in the animal. Swallowed up in 
the pleasurable sensations of his palate, he is oblivious 
of everything else, and consciousness sinks into abeyance 
for a time" (Vol. 2, pp. 69, 70). Accordingly, Ferrier 
concludes the matter by expressing the following opinion. 
"This, then, proves that consciousness or the act of negation, 
is not the harmonious accompaniment and dependent, but is the 
oy 
antagonist and the violat. :c u of sensation ". Accordingly 
a path is cleared for the "more mysterious view" of perception 
(Quotation from p.182). 
Now these doctrines of Ferrier quoted here are 
obviously reminiscent of Hamilton: for one thing, there is 
a law of "inverse ratio" spoken of here which seems to be 
like Hamilton's, in a general way, and for another thing 
Ferrier makes the point, against Brown Which Hamilton also 
makes in the Lectures that the intuitive feeling of an 
external reality, when said to accompany the sensations)is 
a superfluity and unnecessary entity. But, all the same, 
side by side with these resemblances between Hamilton and 
Ferrier, there is one striking difference: namely, that 
whereas Ferrier tries to use his version of the "inverse 
law" against Brown, Hamilton never tries to use his 
corresponding doctrine against Brown, and indeed tends to 
regard it as, in a way, compatible with Brown's position. 
(Hamilton's lectures, Vol. 2, p.104: "The distinction 
between perception proper and sensation proper though 
recognised as phenomenal by philosophers who hold the 
doctrine of a representative perception, rises into reality 
and importance only in the doctrine of an intuitive 
perception"). 
Now in order to understand why Hamilton and Ferrier 
are not here unanimous in their treatment of Brown, it is 
necessary to take note of the great difference between their 
respective versions of the lqw of inverse ratio. For this 
purpose, it will be sufficient to take what we have called 
the extreme cases - the case where perception accompanies and 
predominates over sensation, and the case where perception 
is lost and only sensation remains. Now the typical 
extremes for Ferrier, as our quotation shows, are the 
experiences of the glutton and the epicure, and the 
difference between the two is best brought out if we think 
of them as both eating the same food. That is, the 
difference between them may be said to consist in this: 
that, while the same or very similar tastes are felt by 
both, in the one case the flavours are not discriminated 
from one another, much less regarded as in some sense 
objectively existing, and the whole attention is absorbed 
in the pleasurable thrill of eatingland in the other case 
the flavours are discriminated and regarded as objective, 
while the thrill of eating, though not neglected, is given 
proportionately less attention. On the other hand, the 
typical extremes in the Hamiltonian version of the facts 
are those of ordinary visual experience and of bedazzlement. 
But obviously the extremes here are not related in the 
previous case. In the experience of bedazzlement, there 
is no doubt absorption in the sensation, accompanied by a 
failure to discriminate colours and coloured shapes and to 
regard them as objective, but in this case the failure to 
have perceptions arises not through any lack of attention, 
but simply because there are no colours or coloured shapes 
to perceive - the experience being one of blinding light. 
But this being so, it is obvious that Hamilton's view 
of the relation of sensation and perception, despite his 
"inverse law" is, at bottom, more like Brown's view than 
Ferrier's. According to Brown, the relationship between 
sensation and perception is a causal relationship; when 
certain sorts of muscular strains are felt, the intuition 
of an external reality always in fact arises, and when other 
sorts of muscular strains are felt (those occurring, for 
instance, when I move a limb freely) no such intuition 
occurs. But so also in Hamilton's case, the relation is 
also causal: certain kinds of visual expression contain an 
objective element as well as a subjective element, and, in 
that case, I regard the objective element (the visible 
shape defined by the co- existence of colours) as independently 
existing, whereas other kinds of visual experience, like 
that of blinding light, contain no objective element, and 
hence prevent the rise of the notion of independence. On 
the other hand, according to Ferrier, the relationship 
between sensation and perception is not a causal relationship 
at all. The inverse variation of sensation and perception 
is, for Ferrier, an undoubted fact, but this inverse 
variation, in his estimation, takeSplace altogether 
independently of what is given in experience; that is to 
say, a similar experience may, in one man, constitute a 
perception and in another man a sensation. In other words, 
on the subject of inverse ratio, Ferrier agrees not with 
Hamilton, but with Maine de Biran. "The more eminently 
animal the sensation would be, the less it would have the 
true character of a human perception" (Maine de Biran, 
quoted in Hamilton's Reid, Vol. 2, p.888; it is likely that 
Ferrier was shown the volume Cousin sent Hamilton in 1834). 
Let us now see what exactly Ferrier takes the relation 
of sensation to perception to be. "But does Othe philosopher 
of minds now ask us to redeem our pledge, and to inform him 
what it is that takes place between "matter" and "me" (matter 
presenting 7(5,t.ry as it always does, in the shape of a 
sensation)? Then we beg to inform him that all that takes 
place, between them is an act of negation, in virtue of which 
they are what they are; and that this act constitutes that 
link (or rather J.in ) between body and mind, which many 
philosophers have sought for, and which many more have 
declined the search of, out of despair of ever finding it" 
(Vol. 2, pp. 179, 180). 
But what does he mean by "unlink "? That is the 
vital question, and the following passage will make his 
intentions clearer. "Thy consciousness (in childhood) 
was faint in the extreme, for as yet thou hadst but slightly 
awakened to thyself; and thy sensations and desires were 
nearly all absorbing. Carry thyself back still further 
into days yet more "dark with excess of light ", and thou 
shalt behold, through the visionary mists, an earlier time 
when thy consciousness was altogether null; a time when 
the discrimination of thy sensations into subject and object, 
which seems so inevitable and ordinary a process to then now, 
had not taken place, but when thyself and nature were 
enveloped and fused together in a glowing and indiscriminate 
synthesis - - -- But thy destiny was to be free; to free 
thyself, to break asunder the chains of nature; - -- and 
thy first step towards this great consummation was to 
dissolve the strong, primary and natural synthesis of 
sensation. In the course of time, then, that which was 
originally one in the great unity of nature became two 
beneath the first great exercise of a reflective analysis. 
Thy sensations are now divided into subject and object; 
that is, thyself and the universe around thee" (Vol. 2, 
Pp. 142, 13)0 
Now what is Ferrier doing here? If we had only the 
Introduction to go by, we could not say, any more perhaps 
than he himself could have said, when he was writing this 
page. However, we have not merely the Introduction, we 
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have also the 1841-43A , and on the basis of these we can say 
quite confidently that Ferrier's theme in this passage is 
the distinction between the act and the object of sense, 
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and that the meaning of his negation, of his unlink, has 
to do, fundamentally, with the question of the ground of 
this distinction. 
For Ferrier, then, sensation proper (to use Hamilton's 
term) is sensation (e.g. visual experience, tactical 
experience) wherein no distinction is drawn between act 
and object of sense, while perception proper is sensation 
after a distinction has been drawn between act and object 
of sense. Accordingly, to get his meaning better, we 
had better consider first what he says about the extreme 
of sensation, and then how he approaches the question of 
the transformation of sensation into perception. 
Now in pure sensation, we are aware, Ferrier insists 
of nothing but the given. "These sensations are, like all 
other changes in man's given existence, purely passive 
in their character. They are states of suffering, whether 
the suffering be of pleasure, or of pain, or of an 
indifferent cast. There is nothing in them except their 
own contents, and these are derivative. In the smell 
of a rose, for instance, there is nothing present except 
the smell of the rose. In a word, let us turn and twist, 
increase or diminish any sensation as we please, we can 
twist and turn it into nothing but the particular sensation 
that it is" (Vol. 2, p.173, 17L1). 
Now in order tosee what Ferrier is driving at here 
let us look at a passage he wrote on the same theme in 1861 
where the doctrine implic it in the above passage is set 
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forth with all possible lucidity. "The characteristics 
of sensation are two fold. First, it is either pleasurable 
or painful; secondly it is individual and particular. Of 
the first of these points little requires to be said. Sorne 
degree of pleasure or of pain is involved in all our 
sensations. It may be thought that some of them are neutral 
or indifferent. But this indifference seems either to be 
a mixture of pleasure and pain in which these balance each 
other, or else it is a state of tranquillity brought about in 
some other way. But in whatever way the tranquillity which 
looks like indifference is brought about it is still a 
pleasurable condition. Or if the state of apparent indiffer- 
ence be a state of ennui and satiety, in that case, it is a 
condition of pain. A sensation which was absolutely 
indifferent to us would be no sensation; it would not be 
felt at all. All sensations, then, even those which seem 
to be indifferent, involve either pleasure or pain as their 
constant and inseparable ingredient." (The passage is 
interesting as being the longest one in either Ferrier or 
Hamilton on a theme rather important for both of them). 
"The second characteristic of sensation" Ferrier continues, fa ", 
'Is thwt it is strictly individual or particular. By this, 
I mean that - -- a sensation has no general or indefinite 
confines. Hence no sensation and no series of sensations 
can ever carry the being who experiences them out of and 
beyond himself. He is tied dorm by sensation and confined 
exclusively to himself. Not a hairsbreadth beyond his own 
sentient states can the creature experiencing his own 
sensations travel. His condition is one of utter and 
entire isolation. No sensations, transform them as we 
may, can ever transport a being beyond the limits of 
itself ". (Lectures and Remains, Vol. 2, pp. 507 -509). 
Now Perrier has two points to make here. The first 
of these is a development of Hamilton's doctrine that 
experience is never indifferent. That is to say, the 
purely sensational state is a complex state, involving 
on the one hand awareness of smell or colour, according 
to the sense in question, and on the other hand the 
feelings pleasurable or painful attendant on these colours 
or smells. Moreover, these two aspects may be discrimin- 
ated from one another, or may not be discriminated from 
one another, but even if the discrimination be made, the 
state remains purely sensational so long as one is aware 
of nothing but the given, and perception does not arise, 
since perception, by definition, involves awareness of the 
not -given. 
But let us be more precise. Suppose one's only 
sense is that inherent in the mouth and palate, and 
suppose, too, one gets only one kind of food, 'Ä:á°i that one 
could not discriminate the taste from the feeling, so long 
as one's state of health remained constant. Now suppose 
an illness struck one without one's being conscious of its 
Oncoming - and,of course, as one's experience is solely 
gustual, one would know nothing about one's health until 
feeding time came round - then in one's first experience of 
food, one would be conscious of the taste as the same, but 
of the attendant feeling (nausea) as different, and the 
comparison of the new experience with the old one would 
make one aware of one's experiences as a complex of two 
elements. Even so, however, - to come now to Ferrier's 
second and main point - one would still be in no position 
to discriminate the feeling as subjective and the taste 
as objective, ice. one would have no grounds for regarding 
the taste as in some way existing in the food, whether it 
is being eaten or not, since to know about that one would 
have to be aware of things as existing when not given in 
sense. Accordingly, in this sensational state, the tastes, 
though discriminated from the pleasures or pains accompanying 
them, would be equally regarded as feelings, and, in the 
absence of the knowledge of the external world, would not 
be regarded as interesting on their own account. Hence 
the state as a whole would be one of absorption in oneself, 
and, in this way, the experience would always be the sort 
of glutton's experience. 
But now let us go to the other state - that of 
perception, and see what Ferrier says of it. The question 
here is what is involved in awareness of the feelings 
(pleasures or pains) as subjective, and the colours etc. 
as objective and the distinctive contribution of Ferrier 
on this subject is discernible in sentences like this. 
"This act of negation, breaking up the great natural unities 
of sensation, at once displaces the various modifications 
of man's given existence, and by a necessary consequence, 
places the being that was not given, namely the 'I' of 
humanity." Now Ferrier's point here is not very clear, 
but roughly speaking, it would seem to amount to this: that 
the subjective- objective distinction involves the notion of 
a beyond, of a not -given, but that the beyond in question 
is a "beyond which is within us" - "Must not this fact (of 
consciousness) and the man himself be held transcendent 
to this object, and incapable of being objectified or 
conceived of as an object ?" (Vol. 2, p.59). 
Ferrier, however, was well aware of the difficulties 
involved in laying claim to the conception of anything 
beyond the given, and indeed Hamilton had already managed to 
make the point at issue pretty clear. "The first and 
highest ground on which it may be held that the object 
immediately known in perception is a modification of the 
mind itself is the following. "Perception is a cognition 
or act of knowledge; a cognition is an immanent act of mind; 
but to suppose the cognition of anything external to the 
mind, would be to suppose an act of mind going out of 
itself, in other words, a transeunt act, but action supposes 
existence, and to act out of self is to exist out of self, 
which is absurd." (Lectures, Vol. 2, p.1l8,. Accordingly, 
since Hamilton had spoken out on this subject, Ferrier 
contents himself with putting the same point in a more 
intelligible way. "Can a man overstep the limits of himself - 
of his own consciousness? If he can, then the reality of 
the external world is indeed guaranteed, but what an 
insoluble contradiction is here - that a man should overstep 
the limits of the very nature which is his, just because 
he cannot overstep it." (Vol. 2, p.382 - this quotation is 
not from the Introduction, but the second 1843 article). 
However, it will be well to pause here for the 
purpose of making clear just what the problem of the 
external world was for Hamilton and Ferrier. In fact, the 
form the question took derived, as might be expected, from 
Brown. That is to say, the question as to whether the 
object of perception - the coloured shape, the solid 
shape - is a modification of mind, is simply the question 
as to whether there is any foundation for the common sense 
notion of pains as not distinct from the act of feeling, 
but of coloured shapes as being distinct from the act of 
seeing. Accordingly the task Ferrier set himself was 
to inquire into what an act of sense might be. 
The first intimation of the result of Ferrier's 
attempt to observe the facts of perception afresh comes in 
his 1814 article. "The distinction which lay at the 
foundation of the older philosophies is not to be rejected 
and set aside altogether. Unless we make some sort of 
discrimination between our perceptions and outward objects, 
no consciousness or knowledge would be possible. This 
principle is one of the laws of human thought. But we 
allow it only a relative validity. It gives us but one 
half of the truth. We deny that it is an absolute, final 
and permanent distinction, and we shall show that, if by 
one law of intelligence we constantly separate the subject 
and the object, so by another law we as constantly blend 
them into one. It is this latter law that is now to 
engage our research. 
"We shall illustrate our point by first appealing 
to the sense of sight. Light or colour is the proper 
objective of this perception. That which is called, in 
the technical language of philosophy, the objective, is 
the light; that which is called, in the same phraseology, 
the subjective, is the seeing. Let us begin with the 
consideration of the objective - light. It is very easy 
to say that light is not seeing. But, good reader, we 
imagine you will be considerably puzzled to think light 
without allowing the thought of seeing to enter into the 
thinking of it" (Vol. 2, pp. 269 -271, abbreviated). 
Now it is important to understand exactly the "law" 
Ferrier proposes as valid in the present case. The 
question he raises is, of course, whether one can think 
of colours existing unseen, of "flowers born to blush 
unseen ", and the principle of the answer he returns is 
simply that, so long as we confine ourselves to visual 
experience, it is impossible to think of colour divorced 
from seeing, because, of course, confined as we are to 
visual experience we have no notion whatever as to what 
light and colours are like when they are not seen. 
He then goes on to point out that what happens in 
the case of sight, happens in the case of each of the 
other senses. "hat holds good with regard to sight and 
hearing holds good with regard to all our other perceptions. 
The moment when the objective part of any one of them is 
thought, we are constrained by a law of our nature which 
we cannot transgress to conceive as one with it the 
subjective part of the perception. We think objective 
weight only by thinking the feeling of weight. We think 
hardness, solidity and resistance, in one and the same 
thought with touch or some subjective effort." 
Here let us pass to the first of the 1843 articles, 
beginning with a passage which summarises the main point 
of the 1841 article. "Let us begin by supposing that 
man is a mere 'power of seeing'." In that case, "the 
Seeing Power, the Seeing Act, and the Seen Things coexist 
in a- synthesis in which there is no interval or discrimin- 
ation - - -- In mere vision, the sight and its objects 
cling together in a union or synthesis Which no function 
of that sense, and no knowledge imp rted to us by it (and 
according to the supposition, we havé, as yet no other 
knowledge) can enable us to discriminate or dissolve. 
But man is not a seeing animal. He has" Ferrier continues, 
introducing a quite new point, "other senses besides. He 
has, for example, the sense of touch, and one of the most 
important offices which this sense performs is to break up 
the identity of cohesion which subsists between sight and 
its objects. And how? We answer, by teaching.'us t 
associate vision in general or the abstract condition 
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regulating our visual impression, with the presence of 
a small tangible body we call the eye, and vision in 
particular, or the individual sensations of vision (i.e. 
colours) with the presence of immeasurably larger bodies 
revealed to us by touch and tangibly external to the 
tangible eye" (Vol. 2, pp. 366 -368). 
Now guided by this illustration, Ferrier goes on 
to propound the other half of his law - i.e. the law 
regulating the separation between act and object of sense. 
"Here we may hazard an observation, which, simple as it is, 
appears to us to be new, and not unimportant in aiding us 
to unravel the mysteries of sensation: which observation 
is, that, in no case whatever, does my sense inform us 
of the existence of its appropriate organ, or of the 
relation which subsists between that organ and its objects, 
but that the interposition of some other sense is invariably 
required to give us this informatión" (Vol. 2, p.366). 
He goes on to illustrate this point in the following 
way. "It would not be difficult to show that, as, on the 
one hand, distance is not involved in the original 
intuitions of sight, so, on the other hand, proximity is 
is not involved in the original intuitions of touch; but 
that, whit it is touch which establishes an interval 
between the organ and the objects of sight, it is sight 
which establishes no interval between the organ and the 
objects of touch. Sight thus pays back every fraction of 
the debt it has incurred to its brother sense. This is 
an interesting subject, but we can only glance at it here" 
(Vol. 2, p.366 - unfortunately, he never takes up the 
subject again). 
It would seem, then, that the principles regulating 
the blending and the separation of the subjective and of 
the objective ought to amount, in Perrier's opinion to 
something like this. No distinction between sight and its 
objects can be drawn in a purely visual experience, and 
no distinction between touch and its objects can be drawn 
in a purely tactual experience - that is the law of 
blending. On the other hand the law of separation is 
that an experience combining both sight and touch permits 
a distinction to be drawn between the act of sense and the 
object of sense in either case. 
But here of course the question will arise as to 
whether this second principle does really enable us to 
effect the separation which the first principle prevents. 
In order to disentangle properly the sight, for example, 
from the colours, one would have to be able, so the first 
law says, to be aware of colours existing unseen. But 
now after a fashion this new law does seem to make possible 
this very thing, at any rate to the extent of allowing us to 
conceive of our tangible but invisible eyes as having colours 
- the conception being validated here by some kind of analogy, 
which it would be hard to deny. If, however, it is now 
proper for us to regard these utterly and permanently 
invisible objects as being coloured, it is certainly also 
proper for us to regard other relatively and temporarily 
invisible objects as coloured, and in this way the identity 
between sight and its objects dissolves away. 
Ferrier does develop this latter point to some 
extent in his second 1843 article, in the part quoted in 
connection with his solution of the problem common to 
himself and Hamilton. Unfortunately he does not try to 
work out the position full;; in regard to vision, and, still 
more unfortunately, he does not try to apply the analogous 
thesis to the case of touch. And yet, it would seem that, 
if this kind of point has any validity in regard to vision, 
it ought also to have validity in regard to touch. That is 
to say, if one can begin to introduce the notion of colour 
existing unseen by reference to the colours of the tangible 
but invisible eyes, one could also begin to introduce the 
notion of bodies being solid while remaining unfelt, by 
reference to the case of seeing the organ of touch as it 
presses on the object which it tactually explores. 
It is not easy to understand why Ferrier did not 
push his speculations this length. Perhaps the cause is 
that he became aware of our having some ability to discover 
our organs of touch with the help of one another. At any 
rate, in the discussion of touch in the second 1843 article, 
the standpoint adopted no longer involves the view expressed 
in the earlier article of that year that Sight is necessary 
to uncover the relation of the objects to the organ of 
touch, but rather seems to imply the view, originating with 
Condillac, adopted by Adam Smith and propounded by Ferrier's 
own uncle Professor Wilson in Blackwood's, Vol. 40, p.328 
in 1836, that touch can by itself reveal the relation of 
its objects to its organs. "When the obstacle to the 
body's motion takes place, from its touching not another 
object, but itself, then the double sensation thus produced 
(i.e. when two of one's limbs press against one another), 
compared with the single sensation which arises when the 
impeding object is external (i.e. when a single limb touches 
a foreign body), must very much quicken and confirm its 
apprehension of the existence of things unconnected with 
its own body" (Blackwood's 1836, loc. cit.). Such is 
Professor Wilson's account of our tactual knowledge of 
alien bodies as external to our own, and Ferrier' s account 
would seem to be similar. "In the finger points more 
particularly, and generally, all over the surface of the 
body, the touch manifests itself not only as that which 
apprehends hardness, but as that which is itself hard. 
The sense of touch vested in one of its own sensations 
(our tangible bodies, namely) is the sense of touch brought 
within its own sphere. It comes before itself as one 
sensation of hardness. Consequently all its other sensations 
are necessarily excluded from this particular hardness; and 
falling beyond it, they are, by the same consequence built 
up into a world of objective reality, of permanent substance, 
altogether independent of the sense, self- betrayed as a 
sensation of hardnesstt (Vol. 2, p.399). 
All the same, it is a pity Ferrier's speculations, 
instead of taking this turn, did not proceed to explore 
further his original law. For one thing, the fact he now 
relies on - that the organs of touch to some extent reveal 
one another - would seem to be a special case of the fact 
he relied on before - that the organ of one sense and the 
organs of another sense reveal one another, and the 
relationship of the one fact with the other calls for 
exploration. For another thing - and this is the 
important one for the business in hand - sight reveals 
one fact about the relation of the organ of touch to 
objects of touch which touch itself cannot reveal; this 
fact, namely, of the relationship of the hand, outstretched 
on its own account, and untouched by any other limb of the 
body, to the objects it touches. But, in the absence of 
information about this fact, and similar facts, touch does 
not supply sufficient information to permit its having a 
full ordinary understanding of the relation of its organs 
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to external bodies, and, in particular, supplies no means 
of information about the existence of its organs which they 
are in the state of being unfelt solids. Accordingly, 
while touch by itself in a certain sense reveals foreign 
bodies as being external to our own body, and so reveals 
independence, it cannot apparently enable us to form the 
idea of a solid existing unfelt, and accordingly does not 
furnish us with the sort of independence required for the 
problem of the distinction between act and object of 
touch. 
However, Ferrier did not pursue this promising 
speculation. Instead, he finishes the second 181.3 article 
by stating that the great law of sensation is this - the 
senses are not merely presentative, i.e. they not only 
bring sesations before us, but they are self- presentative 
i.e. they bring themselves before us as sensations. 
Apparently, he had, even then, set aside the earlier and 
clearer version of his law where the vital fact is said 
to be that the senses present one another. 
Ferrier never discusses the matter again, but it 
would appear from his one passing reference that he stuck 
to the 184.3 position of the senses presenting themselves. 
"We must suppose Dr. Reid to have held that we apprehend 
material things without apprehending anything else at all. 
If that position could be established, it would at once 
establish both the independent existence of matter and a 
doctrine of intuitive perception. But the position is 
one which runs counter to every law of human knowledge, 
both contingent and necessary. Whenever we know material 
things, we are cognisant of our own senses (sight and 
touch) as well; it thus runs counter to the contingent 
laws" (Institutions of yIetaphysics, p. 493, 494). 
Oddly enough, in condemning Reid here, Ferrier 
is, in a way, condemning his own earlier formulation of the 
°'contingent" law. Reid's defence of common sense just as 
much as Ferrier's defence of common sense, centred on the 
fact that the sense- organs don't present themselves, but 
only things other than themselves. However, Ferrier was 
by that time (185L1.) probably not interested seriously in 
this range of problemat all. 
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that the distinction can't be founded on experience and hence 
can't be justified at all, and -eici. ?,ho argues that the 
distinction must be justifiable, and can, in some -oe.rti,^l 
way, be shown to rest on experiences which have escaped 
Hume's notice. But on this question as to whether the dis- 
tinction can be justified by fefere-r_ce to experience, Hume, 
Ferrier insists, is obviously right and Reid is wrong,, 
and, accordingly, if the distinction is to be justified, 
it will be necessary to find some new,hitherto unnoticed 
mode of justificati on, and, in order to do this, we must, 
Perrier concludes, go into the business of phenomenolo,r , 
in a more thorough way than either of them did. 
The embrogli Q between Hume and Reid, says Ferrier, 
"provethat there must have been some flaw in the original 
observation of the facts of perception." (Vol.?., Pp.11, 12). 
Ferrier, then, regards his t ask as being that of the 
justification of a common sense distinction, regards the 
method appropriated for the purpose as that of self -obser -' 
vation or introspection, and his only difference from his 
predecessors 1 lies in this : that he expëcts the facts 
crucial for the solution of the problem to be out of the 
way facts, too familiar to common sense to be dexcribeble 
in colloquial language. Accordingly he sets out in search 
of a fact of this kind, and, by 1843, he thinks he has 
'Reid, however, is at one with Ferrier on this point, th.oumh 
the latter did seem to know this. 
found it in "the o;redual steps by which each men is led 
to appropriate his own. body." - -- "To entitle a person 
to claim a hu;1<: n body as his own, it is not enough th.e t he 
Should find. it in the same wey in which he finds his other 
sensations, namely, a.s impressions_ that interfere not 
with the manifestation of one another. This is not enough, 
even though, in the case supposed, the person should.be the 
first finder. A subsequent finder would have the preference 
if able to show that the particular sensations manifested 
n.s this humen body were essential to his apprehension of 
all his other sensations whatsoever." (Vol. 2, P.402). 
However, to elucidate the common sense distinction in 
question, it is not sufficient to explain the empirical. 
difference between our own bodies and foreign bodies, it is 
also necessary to eliif44txtjthe foundation of our belief in, 
so to speak, the existence of unsensec sense data.. But now 
it is in this part of the -Problem that Ferrier suffers his 
great set -back, the nature of which becomes pretty evident 
in his last discussion of vision. It is touch, not sight, 
he begins, that reveals the empirical given existence of the 
organ of sight. Now of course this fact, though not without 
importance, does not take us beyond sense. However, "some- 
what less directly (than touch) and by the aid of the imac- 
rot 
ination, the sight operates the sane retraction (pardon .. n 
the coinage) upon itself. It represents (i.e. imagines) it- 
self, in its organ, as a minute visual sensation, out of 
max and beyond which, are left lying the great range of all 
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its other sensations" i.e. the riven_, present sensations 
(Vol.2, .391). Now this visual retrotrecti on is, Ferrier 
believes, a fact, an observed fact, and a fact, moreover, 
of a sort that mives us the transcendence of sense we 
are looking for. The difficulty, however, is to explain 
and elucidate this fact, i. e. to explain how this indirect 
visual awareness of the eye can be justified by reference 
to tactual experience, reason and imagination, and s.rhiL _ 
Ferrier is aware of this difficulty, and mentions it et least 
three times, he makes no attempt to solve it and tries to 
make light of it. 
Here then, we probably have the obstacle which stopped 
:L?errier's progress. But it is perhaps not an inseparable 
obstacle, and Ferrier, in oulestime.tion would have been in 
a fair way to overcome it, if he had conti need to keep in 
view the thesis of the complementariness of sight and 
touch that he had propounded in the other article written. 
earlier in the same. year. At any rate, a move of this ?Lind, 
though it would have doubtless produced fresh difficulties 
of its own, would have enabled him to argue that the cor- 
relation of the data of sight and of touch with one another 
would sake possible a kind of simultaneous inference, hard 
to elucidate but -probably justifiable, to the existence 
both of one's invisible eye as a. colour, and of one's impal- 
pable hand as a solid. 
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